Revisiting the Military Strategy - Zafar Hilaly
While history teaches us that Afghans are fickle allies, our own experience shows that the Taliban are infinitely more so. To look to a people as shallow as them to provide ‘strategic depth’ is foolhardy
Unless military plans and strategies are constantly revisited, revised or replaced, they become dated and predictable, making it easier for the enemy to plan its response. In the initial days of the 1965 conflict with India, Iskander Mirza, then in exile in London, rang up our high commissioner to ask, “Why has our armour not been launched as yet?” When the latter responded that he had no clue, Mirza remarked, “Find out. That’s been the plan since day one. Our entire strategy hinges on it.”
Indeed, the plan had been around since the early 1950s, when Mirza was in charge, and long enough for the Indians to know or guess what was in store. Hence, when the predictable thrust did take place, India flooded the battlefield miring our tanks which, as they were unaccompanied by infantry, made easy targets. This mistake cost us victory rather than the controversial draw in which the war ended.
“The military mind,” said Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch, “always imagines that the next war will be on the same lines as the last. That never has been the case and never will be.” Perhaps that is why ‘strategic depth’ continues to form an integral part of our military strategy notwithstanding the bashing it has taken for being flawed and unrealistic ever since it was first propounded by Mirza Aslam Beg two decades ago.
Nor do the slight changes in the present version of the doctrine amount to much. Whereas Beg had envisaged ‘solid’ allies like the mujahideen ruling Afghanistan and rendering it off limits to India, we are now ready to accept a regime in Kabul that is merely ‘friendly’ and ‘well disposed’ to us. But, as the only conceivable Afghan regime which could be remotely friendly or well disposed towards Pakistan is the Taliban, the change is more apparent than real. What is novel in the current version is the distinction between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, namely, the Afghan variety, which we host and the local one, which we fight. Actually, that is not so new either; we had our favourites among the mujahideen too.
While history teaches us that Afghans are fickle allies, our own experience shows that the Taliban are infinitely more so. To look to a people as shallow as them to provide ‘strategic depth’ is foolhardy. Whatever the Haqqani clan, for which we are currently rooting, are promising, they will break instantly for a greater return. That is how it has always been in Afghanistan.
Why then persist with the ‘strategic depth’. So much has changed since the 1980s. The UAE and Saudi Arabia can no longer be counted as Taliban allies. NATO, Russia and China are loath to letting the Taliban/mujahideen enjoy the dominance they did prior to 9/11. It is time to return to normal diplomacy, mutual interests (oil and gas pipelines) and landlocked Afghanistan’s need of Pakistan as a friendly neighbour for external trade and commerce than persist in a scatter-brained concept that never made sense in the first place and has outlived its utility, if it ever had one.
Actually, ‘strategic depth’ is a ‘made for India’ doctrine. Hence, recently, when terrorism rather than India was thought to be the more threatening danger, some felt happy that finally the penny had dropped. But no, we have been informed that India remains the greatest threat on the grounds that we judge our enemies by their ‘capability’ rather than ‘intention’.
Because there is fat chance that India will never dilute or degrade its military capability, India has other fish to fry, the litmus test that we have devised means that we will be continually striving to ward off India and equipping ourselves accordingly, even though it is terrorism that has accounted for 2,300 of our soldiers over the past two years and is being visited daily on society.
That aside, let us consider if the test of ‘capability’ has been correctly applied. If, in seeking our destruction India ensures its own, is not India far less ‘capable’ than we make out? And, was that not what the acquisition of nuclear capability promised and delivered? And, if that promise was a false one or has not delivered, why was it proffered as a panacea for the Indian threat? Either we were wrong when we claimed nuclear weapons were the answer, or are wrong now when we act as if they are not. Such questions raise doubts about the efficacy of our strategies and a whole lot more about the motives of some.
Clearly, the time has come for some fresh thinking. No one should have a vested interest in endlessly pursuing confrontation with India except perhaps those in India who wish to send us to the grave. Nor can we treat India as an eternal enemy. We have issues, including water, to discuss with India, which requires a paradigm shift in our flawed approach. It is time to get real.
A review of strategy is also necessary because we cannot afford the nearly $ 6 billion presently earmarked for defence. (Even if India is spending $ 40 billion annually, it is less than three percent of its GDP). It is an enormous sum for an impoverished state, especially when expenditure on the social sector is already abysmally low and is prohibitive when we consider post-flood requirements.
Unless military plans and strategies are constantly revisited, revised or replaced, they become dated and predictable, making it easier for the enemy to plan its response. In the initial days of the 1965 conflict with India, Iskander Mirza, then in exile in London, rang up our high commissioner to ask, “Why has our armour not been launched as yet?” When the latter responded that he had no clue, Mirza remarked, “Find out. That’s been the plan since day one. Our entire strategy hinges on it.”
Indeed, the plan had been around since the early 1950s, when Mirza was in charge, and long enough for the Indians to know or guess what was in store. Hence, when the predictable thrust did take place, India flooded the battlefield miring our tanks which, as they were unaccompanied by infantry, made easy targets. This mistake cost us victory rather than the controversial draw in which the war ended.
