Nepal – fast becoming ISI Control Centre?By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

 11 May , 2018

On the night of April 17, 2018, a pressure cooker bomb went off outside the Indian Consulate office in Nepal’s Biratnagar, damaging the wall of the premises. Biratnagar is the industrial capital of Nepal and six km north of the border of Bihar. The explosion happened at around 8:20 pm and caused a hole in the compound wall. According to Nepalese media, the investigating officers suspect cadres of a local political group caused the blast; of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) that is banned by  US Treasury since 2012 and is getting support from the ISI.
Nepal for years has been haven for ISI operations. Radicals and jihadis from India have been escaping into Nepal.
This incident was followed by another incident on April 29, 2018, when suspected Jihadi elements targeted office of Arun-III, a 900 MW hydropower project in Sankhuwasabha being developed by India’s Sutlej Jala Vidhyut Nigam. The attack on the power station came a time when Nepalese government was preparing to host Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was to lay the foundation stone for the project jointly with Nepalese PM KP Sharma Oli in second week May 2018. No one claimed responsibility for the blast.
The Project Development Agreement (PDA) for Arun-III was signed between India and Nepal on November 25, 2014 during Modi’s visit to Nepal. The project is expected to bring in USD 1.5 billion foreign direct investment into Nepal,  create jobs for thousands of Nepalese, and come into operation by 2020. The State Bank of India is investing Rs 8,000 cr in the project. On completion of the project, Nepal will get 21.9% of the total electricity produced in a year, and 197 MW electricity with 86 cr units will be free for Nepal every year.
Nepal for years has been haven for ISI operations. Radicals and jihadis from India have been escaping into Nepal. Conversely, ISI-sponsored terrorists have been frequenting into India via Nepal though the open borders for terrorist acts including targeting our trains and the railway network.  Recently, in January 2018, our intelligence agencies had provided Nepal details of five suspected terror-facilitators operating from Biratnagar and Kathmandu that were also involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking and counterfeit Indian currency.
The curious case of retired Pakistani Lt Col Mohammad Habib who went missing in Nepal during April 2017 is highly suspicious. Retired in 2014, he was offered a job by the UN at Lumbini at a salary package of $3500-8500 per month. He reportedly flew into Kathmandu where he was received by one Javed Ansari who provided Habib with a   Nepalese mobile sim-card. Habib then reportedly flew to Lumbini, messaged home he had reached his destination and then vanished.
It is well known that ISI cells active in Kathmandu facilitate visas for terrorists to move in and out of the country before planning sabotage operation.
There are too many questions here that remain unanswered: was Habib ISI agent; who is Javed Ansari who received him in Kathmandu and provided local sim-card to him – is Javed also part of the ISI network;  did Javed accompany Habib to Lumbini; did Habib apply for the UN job in Lumbini merely to get free air ticket and excuse to get into the Terai Region of Nepal; on arrival by air from Kathmandu to Lumbini, who received him at the airport – did the UN not arrange his reception, if so, who received him, and finally; did Habib dump the lucrative UN job to coordinate ISI operations in the Terai Region of Nepal? More the mystery remains unresolved including of Javed Ansari (which may be cover name), more the reason to believe, Habib was on covert mission. It is well known that ISI cells active in Kathmandu facilitate visas for terrorists to move in and out of the country before planning sabotage operation.
Organizations in Nepal like Tehfuzul Madrasa are safe houses that Pakistan’s ISI and LeT has been using for sleeper cells for targeting India; lie low, regroup, arrange material and funds before planning an infiltration into Indian territory. Pakistani Prime Minister SK Abbasi’s visit to Nepal in early March 2018 needs to   be seen in context of not only a well-oiled network in Nepal giving protection to ISI-backed terrorists, but becoming a “Control Centre” as per the Intelligence Bureau.
