VIETNAM ASIAS RISING TIGER POSES THREAT TO CHINA

Being branded as one of the few bright spots in Asia where economic growth has accelerated beyond 6% in recent years, the nominally Communist nation is advancing closer towards its former arch enemy, America, and this will help the country become a competitor to China Vietnam has come a long way in the last four decades. And over the next few years, a less hobbled society added by a slew of massive foreign direct investment will probably reshape the destiny of Asia’s “Other Tiger”. With the advent of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Vietnam’s clout in international trade is expected to change. The fledgling economy of the country, sleeping in the garb of the devastations of the war till recently, is now in the middle of a big revolution — huge capital flow is the trademark of the new beginning. The nominally Communist nation is advancing closer towards its former arch enemy, America, and this will help the country become a competitor to China. Obviously with an appealing market for foreign investment and trade with massive economic growth, it is today registering the fastest growth in Asia. Vietnam has displayed to the world that tried and tested models of development can work wonders. It symbolises a counter to techno-pessimism. Like China, Vietnam is clear-minded and knows what direction it must take to grab the opportunities thrown open by the global economy. So far, the signs of development are positive. However, with end of the first quarter of 2016, Vietnam had aimed for a GDP growth of 6.7 per cent, but this period showed only 5.46 per cent economic growth. The massive climate change gave a disastrous blow to the economy of the country which mostly relies on agricultural sector. Can Van Luc, an economist with the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam, rightly argues that the drought and the intrusion of sea water into the agricultural land has hurt major farmlands in the Mekong Delta region. As the Mekong Delta is the highest rice producing area, the country suffered losses in the beginning of the year. Though the agricultural output has declined, the industrial production, retail sales of goods and services grew as expected, and even more compared to the last year. But it seems it is too early to predict the growth of Vietnam’s economy which normally moves upward only at the end of the year. Vietnam’s economy witnessed a major leap after the country’s growth fell to as low as 5.25 per cent in 2012. The nation has largely benefited from a slow, but steady rise in investment from foreign investors who are trying to cash in on the benefits of most of the free trade agreements, including the TPP. Being a middle income group nation in the 12-nation TPP, Vietnam stands out because TPP together accounts for more than 40 per cent of global output. Sensing the mega impact of the TPP on Vietnam, Hanoi-based World Bank economist Sandeep Mahajan predicted in October last year, “The question is how much benefit they can derive from the TPP; it is not whether they can derive benefit. We have estimates which would show that cumulatively by 2030 it would add about eight per cent to Vietnam’s GDP.” Why Vietnam will factor in so much in comparison to other Asian countries like China? It is because of the rising costs of labour and other services that will force many of the foreign brands to move to Vietnam. Among the key industries to gain from the TPP membership include Vietnam’s textiles and garments and global supply chain operators like telecommunications which are making fast strides as it is closer to China. But Vietnam’s agricultural sector will face strong competition from major commodity exporting countries like that of Australia for sure. Apart from other areas of growth, Vietnam’s exports have been doing exceptionally well. Its market is driven more by foreign manufacturers than the local ones for a number of reasons. Many international labour law experts say that Vietnam offers a set of excellent set of labour laws unlike even some other democratic nations like that of India in Asia. Beyond this, it has a very less heavily regulated business environment wherein the multi-national corporations do not have to encounter bureaucratic hassles quite often. It is sad that despite having widely prevalent democratic systems starting from the grass-roots to Parliament, today India is crippled by the remnants of an overwhelmingly colonial bureaucratic set up. Therefore, unlike China and India, Vietnam offers an excellent opportunity to the foreign investors for a free environment where the ease of doing business is the rule of the day. Being branded as one of the few bright spots in Asia where economic growth has accelerated beyond six per cent in recent years, Vietnam will definitely pose a potential threat to the Middle Kingdom sooner or later. China may come up with numerous problems starting from terrorism in Xinjiang, unrest in Hong Kong, problem with Tibet, a growing middle class who aspires for more freedom than money, brewing internal political fights arising from various layers of the elite and finally its ever greater expansionist tendency in the most controversial zone of South China Sea. These may help Vietnam in the coming years. China’s ambitions have no limit, but Vietnam is a country that has limited enemies unlike the former and it has no hidden agenda. Vietnam’s stable political environment contributes positively for the growth of the nation. Though