KARGIL WAR 15 YEARS ON Strategic lessons that we need to learn
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140723/edit.htm#7
Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong
and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which
enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military
and diplomatic victory
General V.P. Malik
Artillery helped the Indian Army to drive away the intruders.
The regiments that took part in the Kargil conflict. Tribune photos
Sophisticated weapons were recovered from various sites that were occupied
THE Kargil war, forced on India by Pakistan 15 years ago, will always
be remembered for (a) its strategic and tactical surprise (b) the
self-imposed national strategy of restraint keeping the war limited to
the Kargil-Siachen sector (c) military strategy and planning in
keeping with the political mandate and the (d) dedication,
determination, and daring junior leadership at the tactical level.
In fiercely fought combat actions, on the most difficult terrain that
gave immense advantage to the enemy holding mountaintops, we were able
to evict Pakistani troops from most of their surreptitiously occupied
positions. The Pakistani leadership was forced to sue for ceasefire
and seek withdrawal of its troops from the remaining areas.
Diplomatic victory
Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong
and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which
enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military
and diplomatic victory. As two Prime Ministers of Pakistan later
acknowledged, “Kargil war was Pakistan's biggest blunder and
disaster.”
In this article, I will briefly narrate two of the most important
battles of the war, some important strategic lessons and how do we
look ahead.
The Battle of Tololing
Tololing Top in Dras, occupied by the enemy, interfered with our
vehicular movements on the Srinagar-Kargil highway and overlooked the
town and our logistic positions. It was necessary to recapture it as
early as possible and thus it became the first major battle. After 18
Grenadiers set the stage, 2 Raj Rif finished the task against
overwhelming odds on June 13, 1999, after three weeks of bitter
fighting. 2 Raj Rif captured a large quantity of weapons and
ammunition, including rocket launchers and 81mm mortars held only by
Pakistan's regular forces. This large haul of weapons and some vital
documents, shattered the myth that Pakistan had created assiduously
that the men who had intruded across the LoC were jihadi militants.
Anxiety about battle
We were anxious throughout this battle. As the Army Chief, I could not
afford to convey my feelings to anyone, nor could I interfere with the
battle which had been planned and conducted at the brigade and
division levels. The list of casualties kept growing. We lost three
officers, four junior commissioned officers and 16 other ranks. The
enemy losses, based on the number of bodies recovered were put at 27.
Tololing Top was the first turning point in the Kargil war. The events
that transpired during the battle made me think of the difficult days
ahead when we had to clear the enemy from other areas. But realising
the determination and the fighting spirit of our troops, I was
convinced that we could do it.
Capture of Tiger Hill
The Tiger Hill, an awe-inspiring steep mountain top within our
territory, was considered as a major thorn and the most difficult
feature occupied by the enemy in the Mushkoh-Dras sector. During my
visit to the front on June 28, 1999, Major-General Mohinder Puri, GOC
8 Mtn Div, told me that the Tiger Hill would be his next objective.
The attack on Tiger Hill started on June 30/July 1. The objective was
engaged effectively by the Air Force and with intense indirect as well
as direct artillery fire. The infantry assault went in on July 3.
At 6 am on July 4, I was informed that 18 Grenadiers had captured the
Tiger Hill Top but heavy fighting was still going on the feature. I
spoke to GOsC 15 Corps and 8 Mtn Div to learn about the latest
situation and asked them to let me know when the objective would be
fully secured. At 7.30 am, Mohinder Puri confirmed that the enemy
would not be able dislodge our troops from the Tiger Hill Top.
I then informed the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who was
scheduled to address a public meeting at 10 am. The Defence Minister
was flying to Amritsar. I gave him this news when he landed at the
airport.
Blow to Pakistan
That date became important for one more reason: Pakistan's Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif was to meet the US President Bill Clinton.
Before their meeting, the National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and
I made sure that the whole world came to know about the recapture of
Tiger Hill and thus the likely outcome of the war.
The loss of Tiger Hill was a hard physical and psychological blow to
the Pakistan Army. In India, jubilation and relief replaced the
earlier gloomy mood of the people. After the entire Tiger Hill feature
had been cleared by 4 Sikh and 2 Naga battalions, 18 Grenadiers
proudly hoisted the Indian tricolour on the Tiger Hill Top.
Holistic national review needed
Many lessons have emerged from the Kargil war which necessitated a
holistic national security review as well as rethinking on the nature
of conflict in the new strategic environment and the conduct of such
wars.:
n There may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between
two nuclear weapon states but as long as there were territory-related
disputes — currently we have them with China and Pakistan — the
adversary can indulge in a proxy war, a limited conventional border
war, or both.
n A major military challenge in India is the political reluctance to a
proactive grand strategy or engagement. It has invariably led us to a
reactive military situation. This disadvantage is enhanced manifold
because no loss of territory is acceptable to the public and the
political authority. This is a strategic handicap and a risk in any
war setting, which increases in a limited-war scenario. To deal with
such situations, it is essential to have credible strategic and
tactical intelligence and assessments, effective surveillance and
close defence of the lines of control.
n The successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to
react rapidly. The new strategic environment calls for faster decision
making, versatile combat organisations, rapid deployment and synergy
amongst all elements involved in the war effort, particularly the
three services.
n Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This
can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies
and defence planning.
n Any war in future will require close political oversight and
politico-civil-military interaction. It is, therefore, essential to
keep the military leadership in the security and strategic
decision-making loop.
n India has a National Security Council but there is no official
document outlining its broad national security (including defence)
policy and strategy. The government has hesitated in spelling it out
due to the lack of political consensus on its policies and the
inability to address the crucial issues of coordination to formulate
and address national security. The absence of a coherent policy tends
to make our responses ad hoc and less convincing.
All-weather surveillance
Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather
surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made
up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic
aperture radar. We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial
vehicles, and most importantly, acquired and deployed hand-held
thermal imagers, surveillance radars and ground sensors along the
lines of control. Individual service and joint services doctrines have
been revised. Some Special Forces units have been added to the
strength of each service.
At the politico-military strategic level, however, the situation is
dismal. Most of the reforms recommended in the National Security
Review in 2002 to improve the higher defence control organisation, its
systems and processes were either not implemented or implemented only
cosmetically.
There is no policy document or a white paper on broad national
security policy and strategy for the near or long term.
The Ministry of Defence has not been integrated meaningfully nor is
there any improvement in defence planning and procurement systems. The
civil and military relations have worsened.
Over the last 15 years, due to reactive security postures, our
deterrent capabilities have been eroded. This tends to encourage our
adversaries to take liberties on the disputed borders or through
cross-border proxy war. We need to build credible deterrence at the
political as well as military levels.
In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to
carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its
recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented. A
strong, competent and committed political leadership is required to
bring about improvements in the security policies, higher defence
control organisation and its systems, including its rules of business.
— The writer was the Army Chief during the Kargil war
After the conflict
The Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather
surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made
up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic
aperture radar.
We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles,
In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to
carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its
recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented
Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This
can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies
and defence planning.
