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Wednesday 31 October 2012

दलालांना मोक्का लावा मुंबईचारेडलाइट’ एरिया होत आहे-
प्रभाकर पवार
गोवंडीच्या नवजीवन सुधारगृहातून बळीत म्हणून ठेवण्यात येणार्‍या तरुणी वारंवार पळून जात असल्याच्या घटना वाढीला लागल्या असून मुंबई उच्च न्यायालयाने त्याची गंभीर दखल घेऊन राज्य शासनाला चौकशीचे आदेश दिले आहेत. लेडीज बार किंवा रेडलाइट एरियात पोलीस धाड घालून मुलींना ताब्यात घेतात, परंतु त्यांना आरोपी करता बळीत ठरवून त्यांची न्यायालयाच्या आदेशानुसार महिला सुधारगृहात रवानगी करतात. बार किंवा कुंटणखाने चालविणार्‍यांवरपीटा’ची कारवाईही करतात. हे वर्षानुवर्षे मुंबईत सुरू आहे, परंतु कुंटणखाने किंवा लेडीज बार काही बंद पडले नाहीत. उलट मुंबईत वाढत्या लोंढ्यांप्रमाणे वेश्याव्यवसाय करणार्‍या महिलांची संख्या झपाट्याने वाढत आहे. त्या मानाने मुंबईत सरकारने महिला सुधारगृह काही बांधली नाहीत. दीड कोटीच्या मुंबईत फक्त गोवंडी येथेच नवजीवन हे एकच शासकीय वसतिगृह आहे. त्यातही फक्त १०० महिलाच राहू शकतात. तरीही त्यात दुप्पट महिला कोंबल्या जातात. कांदिवली, चेंबूर, बदलापूर, बोईसर येथे सरकारी अनुदान असलेली खासगी वसतिगृहे आहेत. मुंबई पोलिसांच्या रोजच्या लेडीज बार कुंटणखान्यांवरच्या धाडी पाहता सरकारी सुधारगृह कमी पडत आहेत. अतिरिक्त पोलीस आयुक्त कृष्ण प्रकाश यांनी अलीकडे दक्षिण मुंबईत टाकलेल्या धाडीत सुमारे १५० मुलींना ताब्यात घेण्यात आले, परंतु त्यांना ठेवण्यासाठी सुधारगृह नसल्याने त्यांना डी. बी. मार्ग पोलीस ठाण्याच्या आवारात ठेवण्यात आले. तेथेच त्यांची स्थानिक पोलिसांना ऊठबस करावी लागली. चहा, पाणी, नाश्ता, जेवणाचीही पोलिसांनाच सोय करावी लागली. जोपर्यंत न्यायालय त्यांची सुटका करीत नाही तोपर्यंत पोलिसांना सोडता येत नाही. त्यामुळे पालकांची इच्छा असूनही कधी कधी मुली नाहक कायद्याच्या कचाट्यापुढे सुधारगृहात सडत असतात तेव्हा आजची सुधारगृह आहेत की बिघाडगृह आहेत, असाही कधी कधी प्रश्‍न पडतो. एकवेळ जेल परवडतील, परंतु महिलांची वसतिगृह तुम्ही बघू शकणार नाही. त्यामुळेच महिला सुधारगृहातून पळून जाणार्‍या तरुणींचे प्रमाण वाढू लागले आहे. सुधारगृहात राहणार्‍या मुलींच्या संरक्षणासाठी तेथे सुरक्षा नसेल तर का नाही पळणार त्या मुली? का नाही होणार त्यांचे लैंगिक शोषण? एखादी मुलगी सुंदर असेल तर सुधारगृहाचे अधिकारी न्यायालयाला तिच्या चारित्र्याचा, चांगल्या वागणुकीचा दाखला देण्यासाठीही (जेणेकरून तिची सुधारगृहातून लवकर सुटका होईल) कधी कधी तिचे लैंगिक शोषण करतात तर मुलगीव्हर्जिन’ आहे की हॅब्युच्युअल आहे हे ठरविण्यासाठी तपासणीच्या वेळी सरकारी डॉक्टरही त्या मुलीचा विनयभंग करतात. त्यामुळे कुंटणखाने किंवा बारवरील धाडीत बळीत म्हणून ठरविलेल्या मुलींचे अधिकच शोषण होते. त्यांची सतत वरात निघत असते. तेव्हा या सर्व फार्सवर आता राज्य शासनाने गांभीर्याने विचार करण्याची गरज आहे. महिला सुधारगृहात आता आत्महत्याही होेऊ लागल्या आहेत. त्यामुळे राज्य शासनाने महिला सुधारगृह वाढविणे त्या सुधारगृहात सुधारणा करणे गरजेचे आहे.
मुंबई ही सोन्याची अंडी देणारी कोंबडी आहे. त्यामुळे देशभरातून गरिबीला कंटाळलेल्या मुलींना दलालामार्फत मुंबईत वेश्याव्यवसायासाठी पाठविले जाते. पश्‍चिम बंगाल, सिक्कीम, भुतान, नेपाळ, यूपी, बिहार, राजस्थान आदी राज्यांतून वयात आलेल्या सुमारे दोन लाख मुली सध्या मुंबईत वेश्याव्यवसाय करीत असून पोलिसांच्या धाडीत जेव्हा जेव्हा त्यांना पकडले जाते तेव्हा तेव्हा त्यांची वैद्यकीय तपासणी करून त्यांना सुधारगृहात पाठविले जाते. त्यात बांगलादेशी तरुणींची संख्या अधिक आहे. त्याच मुली सुधारगृहात गेल्यावर नीट राहात नाहीत. सुधारगृहाच्या अधिकारी कर्मचार्‍यांवर हल्ले करतात आणि पळून जातात. त्यामुळे ज्यांचा काही संबंध नाही अशा अधिकारी कर्मचार्‍यांवर निलंबित होण्याची वेळ येते. तेव्हा मुंबईत येणारे हे बांगलादेशी-परप्रांतीय लोंढे करदात्या मुबंईकरांनी किती पोसायचे? किती सांभाळायचे? बार किंवा कुंटणखान्यातील धाडीत तुम्हाला कुठेही स्थानिक तरुणी आढळून येणार नाहीत. मग रात्री-अपरात्री धाडी घालून धोके पत्करून स्थानिक पोलिसांनी किती काळ कारवाई करायची? रोज धाडी घालायच्या, पोरींना पकडायचे, बळीत ठरवायचे आणि महिला सुधारगृहात पाठवून पोलिसांनी राज्यकर्त्यांचीच अब्रू काढायची. हे आता नित्याचे झाले असून यावर आता कुठेतरी नियंत्रण आले पाहिजे. वेश्या व्यवसायाला आळा घातला पाहिजे. नाहीतर सार्‍या मुंबईचाच रेडलाइट एरिया होईल हे लक्षात ठेवा. मुंबईत आज १० हजार दलाल आहेत. तेच बाहेरून पोरींना आणतात आणिधंद्या’ला लावतात. त्यांच्यावर जोपर्यंतमोक्का’सारखी कठोर कारवाई होणार नाही तोपर्यंत बांगलादेशी पोरींची आवक बंद होणार नाही.