The disappearance of Pakistani Lt Col Mohammad Habib could well imply his positioning as the overall in-charge of ISI operations in Terai Region, which fits into his forsaking the lucrative UN job in Lumbini. Group these developments with the long-term plans of Mao Zhedong, whose Ministry of Foreign Liaison embedded and the Maoists movement in Nepal, carefully nurtured over the years by successive Chinese governments, Maoists rise, revolution, and takeover of Nepal, underscoring the strategic success of China. Take this further to the ISI-supported CPN, Communist China’s hard and soft power ingress into Nepal and Oli government’s willingness to let Nepal be subsumed by China, and you have a potent hybrid threat forming, particularly at the sub-conventional level.
In dealing with India, aims of China and Pakistan coalesce – to limit India’s strategic space, keep it confined to South Asia, keep India’s development retarded (as possible), and grab as much Indian Territory. It will be prudent to acknowledge that the red carpet rolled out to Prime Minister Modi at Wuhan is temporary relief till the China-US economic war subsides – whatever time it takes.
Chinese media in recent past threatening it could destabilize the northeast if India pressured Pakistan on Kashmir should make it amply clear.
As far as China is concerned, the possibility of linking trade, investment and commerce with territorial claims (however illegal) just does not exist.  Examining China-Taiwan and China-Japan relations should not leave any doubts in this aspect. The proactive sub-conventional asymmetry built by Chinese intelligence and Pakistan’s ISI vis-à-vis India is substantial in favour of the former two. This is not going to recede in any manner, and will continue to be applied, given its nature of being incremental and ambiguous  – even though we may not link the killing of five LeT-HM terrorists in Kashmir Valley and simultaneous abduction of seven Indian engineers working on a power project in Baghlan Province of Afghanistan by Pakistan-supported Taliban. How active Chinese intelligence has been in India’s northeast and in Myanmar needs no reiteration.
Chinese media in recent past threatening it could destabilize the northeast if India pressured Pakistan on Kashmir should make it amply clear. Most importantly, it is the capabilities that need to be kept in focus, not the intentions which can change any time. In this context, the danger is much more at the hybrid and sub-conventional levels.  Nepal’s MoU with China for drilling oil in Terai and such-like other projects will bring Chinese intelligence to the area, which is already ISI infested.
Significantly, about 97% of the Muslim community of Nepal (numbering 12,77,492 – some 4.4% of total Nepalese population) live in the Terai region, while the other 3% are located mainly in the city of Kathmandu and the western hills. According to a 2017 report, quoting Khorshid Alam, head of Nepal’s Islamic Society, some 100,000 Nepalese have converted to Islam over past 15 years and the number is expected to rise (https://www.timesheadline.com/world/conversion-islam-growing-nepal-7551.html). It is not the Muslim population per se that matters but how many the ISI (in conjunction Chinese intelligence) could radicalize and use against India. This also must be viewed in conjunction demographic changes in J&K, where the focus is more on Rohingyas, radicalization of Bakarwals and radical influx in Jammu region, but Ladakh is ignored. Ladakh, where Muslim population was traditionally Shias has seen steady influx of Muslims from the Valley, particularly in Dras-Kargil areas.
What must to be kept in mind is the ISI activities in Nepal and Kashmir Valley, and how the changing demography can be exploited by them.
Nepalese youth in considerable numbers come to Ladakh for employment by the Army as porters. They are young and handsomely paid for hauling loads up the mountains to Army posts. They are permitted to marry Muslim girls (mostly by families that have migrated from the Valley) provided they first convert to Islam. This has been happening past decade plus.
Interfaith marriages are not new to Ladakh and Buddhist-Muslim marriages were common even in ancient days, especially after the King of Skardu gave the hand of his daughter to the Buddhist King of Hunder in Ladakh. Many personnel of Ladakh Scouts too have Muslim wives who were free to continue practicing their own religion even after marrying, albeit such marriages abated after the 1971 Indo-Pak War. What must to be kept in mind is the ISI activities in Nepal and Kashmir Valley, and how the changing demography can be exploited by them. There is clear and present danger.

Steve Coll’s ‘Directorate S’ is about how ISI was allowed to succeed in blocking the United States’ efforts to impose a stable, democratic order in Afghanistan.

