Scorpene data leak underlines the hazards of India’s dependence on foreign sources for military hardware.

Scorpene data leak underlines the hazards of India’s dependence on foreign sources for military hardware. In the famous words of Ian Fleming’s creation, Goldfinger, “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action”. Given the serial abortion (or sabotage) of every significant Indian defence hardware contract, starting with the Bofors 155 mm gun and HDW submarine contracts in the 1980s, it is, perhaps, time to get a bit paranoid and consider the likelihood of “enemy action” being at the root of such occurrences. After all, what better way could there be for adversaries to disarm and neutralise India’s armed forces than by arranging to scuttle their modernisation plans for three decades running. This would be entirely in consonance with Master Sun Tzu’s adage that, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”. Hardly had the Augusta-Westland “scandal” receded to the back pages of newspapers when the dramatic revelation, in Australian media, about massive haemorrhaging of data related to the Indian Scorpene submarine project hit the headlines last week. It would appear that the huge “data dump” of over 22,000 document pages, belonging to French shipbuilder DCNS, contains information relating not only to Indian Scorpenes, but also a Russian amphibious ship and a Brazilian stealth frigate. Opinion in the media is divided between those who consider the leaked data to be “sensitive” and potentially damaging to India’s Scorpene submarine force and others, who point out that the “Restricted” stamp carried on each page indicates the commercial nature of what seem to be marketing presentations and generic operating data released as a volley in some corporate war. At this stage, apart from deploring the laxity of the French custodians of leaked Scorpene documents, and suggesting stringent penalties against them, “armchair experts” need to exercise restraint in their comments. At the tactical and operational levels, it is the navy’s submariners and anti-submarine warfare experts who must evaluate the nature of data that has been leaked, and the likely implications of its falling into wrong hands. Since five out of our six Scorpenes are still under construction, it may be possible to either replace some equipment or make software changes to protect the parameters supposedly compromised. In any case, the standard operating procedures and doctrines that will be evolved by our submariners for this class of boat will be Indian Navy specific and will contain adequate defensive and offensive counter-measures to ensure that the subs are not “sitting ducks”. Moving on to the strategic level, my reference, above, to “enemy action” was rhetorical, because the actual “enemy” resides within. The lesson hammered home — yet again — by the “Scorpene leak” is that as long as India remains so abjectly dependent on foreign sources for military hardware, it will continue to be vulnerable to sleaze, scandals and scams that not only bring a bad name to the country but have effectively halted the process of military re-equipment and upgradation. That this should be happening when our northern and western neighbours are re-arming and re-organising their militaries is worrisome. Four issues need to be highlighted because they call for the urgent attention of our decision-making elite. First, as an industrialised nation and a maritime power, the lack of submarine design and building competence had been a critical lacuna in India’s maritime capability. China has been building subs since the 1960s and Pakistan since 2002. It was in pursuit of this “holy grail” that India had signed a contract for acquisition of six HDW Type-209 submarines in the 1980s; two to be constructed in Germany and the other four in India. Sadly, the precious submarine-building capability and expertise, acquired by Mazagon Docks, Mumbai, were killed by myopic policymakers, when they, whimsically, cancelled the contract in the early-1990s after the construction of just two boats on account of kickback allegations. Had we not thrown out the “baby with the bathwater”, the past 25 years would have seen India become an established producer of diesel submarines. Second, in a larger context, we must never forget that India has the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest importer of arms today. This is despite our vast defence-industrial complex, comprising thousands of scientists and a network of sophisticated DRDO laboratories, backed by production facilities of the government-owned ordinance factories and defence public sector undertakings. That our scientists have struggled for decades to design and produce a jet fighter, a battle-tank or a jet engine can be explained away. But it is incomprehensible why we should still be importing rifles, helmets, night-vision devices and even bullet-proof jackets for our jawans. We have also been unable to develop the technology for vital components with military applications, ranging from diesel engines to micro-processors, magnetrons and klystrons. Thus, at the heart of every ship, aircraft, tank, missile or electronic system produced in India, are key items of foreign origin. It is deeply disturbing to note that for the past seven decades, the political leadership has not seen fit to demand accountability for these gaping voids in capability from the defence-science and defence-production establishments. While “Make in India” and the hike in FDI limits in defence are held out as a panacea, unless a tangible, time-bound roadmap is drawn up, for attaining self-sufficiency in weapon systems, there is unlikely to be much change. Such a roadmap will work only if our innovative private sector is tightly integrated into defence research and production. Third, it is time for Indians to face up to a fact that is known to every foreign firm that bids for an Indian contract: Arms deals are the “golden goose” for election funding. Till such time that we attain a modicum of self-sufficiency in military hardware — 20 to 30 years hence — a consensus needs to be struck between the major political parties to treat defence contracts as “holy cows” and exclude them from the purview of election fund-raising. Moreover, since alleged scams come in handy to settle political scores, after every change of government, the bureaucracy has, understandably, become cagey about decision-making in defence acquisition cases. The grounds for such apprehension must be removed. Finally, banning or “blacklisting” of arms companies alleged to be involved in malpractices may appear to be a dramatic antidote because it makes a splash in the media. But in reality, it is counter-productive because it harms our security far more than the impugned firm. Here again, the Scorpene provides an apt example of our proclivity of “cutting off one’s nose to spite the face”. The contract for the torpedo selected for this class of submarines has recently been rejected, at the eleventh hour, because the mother company, Augusta-Westland, has been blacklisted in another context. Thus, at one stroke, we have de-fanged this potent and expensive submarine, and it will take a few years before a new weapon can be acquired for it. By disarming ourselves in this manner, we are thoughtlessly fulfilling the fondest dreams of our adversaries

NEPAL -DISASTOR MANAGEMENT ARMED FORCES

Disaster Management by Armed Forces and Others. Things don't just happen automatically. Leaders understand a situation and make it happen. It is pleasing to see the response of the Central Government and its multiple agencies to the disaster in Nepal. There can be no better way to convey India’s concern and sensitivity towards its neighbors than these very actions which have drawn national approval and applause. No doubt, the recent experiences gained in the Uttarkhand and Kashmir floods, Orissa cyclone and the mass evacuation from Yemen’s war zone have added richly to our institutional expertise in handling unpredictable situations. However, it is the leadership at the Centre which has obviously made a major difference; officials are learning to function and take decisions in situations of limited but progressively building information. While electronic news channels have been busy with visuals of the disaster and the relief build up ,unfortunately they tend to highlight only the tragedy and the sufferings - not to mention each channel loudly proclaiming "" we are the first and only channel on Ground Zero (!), Breaking News , etc "". But unfortunately the real heroism is neither adequately recorded nor projected ! Hence, it is best to recount what exactly is involved in such contingencies when disasters strike. Let us give credits and dues to these unsung heroes too. We do have ten specialist units for disaster relief manned by personnel of the National Disaster Relief Force. These personnel are crucial to the initial response required at the spot of disaster where in the case of this earthquake they are busy rendering rescue from the collapsed buildings along with specialist locating equipment and sniffer dogs. However, organizationally the relief efforts start from rear to forward in a ‘push’ system with available resources at the point of disaster and those in the vicinity making the first push. It involves, human resources, both specialist and muscle power, machinery, vehicles, earth moving plant and breaking equipment, including drills, generators, communications, water purification plants with dispensers, medical equipment and drugs besides resources for disposal of the dead and control of epidemics. The importance of each individual item in the chain cannot be over emphasized and a single crucial item can render a whole effort void. For example, if there are no stretchers or no water dispensers nowhere can they be obtained from once the team is in-situ. Hence, necessity to carefully register inventories, on basis of progressive experience. The Army does this as a Standard Operating Procedure and tests its drills and battle procedures (everything in the Army is related to battle) through frequent mobilization exercises, where inventories and personnel are checked along with the loads, and queries are directed at personnel to ascertain they understand their duties and responsibilities. The first and foremost action at the operational level is to earmark the command and control so that a single commander is responsible and becomes the point of contact. Major General JS Sandhu, in the instant case, an officer from 5 Gorkha Rifles is a good choice for being the overall in charge at the Nepal end along with Brig Gamlin also of the Gurkhas. Both are fluent Nepali speaking, which explains it. All commanders have adequate staff and they swing into action to gather maximum information even as basic drills are put into gear. Up and down the chain initial short coordination meetings are held but before that it is necessary to send out Warning Orders on the basis of available information. The result of these coordination meetings is the issue of directions to subordinates and earmarking of resources. Taking the disaster in Nepal as an example, it can be seen that the NDRF was ready with its emergency loads and recce teams which flew out within a few hours -- quite a commendable alacrity. Along with the initial flight it is essential to earmark space for communication personnel of the Air Force and Corps of Signals along with basic equipment without compromising excessively on the life saving equipment of the NDRF. A communication hub will then build up progressively at the airfield and inwards towards the city. Without communications nothing can move. It may be essential in some cases to send technicians of the lead civil communication service provider to ascertain the state of mobile communications. In modern times this is essential so that civil mobile communications are established early to overcome the trauma of relatives. It also helps in tracing missing personnel. As of now the Internet seems to have been restored in Kathmandu and this is a major achievement. As an add on from personal experience it is prudent to also cater for small charging sets with multiple charging facilities as the availability of mobile communications in the hands of people will help in coordination of relief efforts. The IAF remains a key player because it has to earmark and move adequate transport aircraft to the mounting bases which are spread out. Its personnel have to be involved with technical aspects of loading and that too very quickly. Progressively the rotary aircraft join in when the relief moves out into the countryside, away from the urban centres in this case. The Army’s aviation arm joins in. On 27th itself an aviation hub is being established at Pokhra. The principle which has to be followed is that of ‘simultaneity’ and not of ‘sequencing’. Almost everything is of importance and in the case of the IAF this becomes the biggest challenge, ascertaining priority. Human survivability requirements have necessarily to be at very high priority. In this, medical equipment, doctors and para-medics, plus medicines take precedence. A composite packet of medical needs has to move early, for which emergency supplies have to be in state of readiness. The Army’s medical system has this well taped up and usually needs no directions for emergency release. Many more such packets will continue to move as the level of casualties is ascertained. In the instant case six field hospitals has been moved replete with power generation equipment and surgical teams; functioning with 18 medical teams. Six ambulance vehicles have also been inducted by road. The location of Army cantonments in North India is a boon because many of the formations having medical resources are located close to airfields. Medical teams from these cantonments are the first to move. As far as food, water and shelter is concerned, initial dependence is on food packets which are made up of ready to eat dry items hurriedly put together by the Army Service Corps (ASC) and volunteers. An important element here is the existing supply chain facilitated by the stocks which are held by the Army at different levels; these are mostly dry items and cannot be converted to ready to eat in the desirable timeframe. This is where the Army’s logisticians depend very largely on the contractors who supply fresh items and can be mustered to provide readily consumable items on deferred payment systems. The system works on trust, the best mantra for disaster management. Civil agencies subsequently step in and the local administration has an uncanny knack of ensuring supplies as the demand increases. It is important to remember that initially all affected people will need immediately consumable food and not dry rations; baby food being one of the highest priorities. During the Kashmir Flood, need for Insulin was high and the agencies were busy procuring that for the first few days. One of the heaviest loads and fast consumed is fuel. It is needed for the power generation equipment for the medical facilities and for the vehicles plying at the airfield of the disaster area. This necessitates early dispatch of engineer teams by road so that road communications are opened. The Army’s Corps of Engineers has a man sized job to perform. Units function as composite engineer task forces (ETFs) with technical manpower, plant equipment, water supply and purification facilities, explosives to blast buildings and collapsed hillsides, power generation equipment and many other items required to restore mobility, power and water; their expertise in handling boats, building bridges and pumping water proves invaluable in flood based disasters. Lifting their equipment is the most difficult as it is bulky and if being airlifted will take up much of the air effort. Hence always good to send recce elements and a few initial equipment based teams by air with bulk following by road; they can be relied upon to open the road for themselves if blocked. The arrival of ETFs lends great weight to the disaster relief efforts because of the innate expertise that Army engineers carry with them. This is already happening with six plant equipment, generators, electricity survey team etc having reached and established themselves outside Kathmandu. They are in communication with the Nepal Army personnel with whom operations are being coordinated. It is important to mention that no disaster relief efforts belong to any one organization. Besides, the Army, Air Force and NDRF, Police organizations play a most important role. Local police provides the liaison for all missions as others are unfamiliar with ground layout. The police too have tremendous manpower but there could be contingencies where many of them being locals cannot immediately function. Their own resources would be badly jeopardized in such a calamity. Social organizations are known to provide much backup to the armed forces. The Gurdwara Committees and in particular the efforts of the Golden Temple towards providing meal packets made by volunteers is one of the finest examples of cooperation and support. Disaster relief may be calibrated to lower levels over a period of time but societal support is needed exactly when this happens. Medicines, blankets, clothing, tents etc will remain in short supply. NGOs take over this effort and carry out yeoman service in setting up collection and distribution centres. Certain airlines too have played a stellar role in providing free lift of logistic loads for various organizations and their efforts need to be lauded. The essential aspect is the distribution and not the collection; mismanagement is this can lead to much misery. The survey of damage in the countryside has only just begun in Nepal, both on foot and by helicopter. This is a task by itself and casualty management, communications, food and medicine supply, shelter are all problems which will progressively face the relief providers. Human endurance too has limits and stamina starts sapping after some time as the logistics for the relief workers themselves cause a challenge. Many other countries too are pitching in with efforts and domain expertise. It is essential to have a central information hub for the embassies at New Delhi to remain in touch with. The lesson which must be clear is that no one can predict a disaster but institutional knowledge can overcome much of the effects with readiness and cooperation. Disaster management is a subject by itself and needs continuous buildup of expertise through training and exchange of experience. However, as said in the beginning, if the direction from the top leadership is effective, as seen in this case, there is increased professionalism at all levels to give that extra something in the face of such human suffering. KUDOS TO THE WHOLE SYSTEM ~ The Leadership, the Armed Forces, the NDRF, the Police, all the voluntary organisations & individuals, and of course the survival instinct itself of a sturdy race of people !! 3 Cheers to the Great Human Spirit !