there are contests for the top job i.e. Secretary General of the Communist Party, it is not so complicated that it may destabilise the national political environment. Vietnam is ruled by the Communist Party and it is the most powerful organ of the country. Today, Nguyen Phu Trong, who is the Secretary General of the Communist Party, virtually controls all affairs of the State. Indeed he secured a second term in the 12th party Congress this year where there was a tough battle for the top job between him and then Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, but the latter failed. Though branded as maverick and charismatic by many, Dung’s own legacy invited his downfall. He was known widely as a great reformer, but in reality he is not so. Undoubtedly, he built up a powerful patronage network throughout his rule. His reforms have helped well-placed persons and foreign investors for sure. He was projected as only one leader in Vietnam, who espoused for more open and democratic Vietnam, but to be precise, the critics always dismissed such expectations from him. Dung was succeeded by a less charismatic Nguyen Xuan Phuc as the Prime Minister in April 2016. Phuc is known as a team player and a technocrat, ready to adhere to the party line. It is critical for any Vietnamese leader to respect and work as per the setting standards of the Communist Party as it is the DNA of this eastern-most country of the Indo-China peninsula. Whatsoever it may be, barring political differences within the party, the country is forging ahead and it will rise above the horrors of the war. Vietnam has set its sights on becoming a developed nation by 2020. Let’s wait and watch how the communist country will wade through the troubles coming from both within and outside while competing with the neighbouring giant China

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Unravelling LEMOA: Repackaged agreement in Indo-US strategic interest- PRADIP CHAUHAN

Unravelling LEMOA: Repackaged agreement in Indo-US strategic interest Finally, there's an umbrella arrangement between New Delhi and Washington for the provision of combined training exercises and disaster relief operations. After 12 exasperating years of “….letting ‘I dare not’ wait upon ‘I would’, like the poor cat i’ th’ adage”, the Narendra Modi government has demonstrated geopolitical acumen to finally ink a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US. (For readers of more contemporary education, the adage is that the cat loves and wants the fish, but does not want to wet her paws!) Defence minister Manohar Parrikar completed the formality of signing this agreement during his visit to the US from August 29 to 31. The Congress, now in the Opposition, has made all the expected outraged noises, but one rather suspects that this is only to gain whatever little mileage it can from its Left-leaning domestic audience. Amid the media hype in the immediate aftermath of Parrikar’s visit, it may be useful to take an overview of this foundational agreement that forms an important cornerstone of the India-US defence relationship. With the decadal percentage value of India’s openness ratio (the ratio of India’s external merchandise trade to her GDP) hovering at close to 40 per cent, the dominance of the maritime relationship - and in particular, maintaining freedom of navigation and the world’s international shipping lanes (ISLs) - is greater than ever before. Although the term “maritime” encompasses far more that merely the Navy, the India-US maritime relationship is overwhelmingly dominated by the “Navy-to-Navy” relationship. What is LEMOA all about? It is actually nothing more than a repackaged, India-specific “ACSA”. To facilitate its foreign engagement with militaries and defence establishments across the world, the US routinely concludes what are called “Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements” (ACSAs). In its generic form, ACSA is an enabling agreement that allows the US military to acquire logistic - support, supplies, and services (such as food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment), either “from” or “to” a foreign government, or, organisations such as NATO, the UN, etc. These agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises, to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the ACSA. As the tempo of the defence and security engagement between India and the US increased through the first decade of the current century, US representatives in the Defence Policy Group (DPG) proposed that an ACSA be signed between the two countries, as had been done with some 76 countries. However, in the 2005 DPG, sensitivity to the imperatives of coalition politics - especially the increasingly shrill opposition of the Left bloc - were in strong evidence as the Indian side stated that ACSA in its generic form presented certain difficulties. The Indian side proposed a change of nomenclature to a “Logistic Supply Agreement” (LSA) and promised to present a revised draft of the original ACSA agreement. This is how the LSA was hived from the ACSA and made into an India-specific logistic agreement. Addressing US concerns, the Indian side agreed to ensure the draft LSA was comprehensive enough to include activities other than merely exercises (disaster-relief and anti-piracy operations being illustrative cases-in-point). US domestic law dictates that until such an agreement is signed, logistic-support, supplies, and services, may be acquired from the nation (or NATO entity), but