An Overview of Operation Condor and J. Patrice McSherry’s Analysis
In her pivotal work Predatory States, J. Patrice McSherry explores Operation Condor, a covert network uniting repressive military regimes in Latin America during the Cold War, with significant influence from the United States. Operation Condor remains one of the most critical examples in the study of state-sponsored assassination. While numerous books cover this topic, McSherry’s work stands out for its early contribution and extensive use of archival material. Her analysis raises key questions about the degree of U.S. responsibility in Condor’s operations, carefully examining the role of American support without explicitly assigning blame. Although the primary drivers were Latin American dictatorships—led notably by Pinochet’s Chile and Argentina—the United States was a powerful regional influence, making McSherry’s nuanced discussion of state responsibility both essential and timely.
U.S. Support for Repression: Ideological Backing and Logistical Assistance
From the 1950s onward, the U.S. supported the shift of Latin American militaries’ focus from external threats to internal repression, embedding itself in the political dynamics of the region. McSherry details the logistical support provided by the United States, including technology transfers, arms sales, intelligence sharing, and training for military personnel involved in Condor operations. U.S. personnel were reportedly directly involved in abductions and interrogations, and Condor communications even routed through American facilities in Panama, creating an infrastructure that could have been terminated but was instead maintained. Such actions underline the extent of American engagement, despite opportunities to disengage or limit support for Condor’s violent objectives.
U.S. Tolerance and Reluctance to Condemn Human Rights Violations
McSherry also highlights a concerning pattern of American tolerance for Condor’s human rights abuses. When Condor assassinated Orlando Letelier, a former minister under Chilean President Salvador Allende, in Washington, D.C., the U.S. government refrained from strong measures against Condor-affiliated nations. High-level officials like Secretary of State Henry Kissinger often ignored warnings from U.S. ambassadors urging greater human rights advocacy. This reluctance to hold Latin American allies accountable reflects a broader tolerance of abuses, as long as they aligned with anti-communist objectives.
Ethical Dilemmas in Foreign Policy: Is Government Morality Real?
Competing Views Within the U.S. Government
Addressing the ethical question, McSherry’s analysis suggests that government morality in foreign policy is complex, with positions that vary widely among officials. Investigative journalist John Dinges, who has extensively covered Condor, describes a system of mixed signals within the U.S. government, where some officials quietly approved (a “green light”) while others opposed (a “red light”) severe human rights abuses, including torture, disappearances, and assassinations. The impact of these mixed messages often depended on the authority level: those in power selectively received guidance, giving precedence to higher-level endorsements over objections from lower-level ambassadors or diplomats.
Conclusion: Balancing Morality and Realpolitik
McSherry’s work does not entirely dismiss the presence of morality in government policy but points to a challenging reality—foreign policy often involves ethical compromises, where power dynamics, national interests, and ideological alignment take precedence over moral concerns. Operation Condor exemplifies this tension, revealing how selective morality has shaped global relations, influenced covert operations, and complicated the accountability of state actors in international affairs.
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