TRANSPERENCY IN DEFENSE DEALS BY MANOHAR PARIKAR

संरक्षण क्षेत्रातील विदेशी कंपन्यांच्या दलालांना परवानगी देण्याचा संरक्षणमंत्री मनोहर पíरकर यांचा निर्णय हा या क्षेत्रातील पारदर्शक कारभाराच्या दिशेने टाकलेले एक पुढचे पाऊल आहे. संरक्षण क्षेत्रातील दलाल ही काही नवी गोष्ट नाही. अमेरिकेसह अनेक देशांत या दलालास संरक्षणसामग्रीच्या खरेदी-विक्रीच्या साखळीतील एक महत्त्वाचा दुवा म्हणून अधिकृत मान्यता आहे. लढाऊ विमाने, युद्धनौका, पाणबुडय़ा, तोफा, बंदुका, विविध सामग्रीचे सुटे भाग यांची खरेदी-विक्री हा खर्व-निखर्व रुपयांचा मामला असतो. संरक्षणसामग्रीनिर्मिती कंपन्यांतील स्पर्धेनेच दलाल या संस्थेला जन्म दिला असून, ती टाळणे कठीण असते. 'संरक्षणसामग्रीची निर्मिती करणाऱ्या कंपन्या आणि संरक्षण मंत्रालय यांनी थेटच व्यवहार करावा; त्यात कोणा मधल्याची आवश्यकताच नाही,' हे कागदावर छान दिसते. भारतात दलालांवर बंदी होती, पण त्याचा अर्थ कोणताही संरक्षण व्यवहार दलालांशिवाय होत होता असे नाही. त्याचा अर्थ एवढाच होता की, ते दलाल अनधिकृत होते. त्यामुळे उलट लाचखोरीलाच खतपाणी मिळाले. त्यात आपल्याकडील सर्वात गाजलेला बोफोर्सच्या हॉवित्झर तोफांचा खरेदी व्यवहार हा त्याचाच उत्तम नमुना होता. बोफोर्स ही स्वीडिश कंपनी. तिने या १५०० कोटी रुपयांच्या व्यवहारात काही दलालांना ६४ कोटी रुपयांची लाच दिल्याचा गौप्यस्फोट १९८७ मध्ये स्वीडिश रेडिओने केला. त्या आरोपामुळे तत्कालीन पंतप्रधान राजीव गांधी यांना सत्ता गमवावी लागली. पुढे सुमारे २५० कोटी रुपये चौकशीवर खर्च होऊनही त्यातून काही हाती लागले नाही हा भाग वेगळा. पण या सगळ्यात त्या कंपनीला काळ्या यादीत टाकण्यात आले आणि फटका देशाच्या संरक्षणसज्जतेस बसला. या प्रकरणानंतर राजीव गांधी यांनी संरक्षण दलालांवर बंदी घातली. वाजपेयी सरकारच्या काळात संरक्षणमंत्री जॉर्ज फर्नाडिस यांनी ती अधिक कडक केली. त्याचबरोबर १९८५ पासूनच्या सर्व मोठय़ा संरक्षणसामग्री खरेदी व्यवहारांची चौकशीही सुरू केली. त्या वेळी केंद्रीय दक्षता आयोगाने अशा व्यवहारांत दलालांना कायदेशीर परवानगी द्यावी, अशी शिफारस केली होती. पण त्यावर नेहमीप्रमाणेच पुढे काही झाले नाही. दरम्यानच्या काळात या व्यवहारांतील भ्रष्टाचार सुरूच राहिला. हेलिकॉप्टर, ट्रक, रायफलींपासून शवपेटय़ांपर्यंत अनेक गोष्टींत लाचखोरी झाल्याचे आरोप झाले. ऑगस्टा-वेस्टलॅण्ड, टाट्रा सिपॉक्स, डेनेल अशा विविध कंपन्या त्यात अडकल्या. त्यांना रीतसर काळ्या यादीत टाकण्यात आले. पण त्यामुळे देशाच्या संरक्षणसज्जतेवर जो परिणाम व्हायचा तो झालाच. मोदी सरकारने दलालांना कायदेशीर मान्यता देण्याचा जो निर्णय घेतला त्याला ही पाश्र्वभूमी आहे. त्या त्या कंपन्यांना आपले अधिकृत प्रतिनिधी म्हणून हे दलाल नेमावे लागणार असून, त्यांना जे काही पैसे द्यायचे ते त्या कंपनीलाच द्यावे लागणार आहेत. व्यवहाराची दलाली वा टक्केवारी घेता येणार नाही. यामुळे राजकारण्यांपासून बडय़ा अधिकाऱ्यांना लागलेली लाचखोरीची चटक संपेल का? तर तसे सांगता येणार नाही. पण या पíरकरी पारदर्शकतेमुळे भ्रष्टाचाराला आळा बसेल हे मात्र नक्की.

MANOHAR PARIKAR- KNOW YOUR DEFENCE MINISTER

Is this a BJP PR GAMBIT OR THE TRUTH? HOPE TIME WILL REVEAL A POSITIVE MAN FOR THE DEFENCE FORCES! PM Narendra Modi handpicked Goa’s super CM Manohar Parrikar for the all-important Defence Minister post, and since then there has been nothing but praise coming in for the man of the hour. Take a look at 9 things you may not know about him.1. He has a signature lookprokerala.com You'll never find him without his trademark half-sleeved bush shirt, creased trousers and simple footwear. And we mean never! Case in point, his son’s wedding where he welcomed guests in the same attire.2. He refused to let personal tragedy come in the way of workDailymail About a month before his swearing-in as the first-time chief minister of Goa, Parrikar’s wife Medha succumbed to cancer. That left Parrikar with the responsibilities of running the state while being a single parent to his two teenage boys. But he put up a brave front and got about discharging his duties as CM.3. He doesn’t care for sarkaari benefitsindiatvnews Even after becoming CM, Parrikar continued living in his own modest house and didn’t upgrade to a fancier vehicle, preferring instead to keep using the Innova he was allotted as leader of the opposition.4. He's the real poster boy for aam aadmisgfdc.in Parrikar always travels in economy class and pays for personal calls from his own pocket. He doesn’t entertain the VVIP treatment meted out to netas. He is famous for using a rickshaw and public transport like a regular person, especially outside Goa. 5. He's a workaholicThe Goan One of the many traits he shares with PM Modi is his penchant for keeping a punishing schedule of 16-18 work hours every day. For a 58 year old man, that’s pretty impressive.6. He is a taskmasterIndiaToday ...who doesn’t tolerate corruption and is blunt in his dealings. He took on the illegal mining in Goa with gusto, handing out suspensions and cancelling licenses of rogue traders. His clean governance motto leaning saw him suspending block development officers, panchayat secretaries and lower-rank staff. No wonder this squeaky clean CM was branded Goa’s Mr Clean.But...manoramaonline His image took a beating, and he was dubbed a 'U-turn' CM by the media and Congress when he failed to deliver on poll promises, flip-flopped on important issues and failed to root out the mining mafia completely.7. He has some famous IIT batch matesNobody stops talking about his engineering degree from IIT Bombay. But not many know that this metallurgical engineering graduate shared hostel space with technocrat Nandan Nilekani in 1978.8. He has RSS rootsapplied-science.in Parrikar joined the RSS at a very young age, even looking after the Powai hostel unit of RSS. He has often expressed pride of his RSS background. The RSS loves him back equally, even considering him for the post of BJP president, before appointing Nitin Gadkari. His RSS roots helped strike a saffron chord with PM Modi and Amit Shah. Look what this did for his political career!9. He has sharp political foresightPTILong before anybody could foresee the Modi wave, Parrikar openly backed Modi to be BJP’s choice for PM, becoming the first party functionary to do so.

MMRCA ABSOLUTELY REQD BY INDIAN AIRFORCE

By Arjun Subramaniam Published: 27th October 2014 Bharat Karnad’s article, “Impending MMRCA Waste”, published in The New Indian Express on October 3 is a clear attempt to keep the MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) pot boiling—it warrants a response only to sensitise the environment of the truth, just as the learned professor tries to undermine it with his needless ranting on the MMRCA. There seems to be a desperation that merits serious scrutiny—who or what is the guiding beacon behind his sustained attempt to force policy makers to take a re-look at an acquisition, the need for which was felt as far back as 2001? Is he batting for an outsider who is looking for a “window of opportunity” as the new government settles down, or is he pitching for an ill-informed brigade that seems to think that a “whatever there is to offer” approach, which will cause the IAF to dangerously slip into the “operational red” in a hostile environment is okay just because it gives a fillip to indigenisation. The IAF has been trying to plug operational gaps over the past few years despite assiduous attempts by the likes of Karnad to throw in a spanner at regular intervals. In November last year, a few months after the new Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA) was acquired by the IAF, the Pilatus PC-7 commenced operations at the Air Force Academy in Dundigal after years of attempting to set the HPT-32 right. Along comes an article from Karnad questioning the Pilatus deal. Worse still, despite numerous crashes on the HPT-32 and a gaping hole in our training preparedness, he wanted the IAF to buy a platform which he called the HJT-44 (actually the HTT-44) whose prototype had yet to be proven. One year down the line, cadets at the Air Force Academy are raving about the Pilatus PC-7, instructors no longer have to worry about extricating themselves from too many life-threatening emergencies and technical glitches, and more importantly, its operational impact will soon be seen when pilots trained in it make the transition to more sophisticated aircraft like the Hawk, Mirage-2000 and SU-30 with ease. Apart from its operational impact, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) also wants to see less worry in the eyes of parents who send their young adult-kids into the tough world of military aviation—I wonder Mr Karnad if you have ever served as a pall-bearer and heard the last post sounded after a fatal crash involving a cadet under training and/or his instructor. The CAS did some plain talking at his traditional pre-Air Force Day press conference and clearly highlighted the operational gaps that existed with the IAF’s current force and capability levels, particularly in the offensive domain. The main punch of the IAF revolves around the swing role capability of the SU-30 MKI which is experiencing some maintenance problems that are under resolution. The Mirage-2000 and MiG-29 are in the midst of major upgrades which have long implementation periods to fructify into contemporary capability. Our western adversary has acquired aerial weapons systems that allow it to punch above its weight, and the only way that the IAF can retain its decade-old aerial edge and counter it is by swamping it with a combination of SU-30 and an equally good or better platform. The Rafale emerged as a clear winner along with other ingredients (combination of pricing, life-cycle costs, technology transfer, etc.) that gave it a clear competitive edge over other contenders for the 126 aircraft MMRCA deal in what was an impeccably transparent evaluation process. Prof Karnad’s contention that the procurement of 12 upgraded Qatari Mirage-2000s in the early part of the last decade was shelved to pave the way for a global tender for an MMRCA that would last well beyond the middle of the century; of course it was and why not if the IAF was getting a significantly superior platform? Karnad would like the public to believe that the purchase decision of the Qatari Mirages was scuttled by the then CAS. Technically, the CAS is not part of the procurement process which has embedded checks and balances at every level. He is not an “approving authority” in any procurement process and to attribute such influence to him is amazing, particularly when it comes from someone like Prof Karnad, who not so very long ago was part of government advisory bodies like the National Security Advisory Board and numerous other quasi-official committees. The accusation, unless proven, could rightfully be tantamount to mud-slinging. Prof Karnad also attempts to frighten the daylight out of us by predicting a grounding of fleets and closure of manufacturing lines of aircraft like the Eurofighter (EF). How does the Eurofighter suddenly emerge in your target zone, prof? I thought you were targeting the Rafale! Inclusion of Eurofighter in this debate is a canard by Karnad. He rambles along disjointedly in his article about Raytheon, a US company being the manufacturer of the Eurofighter’s data fusion system and the probability of the US pulling the plug whenever they want and grounding the fleet. I think we have come a long way in our relationship with the US. Air power in modern warfare is not just physical destruction of targets; it is more about affecting the mind of your adversary with coercive capability. A combination of the SU-30, MMRCA (Rafale) and upgraded M-2000 and MiG-29s as your frontline offensive punch is an intimidating mix by any standards. The flexibility that it will afford to mix and match between offensive and defensive missions will offer great security, particularly to the Indian Army as it increasingly looks to the IAF to clear the skies and cause significant attrition to the enemy’s combat potential before it comes into contact with own forces in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). Smaller and legacy platforms like the LCA, Jaguar, Hawk and the remaining MiG variants will then contribute significantly to the joint battle as they put pressure on the enemy and cause destruction in and around the TBA. That, Mr Karnad, is how a battlefield is shaped if you have the necessary wherewithal—you cannot do it if you remain with 34 squadrons or less for much longer, or opt for platforms that do not meet the requirements of operational commanders. The IAF has always welcomed constructive criticism, but when Karnad dishes out such disruptive writing, he needs to be suitably countered