may not be transferred to it. It is important to recognise that ACSA is a US construct, and, as such, is designed to “benefit the interest of DoD (Department of Defense) forward deployed commands and forces; they are not a grant program. Acquisitions or transfers must be either in cash, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of supplies or services of equal value in support of the operational needs of forward deployed forces. They may not be used to increase inventories, nor can the DoD use them when the desired materiel or service is reasonably available from US commercial sources. Most importantly, DoD acquisition personnel must ensure ACSAs are not used as a routine source of supply for a foreign country”. It is precisely to make the agreement more even-handed, serving the national military interests of India as well as those of the US that the ACSA was redrafted and converted into an India-specific LSA. And yet, for over a decade, the LSA remained unsigned - once again demonstrating (as in the case of the Communications Interoperability Security Memorandum of Agreement, CISMOA) a most peculiar trend of the Indian defence establishment eventually ending-up disagreeing with its own draft! The LSA was then repackaged as LEMOA and has finally passed muster - and not a moment too soon! In the absence of LEMOA, there was no umbrella arrangement for the provision of mutual logistic-support for combined exercises, training, port-calls, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, etc. As a consequence, the Indian Navy and the US Navy had no option but to support their bilateral maritime engagement through a series of “ad-hoc” arrangements, such as the Fuel Exchange Agreement (FEA) that permitted, inter-alia, Indian warships deployed on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere off the coast of Somalia to embark fuel from US Navy replenishment-tankers whilst underway, thereby obviating the need to break patrol and go into a foreign port to refuel. Also read: How South China Sea dispute affects India Such ad-hoc agreements (based essentially upon personal liaison - what in colloquial Hindi is known as “bhai-bandhi”) are subject to delays and legal challenge within the US and, as such, are far from being optimal. The utility of the LEMOA lies in the comprehensiveness of mutual logistic-support, in terms of supplies and services and includes food, water, transportation, medical services, communications, etc. It may be readily seen that the LEMOA would be of particularly significant utility in enhancing the reach and sustenance of forces operating together at sea during unforeseen situations such as those occasioned by natural disasters. The lack of broad understanding of the LEMOA among the various echelons of the Indian bureaucracy has had some odd manifestations. At one point in time, the Indian home ministry contested the inclusion of provisions related to disaster relief efforts in the scope of the LEMOA, asserting that disaster management was a home ministry function and it was for it to initiate any bilateral support agreement relating to disaster-relief! This highlighted once again, the disproportionate effects of linguistic infirmity (in both “comprehension” and “articulation”). The fact, of course, is that the LSA pertains to logistics-support to units participating in the HADR mission and not to the relief material to be provided to the affected region and do not, in any way impact the management of disasters at the national level (which would continue to remain under the home ministry/ National Disaster Management Authority). In any event, the Indian home ministry could hardly be involved in a “combined” IN-USN effort to provide HADR support to a third country. The provision of logistic support at sea itself will obviate the need for costly and time-consuming operational turnarounds (OTRs), which may not be readily available in the vicinity of the disaster area. The attendant savings of cost and time that such an agreement would enable are quite evident. The agreement obviates the tedious process of seeking case-by-case approvals for logistic support and enables us to respond faster and more efficiently. Also read: Signing LEMOA with US a bold step, but India must be cautious Since the LEMOA is an enabling agreement, rather than being “binding” on any given specifics, and since its scope is clearly defined, India is still free to invoke any or all (or none) of the provisions of this agreement on a “case-by-case” basis. This provides the government of India with the desired flexibility and the discretion to either accept or refuse US requests. It is this central freedom that needs to be understood and grasped by the protagonists in the debate on the other pending “enabling” agreements such as CISMOA and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). India needs to demonstrate the self-confidence to be able to invoke such provisions as are relevant to a given case or situation and are in consonance with India’s own national interests - whether within the maritime sphere or otherwise. So what needs to be done from here on? According to some segments of the Left, too much has already been done that ought never have been done and so the short answer is nothing. However, ideological leanings aside, the recently generated impetus must now be capitalised so as to maintain momentum and achieve strategic results. However, apex-level exchanges by the political leadership are not enough and both, India and the US, are far too big (literally and militarily) to be satisfied with a short-term tactical relationship. Bilateral institutional structures need to be rejigged to reflect the seriousness of the relationship and focus maintained on developing the Navy-to-Navy relationship - not just in operational terms, but right across the engagement spectrum. Perhaps the most important maritime features at the operational level are to understand, discuss and take strong and persistent actions to deliberately blur the wholly artificial seams between India, PACOM, CENTCOM and AFRICOM (US Pacific Command, US Central Command and US Africa Command), and, to simultaneously sign the remaining enabling instruments of CISMOA and BECA, without which operational acceleration cannot be fully achieved