In plain black ink, below the embroidered letterhead of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, were words designed to deter as effectively as his nuclear weapons. Threats had been made, it recorded, that any act of terrorism against the United States emanating from Pakistan “will warrant a direct action by the United States against Pakistan”.
“The consequences of such a scenario for overall security in the region are not difficult to predict,” it went on. “We must do anything and everything possible to avoid such a catastrophe.”
“No more!”, President Donald Trump tweeted on New Year’s day. “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit”. “They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan”.
But the letter, revealed by author and journalist Steve Coll in ‘Directorate S’, his account of the failure of the United States’ 9/11 war in Afghanistan, was written in 2010—years before Trump’s threat. Coll’s lushly detailed account investigates the decision-making processes that led Afghanistan into the murderous warfare it is now mired in—and helps understand why Trump’s strategy may achieve little.
In spite of its title, ‘Directorate S’ isn’t, in fact, about Directorate S—the Inter-Services Intelligence wing responsible for covert action in India or Afghanistan. It is about something arguably more significant: precisely why, and how, Directorate S was allowed to succeed in blocking the United States’ efforts to impose a stable, democratic order in Afghanistan. There are few villains, and no heroes, in Coll’s account. Like all good historians, he seeks instead to understand why the actors in this tragedy behaved as they did.
From the outset, Coll’s account shows, Pakistan attempted to deflect responsibility for the attacks from itself, and its client regime in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. President Pervez Musharraf asserted that “al-Qaeda could not have done this”. “They live in caves,” he explained to the United States ambassador in Islamabad, Wendy Chamberlain. “They don’t have the technology to do something like this.”
Major-General Tariq Majid, Musharraf’s military intelligence chief, suggested investigating Cold War era Marxists, like the Red Army Faction, and even Pakistani exiles in Bolivia.
In the immediate wake of 9/11, much of the United States’ intelligence community saw the ISI as a key strategic partner. Central Intelligence Agency chief George Tenet’s argument ran thus: “The enemy is Al Qaeda; we need Pakistan’s army and ISI to dismantle Al Qaeda; and Pakistan’s stability and interests are at least as important to the United States as Afghanistan’s recovery from Taliban rule.”
Robert Grenier, the CIA’s station chief in Islamabad, argued that Pakistan was indeed willing to partner with the United States. The ISI’s post 9/11 chief, Lieutenant-General Ehsan-ul-Haq, he wrote in one top-secret cable, represented a new, moderate leadership that was “motivated to cooperate fully with the CIA in the war on terrorism”.
From the outset, though, there were sceptics. Gary Schroen, the CIA’s ranking expert on Afghanistan, attacked Grenier, saying the “push to allow the Pakistanis back into the Afghan game was disturbing and a real mistake”. “They had their own specific agenda for the country and it did not track with anything the U.S. government would want to see emerge there in the post-Taliban period.”
Evidence in support of Grenier’s argument wasn’t hard to come by. For example, journalist Ahmed Rashid found the Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah “living openly in a village outside Quetta”. Leaders of the provincial government, and top jihadist leaders, even attended a lavish family wedding.
Later, Coll writes, Afghan intelligence and the CIA jointly provided the ISI with the details of the locations of top Taliban leaders inside Pakistan, some of whom were under surveillance. “Within forty-eight hours, all of them moved,” Coll writes. “The Americans watched them disappear”.
Why did Pakistan act as it did? Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s President, met with General Kayani to address this issue.
“The heart of Kayani’s offer to Karzai,” Coll records, “was ‘We can help you sort out the insurgency, we can turn it off’”. In exchange, he writes, Pakistan would expect an end to Indian influence in Afghanistan.
But Indian influence in Afghanistan was minimal—and Pakistani offered other, more plausible explanations to its United States interlocutors. “The CIA’s drone war was driving the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Haqqanis into closer cooperation, particularly in North Waziristan, the ISI feared,” Coll writes. Kayani argued that “this was dangerous for both Pakistan and the United States”.
