TRIBUTE TO OSAMA BIN LADEN

ओसामाचे पुण्यस्मरण शिरीष पारकर Monday June 20, 2011 ओसामा बिन लादेनच्या मृत्यूनंतर जगभर छापून आलेल्या प्रतिक्रिया खोट्या होत्या. आत त्या घटनेला महिना उलटून गेलाय. त्यानिमित्त थोर अरेबियन संत मा. ओसामा बिन लादेन यांच्या निधनाबद्दल व्यक्त झालेल्या या ख-याखु-या प्रतिक्रिया...मोडून पडला संसार मोडला नाही कणा
बंदुकीवर हात ठेऊन फक्त लढ म्हणा
तुझी आठवण आली नाही, असा एकही दिवस गेला नाही. तीस वर्षांपुर्वी तू फुलवलेल्या दहशतवादाच्या रोपट्याचे आज एका वटवृक्षात रुपांतर झाले याचा आम्हाला अभिमान वाटतो. या पुढे आयुष्यातील प्रत्येक क्षण आम्ही तुझी आठवण काढून तुझ्या रक्तरंजित मार्गावर चालण्याचा प्रयत्न करू...ठोsss ठोsss ठोsssआपले नम्र, तालिबान, अल-कायदा, आय. एस. आय., सिमी, लष्करे तोयबा, हिजबुल मुजाहिद्दीन, जैश-ए-मोहम्मद, हमास आणि जगभर विखुरलेल्या अतिरेकी संघटना. सच्चा मित्र हरपला आता जगण्याला काहीच अर्थ राहिला नाही. मा. ओसामा यांच्या जाण्याने अमेरिकेच्या लष्कराचा तसेच पेन्टेगोनचा सच्चा मित्र हरपला. जागतिक दहशतवादामुळे अमेरिकेतील शस्त्रास्त्राच्या कारखान्यांना चांगले दिवस आणल्याबद्दल अमेरिका मा. ओसामा यांचे कायमचे ऋणी राहील. ९/११ च्या हल्ल्ल्यापेक्षाही हा धक्का मोठा आहे हे निश्चित.मा. जॉर्ज डब्लू.बुश. (माजी अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपती)जबतक सुरज चांद राहेगा ओसामा तेरा नाम रहेगा माझे तर डोकेच चक्रावले आहे. एक तर ओसामा गेल्याचे दु:ख आणि वर ओसामाचे बील पण माझ्यावरच फाटले. मला मिडीयाचे एक कळत नाही की ओसामानंतर माझा नंबर आहे तर मी कशाला ओसामाला मारून माझा पहिला नंबर (मरायला) लावेन. पण दहशतवाद या शब्दाची जादू इतकी की कोण कुठला सौदी मधला लादेन, मी इजिप्तचा दाउद भारताचा, पण अमेरिका विरोधातून एकत्र आलो. यालाच विविधतेमध्ये एकता असे म्हणतात. त्या नापाक हिंदूस्थानातील शोले चित्रपटातील ‘ये दोस्ती हम नाहे तोडेंगे’ हे गाणे म्हणजे आमचे ध्येय धोरण होते. ओसामाने आपल्या वडिलोपार्जित संपत्तीवर पाणी सोडले, दाउदने स्मगलिंगवर पाणी सोडले आणि मी तर डॉक्टरी पेशावरच पाणी सोडले. मला आमच्या या सर्व लोकांचे कौतुक अशासाठी वाटते की एक, दोन, तीन, नाही तर किमान तीस चाळीस दहशतवादी संघटनाना आम्ही जन्म दिला. डॉ. अल जवाहिरी (अल कायदा नं. २ आणि आता नं. १) अमेरिकेने घाई केलीओसामाच्या जाण्यामुळे एक मोठे प्रश्नचिन्हच माझ्यापुढे उभे राहिले आहे. भारतातील पाच राज्यांच्या निवडणूकांमुळे मुस्लीम मतांच्या करीता ओसामाच्या मृत्यूवर टीका पण करता येत नाही. खंरं म्हणजे ओसामा वैगेरे मंडळी चांगली होती त्या डेम्बीस आय.एस.आय ने त्याला आमच्याविरुद्ध फितवले. अमिरीकेनेपण घाईच केली. आम्ही बघा कसाबची आणि अफजल गुरुची कशी छान बडदास्त ठेवलेय. आतापर्यंत आम्ही भारतात दाउदविषयी प्रश्न विचारले की सांगत होतो की अमेरिका जर दुस-या देशात घुसून मुल्ला ओमर, अल जवाहिरी व ओसामाला पकडू शकत नाही तर भारताला कसं काय शक्य आहे. आता मात्र दाउदकरीता हालचाल करावी लागणार हे निश्चित. मनमोहन सिंग (पंतप्रधान – भारत )हे असे व्हायला नको होतेओसामा बीन लादेन आमच्या देशातच मारला गेल्यामुळे आमची पंचाईत झालीय खरी पण आमच्या मुल्ला मौलावीम्ना आम्ही पटवून देतोय की हे सर्व सीआयए आणि रॉ चे कारस्थान आहे कारण ओसामा हा अमेरिकेचा अथवा भारताचा शत्रू असेल पण पाकीस्तानचा तो नुसता मित्रच नव्हे तर तारणहार होता. १९८० च्या दशकात अफगाणीस्थानातील तालीबानांमुळे तसेच १९९० च्या दशकात सौदी अरेबीया मुळे आणि गेली दहा वर्षे ओपरेशन ओसामामुळेच पाकीस्तानला भरघोस आर्थिक मदत मिळून लंगडत का होइना पाकिस्तानी अर्थव्यवस्था तगली हे ओसामाजींचे श्रेय मानावेच लागेल. जागतिक दहशतवादाचे प्रेरणास्थान हे पाकेस्तानाची नवी ओळख म्हणजे, "बदनाम हुवे तो क्या हुवा नाम तो हुवा है" या म्हणीप्रमाणे आहे. आमचे राष्ट्रपती श्री आसिफ आली जरादारीसाहेबांचे सासरे श्री झुल्फेकार आली भूत्तो यांच्या म्हणण्यानुसार, ‘आम्ही (म्हणजे अर्थात पाकिस्तानी) हजार वर्षे गवत खाऊन उपाशी राहू पण दरवर्षी १०० अणुबॉम्ब नाक्केच बनवूच... इन्शाल्ला
-युसुफ रजा गिलानी (वजीरे आम पाकिस्तान
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IMAGINARY INTERVIEW WITH OSAMA BIN LADEN

Read this gem from The Dawn, Pakistan. Hail these astute minds who have the astounding ability to make fun of themselves even amidst national calamity...a great art indeed! Indian journalism looks so insipid compared to this..."