IS USA READY FOR WAR WITH CHINA

Are we ready for war with China? By David C. Gompert A U.S.-China war could begin with devastating strikes, last years, have no winner and inflict huge losses on bot... This article is an edited version of a report by the Rand Corp. The full report may be found in PDF format or online here. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140z1.zhs.pdf As its military advantage declines, the United States will be less confident that a war with China will conform to its plans. China’s improved military capabilities, particularly for anti-access and area denial (A2AD), mean that the United States cannot count on gaining operational control, destroying China’s defenses and achieving decisive victory if a war occurred. With that in mind, this report examines alternative paths that a war between the United States and China might take, losses and other effects on both sides, preparations that the United States should make and ways to balance U.S. war aims against costs should war occur. We postulate that a war would be regional and conventional. It would be waged mainly by ships on and beneath the sea, by aircraft and missiles of many sorts, and in space (against satellites) and cyberspace (against computer systems). We assume that fighting would start and remain in East Asia, where potential Sino-U.S. flash points and nearly all Chinese forces are located. Each side’s increasingly far-flung disposition of forces and growing ability to track and attack opposing forces could turn much of the Western Pacific into a “war zone,” with grave economic consequences. It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used: Even in an intensely violent conventional conflict, neither side would regard its losses as so serious, its prospects so dire, or the stakes so vital that it would run the risk of devastating nuclear retaliation by using nuclear weapons first. We also assume that China would not attack the U.S. homeland, except via cyberspace, given its minimal capability to do so with conventional weapons. In contrast, U.S. non-nuclear attacks against military targets in China could be extensive. The time frame studied is 2015 to 2025. The need to think through war with China is made all the more important by developments in military capabilities. Sensors, weapon guidance, digital networking and other information technologies used to target opposing forces have advanced to the point where both U.S. and Chinese military forces seriously threaten each other. This creates the means as well as the incentive to strike enemy forces before they strike one’s own. In turn, this creates a bias toward sharp, reciprocal strikes from the outset of a war, yet with neither side able to gain control and both having ample capacity to keep fighting, even as military losses and economic costs mount. A Sino-U.S. conflict is unlikely to involve large land combat. Moreover, the unprecedented ability of U.S. and Chinese forces to target and destroy each other—conventional counterforce—could greatly deplete military capabilities in a matter of months. After that, the sides could replenish and improve their forces in an industrial-technological-demographic mobilization contest, the outcome of which depends on too many factors to speculate, except to say that costs would continue to climb. While the primary audience for this study is the U.S. policy community, we hope that Chinese policymakers will also think through possible courses and consequences of war with the United States, including potential damage to China’s economic development and threats to China’s equilibrium and cohesion. We find little in the public domain to indicate that the Chinese political leadership has given this matter the attention it deserves. Four Analytic Cases The path of war might be defined mainly by two variables: intensity (from mild to severe) and duration (from a few days to a year or more). Thus, we analyze four cases: brief and severe, long and severe, brief and mild, and long and mild. The main determinant of intensity is whether, at the outset, U.S. and Chinese political leaders grant or deny their respective militaries permission to execute their plans to attack opposing forces unhesitatingly. The main determinant of duration, given that both powers have the material wherewithal to fight a long war, is whether and when at least one side loses the will to fight or calculates that continuing to do so would be counterproductive. We categorize the effects of each case as military, economic, domestic political and international. Military losses include aircraft, surface ships, submarines, missile launchers and inventories, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems, which