Increasingly, the ISI knew, even elements of loyal jihadist clients like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad were turning against Islamabad—a consequence of the forces unleashed by the fighting in Afghanistan. Moreover, with a steady flow of revenue from narcotics, Afghan jihadists were increasingly independent of the ISI. The answer, from Pakistan’s optic, was to install the Taliban back in Kabul—either alone, or as part of a coalition—thus breaking up the emerging jihadist challenge.
Hoping this end would also facilitate the United States’ exit from the Afghan war, President Obama authorised an ambitious secret outreach to the Taliban, led by the German diplomat Michael Steiner (later his country’s ambassador to New Delhi) and veteran peacemaker Richard Holbrooke. Though promising much, their efforts failed: the Taliban couldn’t, or wouldn’t, make peace on terms that were offered, and what they wanted was certain to provoke a savage backlash from minorities in Afghanistan, like the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras.
In the end, Holbrooke became deeply pessimistic about his own project: “The best that can be hoped for is a bloody stalemate,” he said, privately. “Moreover, as far as I can tell, one constant about counter-insurgency: It does not work against an enemy with a safe sanctuary, and I do not believe we can get Pakistan to see its strategic interests as being symmetrical with ours.”
Things have moved on little in the years since then. Kabul is shortly to begin its own outreach to the Taliban, but few believe it has real chance of success. The reason is simple: the Islamist insurgents believe they can wait out the United States, which will sooner or later cut loose the Afghan state. Even if the Taliban do accept a peace deal, moreover, it is far from clear if it draws in local commanders enriched by extortion and narcotics revenues, as well as new forces like the Islamic State.
Larger lessons for regional stability and peacekeeping, too, emerge from the book. From the work of Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam, we know the United States has struggled in wars from Korea to Vietnam, and in finding the numbers needed for counter-insurgency—a form of warfare that needs massive numbers of forces to prevent the insurgents from reoccupying territory. The situation today is bleak: ‘The Long War Journal’ estimates the Taliban hold 97 districts, up from 70 a year ago.
Afghanistan’s army was expected to fill the gap, but just doesn’t have the numbers. The Afghan National Army is authorised 195,000 personnel, and the Afghan National Police another 157,000—a total of 352,000—to guard a 652,864 square kilometre nation, much of it rugged mountains with extremely poor road connectivity. India, by contrast, uses an estimated 325,000 troops, backed up by some 85,000 police and 7,000 central police, to protect the 42,241 square kilometre Kashmir and Jammu divisions.
The United States, Coll observes sharply, has ultimately failed to resolve fundamental questions.
“Did they truly believe that Afghanistan’s independence and stability was more important than Pakistan’s stability”, he asks. “Why did they accept ISI’s support for the Taliban even when it directly undermined American interests and cost American lives? If they were to try to stop ISI’s covert action, what risks were they prepared to take?”
Coll makes no simple prescriptions: there are none. Yet, he has flagged exactly the right questions. How much pressure ought be mounted on Pakistan to cut off the Taliban, and what might the consequences of military pressure, covert action or economic sanctions be? Should pressure fracture the Pakistani state, after all, the price of peace in Afghanistan might be a far larger crisis in nuclear-armed Pakistan.
Though ‘Directorate S’ does not address the Pakistan Army’s own motivations—and those of the ISI—there is a wealth of literature that explains why it will not easily abandon its sponsorship of jihad in Afghanistan or elsewhere. As both C. Christine Fair and Husain Haqqani have pointed out, the Army sees itself as the praetorian guard of an ideological project—as the vanguard of the Islamic state. The jihadist project is not simply a matter of projecting power, but also of the state’s fundamental values.
‘Directorate S’ deserves careful reading—not just by all those who wish to understand why the region is where it is, but Indian policy-makers. Now seeking to coerce Islamabad into reining in its sponsorship of jihadists both by diplomatic pressure and covert action, New Delhi needs to clearly understand the consequences of its actions, as well as the limits of coercion.