Thursday 25 October 2012

मुंबईचे पोलीस आयुक्त डॉ . सत्यपाल सिंह मुस्लिम समाजातील नेत्यांच्या दबावापुढे झुकले आहेCSTदंगलखोरांच्या अटकेचा फेरविचार (महाराश्ट्र टाइम)
 
 
 
 
मुंबई पोलिसांचे नीतीधैर्य वाढविण्याच्या गोष्टी करणारे आणि पोलिसांवर हात उचलणा - यांच्या नाकाबंदीच्या घोषणा करणारे मुंबईचे पोलीस आयुक्त डॉ . सत्यपाल सिंह मुस्लिम समाजातील नेत्यांच्या दबावापुढे झुकले आहेत . सीएसटी हिंसाचाराप्रकरणी अटक करण्यात आलेल्या समाजकंटकांच्या अटकेचा फेरविचार करण्याचे आदेश सत्यपाल सिंह यांनी क्राइम ब्रँचला दिले आहेत .
गेल्या आठवड्यात मुंबईतील इस्लाम जिमखान्यात मुस्लिम समाजातर्फे सत्यपाल सिंह यांचा सत्कार करण्यात आला . याप्रसंगी मुस्लिम समाजातील काही नेत्यांची भाषणे झाली . या भाषणांचा रोख सीएसटी दंगलीनंतर झालेल्या अटकांवरच होता . या प्रकरणाला हवा देण्यासाठी पोलिसांनी अनेक निष्पाप तरुणांना अटक केल्याचा आरोप मुस्लिम नेत्यांनी यावेळी केला . आझाद मैदानाजवळ पार्क केलेल्या बाइक आणण्यासाठी गेलेल्या तरुणांना पोलिसांनी आकसाने अटक केली आहे , असे सुनावतनाच , या तरुणांना ताबडतोब सोडून देण्याची मागणी या नेत्यांनी आयुक्तांकडे केली . पोलीस आयुक्तांवर मुस्लिम नेत्यांची ही दादागिरी पाहून उपस्थित पोलीस अधिकारीही अवाक् झाले . सिंग यांनी मुस्लिम नेत्यांपुढे तत्काळ शरणागती पत्करत अटकेचा फेरविचार करण्याची मागणी मान्य केली . इतकेच नव्हे तर पोलिसांनी चुका केल्याची कबुली दिली .
प्रत्यक्षात हिंसाचारानंतर अटक करण्यात आलेल्या तीन तरुणांना पुरा्व्याअभावी कोर्टाने आधीच सोडून दिले आहे . तर इतरांवर शस्त्रास्त्र बाळगणे , दंगल घडवणे आणि सार्वजनिक मालमत्तेचे नुकसान करणे ही कलमे लावण्यात आली आहेत . मात्र , आयुक्तांच्या आदेशानंतर या सगळ्यांच्या अटकेचा फेरविचार करण्याचा दबाव आता पोलिसांवर वाढला आहे .