are increasingly vulnerable to cyber- and anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare. Economic costs include the contraction of trade, consumption and revenue from investments abroad. (The disruption of energy supplies is captured in the effects of trade contraction.) Should cyberwarfare escalate from military to civilian domains and infect critical information infrastructure, economic activity could be further disrupted. Domestic political effects could range from impeding war policy to endangering internal stability. International responses could be supportive, opposed or destabilizing. The current rate of advances in military technology, especially in Chinese A2AD and in cyberwar and ASAT capabilities of both sides, implies a potential for major change in the decade to come, which dictates examining 2025 cases distinct from 2015 cases. Economic conditions will also change between now and 2025—with the Chinese economy potentially overtaking the U.S. economy, Chinese investments abroad growing, and both economies relying more than ever on computer networking—though not enough to alter qualitatively the economic impact of a war. Attempting to specify domestic political and international effects of war a decade from now would be even more speculative. Thus, 2025 is analyzed distinctly from 2015 only in the military dimension. The four cases and indicative findings about losses, costs and other effects are as follows: 1. Brief, Severe If either U.S. or Chinese political leaders authorize their military commanders to carry out plans for sharp strikes on enemy forces, a severely violent war would erupt. As of 2015, U.S. losses of surface naval and air forces, including disabled aircraft carriers and regional air bases, could be significant, but Chinese losses, including to homeland-based A2AD systems, would be much greater. Within days, it would be apparent to both sides that the early gap in losses favoring the United States would widen if fighting continued. By 2025, though, U.S. losses would increase because of enhanced Chinese A2AD. This, in turn, could limit Chinese losses, though these would still be greater than U.S. ones. It could be unclear then whether continued fighting would result in victory for either side. Economically, even a brief, severe war would produce a shock to Chinese global trade, most of which would have to transit the Western Pacific war zone, whereas U.S. economic damage would largely be confined to bilateral trade with China. International and domestic political responses would have little impact. 2. Long, Severe As of 2015, the longer a severe war dragged on, the worse the results and prospects would be for China. By 2025, however, inconclusive results in early fighting could motivate both sides to fight on despite heavy losses incurred and still expected. Although prospects for U.S. military victory then would be worse than they are today, this would not necessarily imply Chinese victory. As the fighting persisted, much of the Western Pacific, from the Yellow Sea to the South China Sea, could become hazardous for commercial sea and air transport. Sharply reduced trade, including energy supplies, could harm China’s economy disproportionately and badly. The longer and harsher a conflict, the greater would be the likelihood of involving other states, especially U.S. allies in the region—most important, Japan. 3. Brief, Mild Given the uncertain prospects of swift military victory, the risks of losing control, and the specter of major economic damage, both Chinese and U.S. leaders (for it would take both) might decline to authorize all-out strikes on the other side’s forces. What could follow is tightly restricted, low-grade, sporadic, inconclusive fighting, with minimal military losses. Assuming that leaders of both states were inclined and had enough political latitude to compromise, such a conflict could be ended before it produced major economic damage or domestic and international political tremors. 4. Long, Mild With fighting contained and losses tolerable, the sides could try to escape the political costs of compromise by continuing a low-grade conflict. Because neither would gain the upper hand militarily, this could go on for some time. In the meantime, even with fighting limited, economic losses would grow, especially for China. With the passage of time, domestic and international political reactions would intensify, though less consequentially than in the long, severe case. These cases indicate that the advanced conventional counterforce capabilities of both the United States and China could produce major military losses from the outset and throughout unrestrained (though non-nuclear) hostilities. Once either military is authorized to commence strikes, the ability of both to control the conflict would be greatly compromised. Each side could regard a pre-emptive attack on the other’s forces as a way to gain a major early and sustainable edge in losses and thus in capabilities to prevail. This underscores the instability inherent in mutual, conventional counterforce capabilities and war-fighting concepts. By 2025, enhanced Chinese A2AD will have shrunk the gap between Chinese and U.S. military losses: Chinese losses would still be very heavy; U.S. losses, though less than China’s, could be much heavier than in a 2015 war. Even as U.S. military victory became less likely, Chinese victory would remain elusive. Because both sides would be able to continue inflicting severe losses, neither one would likely