CHINA’S MARITIME BEHAVIOUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE PART 2

 

The image of China turning on the charm one minute, for instance during Xi’s 2014 visit to Australia, will be offset the next minute by news of controversial land reclamation operations on a disputed shoal. While there are actors pushing the government in a more provocative direction, there are also more moderate voices, such as local governments and corporations investing in Southeast Asia and some scholars, who urge the government to pursue a constructive agenda in the region.158 They However, there is no evidence of a central government-approved ‘grand plan’ that mandates different actors coercing other claimants in a tailored way towards a mutual goal.

argue that China continues to need a stable environment to prosper. Friendly relations in the region are imperative to counter US influence. Constructive relations with the United States also benefit China. If one looks beyond the maritime sphere, many of the trade and investment policies that China implements are welcomed in neighbouring countries. China will also continue to develop its civilian law enforcement capabilities by strengthening its maritime presence and its ability to police disputed waters. The new China Coast Guard will not shy away from using its enhanced capabilities to coerce its neighbours when deemed necessary. Some in China presume that this intimidation — both psychological and the physical ‘bumping’ by Coast Guard vessels and use of water cannon — will weaken other claimants’ resolve, especially if China’s economy keeps growing and other claimants’ economic dependency on China grows along with it.

It is important to emphasise, as M. Taylor Fravel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has, that China does not rely on its navy to assert its claims, nor is China’s Coast Guard using weapons to drive home its message.159 The PLA can be expected to remain an ‘over the horizon’ force, at least for the time being.160 Whether the PLA will have a bigger role in coordinating tense situations in disputed waters (as it apparently did with the ‘defence’ of the HYSY-981 rig) is an open question. The recent increase in joint military–civilian exercises could be an indication that the PLA aspires to that role. Alternatively, the PLA’s role as a coordinator could prove to be an exception that was prompted because of the ongoing restructuring problems within the new China Coast Guard. Foreign and security policy serves Xi’s domestic agenda. One cannot rule out the idea that some CPC leaders — possibly Xi himself — want to create the image of China as a strong power by resorting to harsh actions in the maritime sphere to counter the criticism the leadership faces from its own citizens on domestic issues. These issues include social injustice and hazardous pollution, both of which grind away at the Party’s legitimacy and affect elites and the middle class. People are also frustrated with the slow pace of economic reforms. The fierce propaganda war over maritime rights will also continue. The more that outsiders perceive China as a bully, the more difficult it is for anyone to write objectively about the maritime disputes in China’s vicinity. For policy-makers in the region, the existence in China of diverse, persistent, and nationalist maritime security actors is a source of concern. So is the continuous uncertainty about the role of the PLA Navy. The actors make China’s behaviour unpredictable because they can be expected to continually stretch the boundaries of the permissible, using the pretext of Xi’s very general guidelines on safeguarding The PLA can be expected to remain an ‘over the horizon’ force, at least for the time being.

maritime rights. These actors are also not united, which impedes coordination and effective governance. Indeed, often fierce rivalry between these actors further increases unpredictability. Consequently, there is a genuine risk of an incident at sea (or in the air) spiralling out of control. The complex interactions between China’s maritime security actors will keep the East and South China Seas volatile.