INDIA SHOULD CREATE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL GIANT COMPLEX

Create Defence-Industrial GiantSaturday, 23 August, 2014 6:30 PM Mark as Unread Flag this messageFrom: "Capt.(Dr.) S G Naravane" To: "Jayant Sahasrabudhe" Full Headers Printable ViewPrime minister Narendra Modi extolled “Made in India” products from “satellites to submarines” in his Independence Day address. A day later he demanded that “Instead of having to import even small things...India...become an exporter of [military] equipment over the next few years”. And, he exhorted foreign countries and companies to “make in India”. Rendering the country self-sufficient in armaments, it turns out, will help India emerge as workshop of the world manufacturing all kinds of quality goods economically. But it will require the PM to do to the Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) overseen by the ministry of defence (MoD) what he did to the Planning Commission—utilise their resources more effectively. At the core is a fact that cannot be glossed over: DPSUs are deadweight. Despite outputting some 800 combat aircraft and thousands of jet engines not an iota of any of the technologies, for example, have been absorbed let alone innovated over the past 60 years by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Indeed, DPSUs haven’t progressed much beyond assembling platforms from imported kits achieved during the Second World War when Harlow PC-5 and Percival Prentice trainer aircraft, trucks, and mortars were mass-produced for the Allied armies. In this context, the indigenous HF-24 supersonic fighter developed from scratch in the 1960s seems an aberration. It is because the DPSUs have stayed stuck at the screwdriver technology level that the department of defence production in MoD has evolved a procurement system willy-nilly funnelling billions of dollars to foreign vendors with minimal transfer of technology (ToT). DPSUs neither ingest foreign technology nor let the private sector benefit from it. How much the ToT provisions are eyewash and how much the military procurement system favours imports and enriches foreign countries may be gauged from a few facts. Firstly, the technology transfer content in deals is not required to be divulged by the foreign vendors until after the bids are in and a supplier chosen! This empowers the vendor to restrict the technology it chooses to transfer, usually basic stuff related to the platform—a ToT threshold DPSUs are comfortable with. As prime buyer India doesn’t use its leverage to squeeze state-of-the-art technologies out of the suppliers, is uncommonly generous in forking out huge sums at the outset, and tolerates delays in delivery and non-transfer of technology. Hence, gains from indigenisation even from the offsets policy are minimal. It leads to imports of high-value packages being locked into long-term deals. Dassault, for example, will supply 30% of the advanced avionics amounting to over $10 billion of the $30 billion plus contract for the full duration of the Rafale programme. Secondly, ostensibly because of foreign currency fluctuations foreign suppliers are not held to the cost-figure in their winning bids, even as Indian bidders who may buy technology from abroad and refine it here are! Foreign suppliers are thus incentivised deliberately to underbid to win contracts and then to raise the price at the price negotiation stage without incurring any penalties. The French firm, Dassault Avions, originally offered the Rafale combat aircraft with comprehensive ToT for $10 billion. But after winning the tender, it increased the cost to over $30 billion and the MoD did not blink! This skewed system is bolstered by the military’s preference for foreign, especially Western, hardware. India, consequently, is routinely relieved of monies and Indian private sector companies are prevented from winning procurement contracts. The extant system has evolved around the fact that the remit of the Defence Production Secretary as the guardian of DPSUs is to ensure their order books are full. Because DPSU capability is limited to licensed manufacture, procurement deals centre on it. Committees chaired by ex-bureaucrats, the most recent one by Vijay Kelkar, are periodically constituted to recommend revamp of existing protocols and procedures but without disturbing the dominance of DPSUs. This is akin to leaving a cancerous tumour intact while fiddling with the tissues around it! In the event, documents such as “Defence Procurement Policy-2013” are meaningless. But how can competition and profit motive, the two great drivers of any vibrant industry, be injected into the defence industrial and military procurement spheres? The solution lies in eliminating the spurious distinction between public and private sectors and meshing their resources and capabilities. It was outlined in a 1999 paper by me to the technology review sub-committee in the first National Security Advisory Board. Keeping in mind the need to amortise sunk costs in building up impressive laboratories and physical facilities for R&D and weapons testing under DRDO (whose “chalta hai” attitude was decried by the PM) and production facilities in innumerable DPSUs and ordnance factories, I proposed that all these installations, some 50-odd, be divided into two nearly equally capable defence R&D and manufacturing combines and be led as commercial enterprises by two of the most ethical and industrially versatile business houses—Larsen & Toubro and Tata. These two combines, subsuming the capacities of L&T and Tata, would pay the government rent for the DRDO centres/DPSUs/ordnance factories in their group and royalty for the technology, software, and hardware outputted by them. They’d bid for all weapons contracts with funds being provided by MoD to develop prototypes, and the winner determined by a transparently conducted run-off. What technology is procured from where under what financial terms, and which foreign or local firms are associated on which project, would be the sole concern of the combines. It will hasten the globalisation of Indian industry. Such a scheme, besides creating a world-class defence-industrial complex and arms exporter, will rid the procurement system of its most serious ills—the inclination to import, endemic corruption and influence-peddling, the self-defeating lowest tender (L-1) process, production orders in small tranches that undermine economies of scale, and the bans on commercialising imported technology and exporting military products. Integrating private and public sector skills and wherewithal, inducing competitive pricing, and rewarding performance will increase labour productivity and efficient resource-use resulting, say, in the Kolkata-class destroyer being produced not in 8-9 years but the international industry standard—three years. Unsurprisingly this “out of the box” proposal is collecting dust. The author is professor at the Centre for Policy Research and blogs atwww.bharatkarnad.com By Bharat Karnad

MESS UP BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

INS Vikramaditya, latest aircraft carrier to join the Navy, is still without an integral air defence system, kind courtesy the BABOOS. It took the DRDO 30 years to realise that the Bofors contract had a complete transfer of technology clause, and the complete blueprints were available to make brand new guns. The improved version of Bofors gun has been named Dhanush. A Chinese nuclear submarine was on the prowl in the Indian Ocean from 03 Dec 2013 for a period of two months. Army's plans to acquire 145 ultra light howitzers for employment in the mountains, particularly against China, have been further delayed by the politico-baboo nexus. Army's holding of WWR ammunition cannot last for more than 20 days. The BABOOS , on being reminded again, let out a deeper snore. Import of 126 Rafale jets is in limbo as the contract is yet to be signed.

DEFENCES ARE DOWN-But Antony is an honourable man.” But has it helped the country?

Defences are down Mar 12, 2014 ... Nirmala SitharamanWhen issues related to A.K. Antony are raised, there is a rush of people reminding us about his ‘squeaky clean image’. But has his image been built at the cost of the image of the defence forces? .The Indian armed forces never had it so bad ever before. The morale of the forces has taken a beating as there have been one too many avoidable controversies. With the occurrence of naval accidents and scams, trust between the defence forces and the elected civilian government has hit rock bottom. This has adversely impacted acquiring resources in terms of equipment. And the forces’ overall preparedness has apparently reached an unacceptable low. Open public discourse on the nitty-gritty of the Indian armed forces — a force which is held in great honour and respect by the people of India — is indeed shocking. Experts, and amateurs like this writer, ask: Where does the buck stop? And this even as the present defence minister, A.K. Antony, is credited with being the “longest continuously serving defence minister”. He has been serving since October 2006. Before him, Babu Jagjivan Ram had served twice as defence minister cumulatively for 6.8 years. Earlier, V.K. Krishna Menon had completed 4.7 years. It is reported that Mr Antony is extremely mindful of his image — some in the media refer to him as “St. Antony”. All versions of his publicly available curriculum vitae refer to “his intolerance towards corruption in public life.” But then who is to be mindful of the image of the armed forces, known for their valour and which, notwithstanding the pressure Pakistan brought on us through US Task Force 74 of the US’ Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, made Pakistan surrender in 1971? Whenever law and order situation crumbles in any part of the country, it is the Army which, by a simple flag march, restores confidence and faith in the law-abiding citizen whilst, simultaneously, containing the outlaws. However, when issues related to Mr Antony are raised, there is a rush of people reminding us about his “squeaky clean image”. But has his image been built at the cost of the image of the defence forces? Or, even, the image of the country itself? Is his image a handy smokescreen behind which certain incidents and happenings remain hidden? In an interview with a leading news daily in March 2012, the then Army Chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, had said that he had informed Mr Antony about a shocking case of bribes running into several crores and that a bribe was being offered to him as well. Mr Antony issued a rebuttal, stating that he had asked Gen. Singh for a written complaint which the latter did not give. What came of that, if at all an investigation was held, is anybody’s guess. A list of the various controversies during Mr Antony’s tenure is sufficient for us to ask a few questions. The age row of Gen. Singh, the purchase of substandard and outrageously priced Tatra trucks, kickbacks in the purchase of AgustaWestland helicopters, shortage of India-made batteries in submarine INS SinduRatna leading to the death of two sailors, the accident in submarine Sindurakshak, two dead in the naval dockyard in Visakhapatnam, the report of the Army allegedly marching towards Delhi to attempt a coup which spooked the Government of India, the Sukhna land scam, and the Adarsh Housing society scam. Repeated Chinese incursions, with the Chinese troops sometimes camping in Indian territories, have left a string of unanswered questions. Have we driven them out of our territory completely? The defence ministry failed to coordinate its strategies with the external affairs ministry to talk with Pakistan to restore the honour of our dead soldiers, whom they had dishonoured by severing their heads and gouging their eyes out in violation of the Geneva Convention. On March 13, 2013, the CBI registered FIRs against 13 people, including former Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi and some members of his family. The Indian media went to town highlighting the fact that the Italians had arrested the CEO of Finmeccanica and that the chargesheets in the case stated that `40 million as kickbacks were paid to people in India for obtaining the contracts. Italy’s Prime Minister, Mario Monti, said: “There is a problem with the governance of Finmeccanica at the moment and we will face up to it.” In January 2014, the Government of India cancelled the `3,600 crore deal. Who received the kickbacks is yet to be revealed, though the Leader of the Opposition in Rajya Sabha, Arun Jaitley, put it succinctly: “The middleman gets the commission; bribes go to the decision-makers.” Ordering inquiries may partly reveal the truth. But canceling the order each and every time a scandal erupts is bound to have an adverse impact on the armed forces which has a long list of delayed purchases. The defence forces need highly specialised equipment, and failure to obtain them in good time can cripple their capability. The avoidable death of the Navymen due to lack of timely procurement of India-made batteries pushed a sensitive Naval Chief Adm. D.K. Joshi to resign. “It’s a very ominous situation to be in. The Indian Navy is going through a blighted phase,” observed C. Uday Bhaskar, a fellow at Delhi’s National Maritime Foundation. The BBC reported in April 2012 that efforts to modernise the Indian Army suffered due to “a lack of planning and acrimony between the military and the defence ministry”. There is also the issue of manpower shortage in the defence forces today. The time-tested trust between the civilan government and the defence forces is now under stress. Scandals, inquiries, lack of sophisticated arms and training make just the cocktail potential recruits would avoid. In all this, the role of the defence minister raises several questions. Why is it that we have not heard from Mr Antony at all — on the steps taken to instill confidence and trust in the people of our country that our territories are being protected, and on our soldiers who were tortured by the Pakistani Army? It may not be an exaggeration to say decision-making has suffered. When corruption was rampant, Mr Antony chose to look the other way. With apologies to William Shakespeare for tweaking his line from Julius Caesar “…But Antony is an honourable man.” But has it helped the country? The writer is spokesperson of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The views expressed in this column are her own