be willing to accept defeat. History offers no encouragement that destructive but stalemated fighting induces belligerents to agree to stop. A severe, lengthy, militarily inconclusive war would weaken both powers and leave them vulnerable to other threats. The Importance of Nonmilitary Factors The prospect of a military standoff means that war could eventually be decided by nonmilitary factors. These should favor the United States now and in the future. Although war would harm both economies, damage to China’s could be catastrophic and lasting: on the order of a 25 to 35 percent reduction in Chinese gross domestic product in a yearlong war, compared with a reduction in U.S. GDP on the order of 5 to 10 percent. Even a mild conflict, unless ended promptly, could weaken China’s economy. A long and severe war could ravage China’s economy, stall its hard-earned development and cause widespread hardship and dislocation. Such economic damage could in turn aggravate political turmoil and embolden separatists in China. Although the regime and its security forces presumably could withstand such challenges, doing so might necessitate increased oppressiveness and undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese regime in the midst of a very difficult war. In contrast, U.S. domestic partisan skirmishing could handicap the war effort but not endanger societal stability, much less the survival of the state, no matter how long and harsh the conflict, so long as it remains conventional. Escalating cyberwarfare, while injurious to both sides, could worsen China’s economic problems and impede the government’s ability to control a restive population. International responses could, on balance, also favor the United States in a long and severe war: The support of U.S. East Asian allies could hurt China’s military chances; the responses of Russia, India and NATO would have less impact; and NATO could neutralize Russian opportunistic threats in Europe. Japan’s entry would be likely if the nation were party to the underlying dispute and almost certain if its territory (where U.S. bases are) were attacked. With Tokyo’s more permissive interpretation of constitutional limits on its use of force and programmed improvements in Japanese military capabilities, Japan’s entry could make a difference by 2025 in the course and results of war. Heightened turmoil in the Middle East could be harmful to both Chinese and U.S. interests. These findings reinforce the widely held view that a Sino-U.S. war would be so harmful that both states should place a very high priority on avoiding one. While expectations of huge costs make premeditated war improbable, they also demand strong crisis management and civilian control of the military by both governments. Given the extreme penalty for allowing one’s forces to be struck before they strike, creating mutual forbearance at the outset of hostilities could be as difficult as it is critical. It requires an ability to cooperate, in effect, even after fighting has begun. Thus, the need for instant and unfiltered leader-to-leader communication is as great when hostilities begin as it is during crises that could lead to them. Because the United States might be unable to control, win or avoid major losses and costs from a severe conflict, it must guard against automaticity in executing, if not initiating, a sharp and prompt counterforce exchange. This demands fail-safe assurance of definitive presidential approval to carry out military plans, which in turn requires that military commanders provide the president with a range of feasible options. Notwithstanding its improved A2AD capabilities, China has even more to lose from a severe conflict, yet it has less experience with civilian-military coordination during high-tech, high-speed warfare. China’s leaders would be ill-advised to think that trends in military modernization point to a brief and successful war. More likely is a severe, drawn-out, militarily inconclusive one, with economic, political and international effects that might favor the United States. China has as much cause as the United States to prevent automatic execution of military plans for a prompt and sharp counterforce exchange, including an unambiguous requirement for political decision-making. Recommended Actions for the U.S. Military Chinese restraint in attacking U.S. forces when hostilities begin depends on Chinese expectations of U.S. action. The U.S. military should not rely on plans to destroy China’s A2AD capabilities in the first moments of a conflict. Such reliance could undermine crisis stability, predispose the Chinese toward pre-emptive strikes and heighten the danger of automaticity and the inevitability of fierce fighting from the outset. Furthermore, the U.S. military should not prejudge or limit the president’s options by having only a plan for immediate conventional counterforce attack, nor leave itself unprepared to carry out alternative plans. It would be far better for stability, and at least as good for deterrence, for the U.S. military to emphasize, in general, planning for a prolonged high-intensity war and to make this emphasis known to China. Signaling a specific predisposition to strike Chinese A2AD capabilities before they could be used against U.S. forces increases the risk that those capabilities would be used before they were themselves struck. In parallel with measures to prevent crises from becoming violent and violence from becoming severe, the United States should try to reduce the