“The military mind,” said Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch, “always imagines that the next war will be on the same lines as the last. That never has been the case and never will be.” Perhaps that is why ‘strategic depth’ continues to form an integral part of our military strategy notwithstanding the bashing it has taken for being flawed and unrealistic ever since it was first propounded by Mirza Aslam Beg two decades ago.
Nor do the slight changes in the present version of the doctrine amount to much. Whereas Beg had envisaged ‘solid’ allies like the mujahideen ruling Afghanistan and rendering it off limits to India, we are now ready to accept a regime in Kabul that is merely ‘friendly’ and ‘well disposed’ to us. But, as the only conceivable Afghan regime which could be remotely friendly or well disposed towards Pakistan is the Taliban, the change is more apparent than real. What is novel in the current version is the distinction between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, namely, the Afghan variety, which we host and the local one, which we fight. Actually, that is not so new either; we had our favourites among the mujahideen too.
While history teaches us that Afghans are fickle allies, our own experience shows that the Taliban are infinitely more so. To look to a people as shallow as them to provide ‘strategic depth’ is foolhardy. Whatever the Haqqani clan, for which we are currently rooting, are promising, they will break instantly for a greater return. That is how it has always been in Afghanistan.
Why then persist with the ‘strategic depth’. So much has changed since the 1980s. The UAE and Saudi Arabia can no longer be counted as Taliban allies. NATO, Russia and China are loath to letting the Taliban/mujahideen enjoy the dominance they did prior to 9/11. It is time to return to normal diplomacy, mutual interests (oil and gas pipelines) and landlocked Afghanistan’s need of Pakistan as a friendly neighbour for external trade and commerce than persist in a scatter-brained concept that never made sense in the first place and has outlived its utility, if it ever had one.
Actually, ‘strategic depth’ is a ‘made for India’ doctrine. Hence, recently, when terrorism rather than India was thought to be the more threatening danger, some felt happy that finally the penny had dropped. But no, we have been informed that India remains the greatest threat on the grounds that we judge our enemies by their ‘capability’ rather than ‘intention’.
Because there is fat chance that India will never dilute or degrade its military capability, India has other fish to fry, the litmus test that we have devised means that we will be continually striving to ward off India and equipping ourselves accordingly, even though it is terrorism that has accounted for 2,300 of our soldiers over the past two years and is being visited daily on society.
That aside, let us consider if the test of ‘capability’ has been correctly applied. If, in seeking our destruction India ensures its own, is not India far less ‘capable’ than we make out? And, was that not what the acquisition of nuclear capability promised and delivered? And, if that promise was a false one or has not delivered, why was it proffered as a panacea for the Indian threat? Either we were wrong when we claimed nuclear weapons were the answer, or are wrong now when we act as if they are not. Such questions raise doubts about the efficacy of our strategies and a whole lot more about the motives of some.
Clearly, the time has come for some fresh thinking. No one should have a vested interest in endlessly pursuing confrontation with India except perhaps those in India who wish to send us to the grave. Nor can we treat India as an eternal enemy. We have issues, including water, to discuss with India, which requires a paradigm shift in our flawed approach. It is time to get real.
A review of strategy is also necessary because we cannot afford the nearly $ 6 billion presently earmarked for defence. (Even if India is spending $ 40 billion annually, it is less than three percent of its GDP). It is an enormous sum for an impoverished state, especially when expenditure on the social sector is already abysmally low and is prohibitive when we consider post-flood requirements.
The Soviet Union’s wonderful battlements did not prevent it from collapsing, nor will ours at this rate. Besides, at the moment the nation needs to address the issues of economic bankruptcy, poor governance and terrorism and not obsess about an attack that is likely to prove as lethal for the aggressor as its victim.
We need a strategy, which, while enabling Pakistan to resist localised Indian thrusts, would draw a line beyond which war would be inevitable. The Rubicon, as it were, cannot keep shifting or else there is the danger that we may not react when we should, or over-react when there is no need. Ambiguity and uncertainty is inadvisable when it comes to laying down markers that may decide the very existence of countries.
Meanwhile, the military could profitably ponder whether ‘strategic depth’ - utilising the Taliban to seal off Afghanistan from India and treating India as the eternal enemy - are workable or desirable goals. Knowing that, if nothing else, the doctrine is a powerful psychological barrier for improving relations with India and plays into the hands of ‘hawks’ of both sides
We need a strategy, which, while enabling Pakistan to resist localised Indian thrusts, would draw a line beyond which war would be inevitable. The Rubicon, as it were, cannot keep shifting or else there is the danger that we may not react when we should, or over-react when there is no need. Ambiguity and uncertainty is inadvisable when it comes to laying down markers that may decide the very existence of countries.
Meanwhile, the military could profitably ponder whether ‘strategic depth’ - utilising the Taliban to seal off Afghanistan from India and treating India as the eternal enemy - are workable or desirable goals. Knowing that, if nothing else, the doctrine is a powerful psychological barrier for improving relations with India and plays into the hands of ‘hawks’ of both sides
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