DEATH ON INS KOLKATA LEAVES YOUNG OFFICERS UNHAPPY

Widespread anger is palpable among large sections of naval officers as yet another accident claimed the life of an outstanding officer, even as a dirty war has broken out among senior admirals with lobbies backing them to canvass for the post of new Navy chief. Commander Kuntal Wadhwa, the chief engineer-designate of INS Kolkata, who was killed on Friday, was among his batch's finest officers. This MTech holder's selection to the commissioning team of country's latest destroyer spoke volumes about his capabilities. One of his batch-mates said, "Any sailor could have opened the valve, but Kuntal went to do it himself." A retired officer, who has mentored Kuntal in his young days, said the officer was upholding the tradition of leading from the front and being personally responsible to ensure that systems such as those for fighting fire in a ship are personally inspected by officers themselves. "While carrying out a tradition he paid with his life," he said. The story of young officers laying down their life leading from the front is also among the common themes running across most recent naval mishaps. Lt Commander Kapish Muwal and Lt Manoranjan Kumar also died heroically aboard INS Sindhuratna, their colleagues said. They pushed out the sailor who was on duty to keep watch on the battery pit, and were trying to find out the source of fire. Both paid with their lives. As young officers hold up the highest traditions of military, many in service are also dismayed and appalled by the low standards to which their senior officers are plunging as they try to project their select candidates for next Navy chief's post. The government is set to appoint the new Navy chief in place of Admiral DK Joshi who resigned on February 26. What is appalling to the officer cadre is the way the contenders and their supporters are going about projecting individual cases. "They are spending all their time in spreading stories about each other, and in projecting individual cases," one young officer said. "But they don't seem to have enough time to sit down and figure out what's wrong, and if there is indeed a systemic problem." What has left many young officers agitated is the story in the naval circles that a senior admiral may have played an active role in creating a scare around even minor issues by consistently leaking out information and exaggerating them. This particular officer is among those eyeing the top job, and has long bitterly complained about how he has always been discriminated against by the top brass. There are also stories about arms dealers and other unsavoury elements taking active interest in the appointment of the new Navy chief. Most of these stories do not have any credible evidence, but they definitely add to the resentment among the younger officers. India's warship refits suffer lack of quality control NEW DELHI: India is building a powerful Navy for the future, with as many as 44 warships on order in domestic shipyards at a cost of over 2 lakh crore in a major boost to indigenisation, but huge time and cost overruns have for long plagued the endeavour. Now, the lack of "requisite quality control", "proper planning" and "effective oversight" is also fast coming into focus in the complex arena of warship construction and refits. On Friday, Commander Kuntal Wadwa was killed after the valves of the carbon dioxide discharging system "malfunctioned" during trials on the new guided-missile destroyer INS Kolkata, which was to be handed over to the Navy in end-April. Both Mazagon Docks (MDL) and Navy will conduct separate probes into the accident. This comes days after two other officers, Lieutenant Commanders Kapish Singh Munwal and Manoranjan Kumar, were killed after inhaling toxic gases due to "a cable fire" on board INS Sindhuratna on February 26, just two months after the 26-year-old submarine underwent an extensive seven-month refit. The mishap prompted Admiral D K Joshi to resign as the Navy chief within hours. "The levels of quality control and efficiency are tardy in our defence shipyards and naval dockyards, much like other defence PSUs. Lack of proper infrastructure like paltry dry-docking facilities, timely availability of steel and supply of spares also remain huge problems," admitted a senior official. The Navy currently operates 145 warships, which includes 50 "major combatants'' and 14 submarines, apart from aircraft, helicopters and spy drones, but many of them will retire in the coming years. Consequently, the force has charted out long-term plans for induction of four to five new warships every year. But the modernisation of the four defence shipyards - MDL (Mumbai), Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (Kolkata), Goa Shipyard (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard (Vizag) - has lagged far behind what is actually required. Consider this: There has been a cost escalation of over 225% in the ongoing Project-15A at MDL to build the three Kolkata-class destroyers. The project was first sanctioned in June 2001, with INS Kolkata slated for delivery in 2008. The cost escalation for construction of four anti-submarine warfare corvettes at GRSE, in turn, stands at 157%. MDL is the largest among the four shipyards, with an order book of around Rs 1,00,000 crore, including the Rs 23,562 crore project for six Scorpene submarines and the Rs 41,007 crore one for seven guided-missile destroyers. But the overall capacity of the four shipyards is limited, forcing the government to explore private shipyards as well as public-private partnerships to meet timelines for ship-building. Warships on order 1 Indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant—Cochin Shipyard 3 Kolkata-class destroyers (Project-15A) — Mazagon Docks (MDL) 4 Guided-missile stealth destroyers (Project-15B) — MDL 6 Scorpene submarines (Project-75) — MDL 7 Stealth guided-missile frigates (Project-17A) — 4 at MDL, 3 at Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) 4 Anti-submarine warfare corvettes (Project 28)—GRSE 8 Landing Craft Utility — GRSE 5 Offshore patrol vessels — Pipavav Shipyard 2 Cadet training ships — Alcock Ashdown Shipyard 3 Double-hulled catamarans — ABG Shipyard 1 Naval offshore patrol vessel — Goa Shipyard While the defence ministry may not be very amused by P Chidambaram's advice that it must spend money wisely, many among military officers agree with the finance minister's advice. The finance minister said: "How is that money (defence budget) spent? If Rs 2.25 lakh crore is allotted to defence, how is it spent? Should it be spent on maintenance, acquiring new equipment, training, raising a new battalion — these are questions which are decided by very senior officers of the Army, Navy and the Air Force." Commenting on the recent submarine accident, Chidambaram said: "I sincerely hope that the defence forces will learn a lesson and make sure that the money allocated to them is spent more wisely and more efficiently on essential matters." He went on to say that "at some point of time the maintenance of the submarine appears to have been neglected. Only an inquiry will prove the fact, from what reports I have read (it) appears to be neglected. There seems to be some problem with the battery that led to the fire, and two precious lives were lost". The MOD did not offer any direct comment to Chidambaram, but many military officers agreed with the suggestions. "I don't really know what is going wrong. But what I can say for sure is that most of the problem is within us. We are also playing our own games (within the military)," said a naval officer who has dealt with submarine acquisitions. He said the navy, and the MOD, have not shown enough perspective to create submarine building, maintenance and overhaul capabilities. "From the HDW days (of the 1980s) when we started assembling submarines we have not moved forward much. We are almost where we started," he said. The result is expensive refits, overpriced foreign items and deep-rooted corruption. "The story is not very different in the case of fighters, tanks or any other major platform," he said. A senior MOD official said what Chidamabaram said in public is what defence minister AK Antony has been repeatedly telling the forces both in public and private. "The minister has been saying this, and pushing to be more financially prudent," he said. That is why Antony appointed independent financial comptrollers in all major departments including service headquarters, and has taken action whenever any wrongdoing was detected. Almost 600 complaints have been sent for vigilance inquiries by Antony and over 100 of them to CBI, he pointed out. Many of the other steps taken by Antony have also been in many senses a response to concerns about possible irresponsible spending, he pointed out. However, a senior navy officer pointed out that Antony has failed to push the services into embracing indigenisation in a big way, and to clean up the entire place. "The arms dealers are still very busy, India continues to be the biggest importer in the world, and we continue to spend imprudently," he said.

INS KOLKOTA-आयएनएस कोलकातात वायूगळती

अर्थमंत्रालय आणि संरक्षण खात्यात युद्धाचा भडका एवढा पैसा दिला तो गेला कुठे? युद्धनौका आणि पाणबुड्यांच्या देखभालीत अक्षम्य दुर्लक्ष होतेय! चिदंबरम यांचा ऍण्टोनींवर हल्ला नौदलाचे ग्रह फिरले... आयएनएस कोलकातात वायूगळती! माझगाव डॉकमध्ये घबराट नवी दिल्ली, दि. ७ (वृत्तसंस्था ) - संरक्षण मंत्रालयाला पैसा कमी पडतोय अशी ओरड का करता? एवढा पैसा दिला तो गेला कुठे? माझं तर ठाम मत आहे, युद्धनौका आणि पाणबुड्यांच्या देखभालीकडे अक्षम्य दुर्लक्ष होतंय, असा जबरदस्त हल्ला अर्थमंत्री पी. चिदंबरम यांनी आज संरक्षण मंत्री ए. के. ऍण्टोनी यांच्यावर चढवला. नौदलाच्या पाणबुड्यांना होणार्या अपघातांमुळे अर्थ मंत्रालय आणि संरक्षण खात्यातच युद्धाचा भडका उडाल्यासारखी स्थिती आहे. चिदंबरम यांनी आयएनएस ‘सिंधुरत्न’ या पाणबुडीला झालेल्या ताज्या अपघाताचा यावेळी उल्लेख केला. पाणबुड्यांच्या दुरुस्तीबाबत अक्षम्य बेफिकिरी दाखवली जात असल्याचे प्रकर्षाने जाणवू लागले आहे असे सांगून अर्थमंत्री म्हणाले की, ‘सिंधुरत्न’च्या अपघातामागील कारणे चौकशीतूनच उलगडतील, पण मी स्वत: जो अहवाल वाचला त्यावरून पाणबुड्यांच्या दुरुस्तीकडे दुर्लक्ष करण्यात आल्याचे मला कळून चुकले आहे. संरक्षण खात्याला पुरेसा निधी मिळत नाही, ही संरक्षण मंत्री ऍण्टोनी यांची ओरडही साफ खोटी असल्याचे चिदंबरम यांनी सांगितले. आपल्या अर्थ मंत्रालयाने संरक्षण खात्याला २.२५ लाख कोटींचा निधी दिला आहे असे सांगून ते म्हणाले की, हा निधी बर्यापैकी मोठा आहे. नौदल अधिकार्याचा गुदमरुन मृत्यू मुंबई : हिंदुस्थानच्या नौदलाचे ग्रहच फिरलेत. ‘आयएनएस सिंधुरत्न’ पाणबुडीमध्ये स्फोट होऊन दोन अधिकारी ठार झाल्याची घटना ताजी असतानाच नौदलाच्या ताफ्यात लवकरच दाखल होणार्या ‘आयएनएस कोलकाता’ या विनाशिकेवर शुक्रवारी प्रचंड वायुगळती झाली. इंजिन रूममध्ये कार्बनडायऑक्साइड वायू कोंडला. यात नौदल कमांडर कुंदल वाधवा (४२) यांचा गुदमरून मृत्यू झाला. तर डॉकमधील कर्मचारी असलम काझी (५१) हे जखमी झाले. कशी झाली वायुगळती मुंबई, दि. ७ (प्रतिनिधी) - हिंदुस्थानी नौदलाच्या ताफ्यात लवकरच दाखल होणार्या ‘आयएनएस कोलकाता’ या विनाशिकेवर शुक्रवारी मुंबईच्या माझगाव डॉकमध्ये परीक्षण आणि चाचण्या सुरू असतानाच तेथील कार्बन-डाय-ऑक्साईडचा मोठा सिलिंडर खाली पडला आणि वायुगळती होऊन एका नौदल कमांडरचा गुदमरून मृत्यू झाला, तर एकजण जखमी झाला. या दुर्घटनेचा आंखों देखा हाल चौकशी करणार्या मुंबई पोलिसांनी दिला आहे. कार्बनडायऑक्साइड इतक्या वेगात इंजिन रूममध्ये पसरला की, या ठिकाणी काम करणार्या कमांडर कुंदल वाधवा यांना बाहेर पडायची संधीदेखील मिळाली नाही. श्वास कोंडल्याने कुंदल यांचा जागीच मृत्यू झाला तर त्याच ठिकाणी काम करणारे माझगाव डॉकमधील कर्मचारी अस्लम काझी हेदेखील बेशुद्ध झाले. त्यांना उपचारासाठी माझगाव येथील प्रिन्स अली रुग्णालयात दाखल करण्यात आले असून त्यांची प्रकृती स्थिर असल्याचे पोलिसांनी म्हटले आहे. मिसाइल उद्ध्वस्त करण्याची क्षमता असलेली युद्धनौका सुमारे ६८०० टन वजनाच्या ‘आयएनएस कोलकाता’ या विनाशिकेचे २००६ साली जलावतरण करण्यात आले. १६३ मीटर लांबीची ही विनाशिका २०१० साली नौदलाच्या ताफ्यात दाखल होणार होती. पण नवीन शस्त्रप्रणाली आणि सेन्सर यासारखे काही बदल नौदलातर्फे सुचविण्यात आल्याने या प्रक्रियेला विलंब झाला. अद्ययावत तंत्रज्ञानाचा वापर करण्यात आलेल्या या युद्धनौकेत मिसाइल उद्ध्वस्त करण्याची क्षमता आहे

