MANAGING INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE FEW RECOMMENDATION

 The article argues that India’s external position is stronger than the widely quoted goods-trade deficit suggests. While India imports substantially more goods than it exports, this deficit is offset by a large surplus in services exports and by remittances sent by Indians living abroad. Taken together, these flows are said to have produced a small current-account surplus rather than an external-payment crisis.

Services and Remittances

India’s services sector is presented as a major economic strength. Services exports of about $420 billion, against imports of around $200 billion, create an estimated surplus of $210 billion. This surplus, the article notes, reflects not only IT and professional services but also the broad service economy that provides employment across the country.

Remittances are the second major cushion. Indians abroad reportedly sent about $155 billion home last year, producing a remittance surplus of about $143 billion. These inflows support household consumption, healthcare, housing and savings in India.

Why the Goods Deficit Misleads

The article challenges the focus on the approximately $330 billion goods-trade deficit. Its central calculation is that a goods deficit of roughly $330 billion is more than counterbalanced by a services surplus of around $210 billion and a remittance surplus of about $143 billion.

It also argues that concerns over gold and oil imports should be kept in proportion. Gold is a comparatively limited component of the import bill, while a weaker rupee can improve export competitiveness, though it can also make imports and foreign debt more expensive.

The Real Pressure: Capital Flows

According to the article, the larger problem is not the current account but capital outflows. It states that long-term investment inflows were nearly matched by exits, while portfolio investors withdrew roughly $16 billion. Such withdrawals can weaken the rupee quickly because portfolio capital is sensitive to returns, global risk sentiment and opportunities in other markets.

The article therefore asks why foreign portfolio investors are leaving India, suggesting that this issue deserves greater policy attention than the goods-trade deficit.

RBI Liquidity and Interest Rates

The article criticises the RBI for maintaining the repo rate at 5.25 percent while conducting very large open-market purchases of government bonds. It claims that RBI purchases of about Rs 7 lakh crore injected far more liquidity than in a normal year.

The concern is that abundant liquidity and low real interest rates may weaken the rupee and generate inflation with a delay. The article invokes the idea that monetary policy often produces immediate support for growth and credit, but inflationary effects may appear one or two years later.

State Borrowing and Fiscal Pressures

The article attributes part of the pressure to rising borrowing by state governments, particularly spending associated with welfare transfers and “freebies.” It argues that instead of allowing interest rates to rise in response to increased borrowing, the RBI absorbed government bonds and supplied liquidity.

Its warning is that this approach can mask underlying fiscal pressures in the short term, while transferring the inflationary and currency risks into the future.

FCNR-B Deposits as Emergency Medicine

The strongest criticism concerns RBI measures to attract NRI dollar deposits, reportedly through FCNR-B deposits and exchange-rate protection. The article argues that guaranteeing the exchange rate effectively gives investors an unusually favourable, low-risk return: they can earn an interest differential without bearing the usual risk of rupee depreciation.

It further warns that leverage through GIFT City could magnify such inflows. The reported attraction of around $40 billion, with an expectation of $100 billion by September, may support the rupee immediately but could create substantial repayment obligations in two to three years.

The Risk of Future Outflows

The article’s key fear is a future “rollover” or exit risk. If NRI deposits worth $80–100 billion mature during a global shock, conflict or domestic financial stress, the RBI may have to meet foreign-exchange obligations just as capital is leaving.

The argument is that an outflow much larger than last year’s estimated $16 billion portfolio withdrawal could sharply strain the rupee and foreign-exchange reserves. Thus, the article calls the present stability “borrowed calm”: stability created by short-term foreign inflows rather than by durable domestic capital formation.

Reserves Versus External Debt

The article highlights a worrying change in the relationship between foreign-exchange reserves and external debt. It claims that reserves and external debt were each around $700 billion six months earlier, but could move to about $600 billion in reserves against $850 billion in external debt within three months.

Its conclusion is that the rupee’s stability near Rs 95 per dollar is being sustained partly through debt-linked inflows. If the rupee strengthens temporarily, the article cautions that this should not automatically be treated as evidence of lasting economic strength.

Policy Critique

The article argues that tax incentives have been directed toward government-bond investment rather than long-term foreign direct investment. It prefers policies that attract risk capital into factories, technology, research and productive capacity, rather than capital that can leave quickly.