Copy this link and read the imaginary but very interesting interview with OBL.

<<http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/05/dead-man-and-the-sea.html>>

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KILLING PAK JOURNALIST

WAS SALEEM SHAHZAD ON TRAIL OF ISI MEN BEHIND  OBL’S STAY AT ABBOTTABAD?

B.RAMAN

The brutal murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief of Asia Times Online, is unlikely to be solved satisfactorily by the investigating agencies of Pakistan.


2. Shahzad went missing on the evening of May 29,2011, while going to the Islamabad studio of a private TV news channel and his car with his dead body was reportedly found at a place about 150 kms from Islamabad on May 31. His body reportedly had torture wounds, indicating he had been severely tortured in order to extract information from him.


3. What was that information? Who was interested in that? The widely believed suspicion in Pakistan is that the information sought to be extracted from him through torture must have had a bearing to the first part of a despatch which he had sent to Asia Times and was carried by it on May 27.


4. This related to the daring attack by some terrorists on PNS Mehran, the base of the Naval Air Arm of the Pakistan Navy, at Karachi on the night of May 22 during which the terrorists destroyed two US-supplied Orion maritime surveillance aircraft which were being used by the Navy to patrol the sea to prevent any Al Qaeda attack on ships bringing logistic supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan.


5. The responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known. It said that it carried out the attack to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden during a raid by US naval commandos at his hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2 ,2011.


6.The investigation into the attack by the local police has not yet made much progress. However, the arrests of some suspects in Karachi and Lahore, including an ex-naval commando of the Special Services Group (SSG), who was allegedly sacked 10 years ago on disciplinary grounds, have been reported.


7.Shahzad did not appear to have believed in the claim of the TTP. His enquiries indicated that the attack was carried out by the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commando of the Special Services Group (SSG), which operates from North Waziristan as an affiliate of Al Qaeda.


8. Shahzad said in the first part of his investigative report: “Asia Times Online contacts confirm that the attackers were from Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade, the operational arm of al-Qaeda.” He alleged that “Al-Qaeda carried out the brazen attack on PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi on May 22 after talks failed between the navy and al-Qaeda over the release of naval officials arrested on suspicion of al-Qaeda links.”


9. He had also indicated at the end of the first part of his despatch that the second part would cover “the recruitment and training of militants.”


10.He was the only Pakistani journalist to have visited the headquarters of the 313 Brigade in October 2009 at the invitation of Ilyas Kashmiri. One of the purposes of Ilyas’ invitation was to disprove rumours then circulating in Pakistan that Ilyas had been killed in an American Drone (pilotless plane) strike in South Waziristan in September,2009.


11. Subsequently, after the terrorist attack on the so-called German Bakery in Pune in February 2010, Shahzad was in receipt of a message purporting to be from Ilyas indirectly hinting that the 313 Brigade had a role in the Pune attack. Shahzad had written about it in Asia Times.


12. Shahzad was thus well-informed on the activities of the 313 Brigade and Ilyas Kashmiri. He was reportedly the only Pakistani journalist with good contacts in the 313 Brigade.


13. Who killed him--- the ISI as it is widely suspected in Pakistan or the 313 Brigade or the two acting in tandem? Next to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the 313 Brigade has the closest contacts with the ISI. By virtue of his former association with the SSG, Ilyas is believed to have a network of contacts in the Army, the SSG and the ISI.


14. It is apparent that Shahzad was killed either because of what he reported in his despatch of May 27 regarding the penetration of the Navy by Al Qaeda or because of what he intended reporting about the training camps of the 303 Brigade.


15. Thus both the ISI and the 313 Brigade had a common motive for having him eliminated. Was their decision to eliminate him only related to his story on the Mehran attack or was there more to it? Whoever took the decision to eliminate him was in a desperate hurry. He was kidnapped within 48 hours of the first part being published. He would have most probably despatched the second part in the week beginning May 30. His captors wanted to do away with him before that.


16. Well-informed contacts in the Pakistani Police say that his kidnapping and murder were related not only to his investigation into the Mehran attack, but also his investigation into the local support base of OBL which facilitated his undetected stay for over five years at Abbottabad. His investigations post-May 2 were dangerously moving in that direction. His discovery of the penetration of the Navy by Al Qaeda was only the first step in his investigation. According to these police sources, he was digging deeper into OBL’s support base.


17. To have waited till he found out the details would have been suicidal for the ISI. The Police sources suspect that the ISI joined hands with the 313 Brigade to eliminate him before he made any progress in the matter.


18. The “real” truth will never be known just as the “real” truth behind the murder of Murtaza Bhutto in Karachi in 1996 and behind the murder of Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi in 2007 was never known.