Monday 22 October 2012

Some documents on the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict
  • Report of the Officials - Part 1 (1961)
  • Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 1
  • Report of the Officials - Part 2 (1961)
  • Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 2
  • Report of the Officials - Part 3 (1961)
  • Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 3
  • Report of the Officials - Part 4 (1961)
  • Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 4
  • President Rajendra Prasad’s address to Parliament - 8 February 1960
  • The incursions into parts of the territory of the Union of India, across our traditional and well understood borders, by elements of Chinese forces have, …deeply distressed our people and evoked legitimate and widespread resentment. They impose a great strain on our resources and our nationbuilding endeavours. We regret and deplore these developments on our border. They’ have resulted from the disregard by China of the application of the principles, which it had been mutually agreed to between us, should govern our relations. My Government have taken prompt and calculated measures, both defensive and diplomatic, to meet the threat to our sovereignty.
  • People's Daily editorial on Khrushchev's visit to India - 6 March 1960
  • The foreign policy of peace of the socialist countries finds particularly clear expression in their economic and cultural relations with those countries which have won national independence. Comrade Khrushchev's visit to the four nations provides an example of true international co. operation. The economic and cultural agreements signed by the Soviet Union with India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan make it clear that the economic and cultural co-operation of the socialist countries with these nations is entirely
    motivated by the desire to help them develop their national economies and raise their people's living standards. This contrasts sharply with the "aid" from imperialism which is used as a smokescreen for aggression.
  • Foreword by GB Pant to India-China Border Problem - March 1960
  • Foreword by Indian Minister G.B. Pant to Congress Party publication entitled India-China Border Problem, 4 March 1960 (Extract)
    The boundary between India and China along its entire length has been well known for centuries and is defined by treaty or international agreements or recognised by custom and tradition. It follows unchanging natural features and is in the main marked out by the Himalayas which are inseparably bound up with our frontiers as, since the dawn of our history, they are interwoven with the fabric of Indian civilisation. The historic northern frontiers of India are so well established that there could be no doubt, except to a mind pre-possessed otherwise, as to where the customary boundary lay. No Chinese Government called it in question in the past.
  • Zhou Enlai's speech at the NPC- April 10, 1960
  • Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the second session of the Second National People's Congress, 10 April 1960 (Extract)
    We likewise place ardent hopes in friendly relations between China and India. We are happy to see that the Indian Government has agreed to the Chinese Government's proposal for a meeting between the Premiers of China
    and India.
  • Morarji Desai's discussions with Chou En-lai - April 1960
  • Finance Minister Morarji Desai's discussions with Chou En-lai, April 1960 (Extract)
    When nobody supported China, India took your side and put up your case in the United Nations and forged friendship with you. You accepted the principles of Panchasheela. India accepted your sovereignty over Tibet, but you had accepted the condition that Tibet's autonomy would be respected and that you would not interfere with it.
  • Joint communiqué of the Prime Ministers of India and China - April 25, 1960
  • At the invitation of the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal; Nehru, His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Delhi on the 19th April to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which have arisen between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China.
    His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai was accompanied by His Excellency Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Foreign Minister of China, and other officials of the Chinese' Government.
    His Excellency the Premier and his party concluded their visit to India on the morning of the 26th April.
  • Nehru’s statement in Lok Sabha - 26 April, 1960
  • Our whole argument was based on the Chinese forces having come into our territory. Their [Chinese] argument was that they had always been there not those particular forces, but the Chinese authorities either of Sinkiang in the north or of Tibet had been in constructive or actual possession of these areas for two hundred years. That was such a variance in the factual state that there was no meeting ground. We repeat, again after all these talks that their forces came into this area within quite recent times, in the course of the last year and a half or so. That is our case, to which we hold… In the prolonged talks that took place, this basic disagreement about historical and actual facts came up again and again.
  • People's Daily editorial on Chou En-lai's six points - April 27, 1960
  • Of the six points, the first and the second are objective facts which nobody can deny. If the two sides recognize these facts and reach identical views, a favourable prerequisite will be provided for a reasonable solution of the boundary question. Points three and four are principles for the handling of the boundary question. Obviously they are completely reasonable and some of the geographical principles contained in them have also been repeatedly
    stressed by the Indian side on certain occasions. Therefore, there should not be difficulties, too, in reaching identical views on these principles. Points five and six relate to the necessary measures to be taken by the two sides pending a settlement of the boundary question. They are both reasonable and justifiable. In the past, the Indian side .also maintained that individual adjustments may be made on the boundary and that patrolling along the eastern sector should be discontinued.
  • Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha - 29 April, 1960
  • So far as the original Akasai Chin road was concerned, it was an old caravan route, hundreds and hundreds of years old. This has always been used as a caravan route by people going from Sinkiang to Tibet. This and the near-by route were used by the Chinese forces, probably in 1951 or may be 1952, that is to say, soon after the Chinese Government came to Tibet.
  • Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1959-60 - March 1960
  • During the year under review, our relations with China suffered a serious setback. It will be recalled that in the middle of March 1959 there was a sudden uprising in Lhasa leading to. the outbreak of hostilities between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces and, as a consequence, the Dalai Lama, with a small entourage, left Lhasa on 17 March 1959. In view of the age-old cultural and religious relationship between Tibet and India, there was a spontaneous outburst of sympathy with the Tibetan people when the news of the disturbances was published in India. The Government of India made it clear that while they sympathised with the Tibetans in their aspirations for autonomy, they fully recognized the suzerainty of China and could not, in any way, intervene in the developments inside Tibet. When, however, the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, the Government of India, in exercise of their sovereign right, agreed to grant asylum to him and to afford to the Dalai Lama the courtesy which befitted his recognized spiritual position.
  • The Official History of the Conflict
  • The Indian Ministry of Defence published the Official History of the 1962 Conflict.
  • Ministry of External Affairs - White Paper 6
  • Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
    WHITE PAPER VI
    November 1961 – July 1962, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  • Ministry of External Affairs - White Paper 7
  • Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
    WHITE PAPER VII
    July- October 1962
    Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  • Ministry of External Affairs - White Paper 8
  • Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
    WHITE PAPER VIII (extracts)
    October 1962 – January 1963
    Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  • 1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy
  • Published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, (Working Paper # 48) 
  • An Introduction to the Henderson Brooks Report
  • Neville Maxwell’s summary of the Henderson Brooks Report. This article first appeared in the Economic Political Weekly.
  • Conversation between Zhou Enlai and J. Zedebal - December 26, 1962
  • On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic, Comrade J. Zedenbal. During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a conversation took place between the two, which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.
  • Benediktov in conversation with R.K. Nehru - December 12, 1962
  • Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General-Secretary of India, R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world. 
  • Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan - November 4, 1962
  • Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Benediktov in conversation with R.K. Nehru - November 2, 1962
  • Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General-Secretary of India, R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world. 
  • More on Nehru’s Philosophy - October 27, 1962 (People’s Daily)
  • More on Nehru’s Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question — Editorial of the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) on October 27, 1962
  • Benediktov in conversation with E.M. Nambudiripad - October 26, 1962
  • Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPS - October 20, 1962
  • Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world. 
  • Benediktov in conversation with the Chinese charge d'affairs in India - October 10, 1962
  • Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with the charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, Comrage E Cheng-Cheng regarding Sino-indian border disputes.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world. 
  • Benediktov in conversation with Bhupesh Gupta - January 27, 1962
  • Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world. 
  • Benediktov in conversation with Bhupesh Gupta - January 17, 1962
  • Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world. 
  • The Poisonnous Arrow - The Panchen Lama’s letter to Zhou Enlai on the situation in Tibet
  • The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama
    A Few Chapters of the Report on the sufferings of the masses in Tibet and other Tibetan regions and suggestions for future work to the central authorities through the respected Premier Zhou Enlai (July 1962)
  • Nehru's SOS to Kennedy - Two Articles by Inder Malhotra
  • Forty-eight years have elapsed since the Black November of 1962, when took place the brief but brutal border war with China in the high Himalayas.
    As is clear, in retrospect, it was a relatively limited clash of arms — that unfortunately turned into a traumatic military debacle and political disaster for us. So, why recall those days and scratch the wounds that have nearly healed?
  • Zhang Wenji-Parthasarathy talks - 1961
  • Three conversations between Zhang Wenji, director of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department Number One, and Indian ambassador Parthasarathy. Addressed are the future of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Indian border issues, and India’s focus on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan.
  • Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, South Asia
  • The volume focuses upon the Kennedy administration's efforts to reorient U.S. policy with respect to South Asia by improving relations with India while maintaining the established alliance relationship with Pakistan. It includes documentation on the impact of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the Indian invasion of Portuguese Goa, and the impact of the Pushtunistan dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It documents U.S. efforts to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan and India, as well as the attempt to take advantage of the border war between India and China that developed in 1962 in order to forge a closer relationship between the United States and India.
  • Chinese attack on India — October 1962 (Maj. Gen. K.K. Tewari)
  • Extracts from A Soldiers’ Voyage of Self-Dicovery By Maj. Gen. K.K. Tewari (PVSM, AVSM) First published 1995. The story of a PoW in China.
  • The Cuban Crisis - Some Documents
  • Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis - by M.Y. Prozumenschikov
  • The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership’s deviation “from the generally fraternal countries and parties” and described Beijing’s authorities as seeking “to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice.”
  • Extracts of Roderick MacFarquhar’s book on the Cultural Revolution
  • The Origins of the Cultural Revolution
    Roderick MacFarquhar
    Volume III
    WAR IN THE HIMALAVAS, CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN
  • The 1960 Border talks between India and China
  • Notes on the five sessions of border talks between India and China in 1960.
  • Communist China's Domestic Crisis - The Road to 1964
  • A CIA paper on the tumultuous years before the Cultural Revolution and particularly Mao's Great Stride Forward between July 1962 and December 1963
  • Memorandum of Conversation of Khrushchev with Mao Zedong - 2 October 1959
  • We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. We consider this issue as follows: five kilometers more land we have or five kilometers less—this is not important. I take Lenin’s example, and he gave to Turkey Kars, Ardahan and Ararat. And until today area a part of the population in the Caucasus are displeased by these measures by Lenin. But I believe that his actions were correct. I am telling about all this to show you that for us this territorial issue was not  insurmountable. You have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position.
  • The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: 1961-62 (CIA Papers)
  • The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973.
  • The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: 1959-61 (CIA Papers)
  • The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU CIA Papers Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973.
  • The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1950-1959 (CIA Papers)
  • The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973
    This collection of declassified analytic monographs and reference aids, designated within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, ESAU, and POLO series, highlights the CIA’s efforts from the 1950s through the mid-1970s to pursue in-depth research on Soviet and Chinese internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations. The documents reflect the views of seasoned analysts who had followed closely their special areas of research and whose views were shaped in often heated debate. Continuing public interest in the series, as reflected in numerous requests through Freedom of Information and Executive Order channels, led CIA’s Office of Information Management Services (IMS) to conduct a search of Directorate of Intelligence record systems for documents in this series and then undertake a declassification review of all the documents we located. 
  • An Historical Note of the Frontier
  • An historical background of the Himalayan Frontier of India to understand the border issue

