The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will
continue its whole-of-government efforts to spread China’s influence, undercut
that of the United States, drive wedges between Washington and its allies and
partners, and foster new international norms that favor the authoritarian
Chinese system.
Chinese leaders probably will, however, seek tactical opportunities to reduce tensions with Washington when such opportunities suit their interests.
Ladakh withdrawl.
China will maintain its major innovation and industrial
policies because Chinese leaders see this strategy as necessary to reduce
dependence on foreign technologies, enable military advances, and sustain
economic growth and thus ensure the CCP’s survival.
Beijing
sees increasingly competitive US-China relations as part of an epochal
geopolitical shift and views Washington’s economic measures against Beijing
since 2018 as part of a broader US effort to contain China’s rise.
China is
touting its success containing the COVID-19 pandemic as evidence of the
superiority of its system.
Beijing is increasingly combining its growing military power
with its economic, technological, and diplomatic clout to preserve the CCP,
secure what it views as its territory and regional preeminence, and pursue
international cooperation at Washington’s expense.
Regional and Global
Activities
China
seeks to use coordinated, whole-of-government tools to demonstrate its growing
strength and compel regional neighbors to acquiesce to Beijing’s preferences,
including its claims over disputed territory and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.
China-India border tensions remain high,
despite some force pullbacks this year. China’s occupation since May 2020 of contested
border areas is the most serious escalation in decades and led to the first
lethal border clash between the two countries since 1975. As of mid-February,
after multiple rounds of talks, both sides were pulling back forces and
equipment from some sites along the disputed border.
In the South China Sea, Beijing will continue
to intimidate rival claimants and will use growing numbers of air, naval, and
maritime law enforcement platforms to signal to Southeast Asian countries that
China has effective control over contested areas. China is similarly pressuring
Japan over contested areas in the East China Sea.
Beijing will press Taiwan authorities to move toward unification
and will condemn what it views as increased US-Taiwan engagement.
We expect that friction will grow as Beijing
steps up attempts to portray Taipei as internationally isolated and dependent
on the mainland for economic prosperity, and as China continues to increase
military activity around the island.
China’s increasing cooperation with Russia on
areas of complementary interest includes defense and economic cooperation.[ 7 ]
Beijing will continue to promote the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand
China’s economic, political, and military presence abroad, while trying to
reduce waste and exploitative practices, which have led to international
criticism.
China will try to increase its influence using “vaccine diplomacy,” giving countries favored access to the
COVID-19 vaccines it is developing.
China also will promote new international norms
for technology and human rights, emphasizing state sovereignty and political
stability over individual rights.
China will remain the top threat to US technological
competitiveness as the CCP targets key technology sectors and proprietary
commercial and military technology from US and allied
companies and research institutions associated with defense, energy, finance,
and other sectors.
Beijing uses a variety of tools, from
public investment to espionage and theft, to advance its technological
capabilities.
Indian response
Entry in banglore
Entry from asian markets
Stop start ups in tech areas
Military
Capabilities
China will continue pursuing its goals of becoming
a great power, securing what it views as its territory, and establishing its
preeminence in regional affairs by building a world-class military, potentially
destabilizing international norms and relationships. China’s military
commitment includes a multiyear agenda of comprehensive military reform
initiatives.
We expect the PLA to continue pursuing overseas military
installations and access agreements to enhance its ability to project power and
protect Chinese interests abroad.
The PLA
Navy and PLA Air Force are the largest in the region and continue to field
advanced long-range platforms that improve China’s ability to project power.
The PLA Rocket Force’s highly accurate short-, medium-, and intermediate-range
conventional systems are capable of holding US and allied bases in the region
at risk.
Arms
aid-used weapons come for training-repair
Similar
aid
WMD
Beijing will continue the most rapid
expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history,
intending to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next
decade and to field a nuclear triad. Beijing is not interested in arms control
agreements that restrict its modernization plans and will not agree to
substantive negotiations that lock in US or Russian nuclear advantages. China is building a larger and increasingly
capable nuclear missile force that is more survivable, more diverse, and on
higher alert than in the past, including nuclear missile systems designed to
manage regional escalation and ensure an
intercontinental second-strike capability.
Space
Beijing is working to match or exceed
US capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits
that Washington has accrued from space leadership.
We expect a Chinese space station in low Earth
orbit (LEO) to be operational between 2022 and 2024. China also has conducted
and plans to conduct additional lunar exploration missions, and it intends to
establish a robotic research station on the Moon and later an intermittently
crewed lunar base.[ 8 ]
The PLA
will continue to integrate space services—such as satellite reconnaissance and
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)—and satellite communications into its
weapons and command-and-control systems to erode the US military’s information
advantage.
Counters space
operations
will be integral to potential military campaigns
by the PLA, and China has counterspaceweapons capabilities intended to target
US and allied satellites.
Beijing
continues to train its military space elements and field new destructive and
nondestructive ground- and space-based antisatellite (ASAT) weapons.
China has already fielded ground-based ASAT missiles intended
to destroy satellites in LEO and ground-based ASAT lasers probably intended to
blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors on LEO satellites.
Cyber
We assess that China presents a prolific and effective
cyber-espionage threat, possesses substantial cyber-attack capabilities, and
presents a growing influence threat. China’s cyber pursuits and proliferation
of related technologies increase the threats of cyber attacks against the US AND WORLD, suppression of US web content that
Beijing views as threatening to its internal ideological control, and the
expansion of technology-driven authoritarianism around the world.
We
continue to assess that China can launch cyber attacks that, at a minimum, can
cause localized, temporary disruptions to critical infrastructure within the
United States.
China leads the world in applying surveillance systems and censorship to
monitor its population and repress dissent, particularly among ethnic
minorities, such as the Uyghurs. Beijing conducts cyber intrusions that affect US
and non-US citizens beyond its borders—such as hacking journalists, stealing
personal information, or attacking tools that allow free speech online—as part
of its efforts to surveil perceived threats to CCP power and tailor influence
efforts. Beijing is also using its assistance to global efforts to combat
COVID-19 to export its surveillance tools and technologies.
China’s
cyber-espionage operations have included compromising telecommunications firms,
providers of managed services and broadly used software, and other targets
potentially rich in follow-on opportunities for intelligence collection,
attack, or influence operations.
Intelligence,
Influence Operations, and Elections Influence and Interference
China will continue expanding its global
intelligence footprint to better support its growing political, economic, and
security interests around the world, increasingly challenging the United
States’ alliances and partnerships. Across East Asia and the western Pacific,
which Beijing views as its natural sphere of influence, China is attempting to
exploit doubts about the US commitment to the region, undermine Taiwan’s
democracy, and extend Beijing’s influence.
Beijing
has been intensifying efforts to shape the political environment in the United
States to promote its policy preferences, mold public discourse, pressure
political figures whom Beijing believes oppose its interests, and muffle
criticism of China on such issues as religious freedom and the suppression of
democracy in Hong Kong.
AGE OF HIGH BRID WAR/MULTI-DOMAIN- 365 DAYS WAR BY CHINA PAK.
STOPPING INDIAS ECONOMIC PROGRESS
INDIA HAS TO UNITE,FIGHT AS ONE
NATION AGAINST CHINA,PAK