19. People will be arrested and prosecuted, but they will not be the real perpetrators. The history of Pakistan is full of such instances of mysterious elimination of inconvenient people. Shahzad is the latest to join the ranks of such mysteriously eliminated people. He has paid with his life for daring to look into two incidents which the ISI wanted to be covered up---the Mehran attack and the stay of OBL at Abbottabad

US OPS IN PAK

HARE, HOUND & INDIA

By

Shankar Roychowdhury

“We’re telling the Americans: you have to trust the ISI or you don’t. There’s nothing in between”
— ISI to American media in Washington (New York Times, April 12, 2011)
So, did the Americans finally trust the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), at least at some level, for the coup de grace which eliminated Osama bin Laden on May 2?
Given the steadily worsening state of US-Pakistan relations, this would seem highly improbable at first sight, but how else to explain what appears to be a flawlessly-executed American heliborne operation at Abbottabad, a historic garrison town deep inside the Pakistani heartland, and home to the Frontier Force Regiment of the Pakistan Army?
What explanations, amongst others, can be offered for the total lack of reaction from the local Pakistani garrison even as a noisy heliborne intrusion, followed by an hour-long firefight got under way at a compound which must have been designated as a super-sensitive, specially-protected target? Or did the local garrison receive instructions to see nothing, hear nothing and do nothing even as the attack unfolded before their eyes and ears?
Bin Laden was an enemy of India, so no tears need be shed over his demise, in this country at least. In fact, it can be speculated that with his diminishing operational utility, Bin Laden might well have become a suitable pawn of sufficient symbolic significance to be offered to the Americans as quid pro quo for their withdrawal from Afghanistan, a country which Pakistan considers to be within its sphere of influence, region of strategic depth, and gateway to Central Asia.
US President Barack Obama, too, due for re-election in 2012, wishes desperately to pull America out of Afghanistan before the body-bag count brings out larger numbers of anti-war protesters and tilts the anti-incumbency scales further against him.
Bin Laden’s demise has created a win-win situation for both, the US as well as Pakistan. Mr Obama can now claim, with a substantial degree of justification, that 9/11 has finally been avenged on his watch, an achievement which will undoubtedly pay handsome dividends to the Democrats in the forthcoming presidential campaigns.
The watershed moment signalled by the Pasha-Panetta talks in Washington on April 11, between ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha and Leon Panetta, current grey eminence in the Central Intelligence Agency (and by all accounts the next defence secretary of the United States), has come full circle. Pakistan had, in effect, announced at this meeting that it was taking over the steering wheel in the war in Afghanistan, taking charge of the end game to shape it to its own interest when the Americans depart.
Discussions between intelligence agencies never find their way into the public domain, but the agenda here was leaked extensively by the ISI, with the aim of making it clear that it would henceforth place its own agenda first, and operate on its own terms and priorities, whether in Afghanistan or anywhere else.
Pakistan had demanded that the future scope of the CIA-ISI activities must be formally defined and the CIA drastically reduce its activities in the country, particularly its drone operations, except with prior concurrence of the Pakistan Army. In addition, over 300 CIA operatives functioning inside Pakistan (allegedly 40 per cent of the strength) were to be withdrawn.
The ISI tries hard to control America’s Af-Pak policy, giving very limited leverage to the United States with the Pakistani power centres in the ISI and military establishment.
So when Pakistan’s demand for cessation of drone strikes against militants was rejected by the US, especially in respect of North Waziristan, Pakistan turned the screws in retaliation, by almost summarily expelling CIA personnel from airfields at Shamshi, Jacobabad and Pasni in Balochistan, which had been made available earlier by President Pervez Musharraf’s government as operational bases for the CIA’s force of Predator drones. Drone operations from Pakistani territory, a key component in the American strategy against Taliban, are likely to be severely affected as a result, if not terminated altogether.
The elimination of Bin Laden has to a great extent restored America’s position as senior partner in the US-Pakistan relationship. If necessary, the US can now publicly wash its hands off the whole process, pick up its marbles and go home with a justified sense of victory.
India on its part must now very carefully examine how the fallout from the Washington meeting will square off against Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s effusive bonhomie towards Pakistan. The Mumbai terror attacks of 26/11 are being pushed into oblivion, and it remains to be seen how India’s latest gambit of cricket diplomacy will reconcile with the revelations made in a Chicago court by Tahawwur Hussain Rana and Daud Gilani, aka David Coleman Headley.
There is a strong revival of radical Islam in Pakistan, and any surface calm brought about by Dr Singh’s unilateral initiatives is superficial, even deceptive.
The currents of fanaticism and hatred towards India run deep in Pakistan, even amongst the common people, most recently seen in the mass demonstrations in support of Mumtaz Qadri, the bodyguard and assassin of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab who was murdered on January 4 this year. This was followed by the murder of the minority affairs minister Shahbaz Bhatti on March 2 by assassins who still remain untraced.
India on its part must never be lulled into a false sense of complacency by the elimination of Bin Laden. There should be no doubt that India will continue to remain the primary long-term target of the ISI regardless of the latter’s current preoccupations in Afghanistan. The ISI is confident it can handle both.
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament

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GOOD ARTICLE

The Bin Laden Operation: Tapping Human Intelligence

By Fred Burton

Since May 2, when U.S. special operations forces crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border and killed Osama bin Laden, international media have covered the raid from virtually every angle. The United States and Pakistan have also squared off over the U.S. violation of Pakistan’s sovereign territory and Pakistan’s possible complicity in hiding the al Qaeda leader. All this surface-level discussion, however, largely ignores almost 10 years of intelligence development in the hunt for bin Laden.

While the cross-border nighttime raid deep into Pakistan was a daring and daunting operation, the work to find the target — one person out of 180 million in a country full of insurgent groups and a population hostile to American activities on its soil — was a far greater challenge. For the other side, the challenge of hiding the world’s most wanted man from the world’s most funded intelligence apparatus created a clandestine shell game that probably involved current or former Pakistani intelligence officers as well as competing intelligence services. The details of this struggle will likely remain classified for decades.

Examining the hunt for bin Laden is also difficult, mainly because of the sensitivity of the mission and the possibility that some of the public information now available could be disinformation intended to disguise intelligence sources and methods. Successful operations can often compromise human sources and new intelligence technologies that have taken years to develop. Because of this, it is not uncommon for intelligence services to try to create a wilderness of mirrors to protect sources and methods. But using open-source reporting and human intelligence from STRATFOR’s own sources, we can assemble enough information to draw some conclusions about this complex intelligence effort and raise some key questions.