        Tuesday 16 October 2012

        ARE MAOISTS POLITICAL PRISONERS

        Bibhu Prasad Routray


        Two judicial decisions in Kolkata have opened up a dormant debate on the status of the jailed cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist. Whether the arrested left-wing extremists should be treated as 'political prisoners'? Whether India should recognise the Maoist movement as essentially political in nature?

        In August, the Kolkata high court declared seven suspected Maoists, including CPI-Maoist backed leader Chhatradhar Mahato and Maoist spokesperson for Bengal and Gaur Chakraborty as 'political prisoners'. Following the trend, on September 21, a sessions court in Kolkata bestowed a similar status on nine suspected Maoists -- including head of the outfit's technical committee, Sadanala Ramakrishna.

        This piece attempts to provide answers to three important questions relating to this debate. First, do the Maoists qualify to be 'political prisoners'? Second, what could have prompted the judiciary in Kolkata to take such decisions? Third, what are the implications of such decisions on the future developments with regard to Maoist activities in the country?

        Extremism- Politics dichotomy

        'Political prisoner' status has been a long-standing demand of the CPI-Maoist. It is one of the three pre-conditions laid down by the outfit for peace negotiations with the government. Legal teams representing the Maoists have persevered to gain a 'political prisoner' status for all the high-profile Maoists lodged in different state prisons today.

