U.S. lost or damaged 42 aircraft in the Iran war needs careful handling,

 

 U.S. lost or damaged 42 aircraft in the Iran war needs careful handling, because the figure includes all losses and damage—fighters, tankers, helicopters, AWACS, and drones—and some were caused by combat, some by friendly fire, and some by accidents or ground attacks 

So this is not the same thing as saying the U.S. lost 42 frontline fighter jets in air-to-air combat 
What the numbers suggest
The reported U.S. tally is a warning that modern air forces can still take serious losses when they operate near strong air defenses, disperse over long distances, and rely heavily on tankers, drones, and support aircraft 

The most vulnerable assets in these reports were drones and non-stealth support aircraft, not just fighters, which shows that air power now depends on a whole system, not only on the jet itself .
Israel’s reported experience is different: public Israeli statements said no manned aircraft were lost, while some drones were shot down 

That does not mean Israeli aircraft were immune; it means Israel appears to have kept manned jets outside the most dangerous exposure, or used them in ways that reduced risk 
Why Israel may have avoided manned losses
Israel usually flies with very tight intelligence, electronic warfare, deception, standoff weapons, and layered air defense support, so its manned aircraft can often strike from safer ranges 

It also tends to use cheaper drones and missiles for the highest-risk tasks, which protects pilots and aircraft 

In other words, Israel appears to have used risk management, not invulnerability 

By contrast, the U.S. is operating over a much larger theater with more support aircraft in the air and on the ground, which increases exposure and creates more opportunities for losses and mishaps 

A large campaign also gives the opponent more chances to hit parked aircraft, tankers, drones, or aircraft during transit 
Air power has not become irrelevant
Air power is not obsolete; it is changing. The key shift is from “fighters alone” to a mixed system of stealth aircraft, drones, standoff missiles, electronic warfare, tanker support, space-based sensing, and integrated air defense suppression 

The side that can see first, jam first, shoot first, and keep its own aircraft survivable still has a major advantage 
So the lesson is not “air power no longer matters.” The lesson is that air power without support systems is expensive and vulnerable, while air power integrated with sensors, EW, missiles, and layered defenses is still decisive 
Lessons for India
For India, the biggest lesson is that future war will punish any force that relies only on a few high-value aircraft or only on a single platform type 

India needs a hybrid doctrine: fighters for control, missiles and drones for cost-effective strike, and strong air defense plus electronic warfare for survival 

Kargil-style lessons and more recent Indian analysis both point to the need for joint planning, dispersion, deception, and survivability 
India should especially invest in:
Better integrated air defense and counter-drone systems.
More dispersal and hardened operating bases.
Standoff weapons and long-range precision strike.
Electronic warfare and networked targeting.
Joint Army-Air Force planning for contested airspace 
Direct comparison
The core answer is that the U.S. losses do not prove air power is irrelevant; they show that modern air power is now a contest of systems, sensors, and survivability 

Israel’s lower manned-aircraft losses likely reflect different tactics, shorter operational reach, and stricter risk control rather than a special immunity