It also criticises negative or near-zero real returns for domestic savers, arguing that weak incentives for household saving can reduce the domestic funds available for investment.

Suggested Course of Action

The article recommends allowing a gradual rupee depreciation of roughly 2–3 percent annually, broadly in line with India’s inflation differential. It suggests using foreign-exchange reserves and modest interest-rate adjustments to reduce excessive volatility, rather than offering exchange-rate guarantees for short-term foreign deposits.

It also advocates higher-quality public spending, particularly on defence, defence research, innovation and deep technology. In its view, sustained productivity growth, research investment and export competitiveness would reduce the importance of short-term monetary interventions.

Overall Assessment

The article does not portray India as facing an immediate balance-of-payments crisis. Instead, it argues that the RBI’s emergency-style measures appear inconsistent with otherwise healthy external-account indicators and may create a deferred vulnerability.

Its central message is simple: India’s current account may be relatively sound, but the effort to hold the rupee steady through short-term, exchange-rate-protected foreign money could replace a manageable present challenge with a more serious repayment and reserve-management problem in 2028–29.

Countering Hybrid ,Narrative Warfare & Regime-Change Campaigns-PART 3

 

Countering Hybrid ,Narrative Warfare & Regime-Change Campaigns

India can counter narrative warfare, hybrid war, agitational terrorism, and regime-change operations only through a deliberate, whole-of-nation strategy that integrates doctrine, law, technology, and public awareness. The focus must be on protecting citizens’ minds, securing critical systems, strengthening institutions, and projecting a confident national narrative at home and abroad.

1. National doctrine for narrative and hybrid warfare

India needs a formal national doctrine on information, narrative, and hybrid warfare that clearly defines threats, roles, and response mechanisms. Such a doctrine should:-

Recognise cognitive autonomy—freedom of thought and informed choice—as a national security objective, not only a civil liberty.
Integrate diplomatic, economic, informational, cultural, social, and politico-military tools into a unified “smart power” framework.
Lay down principles to prevent misuse of information power against India’s own citizens while enabling robust defence against foreign influence.
This doctrine must be backed by institutional structures: an apex national information-security council, dedicated narrative warfare units in the armed forces and MEA, and clear inter-agency coordination protocols.

2. Legal and policy measures

Robust legal frameworks are essential to counter agitational terrorism and covert regime-change efforts while preserving democratic freedoms. India should:-

Consolidate counter-terror and hybrid threat laws under a comprehensive doctrine like PRAHAAR, ensuring clarity on prevention, response, radicalisation attenuation, and recovery.
Update cyber, data-protection, and platform-governance laws to address deepfakes, AI-generated propaganda, bot networks, foreign-funded disinformation, and cross-border agitation campaigns.
Strengthen regulations on foreign funding to NGOs, media platforms, and political advocacy groups, with transparent disclosure and strict penalties for covert regime-change activity.
Simultaneously, constitutional safeguards and judicial oversight must ensure that information power is not turned inward for partisan control, maintaining public trust while battling external subversion.

3. Securing cyberspace and critical infrastructure

Hybrid warfare frequently targets cyber systems, financial networks, and digital infrastructure as gateways to disruption and public panic. India’s countermeasures should include:

Building a resilient cybersecurity ecosystem through modernised legislation, empowered cyber commands, and real-time threat intelligence fusion across defence, home, finance, and telecom sectors.

 

Hardening critical infrastructure—power grids, transport, defence networks, banking, and communications—against cyberattacks, ransomware, and data theft.

 

Investing in home-grown technologies, AI tools, and secure open-source solutions to detect patterns of information warfare, bot activity, and hybrid operations, and to provide affordable security to citizens.

 

Regular red-team exercises, tabletop simulations, and public-private partnerships with Indian tech firms can significantly improve preparedness against complex, multi-vector attacks.

4. Media literacy and cognitive defence

Since narrative warfare targets minds, India must treat media literacy, digital hygiene, and cognitive resilience as strategic assets. Key steps:

Integrate media literacy and critical thinking modules into school, college, and military education, training citizens to recognise propaganda, deepfakes, and manipulative outrage cycles.
Run nationwide campaigns—through Doordarshan, community radio, and digital platforms—explaining how disinformation, agitational terrorism, and narrative warfare work, using simple, relatable examples.
Encourage responsible journalism and fact-checking ecosystems, supporting independent verification while exposing foreign-scripted narratives and paid agitation.
Protecting cognitive autonomy means ensuring that citizens can access diverse, factual information and are equipped to resist coercive or deceptive messaging, whether domestic or foreign.