        This yearning for a 'political' status, however, coexists with a strategy that seeks to uproot all that is commonly understood as 'political'. For the Maoists, all forms of elections held in India are a sham. The outfit opposes the parliamentary form of government, regularly calls for boycotting polling, coerces candidates to withdraw from the electoral processes and kills those who disobey. The mass resignation of gram panchayat members in various states under duress is a successful implementation of the Maoist strategy. The demand for a 'political' status, thus, represents bit of a paradox for the Maoists who display intense contempt for the political set-up.

        The Maoist objective of replacing the prevalent structure of governance relies not on peaceful political means, but a doctrinaire violent protracted people's war aimed at annihilating all class enemies. Although the Maoists justify their violence as a response to the 'active and structural' violence of the State, more often than not the 'annihilation' has been the first streak of actual violence in areas now dominated by the extremists.

        This grand strategy of people's war has resulted at least 5,291 dead bodies of civilians and security forces since 2004, the year the CPI-Maoist was formed, till 2011, averaging 755 deaths per year and 63 deaths per month. An overwhelming proportion among the fallen have been from the very classes and communities the Maoists claim to be seeking to 'liberate'. The class war has further left school and gram panchayat buildings, road stretches, bridges, electricity and mobile phone towers destroyed. By no stretch of imagination, this trail of blood, gory and destruction qualifies to be a political struggle.

        The CPI-Maoist's overt reliance on violence and mayhem is intrinsic to its larger strategy of weakening the State, ensure its retreat if not disintegration, thus allowing the Maoist functionaries a free hand to establish a janathana sarkar (people's government) -- an euphemism for an extreme form of authoritarianism devoid of any respect for commonly accepted legal principles including basic human rights. Such forms of government are a reality in the territories under firm extremist control.

        This extremist plan of action is more than evident from the profiles of the two of the 16 Maoists granted 'political prisoner' status by the judiciary. Chhatradhar Mahato, who started as a defender of tribal rights in the Jangalmahal area of West Bengal's West Midnapore district, swiftly degenerated into running errands for the Maoist leader Kishenji. Mahato was a key figure in the numerous Maoist activities in the district including giving shelter to the extremist cadres and murdering cadres of the then ruling Left Front. Mahato's People's Committee Against Police Atrocities was the front organisation used by the Maoists to build up their 'liberation struggle' in the area and provide their wanton violence a legal and humane facade.

        Charges against 60-year-old Sadanala Ramakrishna are even more unambiguous. RK, as he is commonly known, was the head of the outfit's 'technical committee', overseeing manufacturing arms and spares and supplying them deep into the Maoist territories all over the country. During his stay in Kolkata, from where he was arrested in February, the team headed by RK collected explosive substances, ammunition and oversaw a project to manufacture rocket launchers and other weapons. Close to Rs 1 crore (Rs 10 million), ammunition, explosive materials, several diagrams and literature on rocket launchers were recovered from the arms factory he had set up in Kolkata.

        It requires no complex science to understand that neither Mahato nor RK excelled in essentially 'political' activities.

        Why the Decision?

        Given that the Maoist ideology and end game is fairly well articulated and understood in the country's strategic circles, the court decision could be treated with a sense of disbelief.

        It appears that the judgments are based on an unwarranted focus on the end 'political' objective of the Maoists, while disregarding the 'means' the outfit adopts to achieve such an objective. However, this sense of bewilderment needs to be weighed in the wider context of the culture of political opportunism in West Bengal.

        Maoists are not banned entities in West Bengal. While New Delhi and all the states affected by Maoist activities have proscribed the outfit, West Bengal has chosen to bypass such a decision. The Left Front government considered the Maoist problem a 'political' issue, which it said should be fought politically. Only after the goons of the Left Front, the 'Harmad Bahini', were systematically butchered by the Maoists did the Budhhadeb Bhattacharya government agree to a central force-led initiative against the extremists. However, the facade of a political fight against the Maoist was maintained till the very end of Left Front rule in the state. It is, thus, not surprising that the Communist Party of India has welcomed the latest court decisions.

        Surprisingly, close to 18 months since the Left citadel was knocked off in West Bengal by the Trinamool Congress, the status quo has been maintained. In spite of Mamata Banerjee's proclivity to label all strands of critics -- students, cartoonists, farmers -- as Maoists, the chief minister has sidestepped the administrative expediency of proscribing the CPI-Maoist.