STOPPING SINDHURATNA /SUBMARINE ACCIDENTS

नौदलाच्या पाणबुड्या व युद्धनौकांचे वारंवार होणारे अपघात रोखण्यासाठी युद्धपातळीवर प्रयत्न व्हायला हवेत. दुरुस्ती-देखभाल आणि आधुनिकीकरणासंबंधीचे निर्णय तत्परतेने घेण्याची गरज आहे. "जे आकाशात उडते ते जमिनीवर येतेच; पण जे समुद्रात बुडते ते वर येईलच असे सांगता येत नाही.'' नौदलाच्या "वीरबाहू' या पाणबुडी तळावरचे हे पोस्टर खूप बोलके आहे. पाणबुडीवर काम करताना किती मोठी जोखीम उचलावी लागते, याचीही कल्पना त्यावरून येते. भारतीय नौदलाच्या "सिंधुरत्न' या पाणबुडीला अपघात होऊन दोन अधिकाऱ्यांचा मृत्यू झाल्यानंतर पाणबुड्या आणि त्यांची सद्यःस्थिती हा अगदी "तळा'शी गेलेला विषय चर्चाविश्‍वाच्या पृष्ठभागी आला आहे. परंतु या अपघातातून काही धडा आपण शिकलो असू आणि त्याप्रमाणे उपाय योजणार असू, तरच या मंथनाचा उपयोग आहे. पाणबुड्यांवर काम करणाऱ्या नौसैनिकांना हवाई दलातील वैमानिकांप्रमाणे जोखीम भत्ता मिळतो; परंतु दोन्हीतील फरक असा, की हवाई दलात पायलट नेव्हिगेटर्सना प्रामुख्याने धोका असतो. पाणबुडीतील सर्वांनाच धोक्‍यांचा सामना करावा लागतो. पाण्याखाली असताना Sonar (प्रतिध्वनीच्या साह्याने पाण्याखालील वस्तूचा ठाव घेणारे उपकरण) किंवा तत्सम उपकरणावर अवलंबून राहावे लागते. पाणबुडीला खिडक्‍या नसतात. बॅटरीमधून हायड्रोजन (स्फोटक गॅस), क्‍लोरिन (विषारी गॅस) निघत असतो. अग्निशमन करण्यासाठी "फ्रिऑन' नावाचा वायू वापरला जातो. तोही धोक्‍याचाच असतो. पाणबुडीत अगदी कॅप्टनसह सर्व नौसैनिक एकच जेवण घेतात. इतकेच काय, सर्वजण एकच स्वच्छतागृह वापरतात. तसेच ते समुद्रात जातात तेव्हा कोणालाच अंघोळ करता येत नाही. कारण तेवढे पाणीच उपलब्ध नसते. पाण्याखाली असताना शौचास जाणे हीसुद्धा अत्यंत "टेक्‍निकल' गोष्ट असते. एकच उदाहरण देतो. 1944 मध्ये जर्मनीची पाणबुडी U1206 च्या कॅप्टन शिल्टझ याने शौचालय वापरावयाच्या कृतीत चूक केली आणि पाणी, घाण बाहेर जाण्याऐवजी आतच उडाली व बॅटरीत गेली. बॅटरी दुरुस्तीसाठी पाणबुडी पाण्यावर आणावी लागली व दुर्दैवाने मित्रराष्ट्रांच्या विमानाने हल्ला करून तिला बुडविले. 1977 मध्ये मी कलवरी क्‍लासच्या "खंदेरी' पाणबुडीवर इन्चार्ज होतो. इंजिनमध्ये अर्धवट ज्वलन होऊ लागले. धुराबरोबर कार्बन मोनोक्‍साईड हा विषारी वायू तयार होऊ लागला व एक्‍झॉस्ट फ्लॅप बिघडल्याने धूर सातव्या कंपार्टमेंटपर्यंत जाऊ लागला. सात नौसैनिक चक्कर येऊन पडले. त्यांना उचलून तिसऱ्या कंपार्टमेंटमध्ये नेले, की तेथील शुद्ध हवेने ते ताजेतवाने होत. पण एकेकाला उचलून तिकडे नेणे ही मोठीच कसरत होती. हे सर्व एवढ्यासाठीच नमूद केले, की नौसैनिक कोणत्या परिस्थितीत काम करतात, याची कल्पना यावी. अपघात प्रतिबंधाच्या उपाययोजनांची चर्चा करताना तशी ती येणे आवश्‍यक आहे. ""सिंधुरक्षक'' ही पाणबुडी मुंबई बंदरात स्फोट होऊन बुडाली. त्यापाठोपाठ ""सिंधुरत्न'' पाणबुडीला अपघात होऊन दोन अधिकाऱ्यांचा मृत्यू झाला. या घटनेनंतर नौदलप्रमुखांनी नैतिक जबाबदारी स्वीकारून राजीनामा दिला व तो तडकाफडकी मंजूर झाला. गेल्या सात महिन्यांत दहा अपघातांत नौदलाच्या युद्धनौका व पाणबुड्यांचे नुकसान झाले. त्याआधी फेब्रुवारी 2011 मध्ये ""विंध्यगिरी'' ही तीन हजार टनांची युद्धनौका जर्मन व्यापारी जहाजाशी टक्कर होऊन मुंबई बंदरात बुडाली. एकूणच हे अपघात रोखण्यासाठी योग्य ती पावले न उचलल्यास नौदलाच्या कर्मचाऱ्यांचे नीतिधैर्य खालावेल. तसे होता कामा नये. भारतीय नौदलात जर्मन बनावटीच्या ""शिशुमार'' क्‍लासच्या चार पाणबुड्या आहेत. त्या ""हंटर किलर'' आहेत. म्हणजे त्यांचे काम शत्रूच्या पाणबुड्यांना बुडविणे आहे. तसेच रशियन बनावटीच्या ""सिंधुघोष'' प्रकारातील नऊ पाणबुड्या आहेत. 290 कि.मी. अंतरावर मारा करता येतील अशी "क्‍लब' मिसाइल्स त्यावर आहेत. "सिंधुघोष'च्या नऊपैकी आठ पाणबुड्या जुन्या झाल्या आहेत. आता सर्व पाणबुड्यांची, त्यातील उच्च तांत्रिक उपकरणांची काळजीपूर्वक तपासणी करून, ज्या पाणबुड्या समुद्रात जाण्याच्या अवस्थेत नसतील, त्यांना बाहेर काढले पाहिजे. गेल्या चौदा वर्षांत आपण एकही पाणबुडी नव्याने विकत घेतलेली नाही किंवा बनविलेली नाही. आहे त्याच पाणबुड्यांकडून काम भागविण्याच्या वृत्तीने धोकादायक परिस्थिती निर्माण झाली आहे. "सिंधुघोष' प्रकारच्या पाणबुड्या इराणकडेही आहेत व त्यांना "हटॅन्डर्ड' या भारतीय कंपनीने बॅटरी दिल्या आहेत. त्यांना समस्या उद्भवत नाही, याचे कारण ते त्या योग्यवेळी बदलतात. प्रगत देशांतही अपघातात पाणबुड्या बुडतात; पण ते देश त्या घटनेचा सखोल अभ्यास करतात, पूर्ण कार्यप्रणाली सुधारतात आणि अपघाताची पुनरावृत्ती होऊ देत नाहीत. त्या वृत्तीचे आपण अनुकरण केले पाहिजे. संरक्षण मंत्रालयात निधी देण्याची निर्णयक्षमता ज्यांच्याकडे आहे, त्यांच्यात व संरक्षण दलात "ताळमेळ' दिसत नाही. म्हणूनच असे वाटते, की ज्या वेळी एखादी पाणबुडी सज्ज होऊन समुद्रात पाठवली जाते, तेव्हा सर्व संबंधित मुलकी, तसेच दुरुस्ती-देखभाल विभागाच्या अधिकाऱ्यांना पाणबुडीबरोबर पाठवून तेथील परिस्थितीचा थोडा तरी अनुभव दिला पाहिजे. तसा तो दिल्यास निधी देण्याबाबत जास्त योग्य निर्णय ते घेऊ शकतील आणि त्यातील तातडीही त्यांना कळेल. कारण शेवटी "ज्याचे जळते त्याला कळते', हेच खरे. हवेत, पाण्यात वा जमिनीवर आपल्या जवानांनी अतुलनीय शौर्य गाजविले आहे; पण "सरकारी टेबला'पुढे मात्र त्यांचे काही चालत नाही, हे दुर्दैवी चित्र बदलायलाच हवे. जुन्या पाणबुड्यांची जागा नवीन पाणबुड्यांनी घेणे महत्त्वाचे. दुरुस्तीच्या व आधुनिक पायाभूत संरचना तयार करण्यावर लक्ष केंद्रित करावे लागेल. दहा ""सिंधुघोष'' पाणबुड्यांच्या आधुनिकीकरणासाठी सुमारे आठ हजार कोटी रुपये आपण खर्च केले. एवढा निधी भारतात खर्च केला, तर व्यापक पायाभूत संरचना निर्माण करता येईल. उत्तम प्रशिक्षण केलेल्या लोकांकडून पाणबुड्यांची व युद्धनौकांची देखभाल केली तर सुरक्षितता निश्‍चितच वाढेल. आराखडा, बांधणी, प्रशिक्षण व देखभाल यांचा योग्य व अद्ययावत पद्धतींचा अभ्यास सातत्याने केला पाहिजे. आपल्याकडील "निरीक्षक' नावाचे जहाज फक्त 150 मीटरपर्यंत खोल बुडालेल्या पाणबुडीला वर काढू शकते. अमेरिकेकडून "डीप सी रेस्क्‍यू व्हेसल'(DSRV) घेतल्यास दुर्घटनाग्रस्त पाणबुडी बाहेर काढण्याची व्यापक क्षमता प्राप्त होईल. शांतता काळातील अपघात फारच क्‍लेशकारक असतात. ते रोखलेच पाहिजेत. जगातील सर्वांत सुरक्षित नौदल असा लौकिक पुन्हा प्राप्त करण्यासाठी आता दृढविश्‍वास व कठोर परिश्रमांची गरज आहे. कवीने म्हटल्याप्रमाणे "आली जरी कष्टदशा अपार, न सांडिती वीर कदापि थोर.' त्या जिद्दीने पुन्हा उभे राहिले पाहिजे

INS SINDHURATNA BRAVE OFFICERS

INS Sindhuratna’s commanding officer, taken grievously ill on Wednesday after jumping into a hellish pit of poisonous fumes to try and save two juniors, has cheated “the jaws of death” and been taken off the ventilator, navy sources said. Commander Sandeep Sinha, 40, had inhaled toxic gases during the accident on the submarine, when a battery leak started a fire and extinguisher fumes filled two compartments. Two officers died and many were left critical. “He has been taken off the ventilator. He was quite serious till morning but in the afternoon, there was a sudden turnaround,” a Western Naval Command source said. “The doctors are saying that his willpower has brought him back from the jaws of death.” A fellow submariner and former National Defence Academy mate had yesterday described “Sandy” Sinha as a “fighter” and hoped he would “pull this one off too”. Sinha is the son of a retired naval commander of the logistics directorate and the son-in-law of a retired rear admiral from the naval armament inspectorate. His wife Meetu, a computer engineer, had quit her Tata Consultancy Service job two years ago to support him during his command posting in Mumbai. The couple have a four-year-old daughter and a two-and-a-half-year-old son. “Meetu has been by his side. Coming as she does from a family of naval officers and submariners, she has shown a stoic grace during these very tough and painful two days that few can emulate. The doctors were not sure how Sandy would fare,” the navy source said. Meetu’s brother, Commander R. Sominder, is a submariner too. “Sandy and Sominder were course mates and close friends,” the source said. The family’s naval connection doesn’t end there: the husband of Meetu’s sister is also a navy commander. “This is a family that has the Indian Navy in its veins. They know the challenges of the job. They know the sacrifices that are needed and are not scared of them,” the senior naval officer who spoke to this newspaper said. ‘Heroic’ effort Sinha had rushed into compartment 3 of the Sindhuratna on finding that two officers —Lieutenant Commander Kapish Muwal and Lieutenant Manoranjan Kumar — had been trapped inside. “He had gone in to try to rescue them in total disregard of his personal safety. But his heroic efforts failed to save the two juniors’ lives,” said the source. Despite taking in the gases and fully aware that they could be lethal, Sinha had manned the controls personally and brought the submarine up to the surface. He had then stood by till every single soul had climbed to the surface to breathe in fresh air and revive themselves. “He insisted he wouldn’t go up till every person on board had done so. Then, after ensuring shutdown of the controls, he was the last to go up,” the source said. By that time he was quite sick, but still refused to be air-evacuated with the first lot of seven critically ill crew members. “He agreed to go only when a ship came in after three hours to evacuate 22 more sailors and officers. This worsened his condition,” said the source, who is on the navy’s board of inquiry that will probe the accident. The board of inquiry is to be headed by Rear Admiral S.V. Bhokare, Flag Officer Submarines. Bhokare is posted in Visakhapatnam but was in Mumbai during the accident. This afternoon, the navy conducted a wreath-laying ceremony with full military honours in memory of Muwal and Kumar at the Western Naval Command, where there were few dry eyes. The bodies had been handed over to their families last night. Sources said Muwal had probably been the first to spot the fire and had swiftly jumped in to contain its spread, with Kumar’s help. The two of them died trying to save the others in the two gas-filled compartments. After the ceremony, Muwal was cremated in Mumbai. Kumar’s body will be flown to hometown Jamshedpur for the last rites. It was erroneously reported in today’s edition that Muwal was married and leaves behind a child. --