5. Strategic communication and national narrative

To win narrative warfare, India must not merely react to hostile stories but proactively shape the information battlespace with its own coherent civilisational narrative. This entails:

Developing a formal narrative strategy that communicates India’s democratic resilience, development achievements, and security posture in language tuned to domestic and global audiences.

 

Synchronising government communication—MEA, MOD, MHA, PIB—with cultural diplomacy, cinema, literature, and social media to project Bharat’s story as confident, inclusive, and future-oriented.

 

Using strategic events (counter-terror operations, humanitarian missions, technological milestones) as anchors for positive narratives that highlight competence, restraint, and moral clarity.

 

Operations like those described in India’s evolving counter-terror doctrine pair kinetic action with psychological and diplomatic messaging, demonstrating how narrative victory can multiply battlefield success and blunt adversarial propaganda.

6. Intelligence integration and agitational terrorism

Agitational terrorism blurs the line between protest and violence, using mobs, social media, and selective incidents to break state authority without open war. Countering it requires integrated intelligence and calibrated response

Establish multi-agency fusion centres that pool HUMINT, SIGINT, CYBERINT, and OSINT to track networks orchestrating violent agitation, foreign funding, and digital mobilisation.

 

Adopt PREVENT–RESPOND models, as in PRAHAAR, where early identification of radicalisation and foreign incitement allows pre-emptive engagement, dialogue, and legal action before streets explode

 

Train police and paramilitary forces in crowd psychology, narrative sensitivity, and evidence-based interventions so that law-and-order responses do not inadvertently feed hostile propaganda.

 

Well-documented, transparent handling of protests—body-cam footage, rapid myth-busting, public briefings—can deny agitational terrorists the visual and emotional material they need for regime-change narratives.

7. International partnerships and norms

Because hybrid warfare and regime-change scripts often leverage transnational platforms, India must shape international norms and alliances to constrain hostile practices. Measures include:

Building joint intelligence centres with trusted partners for real-time sharing of information-warfare indicators, cyber threats, terror financing routes, and bot-network signatures.

 

Advocating global guidelines on platform transparency, disinformation labelling, and restrictions on foreign state-backed propaganda targeting democracies.

 

Using diplomatic engagement to expose and delegitimise external efforts at narrative subversion and regime change, while supporting genuine democratic processes elsewhere.

 

Such cooperation helps India not only defend itself but also contribute to wider global stability, reducing the legitimacy of covert regime-change operations as an accepted tool of statecraft.

8. Institutional strength and democratic resilience

Finally, the most effective defence against regime-change operations is a resilient democracy with strong, trusted institutions. India should:

Modernise and transparently strengthen electoral, judicial, parliamentary, and regulatory institutions so that claims of “captured” or “fake” systems do not resonate. 

 

Ensure security forces, intelligence agencies, and police remain constitutionally anchored, politically neutral, and socially respected, denying adversaries the ability to fracture the “last wall” of state authority.

 

Promote inclusive economic growth and social justice policies that progressively reduce exploitable faultlines, unemployment, regional imbalances, caste and communal tensions that hybrid warfare depends on.

 

When citizens feel heard, institutions appear fair, and national pride is rooted in lived progress, external narratives of inevitable collapse find little fertile ground. Strengthening Bharat from within is therefore the strategic centre of gravity in countering narrative warfare, hybrid war, agitational terrorism, and regime-change operations.

Conclusion-Lessons for India till 2028 and beyond

History shows that similar scripts, combining economic pressure, narrative warfare, NGO networks, protest orchestration, and elite co-option, have crossed many countries, with only the language, flag, and victim changing. For India, whose demographic scale, economic rise, and civilisational assertion are reshaping global power equations, vigilance against regime-change designs is essential.

Key lessons every student and citizen should internalise are:

Recognise narrative warfare: Question stories that uniformly paint Bharat as hopeless and its institutions as irredeemable.

 

Distinguish genuine dissent from engineered destabilisation: Democracies need protest and criticism, but they collapse when all legitimacy is denied.