        In these circumstances, unless the law enforcement agencies manage to prove their charges of sedition against the arrested extremists, nothing stops the courts from declaring the Maoists, 'political prisoners'.

        The Bigger Picture

        On the surface, the 'political prisoner' status bestows only rudimentary benefits on the arrested Maoists, which should have been granted to all prisoners under the long-pending prison reforms project.

        Compared to the benefits some of our corrupt politicians manage to enjoy while behind the bars, the provision of newspapers, better food and a cot to sleep for the arrested Maoists vide the court judgment does not exactly threaten the existence of the nation.

        The bigger issue, however, is the distinction the judgments establish between Maoism and other forms of extremism. It elevates Maoist activities to a higher level. It makes the Maoist violence an acceptable form of dissent articulation. And it attaches a stamp of legality behind ideology inspired use of carnage for political objectives.

        This is no doubt a dangerous and unacceptable trend. Needless to say, the court rulings in West Bengal have been nothing sort of a moral victory for the CPI-Maoist.

        आदर्श’ दिलासा आणि saamna agrlekh
        ‘इत्तेहादुल’चा धोका!
        नांदेड-वाघाळा महानगरपालिकेच्या निवडणुकीत नांदेडकरांनी पुन्हा एकदा कॉंग्रेसच्या बाजूने कौल दिला आहे. ८१ सदस्य संख्या असलेल्या नांदेड महापालिकेत ४१ जागा जिंकून कॉंग्रेसने बहुमत मिळवले आहे. शिवसेना-भाजप-रिपाइं ‘महायुती’ने १६ जागा जिंकून आपली चमक दाखवली. शिवसेनेचे १४ तर भाजपचे २ नगरसेवक निवडून आले. शिवसेनेपुरते बोलायचे तर मागच्या महापालिका निवडणुकीत शिवसेनेचे ११ शिलेदार निवडून आले होते. यावेळी शिवसेनेचे ३ नगरसेवक वाढले. नवनिर्माण पक्षही येथे नशीब अजमावायला म्हणा किंवा अस्तित्व दाखवायला उभा होता. पण नांदेड-वाघाळाकरांनी त्यांना साफ झिडकारले आहे. लोकांचा हा कौल आहे. त्यामुळे जिंकलेल्यांना व हारलेल्यांनाही तो स्वीकारावाच लागतो. ‘कमाल’ आहे ती कॉंग्रेसचे माजी मुख्यमंत्री अशोक चव्हाण यांची. महागाई आणि भ्रष्टाचार यामुळे कॉंग्रेसची देशभर छी-थू होत असताना त्यांनंी महापालिका जिंकली. तिकडे पश्‍चिम बंगालमध्ये लोकसभेच्या पोटनिवडणुकीत राष्ट्रपती प्रणव मुखर्जी यांचे चिरंजीव काठावर निवडून येतात. कॉंग्रेसचेच उत्तराखंडचे मुख्यमंत्री बहुगुणा यांचे चिरंजीव सपशेल पराभूत होतात आणि नांदेडची जनता मात्र कॉंग्रेसचे सगळे अपराध पोटात घालून अशोक चव्हाणांचा ‘हात’ हातात घेते, याचा ‘अर्थ’ कसा लावायचा? राष्ट्रवादीशी आघाडी न करता अशोक चव्हाणांनी स्वबळावर कॉंग्रेसला बहुमत मिळवून दिले. आता जनतेने हा कौल दिला आहे की, कॉंग्रेसच्या मंडळींनी काही ‘आदर्श’ युक्त्या वापरून हा कौल मिळविला आहे, याच्या खोलात शिरण्यामध्ये काही हशील नाही. कारण तुमच्या या लोकशाहीत जनमताचा कौल म्हटल्यावर त्याचा आदर हा करावाच लागतो. संपूर्ण प्रचारात नांदेड महापालिकेची निवडणूक ही