The Challenge

Following the 9/11 attacks, finding and killing bin Laden became the primary mission of the U.S. intelligence community, particularly the CIA. This mission was clearly laid out in a presidential “finding,” or directive, signed on Sept. 17, 2001, by then-U.S. President George W. Bush. By 2005 it became clear to STRATFOR that bin Laden was deep inside Pakistan. Although the Pakistani government was ostensibly a U.S. ally, it was known that there were elements within it sympathetic to al Qaeda and bin Laden. In order to find bin Laden, U.S. intelligence would have to work with — and against — Pakistani intelligence services.

Finding bin Laden in a hostile intelligence environment while friends and sympathizers were protecting him represented a monumental intelligence challenge for the United States. With bin Laden and his confederates extremely conscious of U.S technical intelligence abilities, the search quickly became a human-intelligence challenge. While STRATFOR believes bin Laden had becometactically irrelevant since 9/11, he remained symbolically important and a focal point for the U.S. intelligence effort. And while it appears that the United States has improved its intelligence capabilities and passed an important test, much remains undone. Today, the public information surrounding the case illuminates the capabilities that will be used to find other high-value targets as the U.S. effort continues.

The official story on the intelligence that led to bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound has been widely reported, leaked from current and former U.S. officials. It focuses on a man with the cover name Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, a Pakistani Pashtun born in Kuwait who became bin Laden’s most trusted courier. With fluency in Pashto and Arabic, according to media reports, al-Kuwaiti would be invaluable to al Qaeda, and in order to purchase bin Laden’s property and run errands he would also need to be fluent in Urdu. His position as bin Laden’s most trusted courier made him a key link in disrupting the organization. While this man supposedly led the United States to bin Laden, it took a decade of revamping U.S. intelligence capabilities and a great deal of hard work (and maybe even a lucky break) to actually find him.

The first step for U.S. intelligence services after Bush’s directive was focusing their efforts on bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership. Intelligence collection against al Qaeda was under way before 9/11, but after the attacks it became the No. 1 priority. Due to a lack of human intelligence in the region and allies for an invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA revived connections with anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan and with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate in order to oust the Taliban government and accrue intelligence for use in disrupting al Qaeda. The connections were built in the 1980s as the CIA famously operated through the ISI to fund militant groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet military. Most of these links were lost when the Soviets withdrew from the Southwest Asian state and the CIA nominally declared victory. Pakistan, left with Afghanistan and these militant groups, developed a working relationship with the Taliban and others for its own interests. A coterie of ISI officers was embedded with different militant groups, and some of them became jihadist sympathizers.

U.S. intelligence budgets were severely cut in the 1990s in light of the “peace dividend” following the fall of the Soviet Union, as some U.S. leaders argued there was no one left to fight. Intelligence collection was a dirty, ambiguous and dangerous game that U.S. politicians were not prepared to stomach. John Deutch, the director of the CIA from 1995 to 1996, gutted the CIA’s sources on what was known as the “Torricelli Principle” (named after then-Rep. Robert Torricelli), which called for the removal of any unsavory characters from the payroll. This meant losing sources in the exact kind of organizations U.S. intelligence would want to infiltrate, including militants in Southwest Asia.

The CIA began to revive its contacts in the region after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. While the U.S. intelligence community was looking for bin Laden at this time, he was not a high priority, and U.S. human-intelligence capabilities in the region were limited. The United States has always had trouble with human intelligence — having people sitting at computers is less of a security risk than having daring undercover operatives running around in the field — and by the end of the 1990s it was relying on technological platforms for intelligence more than ever.

The United States was in this state on Sept. 12, 2001, when it began to ramp up its intelligence operations, and al Qaeda was aware of this. Bin Laden knew that if he could stay away from electronic communications, and generally out of sight, he would be much harder to track. After invading Afghanistan and working with the ISI in Pakistan, the United States had a large number of detainees who it hoped would have information to breach bin Laden’s operational security. From some mix of detainees caught in operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan (particularly with the help of the ISI), including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Farj al-Libi, came information leading to an important bin Laden courier known by various names, including Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. (His actual identity is still unconfirmed, though his real name may be Sheikh Abu Ahmed.)

The efficacy of enhanced interrogation and torture techniques is constantly debated — they may have helped clarify or obfuscate the courier’s identity (some reports say Mohammed tried to lead investigators away from him). What is clear is that U.S. intelligence lacked both a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of al Qaeda and, most important, human sources with access to that information. With the United States not knowing what al Qaeda was capable of, the fear of a follow-on attack to 9/11 loomed large.

Anonymous U.S. intelligence officials told Reuters the breakthrough came when a man named Hassan Ghul was captured in Iraq in 2004 by Kurdish forces and turned over to the United States. Little is known about Ghul’s identity except that he is believed to have worked with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and to have given interrogators information about a man named “al-Kuwaiti” who was a courier between al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda operational commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ghul was then given over to the Pakistani security services; he is believed to have been released in 2007 and to now be fighting somewhere in the region.

While U.S. intelligence services got confirmation of al-Kuwaiti’s role from al-Libi, they could not find the courier. It is unknown if they gave any of this information to the Pakistanis or asked for their help. According to leaks from U.S. officials to AP, the Pakistanis provided the National Security Agency (NSA), the main U.S. communications interception agency, with information that allowed it to monitor a SIM card from a cellphone that had frequently called Saudi Arabia. In 2010, the NSA intercepted a call made by al-Kuwaiti and began tracking him in Pakistan. Another U.S. official told CNN that the operational security exercised by al-Kuwaiti and his brother made them difficult to trail, but “an elaborate surveillance effort” was organized to track them to the Abbottabad compound.

From then on, the NSA monitored all of the cellphones used by the couriers and their family members, though they were often turned off and had batteries removed when the phones’ users went to the Abbottabad compound or to other important meetings. The compound was monitored by satellites and RQ-170 Sentinels, stealth versions of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which were reportedly flown over the compound. According to The Wall Street Journal, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) even built a replica of the compound for CIA Director Leon Panetta and other officials. The NGA is the premier U.S. satellite observation agency, which could have watched the goings-on at the compound and even spotted bin Laden, though it would have been difficult to confirm his identity.