 

Guard against social media manipulation: Verify information, be wary of outrage cycles, and resist being herded into polarised camps.

 

Support institutional reform, not destruction: Strong, accountable institutions are India’s shield against both internal decay and external subversion.

 

Till 2028 and beyond, patterns matter. The question is not whether India is merely arguing with itself—healthy democracies always debate, but whether someone is systematically teaching it how to collapse, using its own frustrations as fuel to topple an emerging superpower. The answer lies in collective vigilance, strategic literacy, and a renewed commitment to strengthening Bharat from within so that no external script can override its destiny.

“Defeating Hybrid & Narrative Warfare: Countering Regime-Change Campaigns Against Bharat’s Democracy” PART 2

 

Step 9–10: Institutional delegitimisation and leadership demonisation

As protests grow, the script moves to discredit every institution that stands between agitation and power. Courts are portrayed as captured or biased, the Election Commission as compromised, parliament as rubber stamp, and independent agencies as tools of vendetta.

This deep delegitimisation serves several purposes:

- It convinces citizens that reform through institutional channels is impossible.

- It justifies bypassing constitutional processes in favour of “direct action”.

- It primes the public to accept extra-constitutional power shifts as necessary corrections.

 

Simultaneously, leadership demonisation becomes intense. One individual—usually the Prime Minister or head of state—is made to answer for every problem, from local potholes to global recessions. Once this singular villain image is entrenched, attention turns to major business figures, who are labelled cronies, oligarchs, and “owners” of the country.

Analyses of regime change operations note that targeting the politico-business nexus is central to breaking the resource base of the ruling dispensation and dividing the elite. Psychologically, demonisation encourages personal hatred rather than policy critique, making compromise harder and confrontation more likely.

Step 11–12: Ring of fire and morale collapse

In parallel with internal agitation, adversaries attempt to build a “ring of fire” around the target state. For India, this could take the form of:-

- Border pressure through skirmishes and salami-slicing tactics.
- Unstable neighbours, covert support to insurgent or extremist groups, and refugee flows.
- Cyberattacks on infrastructure, financial systems, media houses, and government databases.
- Diplomatic campaigns to isolate India in regional or global forums.njips.

 

This multi-directional stress aims at exhausting the government, stretching security forces, and creating an impression of permanent crisis. In such an environment, narrative warriors repeatedly insist that “Bharat is finished”, that the best option for youth is to emigrate, and that collapse is inevitable.

National morale is systematically attacked. Hybrid warfare doctrines explicitly describe psychological operations targeting hope, patriotism, and trust, because a demoralised population is easier to manipulate and less willing to endure hardship for long-term national gains. Once despair sets in, people unconsciously assist in their own disempowerment.

Polarisation and elite fragmentation

The script then intensifies polarisation: religion against religion, caste against caste, young against elders, states against the Centre, and Indian against Indian. Misinformation campaigns highlight real and alleged injustices selectively, ensuring that each community sees itself as victim and others as oppressor.

Hybrid warfare research stresses that polarisation is not a side effect but a deliberate method: fragmenting society prevents unified national responses and allows external players to arbitrate conflicts. Social media echo chambers reinforce identity-based grievances, and any voice calling for balance or nuance is dismissed as “sold out” to one side.

As streets stay turbulent, the elites are quietly split. Ministers may distance themselves, bureaucrats hesitate to take firm decisions, and senior officials start preparing for “after”—imagining life under a new regime. In colour revolutions, a crucial tipping point often occurs when part of the ruling coalition defects, sensing which way the wind is blowing.

Targeting the last wall: state organs

Finally, the last wall is attacked: the organs that embody the state’s capacity to defend itself—police, military, and intelligence. Persistent narratives paint them as enemies of the people rather than protectors of order.

Tactics include:

- Highlighting isolated misconduct as evidence that entire forces are brutal or communal.
- Running campaigns to undermine respect for uniforms and ranks.
- Pushing stories that the security apparatus is divided, politicised, or ready to rebel.

 

A government struggles when streets are angry; a regime falls when the state apparatus either becomes neutral, paralysed, or actively changes sides. Deep state and foreign operations therefore focus on influencing senior commanders, intelligence chiefs, and police leadership through pressure, inducements, or international exposure.