impact of Chinese A2AD by investing in more-survivable weapons platforms and in its own A2AD capabilities: missiles, submarines, drones and drone-launching platforms, cyber and ASAT. Such capabilities would deny the Chinese confidence of victory and would improve stability in crises, as well as in the critical initial stage of a conflict. But they would not restore U.S. military dominance and control or spare the United States major losses or economic costs in a severe conflict. While keeping in mind the potentially huge costs of preparing comprehensively for a low-probability war with China, the United States should make certain prudent preparations: •improve the ability to sustain and survive severely intense military operations •enhance high-priority military capabilities of, and military interoperability with, allies and partners near China •conduct contingency planning with Japan and other East Asian allies and partners •consult with NATO regarding contingencies involving conflict with China, including possible Russian and Iranian reactions •adopt measures to mitigate the interruption of critical products from China •formulate options to deny China access to war-critical imports (e.g., fuels) The U.S. Army, in its Title X and joint responsibilities, can contribute by •investing in counter-A2AD capabilities—for example, mobile land-based missiles and integrated air defense to worsen expected Chinese military, naval and air losses •strengthening, advising and enabling East Asian partners to mount strong defense •assessing high-demand weapons and stocks in the event of a long, severe war •Because such U.S. measures could be interpreted as hostile by the Chinese, the United States, including the U.S. Army, should also expand and deepen Sino-U.S. military-to-military understanding and measures to reduce risks of misperception and miscalculation. Conclusion Although advances in targeting enable conventional counterforce warfare and reduce U.S. war-fighting dominance, they do not point to Chinese dominance or victory. War between the two countries could begin with devastating strikes, be hard to control, last months if not years, have no winner and inflict huge losses on both sides’ military forces. The longer such a war would rage, the greater the importance of economic, domestic political and international effects. While such nonmilitary effects would fall hardest on China, they could also greatly harm the U.S. economy and the United States’s ability to meet challenges worldwide. As China’s military improvements neutralize the military advantages of the United States, and because technology favors conventional counterforce, war between the two countries could be intense, last a year or more, have no winner and inflict huge losses and costs on both sides. The longer such a war continues, the more significant economic, domestic political and international effects would become. While such nonmilitary effects would hit China hardest, they could also greatly harm the U.S. economy and the U.S. ability to meet security challenges worldwide. The United States should make prudent preparations to be able to wage a long and intense war with China. Of no less importance is the ability of the United States to limit the scope, intensity and duration of a war with China through its planning, its system of civilian control and its ability to communicate with China in peace, crisis and war. Likewise for China, political control and good wartime top-level communications are imperative. True, Chinese military improvements have lessened the danger of losing decisively to the United States. Yet China cannot count on a short war, and a long one could leave China weak, unstable, insecure and impoverished. To paraphrase Frederick the Great, evenly matched well-armed powers considering war will want to weigh whether possible gains would even “pay the interest” on probable costs. As the United States and China become more equal in their ability to destroy each other’s forces, neither can be confident of winning at an acceptable price. Should a confrontation or incident nonetheless lead to hostilities, it would be better if both sides had thought through how to limit the harm, not just

Indian Nuclear Submarine Project Is A Rs 25,000 Crore Success: Report

Indian Nuclear Submarine Project Is A Rs 25,000 Crore Success: Report Swarajya Staff - September 02, 2016 Indian Nuclear Submarine Project Is A Rs 25,000 Crore Success: Report The spin-offs and security benefits would definitely be worth more than a measly Rs 25,000 crores. If reports are to be believed, it may now cost less to build nuclear submarines in India than to import conventional ones from abroad. When India last imported (or licence-produced) submarines it cost the exchequer upwards of Rs 3,000 crores per unit. This would only be the upfront cost of manufacturing the submarine, early stage maintenance and some weapon systems. As years roll by arms vendors were able to extract more than their pound of flesh in services and upgrades. This was also observed in the case of Admiral Gorshkov (now INS Vikramaditya) where Russia sold the navy an old ship and then charged a bomb for its refit. The navy will pay a lot more money in the coming decades to keep INS Vikramaditya in service. The situation is the same in almost all major arms purchases. The only way to avoid all the wrangling and mortgaging of national security to foreign powers is to invest heavily in local research and development. But this is easier said