Some of these leaks could be disingenuous in order to lead the public and adversary intelligence agencies away from highly classified sources and methods. But they do reflect long-believed assessments of the U.S. intelligence community regarding its advanced capability in technology-based intelligence gathering as well as the challenges it faces in human-intelligence collection

WATCH ME TODAY AT IBN LOKMAT TV CHANNEL FROM 0930 PM 1000 PM

WILL BE TAKING PART IN  TV DISCUSSION ON AFTER OSAMA & MULLA OMAR WHAT NEXT . NIKHIL WAGLE WILL BE THE ANCHOR

MUST SEE OSAMA VIDEOS

Dear Folks,

This is a series of videos on the US connection with Osama.

Click on the link to view:

OSAMA BIN LADEN Was A BUSH PARTNER & A CIA ASSET Using The Name TIM OSMAN, [1 OF 2]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PAnFtJgDk_0

OSAMA BIN LADEN Was A BUSH PARTNER & A CIA ASSET Using The Name TIM OSMAN, [2 OF 2]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDy8w706680&feature=related

Other related videos can be seen on the you tube page.

--

OSAMA KILLED

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Pakistan

 

The following is the text of a briefing on the recent tragic events in Abbottabad given by the official spokesman to the international media:

 

“How could we not have known where OBL was?  As you know, there are known knowns and unknown knowns.  You do know that, don’t you?  There are things we know we know, like which side of our naan is buttered.  Ghee actually: clarified butter.  We like things to be clarified, which is what we’re doing now.  But there are other things that we don’t know we know.  These are things buried deep in the rubble of our subconscious, like the Mossad agents under the debris of the twin towers they brought down.  So we didn’t know that we knew where OBL was.  Or didn’t know when we were asked if we knew.

 

When we said OBL wasn't in Pakistan we weren't lying. You just don't understand how tough a neighbourhood we live in. None of our borders is settled. Afghanistan claims Pakhtunkhwa, the Indians won't give us Kashmir, we've given up part of the Northern Areas to China. We just don't know where Pakistan begins and where it ends. Honestly. And it’s a canard to say that Britain is girdled by the sea, Pakistan by the C-in-C.  Or that India runs from coast to coast, Pakistan from COAS to COAS. Hindu libels.  OK?  Truth is we didn't know Abbottabad was in Pakistan.

How could we?  Abbottabad? In a pure Muslim country? A town that sounds like an abbey? I ask you. Of course we thought it didn't belong to us.  Would we have kept calling it Abbottabad if we'd known it was ours?   These old colonial names are like pork; we don’t want to put them in our mouths.  We turned Lyallpur into Faisalabad, the Lawrence Gardens into the Bagh-e-Jinnah. We'd have given Abbottabad a good Muslim name, something like Oblistan, if we thought it belonged to us.

 

 

Why did the Pakistan Army have its academy and so many establishments there then? You know how our Army is. It keeps going into places that don't belong to Pakistan. It's a tradition it started in 1947.  Doesn't mean that because the Pakistan Army's there it's part of Pakistan.

But the Americans did find OBL there and kill him and the Pakistan Army was all around him. So how did the Army not know when the Americans did? But of course we knew he was there, but we knew him as Abu Abdullah. If you'd asked us, Do you know where Abu Abdullah is, we'd have told you. You never did. We wonder why. Was it to make Pakistan look bad later?  You didn’t know that he was called Abu Abdullah?  How could you not have known?  You expect us to believe that?

We also thought he was dead. Earlier, well before the Americans arrived. Why? Because over the last five years we've delivered well over 72 virgins to that house. So we thought he'd been martyred already.

 

We didn’t know Abu Abdullah was a Saudi Sheikh.  Crescent my heart and hope to dye, like our President does.  We knew OBL was a Saudi Sheikh, but they only come to Pakistan in the winter to hunt for the houbara.  Bastards in full hawk after bustards.  They don’t go to Abbottabad, they go straight to Rahim Yar Khan, so that’s where we looked out for him.  All the doctors who treat the young boys there the morning after are ISI agents, and have asked each one of them if they felt something holy had entered them the night before.  The Sheikh is, as you know, a holy man.  But, alas, they all said that there was nothing holy about what had been done to them.

 

We thought we’d dropped enough hints about where Abu Abdullah was.   Abu, abbot – the same root. We said he was a holy man, you said he was a bad man, so he was a common oxymoron, a bad holy man.  That’s why we kept him in Abbot-a-bad.  We thought you’d have understood.  Where would you find a malignant evangelist?  Churchill.  A promiscuous prioress?  Nuneaton.  Not our fault if the penny didn’t drop.  Which reminds us: could you spare a dime?

 

Why?  Because we are one of the countries hit hardest by global warming.  That’s what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says, though it’s run by an Indian.  And it’s happening faster than anyone anticipated.  First the Americans warming up with the baniyas, and now seals in Abbottabad.  What next?  We need billions fast.  At least give us the 25 million you put on OBL’s head.  If we hadn’t looked after him, he’d have died shivering in a cave in Tora-Bora, no one would have found him, and you wouldn’t have been able to pull off this stunt.  So be grateful.  That’s all we ask.

 

And now of course you’ve killed him while he was saying his sehri prayers.  Yes, yes, that’s why he didn’t have a gun with him.  You know what this means of course.  The US President has holy blood on his hands.  Obama sin laden.  And then we’re told that OBL was taken out to Carl bin Son and dropped into the sea:  that’s a giveaway.  How can this Carl be the son of his son?  Nonsense.  These last rites carried out in such indecent haste: we know where his body is.  He’s been taken to Canter-bury.  That’s where meddling priests are quickly buried, aren’t they?

