A Summary of the Kargil Review Committee's Recommendations

 

1. A thorough review of the national security system in its entirety should be undertaken by an independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient.

2. Having a National Security Advisor who also happens to be Principal Secretary to PM can only be an interim arrangement. There must be a full time NSA and a second line of personnel should be inducted into the system urgently and groomed for higher responsibilities.

3. There must be periodic intelligence briefings of [the] Cabinet Committee on Security with all supporting staff in attendance.

4. Every effort must be made to ensure that a satellite imagery capability of world standard is developed indigenously and put in place in the shortest possible time.

5. Acquisition of high-altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) should be undertaken and institutionalized arrangements made to ensure that imagery generated by them is disseminated to concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible.

6. Communication interception equipment needs to be modernized and direction-finding equipment augmented.

7. The establishment of a single organization like the National Security Agency of the USA, grouping together all communication and electronic intelligence efforts, needs to be examined.

8. Adequate attention has not been paid to develop encryption and decryption skills.

9. The issue of setting up an integrated Defence Intelligence Agency needs to be examined.

10. There is no institutionalized mechanism for coordination or objective oriented interaction between intelligence agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. Accordingly, a thorough examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to removing these deficiencies is called for.

11. Though the efficacy of the Joint Intelligence Committee has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat, its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of the overall reform of the system.

12. The development of country/region specialization along with associate language skills should not be further delayed. It is necessary to establish think tanks, [to] encourage country specialization and to organize regular exchange of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

13. In order to have a young and fit Army, colour service [service before a soldier is required to retire or to go as a reservist] should be reduced from seventeen years to between seven to ten years. Released officers and men should then be diverted to paramilitary formations. Subsequently, older cadres might be further streamed into regular police forces.

14. Improved border management necessitates a detailed study in order to evolve appropriate force structures and procedures to deal with the inflow of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms. 1

5. Many experts have suggested the need to enhance India's defence outlay as budgetary constraints have affected modernization and created operational voids. Government must determine the level of defence spending in consultation with the concerned Departments and Defence Services.

16. Armed forces headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. This had led to many negative results and it is felt that the Services headquarters should be located within the Government. The entire gamut of national security management and apex decision making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces’ headquarters should be comprehensively studied and reorganized.

17. Beginning with Indira Gandhi, successive Indian Prime Ministers have consistently supported an Indian nuclear weapons programme but enveloped it in the utmost secrecy not taking into confidence their own party colleagues, the Armed Forces and senior civil servants. [Records in government files] establish that the Indian nuclear weapons programme had a much wider consensus than is generally believed. Accordingly, the publication of a white paper on the Indian nuclear weapons programme is highly desirable.

18. On many vital issues, sufficient public information is not available in a single comprehensive official publication. The Government must review its information policy and develop structures and processes to keep the public informed of vital national issues.

19. One of the major factors influencing Pakistan's aggressive behaviour in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 has been a deliberately cultivated perception of an ineffectual Indian Army and a weak and vacillating Indian Government. Though Pakistan was discomfited in all the four military adventures it undertook, it has attempted to portray each as a narrowly missed victory. It is, therefore, necessary to publish authentic accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars to establish the facts. It is also recommended that an authoritative account of the Kargil conflict be published at an early date.

20. A true partnership must be established between the Services and the DRDO [Defence Research and Development Organization] to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former get the indented equipment they require without delay.

21. Establishment of a civil–military liaison mechanism at various levels from Command Headquarters to operative formations at the ground level is essential to smoothen the relationship during times of stress and to prevent friction and alienation of the local population.

22. A rehabilitation programme for soldiers who were wounded in the Kargil war and [for] others must be put in place.

23. The dedication and valour of Ladakh Scouts and J&K Light Infantry merit recognition through raising of additional units of these regiments locally.

24. The country must not fall into the trap of Siachenization of the Kargil heights and similar unheld gaps. The proper response would be a declaratory policy that deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LOC and crossborder terrorism will meet with retaliation in a manner, time and place of India's choosing.

25. Credible measures must be undertaken in J&K to win back alienated sections of the population and attend to genuine discontent.

26. Neither the Northern Army Command nor HQ 15 Corps nor the lower field formations had media cells, which could cater to the requirement of the press corps. It must also be recognized that the media has to be serviced at many levels – national, local and international.

27. The US Armed Forces usually operate dedicated radio and TV channels to entertain and inform their armed forces when deployed overseas. The Government should seriously consider similar dedicated facilities for the Indian Armed Forces. If such facilities had been available at the time of Kargil, some of the misleading reports and rumours that gained currency could have been effectively countered.

28. The committee was informed that Prasar Bharati [India's public sector broadcasting organization] in J&K lacks Balti and other linguistic skills to reach the people across the LOC. Unless such software and programming aspects are taken care of, mere hardware expansion may not be cost effective.