In countries where colour revolutions succeeded, parts of the security forces eventually stood aside or refused to intervene decisively, allowing protest movements to occupy institutions and force leadership change. For India, ensuring the apolitical, constitutional loyalty of the armed forces and intelligence agencies is a critical safeguard against such scripts.

Replacement: malleable coalitions and temporary arrangements

Once the incumbent regime is sufficiently delegitimised and destabilised, a replacement is presented—usually a coalition of disparate groups united mainly by their opposition to the previous leadership. The new arrangement is often projected as “temporary”, “transitional”, or “national unity government”, but in practice it tends to be malleable and susceptible to continued external influence.

Analysts of deep state operations note that both in the West and in targeted countries, unelected networks—across intelligence, diplomacy, big tech, and global finance—retain real leverage, shaping the policy space within which elected leaders operate. The immediate post-regime-change phase often sees rapid policy shifts in areas of strategic interest to foreign powers, including defence alignments, economic concessions, and ideological repositioning.

In other words, regime change is not an end but a means: the objective is to install a dispensation more responsive to external preferences and less committed to independent civilisational goals. For an emerging superpower like Bharat, whose strategic autonomy threatens entrenched global hierarchies, this makes it a prime target for such scripts.

“Defeating Hybrid & Narrative Warfare: Countering Regime-Change Campaigns Against Bharat’s Democracy” PART 1

 

Regime change in India would begin with a story, a narrative of despair and betrayal, that makes citizens distrust their country and admire those trying to break its current order.

India’s enemies would pursue regime change through narrative warfare, hybrid tactics, and psychological operations long before any conventional invasion, seeking to turn Indians against their own state and leadership by systematically eroding trust, morale, and unity. The “deep state” and external actors would combine economic pressure, information manipulation, and social polarisation in a phased script that has already been tested in other countries through colour revolutions and covert destabilisation campaigns.

Mind capture before border invasion

Modern regime change operations do not begin with tanks on the border; they begin by entering minds, shaping perceptions, and rewriting the story citizens tell themselves about their own country. The objective is to make people believe that Bharat must be saved from itself, that its institutions are irredeemably corrupt, and that collapse is inevitable unless external or “progressive” forces intervene.

 

 

In many countries, foreign intelligence-linked foundations, NGOs, media outlets, and activist networks have operated as narrative multipliers, consistently pushing frames that delegitimise the elected government while presenting foreign-backed change as moral and inevitable. This form of information warfare aims at cognitive capture: once citizens internalise a story of national failure, they unconsciously cooperate in weakening their own state.

The language of subversion is often coded. Analysts of information warfare note that “wars of narratives” are conducted through subtle themes—“democracy under threat”, “human rights crisis”, “youth betrayed”—rather than open calls for overthrow, allowing disruptive content to circulate widely without triggering obvious countermeasures. The enemy’s first victory is when citizens repeat these narratives as their own, believing they arrived at them independently.

Studying Bharat’s faultlines

Any adversary planning regime change in India will begin by studying Bharat—its history, social fabric, and vulnerabilities—rather than its military order of battle. Think-tanks, research institutes, and covert agencies map faultlines: communal tensions, caste divisions, regional disparities, economic grievances, educational stress points, and perceived injustices in law and governance.

Hybrid warfare doctrines emphasise targeting “specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions”—economy, politics, culture, information, and technology—to achieve synergetic effects without open war. For India, this would mean detailed analysis of:

Demography: youth unemployment pockets, regions with high migration, urban-rural divides, minority concentration areas, and border states.

 

Social cleavages: historical caste wounds, religious mistrust, linguistic pride, and regional identity movements.

 

Institutional friction: centre–state tussles, judicial–executive disagreements, and controversies around police or investigative agencies.

 

From this mapping, hostile planners identify where small sparks can become large fires if amplified by media and social networks. The aim is not merely to exploit existing problems, but to synchronise them into a national crisis narrative that overwhelms governance capacity.

Story as the primary weapon

Regime change in India would begin with a story—a narrative of despair and betrayal—that makes citizens distrust their country and admire those trying to break its current order. Colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and West Asia followed exactly this pattern: local grievances were woven into a grand narrative of liberation, with the existing government cast as the singular obstacle to justice and prosperity.

Such stories typically include recurring themes:

“The system is rigged”: Elections are portrayed as sham, courts as captured, and parliament as irrelevant.