 

Of course we saw the helicopters coming in.  Our radar system is the best in the world.  In 1998, just before we tested our bombs, we saw Israeli ground-attack planes on tarmacs in India that no one else could see, and told the UN.  Ask the Indians if you don’t believe us.  So why didn't we shoot the helicopters down? Well you see, like the rest of you, we knew that Will and Kate hadn't announced where they were going to honeymoon, and we thought this might be them coming in on the quiet to give the slip to the paparazzi. Can't blame us, can you? Abbottabad seems like the sort of place that someone who'd just been dubbed the Baron Carrickfergus might wish to escape to.  (They can still come, you know.  There’s a des-res with all the mod-cons that’s just come on the market.  Has its own helipad.  Lovely place to get away from it all.)

 

And of course we knew there was something going on at the compound that night.  You really believe that the ISI wouldn’t know if there was a firefight raging half a mile from our military academy in Abbottabad, even if we thought that it wasn’t in Pakistan.  We had a secure two-way link with Abu Abdullah that the Americans never picked up.  Two empty non-alcoholic beer cans with the tops cut out and tied with string.  So when the Americans came through the door, we heard him yelling “May Day, May Day”.  Why didn’t we help?  Well at first we thought he was stating the obvious; we knew it was May Day.  Then someone said he was probably speaking in Bengali and asking for girls, but it was quite late and we didn’t think we’d find any.

 

Why would he be speaking in Bengali?  Well you know he has had time hanging heavy on his hands, and might have wanted to pick up a foreign language.  Besides, this is the 150^th birth anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore, if you didn’t know, and OBL looked so like him that all the jihadis from Bangladesh would fall at his feet and call him Gurudev.  Maybe, who knows, he’d started to believe that he was a reincarnation.  Utterly Hindu of course, and no wonder he got his just desserts.

Yes, and OF COURSE we picked up the yells of "Geronimo EKIA". You know it's an Indian name. That's what the Americans say. Always knew he was an Indian, that bastard. And you know what the SEALs actually reported, don't you? They said "26/11 Geronimo ne kia". 9/11, 26/11, all Indian plots. Thank god our good friends the Americans now know the truth.  We've known it all along."

LADEN SUPPORTERS IN INDIA

http://epaper.pudhari.com/details.aspx?ID=181024&boxid=181851453&pgno=1&u_name=0

INTERESTING STORY OSAMA DEATH -DO YOU BELEIVE IT

What we all should know

In August 2010 after Pakistani authorities shared intelligence with US about the compound in Abbottabad. US after its own intelligence gathering ascertains that the compound is occupied by Osama’s children. Compound surveillance continues through the next year in anticipation of capturing Osama bin Laden. In January 2011 the young CIA contractor who is give the charge of Pakistan Station Chief works “extra hard” to gather clandestine information related to ISI and Al Qaeda relationship. The contractor, now infamous as Raymond Davis the “American Rambo” receives a call from one of his assets, early morning on January 27 about a high value target. But the asset refuses to lay out details on phone or to leave the Lahore city, where he had gone underground. Raymond Davis hires a rent a car and drives to Lahore, while his security detail follows him in a bullet proof Land Cruiser. Raymond Davis is able to loose his Islamabad’s ISI “detail” by leaving in unmarked rent a car. The ISI agents falling for his trap follow the embassy’s Land Cruiser. Raymond Davis arrives at Lahore one hour earlier than his detail and meets with the asset. The asset gives him some pictures of an intelligence building at Tarbela and recording of a phone call. Listening the phone call Raymond Davis realizes the gold mine he had struck and immediately calls his security detail which had also reached Lahore, knowing if ISI reaches him first, he would not leave Lahore alive.

Next hour when the security car catches up with Raymond Davis, the ISI bosses realizes that Raymond Davis had give them a slip earlier in the morning and in the couple of hours he had in Lahore, he might have got some important information. Resultantly, they put two contractors on his tail. Raymond Davis seeing a tail fears the worse and shoots them both in the back, at a traffic stop, without logically realizing that there was no way ISI could have know what he was holding. His security detail which was close behind rushed to his “rescue” however, by the police had chased and arrested him, while the security Land Cruiser running over pedestrians escapes towards US embassy compound in Islamabad. ISI officers quickly reach the scene and confiscating the memory sticks realize Raymond Davis has unearthed a deep secret which even their immediate bosses didn’t know about. The sensitivity of information rattles the entire echelons of the ISI and even its own officers are sent under house arrest while the relevant cell steps forward. At that time even some of the top intelligence officers of the secretive ISI outside the relevant cell did not know that Osama bin Laden had died and his body was kept frozen at Tarbela. Young Raymond Davis had unearthed the biggest secret of the century, somehow. But now the Pandora’s Box had been opened. Pak top brass knew it had only a few days or weeks at best to capitalize Raymond Davis’ arrest before US get the intel. In the next six weeks Pakistan plugs all leaks related to Osama’s death and makes sure that maximum gains are made for Raymond’s release. However, when Raymod Davis is released on March 16, his debriefing results in a tsunami of US policy, personal agendas and fuelling of political rivalries. Everyone in the US chain of command now wanted to use the information to further personal goals from General Petreaus to President Obama. On March 17, knowing that Pakistan had lost its trunk card General Pervaiz Kayani releases a press statement in which he critically criticize drone attacks, first from him. From then on Pak Military raised its stance against drone attacks, fearing that US now might target its nuclear assets. While in USA politics was at its full swing. General Petreaus wanted to get the buckle for Osama bin Laden’s death on his belt for his future political ambitions, while President Obama wanted the credit to help is sliding popularity. While the tussle continued, the other issue still pending was how to confirm Osama’s death. In the next one month, nearly every week a top US official visited Pakistan, everyone meeting with General Kayani trying to convince him to hand over Osama’s body. While the stance from Pakistan remained, “Osama, Who?” It was a first in the history that so many US top officials had visited and met with a military chief of a foreign country in such a short time. Seeing nothing getting through the top military brass of Pakistan, US started a political and media campaign on the sides to put extra pressure on Pak Military.

