RAND Questions China’s Combat Readiness

 U.S. Concerns Over China's Military Modernization

The 1990s marked a turning point in how the United States (U.S.) perceived China’s military advancements. Washington grew increasingly alarmed as Beijing initiated a comprehensive modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), focusing on advanced submarines, ships, fighter jets, and missiles.

Recognizing the growing capabilities of the PLA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) began publishing an annual report in 1999 titled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. These reports highlighted China's expanding military capabilities and strategic objectives.

The DoD's 2024 report references the 2022 National Security Strategy, which asserts that China "is the only competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order." As China aims for "national rejuvenation" by 2049, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is building a "world-class" military to pursue its revisionist ambitions, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

RAND Report Challenges China's Combat Readiness

A recent report by the RAND Corporation, an American nonprofit global policy think tank, contradicts the notion that China's military modernization is aimed at preparing for war. Titled The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness, the report claims that China is modernizing the PLA primarily to uphold CPC rule rather than to engage in combat.

RAND argues that despite China's military advancements, the PLA has historically prioritized political loyalty and enforcement of CPC rule over combat readiness. The report suggests that as China's economic and political challenges grow, the PLA will focus more on safeguarding the CPC rather than preparing for external conflicts.

While China boasts the world’s largest army, navy, and an extensive stockpile of ballistic missiles, RAND asserts that "recent modernization gains have not fundamentally changed the PLA’s political orientation." The report further claims that China is unprepared for a military confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan, though it notably ignores the 2020 Ladakh incursions against India.

PLA's Modernization and Political Control

Chinese leadership, from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, has ensured that the PLA remains the guardian of CPC rule. The RAND report references Mao’s 1938 speech stating, "Power grows from the barrel of a gun," highlighting the military's role in securing state power. Historical events, including the Korean War, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square Massacre, illustrate how the PLA has been used to suppress internal dissent and maintain party dominance.

RAND acknowledges that by the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping declared that China no longer faced the prospect of a major war. However, the conclusion that the PLA's modernization is solely for CPC rule is flawed for two reasons.

First, the PLA has always been the armed wing of the CPC, playing a crucial role in securing the party's rule since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Xi Jinping has further consolidated his control over the military by amending the party's constitution in 2018, eliminating presidential term limits, and purging rivals. As the general secretary of the CPC and head of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi ensures that the PLA also advances China’s foreign policy objectives.

Second, as noted in the DoD’s 2024 report, "the PLA has increasingly turned to military force as an instrument of statecraft to advance its foreign policy objectives—adopting more coercive and aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region."

Evolution of China's Military Doctrine

RAND fails to account for the significant evolution in China’s military doctrine since the 1980s. Deng's 1985 doctrine of "Local War" emphasized limited conflicts rather than large-scale wars. This evolved into "Local Wars Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions" in 1993, influenced by U.S. military success in the Gulf War. By 1999, Jiang Zemin refined the PLA doctrine to "Local War Under Modern Informatised Conditions," integrating information technology across military domains.

Subsequent leaders have continued this trajectory. Under Xi Jinping, the PLA prioritizes cyber and space warfare, developing "long-range, precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons" while emphasizing integrated joint operations. Reforms under Xi have streamlined PLA command structures, reducing the number of Theatre Commands from seven to five to enhance operational efficiency.

China’s Defense White Papers from 2013, 2015, and 2019 consistently highlight the PLA’s modernization focus and combat readiness, refuting RAND's assertion that China's military exists solely to uphold CPC rule.

PLA Combat Readiness: India and Taiwan Perspectives

RAND argues that "China has continued to shy away from combat operations.

First, the PLA’s doctrine of informatised warfare integrates command, control, surveillance, and cyber capabilities across military domains. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) maintains high combat readiness, capable of transitioning from peacetime to full combat readiness within short notice. China's 2023 Dong Feng-31 ICBM tests demonstrated rapid launch capabilities, reinforcing strategic deterrence.

Second, China's actions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) against India contradict the notion of a passive military. The PLA's 2020 incursions in eastern Ladakh involved a pre-planned deployment of 200,000 troops, heavy artillery, and armored vehicles. The PLA’s doctrine emphasizes "preparations and alert activities" for border security, evident in its continuous infrastructure buildup and military drills in Tibet.

Third, China’s repeated military drills and aerial incursions near Taiwan demonstrate operational readiness. The PLA conducts extensive joint exercises involving naval, air, and missile forces to simulate potential invasion scenarios. Recent deployments of advanced drone swarms and amphibious forces near Taiwan indicate significant military preparedness.

Conclusion: Is the PLA Combat-Ready?

RAND’s assessment of the PLA as politically oriented rather than combat-ready . While the PLA remains an instrument of CPC control, it has also evolved into a formidable force with regional and global ambitions. 

 China’s growing military assertiveness, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, India, and Taiwan, suggests a force that is not only modernizing but also prepared for combat operations when necessary. The PLA’s capabilities, doctrine, and strategic actions indicate that it is far more than just a political tool of the CPC.