 

“Only street action brings change”: Peaceful institutional routes are mocked as futile; protests and disruption become heroic. 

 

“External validation matters more than domestic reality”: International media, foreign NGOs, and global activists become ultimate arbiters of truth about the country.

 

In information and narrative warfare, these stories are disseminated through films, web series, social media campaigns, NGO reports, and academic discourse, gradually shifting the Overton window so that questioning the very legitimacy of the Indian state appears progressive and enlightened. Regime change becomes a moral mission rather than a geopolitical operation.

Step 1–2: Economic pain and scapegoating

The first operational step in this script is weakening the economy or, at minimum, amplifying economic stress so that it becomes politically unmanageable. Hybrid warfare literature highlights economic subterfuge—sanctions, supply chain disruptions, currency manipulation, targeted investment withdrawals, and cyberattacks on financial systems- as tools to hurt livelihoods without declaring war.

Once economic pain is felt, the second step is to ensure that every hardship is blamed not on global conditions or specific policy choices, but on the entire governing system and its leadership. Narrative warriors then frame-

Inflation, unemployment, and price shocks as deliberate failures or corrupt mismanagement.
External crises, pandemics, wars, commodity cycles—as proof of domestic incompetence, not global volatility.
The goal is to convert discomfort into rage. In several colour revolutions, economic dissatisfaction was relentlessly personalised to the sitting head of state, making regime change appear as a simple solution to complex structural issues.

Step 3–4: Wounds and faces of anger

The next phase is identifying a wound—an emotionally charged grievance capable of mobilising masses—and then finding faces to represent that anger. In various regimes targeted for change, these wounds have been:-

- Jobs and youth unemployment.
- Examination scandals and student stress.
- Farm distress, land acquisition disputes, or environmental conflicts.

- Religious incidents, caste atrocities, or identity-based discrimination.

 

Once a wound is selected, activists, influencers, and student leaders become the public faces of discontent. Many are genuine, driven by real concerns, but some are carefully trained in messaging, media handling, and mobilisation techniques, often via foreign-funded workshops, scholarships, or NGO networks.

Studies on “deep state” operations and regime change emphasise the use of civil society fronts, human rights groups, and youth movements as the socially acceptable spearhead of political destabilisation. Great actors—skilled in rhetoric and protest theatrics—make complex issues emotionally compelling, encouraging people who otherwise avoid politics to participate in agitation.

Step 5–6: Weaponised social media and protest fusion

With anger personified, social media becomes the primary weapon. Hybrid warfare writings underline algorithmic manipulation, bot networks, and coordinated disinformation as central tools to influence public opinion and magnify perceived crises.

Information operations deploy:

- AI-generated videos, edited clips, and deepfakes to frame the leadership as cruel, dishonest, or anti-people.
- Bot armies to push hashtags, create artificial trends, and make fringe sentiments appear mainstream.

- Micro-targeted content to specific communities, fuelling suspicion and resentment.

 

The next step is merging unrelated protests: different grievances—students, farmers, workers, religious groups—are encouraged to see a common enemy in the central government and its “cronies”. This transforms scattered dissatisfaction into a unified movement.

Colour revolution case studies show how protest coalescence is engineered through common symbols, slogans, and central squares, with NGOs and foreign advisors coordinating messaging. For India, this would mean synchronising campus unrest, rural protests, urban middle-class anger, and regional disputes into one national confrontation framed as a moral uprising.

Step 7–8: The spark and internationalisation

Every regime change script waits for a spark: a clash with police, a controversial arrest, or an emotive death that can be framed as martyrdom. When such an incident occurs, the entire narrative machine is activated to present it as the defining moment of “resistance versus oppression”

Soft power networks, foreign media outlets, and global NGOs then internationalise the outrage. Domestic failures are amplified, context is stripped away, and India is put in the dock of international opinion:-

Editorials and reports describe India as sliding into authoritarianism or fascism.
Hearings in foreign legislatures and international bodies criticise India’s democracy and human rights record.
Social media campaigns frame domestic law-and-order responses as atrocities, invoking sanctions or diplomatic pressure.
The colour revolution pattern is clear: external validation of protests gives them moral authority, while international condemnation delegitimises the government and restricts its room for manoeuvre.