SINDHRATNA DROWNED

१८ नौसैनिकांचा बळी घेऊन ‘सिंधुरक्षक’ बुडाली. आता ‘सिंधुरत्न’ अपघातग्रस्त झाली. यावेळीही आमच्या ‘स्थितप्रज्ञ’ संरक्षणमंत्र्यांनी स्वत: सुरक्षित राहून ऍडमिरल जोशी यांना बुडवले आहे. हिंदुस्थानी संरक्षण दलाने बंदुका व तोफगोळ्यांचे उत्पादन बंद करून ‘फेविकॉल’चे उत्पादन सुरू केलेले दिसते. कारण इतके होऊनही संरक्षणमंत्री खुर्चीला घट्ट चिकटून बसले आहेत. ‘फेविकॉल’ अँटनी ऍडमिरल का बुडाले? हिंदुस्थानच्या संरक्षण दलास वाळवी लागली आहे. समुद्रात पाणबुड्या आगीत खाक होत आहेत किंवा बुडत आहेत. हवाई दलाची मिग लढाऊ विमाने कोसळत आहेत. सीमेवरील सैनिकांची मुंडकी छाटून पाकिस्तानात नेली जात आहेत. तरीही देशाचे संरक्षणमंत्री व त्यांचे कारभारी षंढासारखे बसून आहेत. सहा महिन्यांपूर्वी भीषण स्फोटात आय.एन.एस. ‘सिंधुरक्षक’ ही पाणबुडी नष्ट झाली. त्यात १८ नौसैनिकांचे बळी गेले व आता पश्चिम किनारपट्टीवर हिंदुस्थानी नौदलाची आणखी एक पाणबुडी ‘सिंधुरत्न’ जबरदस्त अपघातग्रस्त झाली आहे. या अपघातातही कपिष मुवल आणि मनोरंजन कुमार या अधिकार्यांचा मृत्यू झाला आहे. गेल्या काही महिन्यांपासून नौदलास अपघातांनी ग्रासले असून प्रचंड नुकसानीस तोंड द्यावे लागत आहे. हिंदुस्थानच्या आरमाराची अशा प्रकारे झालेली वाताहत पाहून शेजारच्या दुश्मन राष्ट्रास आनंदाच्या उकळ्या फुटत असतील. कारण कोणतेही युद्ध सुरू नसताना हिंदुस्थानचे आरमार नष्ट होत आहे. ‘सिंधुरत्न’ पाणबुडीस झालेल्या अपघाताची जबाबदारी स्वीकारून देशाचे नौदलप्रमुख डी. के. जोशी यांनी राजीनामा दिला आहे व कुचकामी संरक्षणमंत्री ए. के. अँटनी यांनी तो स्वीकारला आहे. ऍडमिरल जोशी यांच्या काळात नौदलात सर्वाधिक अपघात झाले व पाणबुड्यांच्या अपघातांनी आमच्या नौदलाची प्रतिष्ठा धुळीस मिळाली आहे. त्यामुळे नौदलप्रमुखांनी राजीनामा दिला. मग याच नैतिकतेच्या मुद्यावर संरक्षणमंत्र्यांनी राजीनामा का देऊ नये? ऍडमिरल जोशी यांनाही त्या पाणबुडीबरोबर बुडवून संरक्षणमंत्री स्वत:ची चामडी वाचवू पाहत असतील तर तो सर्वच प्रकार कोडगेपणाचा कळसच म्हणावा लागेल. नौदलप्रमुखांच्या राजीनाम्याआधी संरक्षणमंत्र्यांनी पदत्याग केला असता तर त्यांची शान राहिली असती. रेल्वे अपघात झाला म्हणून लालबहादूर शास्त्री यांनी तडकाफडकी रेल्वे मंत्रीपदाचा राजीनामा दिला होता. विमान कोसळले म्हणून त्या खात्याचे मंत्री माधवराव शिंदे यांनीही मंत्रीपदाचा त्याग केला होता, पण मनमोहन सिंगांच्या सरकारमधील मंत्र्यांच्या नालायकीचे बळी अधिकारी ठरत आहेत व त्यागपत्र देऊन घरी जाण्याची नैतिक जबाबदारी अधिकार्यांवर लादली जात आहे. हिंदुस्थानचे लष्कर, नौदल व हवाई दल हे जगात सामर्थ्यशाली असल्याचा डांगोरा आपणच पिटत असतो. प्रत्यक्षात ही तीनही दले नैराश्याने ग्रासली आहेत. नेतृत्वच कुचकामी असल्यावर दुसरे काय व्हायचे हो? संरक्षणमंत्री अँटनी हे सज्जन गृहस्थ असल्याचे सांगितले जाते. मात्र त्यांच्या सज्जनपणाचे झेंडे फडकवून दुश्मनांना पळवून लावता येणार नाही. त्यासाठी लढावेच लागेल. तुम्ही भले सज्जन असाल, पण ते पाकडे किंवा चीनची लाल माकडे तुमच्या सज्जनपणास हिंग लावून विचारीत नाहीत. पंतप्रधान मनमोहन सिंगही सज्जनपणाचा निर्जीव पुतळाच आहेत, पण त्यांच्या सज्जनपणामुळे देशातील आर्थिक अराजक कमी झाले काय? भ्रष्टाचार व महागाईवर उतारा म्हणून मनमोहन यांचा सज्जनपणा उपयोगाचा नाही. तेथे पाहिजे जातीचे, येरागबाळ्याचे हे काम नाही. देशाचे नेतृत्व खंबीर हवे, त्याचे मन व मनगट पोलादी हवे आणि आपल्याकडे नेमकी याचीच कमतरता आहे. अँटनी हे गळपटलेले संरक्षणमंत्री आहेत. खरे तर त्यांचा पिंड संरक्षणमंत्र्यांचा नाही. शिक्षणमंत्री किंवा समाजकल्याणमंत्री म्हणून ते उत्तमप्रकारे काम करू शकतात. पण त्यांच्या शिरावर टाकण्यात आला आहे तो देशाच्या संरक्षण खात्याचा भार. तो त्यांना अजिबात पेलवत नाही आणि सोनियांनीच हा भार लादल्याने सहन होत नाही आणि सांगताही येत नाही, अशी त्यांची अवस्था झाली आहे. हिंदुस्थानला संरक्षणमंत्री कसा हवा, तर एकदम ‘दबंग’! पाकड्या व चीनच्या गुंडगिरीस त्याच गुंडगिरीने जशास तसे उत्तर देणारा. पाकिस्तान व चीन हातात हात घालून हिंदुस्थानच्या कुरापती काढतात व आपण मात्र हात चोळत बसतो. ईशान्येकडून चीन धडका मारतो आहे. कश्मीर खोर्यातून पाकडा घुसतो आहे. आसामातून बांगलादेशी हातभर आत शिरला आहे. अशारीतीने हिंदुस्थानची संरक्षण सिद्धता रसातळाला गेली आहे, पण याची खंत संरक्षणमंत्र्यांना आहे असे दिसत नाही. सीमेवर हिंदुस्थानी सैन्यावर हल्ले सुरूच आहेत. वास्तविक पाकिस्तानी सैनिक (खरे तर अतिरेकी!) आमच्या हद्दीत घुसून आमच्या जवानांची मुंडकी कापून घेऊन गेले त्याचवेळी संरक्षणमंत्र्यांनी राजीनामा द्यायला हवा होता. आमच्या देशाची इतकी नाचक्की कधीच झाली नव्हती. ‘पाकिस्तानला धडा शिकवू’ असे नुसते पालुपद वाजवून दुश्मनांचा खात्मा कसा होणार? हवाई दलातील मिग विमाने म्हणजे उडणार्या शवपेट्याच बनल्या होत्या. तरणीबांड पोरे त्यात नाहक मरत असतानाही संरक्षणमंत्री शांतपणे खुर्चीला चिकटून बसले होते. आताही त्यांचे तेच सुरू आहे. देशाच्या संरक्षणमंत्र्यांनी रोज राजीनामा द्यावा असे भयंकर प्रकार हिंदुस्थानी नौदलात घडत आहेत. १८ नौसैनिकांचा बळी घेऊन ‘सिंधुरक्षक’ बुडाली तेव्हा हाहाकार माजला. संरक्षणमंत्री आता नक्कीच राजीनामा देतील असे तेव्हा वाटले होते, पण तसे घडले नाही. आता ‘सिंधुरत्न’ अपघातग्रस्त झाली आणि दोन अधिकार्यांचा बळी गेला. यावेळीही आमच्या ‘स्थितप्रज्ञ’ संरक्षणमंत्र्यांनी स्वत: सुरक्षित राहून ऍडमिरल जोशी यांना बुडवले आहे. हिंदुस्थानी संरक्षण दलाने बंदुका व तोफगोळ्यांचे उत्पादन बंद करून ‘फेविकॉल’चे उत्पादन सुरू केलेले दिसते. कारण इतके होऊनही संरक्षणमंत्री खुर्चीला घट्ट चिकटून बसले आहेत. कमाल आहे!

MILITARY WIFE

MILITARY SPOUSE It was just another harried Wednesday afternoon trip to the commissary (that's a military grocery store). My husband was off teaching other young men how to fly. My daughters were going about their daily activities, knowing I would return to them bearing, among other things, their favorite fruit snacks, frozen pizza, and all the little extras you never write down on a grocery list. My list, by the way, was in my 16-month old daughter's mouth, and I was lamenting the fact that the next four aisles of needed items would have to wait while I extracted the list from her mouth. And in the middle of all this, I nearly ran over an old man. This man clearly had no appreciation for the fact that I had only 45 minutes left to finish the grocery shopping, pick up my four-year old from tumbling class, then get to school where my 12-year old and her carpool friends would be waiting. I knew men didn't belong in a commissary, and this old guy was no exception. He stood in front of the soap selections, staring blankly, as if he'd never had to choose a bar of soap in his life. I was ready to bark an order at him when I noticed a small tear on his face. Instantly this grocery aisle roadblock transformed into a human. "Can I help you find something?" I asked. He hesitated, then told me he was looking for soap. "Any one in particular?" I queried. "Well, I'm trying to find my wife's brand of soap." I reached for my cell phone so he could call his wife, and as I pulled it out he said, "She died a year ago, and I just want to smell her again." Chills ran down my spine. I don't think the 22,000-pound mother-of-all-bombs could have had the same impact. As tears welled up in my eyes, my half-eaten grocery list didn't seem so important. Neither did fruit snacks or frozen pizza. I spent the remainder of my time in the commissary that day, listening to a man tell the story of how important his wife was to him; how she took care of their children while he served our country. A retired, decorated World War II pilot, who flew missions to protect Americans, still needed the protection of a woman who served him at home. My life was forever changed that day. Every time my husband works too late or leaves before the crack of dawn, I try to remember the sense of importance I felt that day in the commissary. Sometimes the monotony of laundry, housecleaning, grocery shopping, and family taxi driving leaves military wives feeling empty; the kind of emptiness that is rarely fulfilled when our husbands come home, then don't want to or can't talk about work. We need to be reminded at times of the important role we fill for our family and our country. Military wives aren't any better than other wives, but we are different. Other spouses get married and look forward to building equity and putting down roots. Military spouses get married and know they'll spend years in temporary housing, so the roots have to be short for frequent transplanting. Other spouses say goodbye to their spouse for a business trip and know they won't see them for a week. Military spouses say goodbye to their deploying spouses and know they won't seem them for months, or a year, or even longer. Other spouses get used to saying "hello" to friends they see all the time. Military spouses get used to saying "goodbye" to friends they've made in the past couple of years. Other spouses worry about being late to Mom's house for Thanksgiving dinner. Military spouses worry about getting back from Japan in time for Dad's funeral. I will say, without hesitation, that military spouses pay just as high a price for freedom as their active duty husbands. --

NO WAR MEMORIAL TO LAY WREATH IN INDIA

No place to lay the wreathJan 29, 2014· · S.K. SinhaThe need for a National War Memorial for soldiers, sailors and airmen has been under examination for over half a century, but nothing has materialised so far thanks to bureaucratic hassles and political indecisivenessThis Republic Day, I watched the Indian high commissioner ceremonially lay a wreath at the impressive Indian Peace-Keeping Force war memorial in Colombo. Sri Lankan Navy buglers suitably participated in the solemn function.The names of 1,000 Indian soldiers killed in Sri Lanka are inscribed in golden letters on black granite at the IPKF memorial. I knew some of the officers whose names are inscribed there. They made the supreme sacrifice at the altar of the folly of our political leadership. This war was not in defence of our nation nor for promoting our national interests. Irrespective of any faulty decision of the political leadership, the soldier acting on it in his line of duty and making the supreme sacrifice is a national hero and his memory must be honoured. The IPKF contingent returning from Sri Lanka faced hostile demonstration and black flags in their home country when they landed in Tamil Nadu. J.R. Jayawardene, the late President of Sri Lanka, had asked for Indian help in dealing with the LTTE and that set a chain of events in which the Indian Army was fighting the Tamil Tigers. President Ranasinghe Premadasa wanted the IPKF to quit Sri Lanka and the IPKF was withdrawn. In 1993, he invited India to put up an IPKF war memorial in Colombo for which he earmarked a site. Little later he was assassinated by the Tamil Tigers. The IPKF memorial was completed in 2010. The memorial for Sri Lankan soldiers killed in the war against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is not far from this site. For their soldiers who made the supreme sacrifice for their country, the US has Arlington in Washington, the UK has the Cenotaph in London, France has the Arc de Triumph in Paris and in our neighbourhood, Bangladesh has one in Dhaka and Sri Lanka has a memorial in Colombo. The British not only included the Indian soldiers in their war memorial in London, but also memorials near battlefields in countries like France, Italy and Egypt. When the capital of India was shifted to New Delhi, they built India Gate in the heart of Lutyens’ New Delhi to honour the memory of Indian soldiers killed in the Third Afghan War and the First World War. They quit India soon after. But they built war memorials for the soldiers who laid down their lives near the battlefields at Kohima and Imphal. The former is perhaps the prettiest war memorial in the world. It is on a terraced well-maintained lawn with names of soldiers along with their religious symbols inscribed on small brass tablets in rows in lush green grass. The entrance has an arch with the following touching words inscribed on it: “When you go back home tell them of us, for their tomorrow we gave our today.” Over 80,000 Indian soldiers have died in various wars we have fought since Independence. There is no National War Memorial for them in New Delhi. The need for a National War Memorial for soldiers, sailors and airmen has been under examination for over half a century, but nothing has materialised so far thanks to bureaucratic hassles and political indecisiveness. As deputy adjutant-general in early Seventies and, five years later, as adjutant-general in late Seventies, I was closely associated with the National War Memorial project at a prime place in the heart of the capital, where both our and foreign dignitaries could place wreaths. After our great victory in the Indo-Pak war of December 1971, Indira Gandhi desired to lay a wreath at a memorial for our martyrs of that war. We rigged up a temporary war memorial under India Gate with a rectangular platform with a soldier’s rifle embedded in it upside down and steel helmet above the butt. An eternal flame was also put up on the top of India Gate. This arrangement has continued to this day pending construction of a proper war memorial. This strengthened our case for a proper national War Memorial at that site. After a quarter of a century, we got government approval in principle for a national war memorial to be constructed there. A striking design in the middle of the roundabout was approved by the Cabinet in 2009. Work has not started as Sheila Dikshit, the then chief minister, raised objection saying that the people of New Delhi will be denied a popular picnic spot. There are many parks nearby, like the Lodhi Gardens, open space in Purana Qila and the huge Jawaharlal Nehru Park. In fact, there is a valid case to stop picnic near India Gate as picnickers litter the area. Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal has made many populist promises which seem almost impossible to implement. Among these is to demolish bungalows with large compounds in Lutyens’ Delhi and put up high-rise apartments for the poor. He may well come up with the idea of having high-rise apartments near India Gate and shelve the national war memorial project. We have a lame duck government at the Centre, which has always shown a marked inability to take decisions. In view of all this we may find that the national war memorial project may remain in cold storage. However, if our parliamentary elections throw up a strong Prime Minister with a reputation and proven record of an achiever, someone who gets things done and has consideration for the military, a national war memorial can come up soon.The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir

THINK TWICE BEFORE ACCUSING ARMED FORCES

Two lessons from the closure of the Barak investigation: be careful with investigations, and buy from the US or Russia through transparent protocols] Reports indicate that the Defence Acquisition Council, chaired by the defence minister, has finally cleared the purchase of a couple of hundred missiles for the Barak anti-air systems fitted in the warships of the Indian Navy. This proposal had been kept in abeyance for several years even as the Central Bureau of Investigation was charged by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to probe allegations of corrupt practices in the purchase of the systems for which these missiles were sought to be procured. Since this weaponry constitutes the last defence against incoming aircraft and the anti-ship missiles fired from them, the decision not to procure clearly exposed the ships to very serious danger of their being hit, possibly sunk. This vulnerability, apparently, did not merit attention; things could wait till the CBI completed its probe. This it has now done and concluded that there is no evidence of any wrongdoing that would stand up to scrutiny. This entire episode merits examination. In 1983, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) initiated work on development of four missile systems - Agni, Prithvi, Aakash and Trishul. The first two were derivates of rocket technology that already existed, while the other two were to be anti air systems which would be far more complex since they had to cope with fast moving targets. DRDO tried to update technology available in similar weaponry of Soviet origin already in use in the Air Force and the Navy; but, despite all its efforts, the goal could not be achieved. In the meantime, the threat to our ships from aircraft and low flying anti-ship missiles had increased. In this scenario, the Navy's recommendation, after critical evaluation of systems available in the international arms market, to fit the Israeli Barak system in the aircraft carrier INS Viraat, was approved by the MoD in 1997. For equipping other ships in similar fashion, it was decided to await development of the Trishul on the assurance of the then head of DRDO that this would soon come about - which did not happen. In 1999, came the conflict in Kargil; and, faced with the exposure of major warships to the air threat, the Navy recommended fitment of Barak in some of its frontline platforms. This proposal, approved by MOD, made eminent sense - including for reasons of standardisation. In 2006, based on some reports - from vested sources or otherwise - the defence minister directed a CBI investigation into the purchase of these Barak systems. Concurrently, procurement of missiles for them was suspended. A FIR was lodged by the investigating agency after a "preliminary enquiry" in which, amazingly, the then Chief of the Naval Staff was, personally, named as possibly complicit in malfeasance. Left unrecognised was a simple fact: chiefs of our armed forces neither personally nominate any hardware for procurement nor evaluate them. Whatever recommendation they make emerges from the work done in their headquarters by dozens of officers of different ranks, all of them with more professional knowledge and experience than most others. To say that questioning a chief's personal integrity and thus humiliating him, was an unfortunate decision for which the defence minister has to bear responsibility, is putting things mildly. Service chiefs are not heads of some public-sector units or even secretaries to government; by subjecting them to indignity, the entire institution they command, navy, army or air force, is denigrated. Now, seven years later, the CBI comes up with a closure report and the DRDO, in response to persistent demands made by the slighted navy chief under the Right to Information Act, grudgingly admits that Trishul had never been a product development but only a technology demonstration exercise and had belied even that expectation. But this is not just about one case of palpable indifference to combat readiness of the armed forces by politicians in power. Procurement of 155mm Bofors guns for the army from Sweden and submarines for the navy from a company in Germany in the 1980s went the same route. In both cases, the firms were blacklisted; in the first a beaming CBI director returned from Switzerland with bagfuls of documents which he claimed would nail the guilty in months - but, 15 years down the line, there is nothing that has been proven. In the second case, the CBI had to file for closure for want of evidence; yet, a former vice-chief of naval staff had been named in the FIR as a likely collaborator in the conspiracy. As a fall-out of the first, the army has not had a replacement gun for more than two decades; and as for the second, production of submarines in India was laid waste for 15 years, leave aside the tattered reputations of honourable men. In the late 1990s, procurement of T-90 tanks from Russia was questioned by an ex- prime minister based on unsubstantiated inputs and the integrity of a senior army officer brought into question. Most recently, a former chief of the air force has been FIR-ed, literally, for having approved a modification in specifications for VVIP helicopters; that this was demanded by the user agency responsible, with the concurrence of the National Security Adviser, was ignored. This purchase has now been cancelled and the company stands ready for getting blacklisted - without any reason to believe that it will not lead to another closure by the CBI some years later. More purchases might also follow this route. As one looks at these instances critically, two things stand out. One, the political leadership shows little concern either for issues which impact the combat readiness of the armed forces, or of the adverse impact of having the senior most military commanders routinely investigated. Second, the principal investigating agency, as a consequence, spares little thought in naming service chiefs in the FIRs, subjecting them to a humiliation which no subsequent closure can erase. The civil bureaucracy in the MoD, which contributes to both, becomes a bystander with little accountability. This is not to suggest that there are not similar investigations in other countries; but they are processed with due care and credible evidence and invariably lead to prosecution and conviction, not closure. In short, they are preceded by 'application of mind'. This, sadly, is lacking in our system of governance, such as it is. Finally, as much of the mud gets thrown around, largely as a result of vendor competition, it may be appropriate to recall late K Subrahmanyam's advice: import of major military hardware should go the single-vendor route and either be channeled from Russia through price negotiation, as was done over several decades and more recently for warships and MIG 29Ks acquired by the navy; or with the United States through the foreign military sales (FMS) route, in which purchase cost is anchored to what the US military has paid - as has been done in the case of C-130J, C-17 and P-8I aircraft. Other methodologies are clearly unsuited to the Indian way of doing business, only resulting in controversy and humiliation, not combat capability. There are lessons to be learnt from Barak. The writer was a member of a 2000 task force on higher defence management and has also served on the National Security Advisory Board

WHAT VICTORY IN KASHMIR MEANS -GENERAL ATTA HASNAIN

WHAT VICTORY IN KASHMIR MEANS Define what it means before you decide what the army should do. For the first time in years, a newspaper's leadership has thrown up a serious strategic issue for debate. Kashmir is far too complex for inexperienced minds to fully comprehend and there are so many stakeholders it confounds even those who have a semblance of an idea. In a recent article in this paper ('Disarming Kashmir', IE, December 7, goo.gl/SWPD7G), Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta talks about victory in the 24-year standoff and the necessity of an early withdrawal of the army from Kashmir's hinterland. We must first highlight what Gupta is seeking through this thought-provoking article. He says the army has become weary and therefore less professional, having lost soldiers in tactical operations this year. He wants the army to strengthen the LoC and de-escalate in the Valley, because Kashmiris, he says, must get a part of the "peace" dividend. He takes a dig, saying that some respected general with five tenures in the Valley had told him that, having defeated the Lashkar, the army has only been building golf courses and guest houses for the last five years. He adds that if any of these bad boys show their faces in Kashmir again, the army can come back to sort them out. He claims that the military objective in Kashmir (if any was spelt out) has been achieved and, that the UPA government has veritably introduced a new concept of governance — veto power (on strategic decisions) for the army. One of the most important points Gupta makes is, "you cannot find a Kashmir settlement with Pakistan before embracing your own Kashmiris and restoring trust with them first". On the face of it, this article evokes negatives all the way but re-reads throw up issues which need serious pondering. Unfortunately, not many are aware of the degree of intellectual analysis that the army itself has done of its role in Kashmir. It recently organised a full deliberation on the concept of victory at the Army War College, Mhow. The first question is: have we ever enunciated an aim in Kashmir? In all these years, there never has been a clearly stated political aim given to the security forces. The informally stated military aim was stabilisation by controlling infiltration and eliminating terrorists. No one realises that in such situations, political and military aims cannot be separated. In 2011, we enunciated our own joint politico-military aim for our commanders — "integrate Jammu and Kashmir with mainstream India, politically, economically, socially and psychologically". We were clear that eliminating terrorists was the easiest part of this war, that eliminating "terrorism" was the real challenge. I wish Gupta had faulted the army for not demanding the articulation of a politico-military aim as fighting without an aim is actually unfair. The lack of such an aim results in exactly what Gupta has done — declaring victory prematurely. Victory has to be measured against an aim, or else all kinds of versions are thrown around. We also have to measure victory against a realistic assessment of the future. Afghanistan 2014 with all its imponderables looms before us; any idea of victorious peace and subsequent actions has to be connected to it. Incidentally, I am speaking of victory as not against the people of Kashmir but for them, and against the intent of Pakistan, the separatists and terror groups. It is essential to explain a few things to those with limited military orientation. First, Kashmir is a case of rim-land insurgency. It is not the LoC alone that needs to be strong. In the event of conventional war with Pakistan, the hinterland of Kashmir is as important as the LoC. It is here that the strategic assets exist, along with strategic arteries, which can be choked in war. Remember, in each Indo-Pak war, Pakistan has depended on the Kashmiri people to rise against us. Second, the larger number of incidents, and the loss of brave soldiers, this year should make us re-evaluate the actual military situation in the Valley. Ironically, this is least important in assessing victory. In counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism campaigns, the answer finally lies in what the people think. Third, in all these years, no serious attempt was made to project to the Kashmiri people how and why their future lay only with India. The only agency that did this was the army. No government agency has ever put together a psychological campaign to win the confidence of the people. The army did it because it is a part of its professional responsibility and all international military counter-insurgency experience talks of winning hearts and minds (WHAM). The "hearts doctrine" articulated by the army in 2011-12 was the first strategically oriented WHAM programme in Kashmir. Separatism and radicalism run hand in hand in the Valley and it will take years of committed campaigning before these are diluted — the on and off presence of terror groups doesn't help. Who has the capability to strategise, plan and stay committed to such a campaign but the army? To presume that the army has done its job and should hand over the responsibility to civilian agencies is absolutely correct, provided there are agencies who can take it forward to "peace". If there is none, why rue the army's insistence that its work must not be undone? Twenty-four years of institutional wisdom need not be sacrificed in the urgency for declaring a premature victory. A few other observations by Gupta are designed to provoke non-intellectual minds, but they deserve a brief comment. The number of soldiers lost in negative incidents in a year is never reflective of the capability of an army fighting terrorism. Moreover, the deployment of the regular army in the hinterland is at its minimum today. The army's Rashtriya Rifles (RR) operates in the hinterland and its soldiers never get exhausted because it has a well-thought-out relief programme. Tactical minds within the RR also rue their presence among the populace, to neutralise just a handful of terrorists each year. This really is the problem — a misunderstanding that the RR's task is to kill terrorists alone, and not recognising that the task of a counter-insurgency force is to cement the separatist population with the mainstream. There is something else that our countrymen need to know about the RR: the highly professional and experienced military force is our add-on resource for conventional operations, especially now that 110 wings of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (the country's virtual RR) have received operational experience and modern weaponry to make them force multipliers. That is a major reason why the RR cannot be disbanded or re-deployed for counter-insurgency tasks in Naxal-affected areas. To claim victory over terror groups is premature also because the number of surrendered terrorists in the Valley (all with different shades of antipathy to the establishment) is much higher than the number of terrorists in holding camps and launch pads in PoK. None of the promises (by the state government or the police) to these surrendered terrorists has been fulfilled, creating a potential resource for home terror. Gupta's most potent statement is, "Because its (the government's) politics is frozen, it has introduced an unprecedented new factor in Indian policymaking: a veto for the army". Seeking and giving professional military advice is a part of governance and on Siachen, Kashmir or Manipur, the army has offered just that. If you go by this accusation, every proposal by the army should have been accepted. In the case of Siachen, it is the trust deficit that prevents the vacation of the Saltoro Ridge; on the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, the government almost relented but the only organisation that offered a rationale for its retention was the army. Its arguments went well beyond the ordinary, explaining just how it was balancing hard and soft power in the emerging situation and just how the AFSPA was only an umbrella to be used in an emergency. The army likes a cemented victory and celebration for the people, not a half-baked one which gives adversaries reason for glee. The general with five tenures in Kashmir who says the army is out of a job needs to revisit Kashmir. Not a single new golf course has come up and yes, guest rooms are indeed necessary to ensure that more armchair strategists visit Kashmir to be briefed at Keran, Machel, Gurez, Uri, Sopore, Tral and Shopian, before passing judgement on their professional army. Don't just visit Srinagar, Gulmarg and Pahalgam to make up your mind because the advice you will then proffer will never meet the professional needs of our army or that of our nation. Learn to trust your army — it is your army. The writer Syed Ata Hasnain is a recently-retired Lt. General, is a former general officer commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps

INS VIKRANT VIRAT VIKRAMADITYA & NAVAL PREPARED NESS

आय.एन.एस विक्रांत, विराट, 'विक्रमादित्य' आणि नौदलाची युद्धसज्जतागेल्या आठवड्यात नौदलात तीन महत्त्वाच्या घटना घडल्या. अँडमिरल गॉर्श्कोव्ह म्हणजेच भारतीय नामकरण झालेली 'विक्रमादित्य' ४0 हजार टन वजनाची विमानवाहू युद्धनौका रशियामधून भारताकडे येत आहे. आय.एन.एस विक्रांतचे स्मारक करणे महाराष्ट्र सरकारला परवडणारं नसल्याने तिची नाईलाजाने भंगारात विक्री करावी लागेल. १९७१च्या पाकिस्तानबरोबरच्या बांगलादेश युद्धात पाकिस्तानचा पराजय करून दोन तुकडे घडवण्यात महत्त्वाचे योगदान भारतीय नौदलाच्या विक्रांत युद्धनौकेचे होते. बांगलादेश मुक्ती लढय़ातील भारताच्या नौदलाने बजावलेल्या निर्णायक कामगिरीची आठवण म्हणून दरवर्षी ४ डिसेंबर हा दिवस 'नौदल दिन' म्हणून साजरा केला जातो. नौदल दिनाच्या निमित्ताने नौदलाच्या गेल्या वर्षभरातील कामगिरीचा आढावाही घेतला जातो. यंदाच्या नौदल दिनावर मात्र १३ ऑगस्ट रोजी मुंबईत 'आय.एन.एस. सिंधुरक्षक' या पाणबुडीला झालेल्या अपघाताचे सावट आहे. या अपघातात नौदलाला ही पाणबुडी आणि त्यावरील १८ नौसैनिक गमवावे लागले होते. सध्या भारताच्या नौदलात 'सिंधू' वर्गातील (रशियन किलो वर्ग) एकूण दहा पाणबुड्या कार्यरत आहेत. डिझेल-इलेक्ट्रिक शक्तीवर चालणार्‍या या पाणबुड्यांपैकी पाच पाणबुड्यांचे आधुनिकीकरण पूर्ण करण्यात आले आहे. 'सिंधुरक्षक' त्यापैकीच एक असून ती १९९७ मध्ये भारतीय नौदलात सामील झाली होती. १९७१चे युद्ध भारतीय नौदलाचा हा विजयोत्सव १९७१च्या युद्धात मुंबईहून पाकिस्तानच्या कराची बंदरावर केलेल्या यशस्वी हल्ल्याच्या स्मृतिदिनानिमित्ताने साजरा केला जातो! पाकिस्तानने ३ डिसेंबर रोजी संध्याकाळपासून भारताच्या ११ हवाई अड्डय़ांवर अचानक हल्ला केला. त्याच रात्री भारतीय वायुदलाने पाकिस्तानच्या हवाई अड्डय़ांवर हल्ले केले. त्याचबरोबर बांगलादेशच्या सीमेवर सज्ज असलेल्या भारतीय सेनेने एकाच वेळी बांगलादेशात प्रवेश करून हल्ले सुरू केले. ३ डिसेंबरच्या रात्रीच भारताच्या तीन विद्युत क्लास मिसाईल बोटी पाकिस्तानच्या सीमेवर ४00 किलोमीटर अंतरावर पोहचल्या होत्या! त्या वेळी कराची हे पाकिस्तानचे एकमेव व्यापारी दृष्टीने आयात-निर्यात करणारे बंदर आणि पाकिस्तानी नौसेनेचे मुख्यालय होते! त्यामुळे कराची बंदराची नाकेबंदी करण्याचा निर्णय घेतला गेला होता. रात्री १0.३0 वाजता पाकिस्तानच्या समुद्रकिनार्‍यावरून जवळ जाऊन तिथल्या पेट्रोलच्या टाक्यांवर मिसाईल बोटींनी हल्ला करून त्या उद्ध्वस्त केल्या. त्याच वेळी पाकिस्तानी नौदलाची पी.एन.एस. खैबर ही युद्धनौका भारतीय नौदलाच्या मिसाईल बोटीच्या टप्प्यात आल्यावर त्यांनी तिच्यावर मिसाईलचा मारा केला! त्या वेळी पाकिस्तानच्या युद्धनौकेला भारतीय नौदलाच्या युद्धनौका कराची बंदराच्या इतक्या जवळ आल्या आहेत हे समजलेच नाही. त्यांना वाटले हा भारतीय वायुदलाच्या विमानांचा हल्ला आहे! म्हणून त्यांनी युद्धनौकेवरील विमान विरोधक तोफा आणि मशीनगनचा हवेतच गोळीबार प्रारंभ केला. त्याचबरोबर कराची बंदरातच अमेरिकेची एम.व्ही. व्हिनस चॅलेंजर ही बोट पाकिस्तानी सैन्यासाठी दारूगोळा घेऊन येत होती. तिच्यावरही भारतीय युद्धनौकांनी तोफगोळे आणि मिसाईलचा मारा करून तिच्या ठिकर्‍या ठिकर्‍या केल्या. इतक्या तत्परतेने ४ डिसेंबरला रात्री ११.३0 वाजेपर्यंत पाकिस्तानची युद्धनौका खैबर, अमेरिकेची युद्धसामग्री आणणारी बोट आणि कराची बंदरातील पेट्रोलच्या टाक्या उद्ध्वस्त करून भारतीय नौसेनेच्या युद्धनौका मुंबईकडे यायला परत निघाल्या. ऐतिहासिक दृष्टीने भारताची र्मयादित क्षमता असूनसुद्धा अत्यंत अल्पकाळात म्हणजे ४ डिसेंबर १९७१ रोजी एका रात्रीतच पाकिस्तानच्या नौदलाला त्यांचे मुख्यालय कराचीतच पोचून त्यांचा पराजय करण्याची क्षमता ही भारताच्या सैनिकी क्षेत्रात एक प्रेरणादायक घटना ठरली आहे. भारतीय नौदलाची पहिली विमानवाहू युद्धनौका आणि १९७१च्या पाकिस्तानबरोबरच्या बांगलादेश युद्धात पाकिस्तानचा पराजय करण्यात महत्त्वाचे योगदान भारतीय नौदलाच्या विक्रांत युद्धनौकेचे होते. विक्रांतने बंगालच्या उपसागरातील त्या काळच्या पश्‍चिम पाकिस्तानातील बांगलादेशचे महत्त्वाचे बंदर असणारे चितगाव आणि कोक्स बाजार या बंदरांची नाकेबंदी केल्यामुळे पाकिस्तानी नेव्हीला कोणती मदत किंवा हालचाली करणे अशक्य झाले. त्याखेरीज विक्रांत युद्धनौकेने त्या भागात तळ ठोकून युद्ध प्रारंभ झाल्यानंतर या बंदराच्या पेट्रोल टाक्यांवर तुफान हल्ले करून त्या उद्ध्वस्त केल्या. यामुळे पाकिस्तान सैन्याची पळून जायची एकुलती एक वाट बंद झाली आणि युद्ध लवकर संपले. नौदलाची युद्धसज्जता चांगली नाही पण सध्याची नौदलाची युद्धसज्जता फारशी चांगली नाही. अनेकांना आय.एन.एस विक्रांतची भंगारात विक्री करावी लागत आहे म्हणून वाईट वाटत आहे; पण सत्य हे आहे की देशाच्या अर्थव्यवस्थेचे दिवाळे निघाल्यामुळे आपल्याकडे लढाई करता जरूरी शस्त्रे घ्यायला पण पैसे नाहीत. आपण या लेखात फक्त आपल्या विमानवाहू युद्धनौकांची तयारी बघू. १९७१ मध्ये भारताकडे विक्रांत ही एकमेव विमानवाहू युद्धनौका होती! तिला १९९८ साली नवृत्त करण्यात आले. त्याखेरीज भारताकडे विराट विमानवाहू ही युद्धनौका आहे ती पण पुढच्या ३-४ वर्षांत नवृतीच्या रस्त्यावर आहे. त्याची जागा घेणारी नवी विक्रांत त्याआधी नौदलात आली तर फार चांगले होईल. रशियाकडून आठ वर्षांपूर्वीच खरेदी करण्यात आलेली अँडमिरल गॉर्श्कोव्ह म्हणजेच भारतीय नामकरण झालेली 'विक्रमादित्य' ही भव्य ४0 हजार टन वजनाची विमानवाहू युद्धनौका रशियामधून भारताकडे येत आहे! जानेवारीत विक्रमादित्य दाखल झाली, तरी त्यावरील मिग २९ के या लढाऊ विमानांच्या उड्डाणांमध्ये वैमानिकांना नैपुण्य येण्यास किमान सहा महिन्यांच्या अवधी द्यावा लागेल. विक्रमादित्यवर उडणारी मिग २९ के ही विमाने आपल्याकडे गोव्याच्या तळावर आधीच दाखल झाली आहेत. विक्रमादित्यच्या डेकप्रमाणे उभारण्यात आलेल्या डमी धावपट्टीवरून गोव्यात नौदलातील वैमानिकांनी मिग २९ केवर सरावही सुरू केला आहे; पण जमिनीवरची धावपट्टी आणि तरंगती धावपट्टी यात जमीन-अस्मानाचा फरक असतो. विक्रमादित्यवर सध्या तरी स्वत:चा हवाई हल्ल्यापासून बचाव करण्याची स्वत:ची यंत्रणा नाही. ती भारतात आल्यावरच तिच्यावर इस्रायली बराक क्षेपणास्त्रांची दुसर्‍या क्षेपणास्त्रांचा खात्मा करणारी यंत्रणा बसवली जाईल. विक्रमादित्य पूर्णरीत्या कार्यरत होण्यास पाच-सहा महिने लागतील व तोपर्यंत विराटचा प्रभाव बराचसा कमीच होईल. त्यामुळे दोन विमानवाहू युद्धनौका ताफ्यात याव्यात, यासाठी आपल्याला आयएनएस विक्रांत या स्वदेशी बनावटीच्या विमानवाहू युद्धनौकेची प्रतीक्षा असेल. ती २0१८ पर्यंत नौदलात दाखल होईल. मुंबईमधील नौसेनेचा तळ नौसेनेच्या विस्तारासाठी अपुरा भारतीय नौदलात सध्या दोन विमानवाहू युद्धनौका, जमीन आणि समुद्रातून ही जाऊ शकतील अशा अँम्फिबियस बोटी, आठ मिसाईलने सज्ज असलेल्या विनाशिका, १५ युद्धनौका, १ अणुशक्तीवर चालणारी पाणबुडी आणि बाकी १३ डिझेलवर चालणार्‍या पाणबुड्या, ३0 गस्ती बोटी आणि २४ सर्वप्रकारे मदत करणार्‍या बोटी आहेत. मुंबईमधील नौसेनेचा तळ नौसेनेच्या विस्तारासाठी आता अपुरा पडत आहे! म्हणून पश्‍चिम किनारपट्टीवरील गोव्यापासून जवळच असणार्‍या कारवारजवळ अकराशे कोटी रुपये खर्च करून 'सी बर्ड' या नावाचा एक सुसज्ज ४0 युद्धनौका ठेवता येतील असा तळ उभारण्याचा उपक्रम गेली १५ वर्षे चालत आहे! पूर्वी आपल्याकडे युद्धनौकांची सामग्री नव्हती. आता सामग्री वाढत चालली असतानाच त्यांची योग्य ती देखभाल कशी करायची याबद्दल नौदलाने अधिक सतर्क होण्याची वेळ आली आहे. 'विंध्यगिरी' आणि 'सिंधुरक्षक'च्या दुर्घटनांवरून बोध घेतलेले बरे. 'विक्रमादित्य'चे स्वागत करतानाच या समस्यांचाही विचार आपल्याला करावाच लागेल. चीन आणि पाकिस्तान यांचे लष्करी सार्मथ्य आणि अण्वस्त्रे, क्षेपणास्त्रे यांचे वाढते सार्मथ्य लक्षात घेतले तर सध्याची नौसेनेची क्षमता अत्यंत अपुरी ठरते