        ‘जनशक्ती विरुद्ध धनशक्ती’ अशी असल्याचा उल्लेख वारंवार झाला ते खरेच होते. मतदारांना पैसे वाटून, आमिषे, प्रलोभने दाखवून निवडणुका जिंकण्याचे तंत्र आता रूढच होऊ लागले आहे. नांदेडातही तेच झाले. कॉंग्रेजी उमेदवारांसाठी थेट पैसे वाटताना पोलिसांनीच अनेकांना रंगेहाथ पकडले. एकंदर ८ ठिकाणी पोलिसांनी अशी कारवाई केली आणि कॉंग्रेस-राष्ट्रवादीच्या २० कार्यकर्त्यांना अटकही झाली. लोकशाहीच्या बाजारातील मतांची ही खरेदी-विक्री आणि जनमताचा कौल याची सांगड घालायची तरी कशी? महापालिकेच्या निवडणुकीचे विश्‍लेषण आणखी आठवडाभर होत राहील, पण या निवडणुकीतील सर्वात धक्कादायक आणि धोकादायक बाब आहे ती म्हणजे ‘एआयएमआयएम’ या कट्टरपंथी मुस्लिम संघटनेचा उदय! ‘ऑल इंडिया मुस्लिम इत्तेहादुल मुसलमीन’ या हैदराबाद आणि आंध्र प्रदेशात सक्रिय असलेल्या रझाकारी संघटनेचा या निवडणुकीच्या निमित्ताने महाराष्ट्रात चंचूप्रवेश झाला आहे. ‘इत्तेहादुल’चे अध्यक्ष खासदार असदुद्दीन ओवैसी यांनी धर्मवेड्या मुस्लिमांना एकत्र आणून त्यांची राजकीय ताकद उभारण्याचा चंगच बांधला आहे. आंध्र विधानसभेच्या ८ जागा त्यांनी लढवल्या. त्यापैकी ७ आमदार निवडून आणले. हैदराबाद महापालिकेतही १५० पैकी ४३ नगरसेवक एकट्या ‘इत्तेहादुल’चे आहेत. आता नांदेडातही या पक्षाने तब्बल ११ जागा जिंकल्या आहेत. नांदेडमध्ये मुस्लिमांची संख्या २५ टक्क्यांच्या आसपास आहे. निवडून आलेल्या ८१ पैकी २४ नगरसेवक मुस्लिम आहेत. मुस्लिमांची वाढती लोकसंख्या आणि त्यांची राजकीय महत्त्वाकांक्षा दर्शवण्यासाठी हे आकडे पुरेसे बोलके आहेत. धर्माच्या नावाखाली
        मुस्लिमांची भक्कम ‘एकजूट’
        होत असताना हिंदू मतदार मात्र जाती-पातींच्या राजकारणातच मश्गूल आहे. पुन: पुन्हा कॉंग्रेसचा पदर हातात घेऊन तो आपल्याच हाताने पायावर कुर्‍हाड मारून घेतो. या देशातील हिंदू जातींच्या विळख्यातून बाहेर पडून ‘हिंदू’ म्हणून जोवर एकत्र येणार नाही तोपर्यंत हे असेच चालत राहणार!
        नांदेड महापालिकेची निवडणूक जिंकल्यानंतर अशोक चव्हाणांचा ‘जल्लोष’ सुरू आहे. जणूकाही ‘आदर्श’ घोटाळ्यातूनच ‘निर्दोष’ सुटका झाली, अशा थाटात चॅनल्सवर त्यांच्या मुलाखती झळकत आहेत. विकासाच्या मुद्यावर कॉंग्रेसने निवडणूक जिंकली, अशा बढाया अशोकराव आणि त्यांची कॉंग्रेस मारत असली तरी ‘जेएनयूआरएम’ आणि गुरूदा गद्दीच्या सोहळ्यासाठी केंद्राकडून आलेले १६०० कोटी आणि महाराष्ट्र सरकारचे १०० कोटी अशा एकूण १७०० कोटींच्या निधीची नांदेड महापालिकेतील कॉंग्रेसच्या राज्यकर्त्यांनी कशी ‘वाट’ लावली हे नांदेडमध्ये पाय ठेवल्याबरोबर लक्षात येते. एवढ्या प्रचंड निधीचा वापर नीट केला असता तर आज नांदेड ‘बकाल’ दिसले नसते. त्यामुळेच विकासाच्या या बाजारगप्पांना तसा काही अर्थ नाही. सरकारी निधी आणि त्याच्या कंत्राटातून विकास झाला तो फक्त कॉंग्रेसवाल्यांचा. तसे नसते तर कॉंग्रेसच्या या ‘विकास पुरुषा’ला ‘आदर्श घोटाळ्या’त घरी जावेच लागले नसते. ‘आदर्श’ प्रकरणात कॉंग्रेसच्या श्रेष्ठींनी अशोक चव्हाणांना कोणताही दिलासा न देता त्यांची खुर्ची काढून घेतली. नांदेडच्या जनतेने मात्र महापालिकेची सत्ता पुन्हा कॉंग्रेसच्या हाती सोपवून अशोकरावांना ‘आदर्श’ दिलासाच दिला, असेच आता म्हणायला हवे!