Politics within Obama Administration was also at its full swing. Petraeus was pulling all the strings to take the credit, while trying to lay out a plan to get Osama bin Laden’s body out of Pakistan. President Obama on the other hand in one smooth move decided to “promote” Petraeus to the head of the CIA. The news got out in the first week of April that Petraeus was being transferred to the CIA. While at the main front, Obama continued to pressurize General Kayani and General Pasha and one April 5, Obama Administration submitted a report to the Congress that Pakistan government had no clear strategy to triumph over militants. Alongside the report the media campaign against Pak Military and the ISI continued.

The second week of April began with a bang for top Pak Military brass. On April 7, Bruce Riedel, former CIA officer and White House advisor wrote a report arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not only a deterrent to India but also to USA. The obvious had now become clear that Obama Administration has indirectly sent a clear threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The timing of the report was perfect with Centcom Chief Gen James Mattis meeting with General Kayani next day. In the meeting General Mattis asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in capturing Osama bin Laden. This was ironically one of typical Hollywood thriller scene. Pakistan knew that US knew that Pakistan knows that US knows that Osama is dead. But Pakistan continued the naive game of “Osama Who?” while US continued to play the game that “Osama must be captured”. General Mattis leaves with veiled threats and stresses that Pakistan must do more to against the Al Qaeda and Taliban, or indirectly saying that Osama bin Laden must be handed over.

For the ten days US waits and sees how Pakistan responds to the threats, but Pakistan acts by burying its head in the sand – see no evil, hear no evil. Obama Administratio ups the ante and on April 18 on Pakistan’s Geo TV, Adm. Michael Mullen said Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence “has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani Network. That doesn’t mean everybody in the ISI, but it’s there.” Again, international media had its field day against Pakistan’s ISI and its links with Taliban and the ISI. After putting pressure on General Kayani, Adm. Mike Mullen meets with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Khalid Shameem Wynne and General Kayani on April 20. Admiral Mullen again demands indirectly that Pakistan needs to help USA in locating Osama bin Laden. Pakistan’s response was again, “Osama, Who?” Admiral Mullen however, left with another threat that if they came to know about Osama bin Laden’s location they would go ahead and take unilateral action. This is the same message which President Obama repeated in his announcement of Osama bin Laden’s death, when he said, “We will take actions in Pakistan, if we knew where he was.”

In response to continued threats from USA Pakistan starts taking back its air bases from US in an attempt to avoid launching of any operation from its own soil. As a result on April 22 the news appears that Pakistan had taken back Shamsi Airbase back from CIA, US forces. While Obama Administration was pilling pressure on Pakistan, General Petraeus visited Pakistan on April 26 and met with General Kayani openly asking him to hand over Osama bin Laden, otherwise get ready to face the consequences. Same day Washington also critically attacked Pakistan Army’s counter-terrorism efforts. General Petraeus left with a clear message that unless Pakistan hands over Osama, US forces would be forces to take action over Pakistani soil. Pakistani Military knowing that US knew that Osama bin Laden was dead couldn’t understand Obama Administration’s continued stance on capturing Osama bin Laden. General Petraeus left with the ultimatum that either Pakistan handed over Osama or US would get him.

Same day meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) is held at Rawalpindi, one week ahead of schedule at the Joint Staff Headquarters. The top brass discusses the Osama issue and decision is reached to work out the Obama’s strategy leading to continuous threats for capturing Osama bin Laden alive, even after knowing that he was dead. While in Pakistan intelligence community starts using all of its sources to reach to the bottom of US’ demand of capturing Osama bin Laden. On April 28 President Obama signs General Petraeus’ transfer to CIA and next day signs the orders to attack the Abbottabad compounds. Thus Osama bin Laden’s credit is assured to President Obama.

On 29 April after President Obama signed the orders to “bring back” Osama bin Laden, Pakistani security agencies get a report that another order had been signed which had authorized US forces to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear assets, if needed. The report was nothing short of seeing a death angel for the top Pak Military brass.

Seeing the imminent threat, General Kayani tried his last shot when on 30 April 2011 he clearly stated in his Youm-e-Shuhada address: “Pakistan is a peace-loving country and wants friendly relations with other countries and our every step should move towards prosperity of the people. But we will not compromise our dignity and honour for it”. However, it didn’t stop what was about to come 24 hours later.

As night fell on Sunday, 1 May four choppers from a US Afghan base at a low altitude towards its destination in Abbottabad, to the same compound where Osama’s children were in the hiding. Without any detection courtesy of their latest stealth technology and Pakistan’s outdated technology the choppers continued over the Pakistani territory. Ironically, ten years ago a Pak Air force air commodore had raised concern about the outdated radar technology citing that US or worse India could fly helicopters into the country and take out nuclear installations and in reply he was shown the boot while no upgrades to the systems were made.

Anyway, the four choppers made it to the compound in Abbottabad. It is then that Pak Army was notified that they have a choice. Either face an entire barrage of US choppers attacking Pak nuclear assets or hand over Osama’s body. In the meanwhile the small gun battle at the Abbottabad compound continued and to give the drama some authenticity the US forces torched one of their own choppers.  Pressed for time a Pakistani helicopter flew from Tarbela carrying dead body of Osama bin Laden which was stored in a cold storage there. While at Abbottabad Pak Army soldiers encircle the entire area around the compound within five minutes of the start of fire fight. The fire fight continued for 35 more minutes, waiting for the Pakistani helicopter. Once the Pakistani helicopter reached the compound the three US choppers and the Pakistani helicopter flew towards the Afghan border, this time without the need to fly below the radar detection altitude.

