Introduction
Pakistani premiers have historically engaged in conflicts with India that they were unlikely to win. This pattern, driven by political motives and strategic miscalculations, has resulted in repeated failures and significant political consequences.
The Kargil War: A Case Study in Valor and Missteps
The 1999 Kargil War is a prime example of Pakistan's futile military ventures. Pakistani forces occupied lightly held Indian positions in an attempt to cut off the highway connecting Srinagar and Leh. Indian soldiers, particularly young officers and jawans, displayed remarkable valor. The critical question, however, is not whether Indian intelligence failed to anticipate the attack or if there was a delay in response. Instead, it is essential to understand why Pakistan continues to wage unwinnable wars.
Historical Context: The Politico-Military Nexus
Pakistan has a history of invoking past glories and perceived threats from India to justify a strong military presence and secure continued aid from the US. This narrative worked as long as it did not escalate into full-scale war. During the 1960s, Pakistan experienced significant economic growth under President Ayub Khan. However, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, driven by personal grievances, manipulated the situation to initiate a war with India, aiming to annex Kashmir.
Operation Gibraltar and the 1965 War
In 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, involving military infiltration and attempts to incite rebellion in Kashmir. This strategy, combined with a conventional war campaign, ultimately failed. Although Pakistan avoided losing Lahore, it did not achieve a decisive victory.
The 1971 War: A Strategic Miscalculation
The 1971 war resulted in Pakistan's worst defeat, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. This comprehensive defeat convinced Pakistan of its military inferiority compared to India. The insecurity fueled by this loss was exploited by the Pakistani military to maintain power, driving the country into economic decline.
General Zia-ul-Haq's Strategy
In the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq devised a strategy to engage India through low-intensity conflicts, which proved effective in Punjab and later in Kashmir. This approach diverted India's attention and resources, while Pakistan avoided direct conventional warfare, especially since it was not yet nuclear-ready.
The Nuclear Dimension and Kargil Misadventure
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s allowed Pakistan to redirect its jihadists towards Kashmir. Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear capabilities in 1998 emboldened its military planners, leading to the Kargil conflict in 1999. Pakistan believed its nuclear status would deter India from escalating the conflict. However, India responded decisively, reclaiming the occupied territories.
Political Fallout and Historical Lessons
Each major conflict with India has resulted in significant political upheaval in Pakistan. After the 1965 war, President Ayub Khan's career ended due to internal machinations. In 1971, the defeat forced Yahya Khan from power, paving the way for Bhutto. In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif following the Kargil War.
Continuing the Strategy of Cross-Border Militancy
Post-Kargil, Pakistan has persisted with the strategy of supporting cross-border militancy, a tactic earlier employed by Zia-ul-Haq. Despite the clear lessons from history, Pakistani leaders have repeatedly attempted to secure their legacies by waging wars against India, often resulting in their political downfall.
Conclusion
The pattern of Pakistani premiers engaging in unwinnable wars against India highlights a combination of political opportunism, strategic misjudgment, and an enduring belief in military solutions. These conflicts have consistently ended in failure, leading to significant political and economic consequences for Pakistan. The historical record underscores the futility of these wars and the need for a fundamental rethinking of Pakistan's approach towards India
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