Tactics:
The above factors influenced the entire gamut of Shivaji
Maharaj's fighting strategy and tactics. Shivaji Maharaj knew his aim of
establishing 'Hindavi Swarjya' could not be achieved through mere hope. Yet he
understood the immense shortfall in resources at his disposal. Therefore, his
first challenge was how to start. He thus formed the strings of preliminary
strategies. He formed a small army with the help of his close friends and their
followers. He was then looking for places from where they could operate. The
only answer to this dilemma was to secure a few forts for himself. Shivaji
Maharaj secured the fort of Torna at the young age of 16. The capture of Torna
came with a buried treasure. It allowed Shivaji Maharaj to make a few more
forts, as forts allowed his small force to fight and hit back. After Torna
Shivaji, Maharaj conquered newer forts, Chakan, Kondana, and Purandar. By 1659,
apart from those named above, Shivaji had a string of hill forts with him:
Rajgadh, Rohira, Tikona, Rajmachi, Lohgarh, Pratapgadh etc. Shivaji Maharaj had
also captured many forts on the Konkan coast as well. For Shivaji Maharaj,
forts were the lifeline to his rule and the instruments of fighting his
enemies. The forts were not merely defensive positions. Shivaji Maharaj used
them for offensive actions. He used the forts like a Pivot. It is a term that
is aptly described in the Indian Army's 'Glossary of Military Terms.' They are
defensive positions established in flat terrain with vast frontages, like in
the Rajasthan and western Punjab deserts. The term used for them is the 'Pivot
of Manoeuvre'. A Pivot has all the elements for a defensive and offensive
battle. Forts for Shivaji Maharaj had a similar use. They were positions from
where Shivaji's commanders could unleash their offensive elements at the
appropriate time. All the hill forts were in a plug-and-play mode. It meant
there was no sacrosanct rule that force from Fort A would return to Fort A. A
force out on an expedition could get into any fort for short durations and act
as reserves or strike elements. Hence, the Mughals found the siege of hill
forts a dangerous tactical posture.
The use of forts as a war tactic is best understood by
studying the campaign of Afzal Khan into Jawli. In 1660, Shivaji Maharaj had a
fort constructed in Jawali: Pratapgadh. This fort was the principal instrument
in the killing of Afzal Khan and the defeat of his army of around 10,000
cavalry, assisted infantry, and artillery that had travelled from Bijapur by
the express sanction of his sultan Adil Shah II. His offensive actions also
included capturing newer forts so that they offered mutual support to each
other. At the time of his death, he had 240 forts, but by 1665, he had about 35
under his control. A part of offensive tactics would be covered later when we
discuss two of his famous battles in 1670-72.
Offensive Strategy:
Shivaji Maharaj's first strategy was inspired by Fabius, the
famous Roman general, in 220 BC.
"Sometimes the Best way to win is not to lose."
"The Fabian military strategy involves wearing down
an enemy over time through a war of attrition and indirection. The strategy is
named after Roman General Quintus Fabius Maximus, who used it in 221 BC to stop
Carthaginian General Hannibal's invasion of Rome. The Fabian strategy is known
for its use of time and is traditionally favoured by the weaker side. The
weaker side avoids decisive engagements and instead uses tactics to harass the
enemy's lines of communication. The goal is to weaken the enemy, disrupt its
supply, and affect its morale. The side using the Fabian strategy may believe
that time is on their side, or they may adopt it when no other strategy is
possible".
Hence, during his initial warning years, Shivaji Maharaj
fought with the Adil Shahi and Mughals in a war of attrition. His inferior
forces would strike and not engage the enemy in a confrontation. They would
disengage and vanish into the hills or forests at the first sign of a
significant force coming, only to regroup at a pre-selected rendezvous point.
Central to this strategy was the possessions of the hill forts. Luckily for
Shivaji Maharaj, the Sahyadri was a favourite destination for the earlier Hindu
kings of the 11th and 12th centuries CE. So many of those forts existed even in
the 17th century, either in the hands of the Mughals or the Adil Shahi forces,
since Nizam Shahi had collapsed and ceased to exist in 1636 CE. The Mughals and
the Adil Shahi forces distributed all the Nizam Shahi forts.
Shivaji Maharaj realised that a Mughal or the Adil Shahi
soldier was not a hill creature, and his fitness was found wanting. He took
adequate advantage of it and created turmoil in their ranks through hit-and-run
tactics. Unlike the Rajputs in the North and NW of India, the Marathas were
averse to giving a battle. The Mughals, in the beginning, called it cowardice,
till realisation dawned on them that it was a very well-thought-of strategy of
Shivaji Maharaj.
Trickery as a Strategy.
During that period,
trickery or deceit was an instrument to get the better of the enemy, and using
it was not considered blasphemy. Afzal Khan used it in Jawli. He came to kill
Shivaji Maharaj under the garb of friendship. Adil Shah used it to imprison Shivaji
Maharaj's father in Bijapur. Aurangzeb used it against Shivaji Maharaj when he
put him under house arrest at Agra. Most of the forts were captured in those
days by deceit. So, deceit was a common trait to get the better of the enemy.
Being short on resources, Shivaji Maharaj was adept at using trickery as an
instrument of his strategy.
Uniting the Maval Chiefs. One
of the greatest strategic victories of Shivaji Maharaj was to bring all the
Maval chiefs under a single flag. In the period between the capture of the
Torna in 1646 and 1660, i.e. up to Afzal Khan's march into Jawli Shivaji
Maharaj, he had a turbulent time trying to balance his force. The old Maratha
province was divided into small provinces ruled by local chieftains. Their
provinces were called Mavals. The Maval belt gave Shivaji Maharaj most of his
fighting strength. These 12 regions of Maval were ruled by chieftains who
called themselves the Raja. They were the Deshmukhs, Sar-Deshmukhs, and the
Sarnaiks, Desais. Meaning the landlords. They exuded tremendous control and
power in their respective regions. First, they were unwilling to join Shivaji
Maharaj and share his dream. For them, the sardeshmukhi under any ruler was
more acceptable; no matter who ruled the Deccan, their position was secure and
hereditary. Amidst such exalted status, they did not want to fight a superior
force for a dream that seemed unattainable to all initially. Thus, Shivaji
Maharaj's battle was both internal and external. Even Napoleon has remarked,
"It is very difficult for a nation to create an army when it is not
already a body of officers and non-commissioned officers to serve as a nucleus
of a military organisation." Historians have written about his
military and administrative exploits. Still, his ability to rein in the Maratha
Maval chiefs has not received the same fame. Shivaji Maharaj's soldiers were
his military strength. They made his force become such a ferocious and agile
fighting force. One Maval chief worth mentioning is 'Chadrarao More'. The chief
of Jawali. The most inaccessible region is Sahyadri, where it is rumoured even
Timur Lane could not reach it. It is because it lay in a patch of thick jungle
surrounded by high hills. Chandra Rao More had once sworn his allegiance to
Shivaji Maharaj's father, Shahaji. But once he left, the Jawli chief did a
volta face and declared himself an independent. His cockiness stemmed from his
confidence in Jawli's invincibility. Shivaji Maharaj subdued him by reaching
his gates with force. He ran but was captured and ultimately executed by
Shivaji Maharaj for treason. He was the last Maval chief to succumb to Shivaji
Maharaj's authority.
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