Next day, the world woke up to the news that Osama bin Laden was dead and President Obama had delivered wheat President Bush and Dick Cheney couldn’t. But the Pak Military brass did not wake up, because they never slept the night before. Last night they had woken to the realization that US could fly under the radar and take out Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The problem here is that US has the complete inventory of Pakistan’s nuclear assets along with exact locations. It would be a matter of minutes in a country wide operation to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear assets

WHAT OSAMA DID FOR PAK Mother of All Embarrassments

WHAT OSAMA DID FOR PAK Mother of All Embarrassments  Ayaz Amir

    For a country with more than its share of misfortunes and sheer bad luck, we could have done without this warrior of the faith, Osama bin Laden, spreading his beneficence amongst us. He was a headache for us while he lived, but nothing short of a catastrophe in his death. For his killing, and the manner of it, have exposed Pakistan and its security establishment like nothing else.

   To say that our security czars and assorted knights have been caught with their pants down would be the understatement of the century. This is the mother of all embarrassments, showing us either to be incompetent – it can’t get any worse than this, Osama living in a sprawling compound a short walk from that nursery school of the army, the Pakistan Military Academy and, if we are to believe this, our ever-vigilant eyes and ears knowing nothing about it – or, heaven forbid, complicit.

    I would settle for incompetence anytime because the implications of complicity are too dreadful to contemplate.

And the Americans came, swooping over the mountains, right into the heart of the compound, and after carrying out their operation flew away into the moonless night without our formidable guardians of national security knowing anything about it. This is to pour salt over our wounds. The obvious question which even a child would raise is that if a cantonment crawling with the army such as Abbottabad is not safe from stealthy assault what does it say about the safety of our famous nuke capability, the mainstay of national pride and defence?

Barely 24 hours before the Osama assault General Kayani, at a ceremony in General Headquarters in remembrance of our soldiers killed in our Taliban wars, was describing the army as the defender of the country’s ideological and geographical frontiers. For the time being, I think, we should concentrate on ideology and leave geography well alone, the Abbottabad assault having made a mockery of our geographical frontiers.

     Every other country in the world is happy if its armed forces can defend geography. We are the only country in the world which waxes lyrical about ideological frontiers. To us alone belongs the distinction of calling ourselves a fortress of Islam.

In the wake of the Raymond Davis affair a certain sternness had crept into our tone with the Americans, as we told them that they would have to curtail their footprint in Pakistan. I wonder what we tell them now. It is not difficult to imagine the smile on American lips when we now speak of the absolute necessity of minimising CIA activities.

With whom the gods would jest, they first make ridiculous. The hardest thing to bear in this saga is not wounded pride or breached sovereignty but our exposure to ridicule. Osama made us suffer in life and has made us look ridiculous after his death. Around the tallest mountains there is the echo of too much laughter at our expense.

     Consider also the Foreign Office statement of May 3, “As far as the target compound is concerned, ISI had been sharing information with CIA...since 2009....It is important to highlight that taking advantage of much superior technological assets, CIA exploited intelligence leads given by us to identify and reach Osama bin Laden.” This is hilarious. If we were aware of the compound and had suspicions about its occupants what ‘superior technological assets’ were required to go in and find out?

      But what takes the cake is the stern warning attached: “This event of unauthorised unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US.” We can imagine the CIA trembling in its shoes. My son burst out laughing when he read this. If the Americans get a clue to the whereabouts of Ayman al-Zawahiri or Mullah Omar will they ask our permission before sending their SEAL teams in?

      The CIA chief, Leon Panetta, has rubbed the point in: “It was decided that any effort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardise the mission. They might alert the targets.” That’s about the level of trust we seem to inspire.

      Anyway, trust Prime Minister Gilani to put it best, that the failure to find Osama for so long was not just Pakistan’s failure but that of intelligence agencies around the world. This is really cool, absolving ourselves of all responsibility even when Osama is discovered within walking distance of PMA Kakul.

      We have some funny notions of sovereignty and national honour. The CIA spreading itself wide in Pakistan is a breach of national sovereignty, and rightly so. And American boots on the ground, as in Abbottabad, are totally unacceptable. But when it comes to Al Qaeda using Pakistan as a base, Sirajuddin Haqqani and the rest of the Taliban holed up in North Waziristan and Taliban elements in Quetta, we somehow can’t work up the same outrage.

     We already had a tough job on our hands convincing the world of our bona fides. After the Osama operation it gets that much tougher.

     In an ideal world this should be a wakeup call for Pakistan, an opportunity for some honest introspection and a hard look at some of the bizarre notions underpinning our theories of national security. Must we spend so much on defence? Is the world engaged in a conspiracy to undermine our foundations? Aren’t our nuclear weapons enough to give us a sense of security? Hasn’t the time come to curb some of our zest for nurturing and sustaining jihadi militias? And isn’t it time we stopped fretting so much about Afghanistan and made internal order and prosperity the principal focus of our endeavours?

     But we do not live in an ideal world and our capacity for self-deception should not be under-estimated. Shaken as we may be by the Osama operation, we can safely assume that we won’t take this as a wakeup call. As the Foreign Office statement vividly shows, we’ll hunt for lame excuses and hide behind false explanations, convinced of our ability to fool the world when the only thing fooled will be ourselves.

      So we will keep talking about strategic assets and good and bad Taliban, and about protecting our interests in Afghanistan, and we’ll keep subscribing to theories of Indian hostility and encirclement, because these are the foundations on which stands the peculiar national security state we have constructed, forever threatened and insecure.

      If the separation of East Pakistan was not a wakeup call, if Musharraf’s adventure in Kargil wasn’t that either, it is too much to expect that Pakistan’s comprehensive exposure in this saga, the Islamic Republic without its clothes, will lead to any radical departures in national outlook.

      Our ruling establishment is too set in its ways and, sadly, the roots of national stupidity run too deep.

 And perish the thought of anyone taking responsibility and throwing in his papers. That’s just not the Pakistani way.

 But there should be no escaping the fact that from now on we will have to be more careful. All the signs suggest that this may prove to be a milestone of sorts, a dangerous turning point, in that our friends, let alone our enemies, become more sceptical of our pronouncements and increasingly less willing to put up with our hidden and double games.

 We will be asked some tough questions and the time for bluster or a show of righteous indignation may have passed.