than done. Complex weapon systems require cutting-edge industrial know-how and top-notch human talent – two things India badly lacks and has been struggling to cultivate. Even if local development efforts do bear fruit armed forces sometimes reject such products because of the availability of a superior product. Vendors are always eager to kill competition before it even takes off. The Arjun tank project is one such example where the army refused to see merit in buying and continuously improving a locally-built tank and has opted for Russian tanks instead. The Indian Air Force (IAF) can also be accused of not recognising the potential and importance of nurturing a military-industrial complex. The Tejas aircraft project, for example, could have progressed much more had the IAF been actively involved from the beginning. Thankfully, there is a success story the armed forces can learn from. An internal assessment by Defence Ministry has shown that it would cost less than Rs 35,000 crore to build six nuclear submarines for the navy. These submarines would be based on the design of INS Arihant, India’s first nuclear submarine. They would have much higher endurance and range than conventional submarines that the navy is looking to license-produce from foreign vendors. This ET report contrasts the cost of six nuclear submarines (Rs 35,000 crores) to the hefty bill of Rs 60,000 crores for Project 75I, code-name for the navy project to import/license-produce six conventional submarines. That is a saving of Rs 25,000 crores – a neat payback for the investment that must have gone into building INS Arihant. Besides, India won’t be held hostage to the whims of foreign vendors. Neither would there be threats of future spares supply or sanctions. Seems like the INS Arihant is already a winner. Even if there were to be a degree of exaggeration in the internal assessment that has come up with these astonishing numbers, what is undeniable is that the indigenous submarine project would have tremendously increased the technical know-how and confidence of those involved. The spin-offs and security benefits would definitely be worth more than a measly Rs 25,000 crores. And that is reason enough to celebrate

East Asia Summit and the South China Sea

East Asia Summit and the South China Sea September 1, 2016, 2:51 pm IST SD Pradhan East Asia Summit and the South China Sea The East Asia Summit (EAS), the next week in Laos would see leaders assembling from 18 countries to take up the ... The East Asia Summit (EAS), the next week in Laos would see leaders assembling from 18 countries to take up the issues discussed earlier at Kuala Lumpur in November 2015. The EAS, which comprises the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States, is considered the premier forum for leaders to discuss strategic issues. This meeting would be significant as this would be the first meeting after the Permanent Court of Arbitration gave its verdict in the Philippines vs China case. In 2015, ahead of the meeting, several countries pushed for a larger role of EAS not only in resolving major regional issues but also global crises and matters of concerns. In view of this, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak commented that ‘we are convinced that a stronger EAS will further contribute to peace and security in the region’. Crucially, the South China Sea received greater focus in the Chairman’s statement. Five of the 31 paragraphs in the entire chairman’s statement were devoted to the South China Sea disputes, compared to the single paragraph allotted for other regional and international issues. This was a reflection of growing importance of the South China Sea among the countries in the EAS. He stressed the importance of peace, stability and freedom of navigation and over flight, expressed serious concerns about ongoing developments, and emphasised the urgent need to conclude a binding code of conduct (COC). Interestingly, one of the paragraphs referenced assurances given by Chinese president Xi Jinping during his visit to Washington was about not pursuing militarization in the South China Sea. The Laos Meet is likely to take up the South China Sea issue and the ruling. While there may not be a strong criticism due to the efforts of China and its supporters, there would be discussions both in bilateral talks as also in the general discussions. Nations would like to be assured that China stops militarisation as was assured at Kuala Lumpur Summit. The ruling that has strengthened the position of other claimants. India has already made its policy clear after the ruling was announced. India’s external affairs ministry issued a statement and without naming China, called on all stakeholders to resolve disputes peacefully and to show respect for the UNCLOS. India and US had also issued a Joint vision statement on the South China Sea and India had signed a “common position” statement on the issue in April 2016 in Moscow. While the Russia-India-China trilateral joint communiqué by three foreign ministers did resemble the language used by Chinese foreign ministry statements, it stressed on the UNCLOS and DOC. It called for all disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) to “be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned. In this regard, the Ministers called for full respect of all provisions of UNCLOS, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC.” A joint statement issued by the Indian and Japanese Defence Ministers following the annual Indo-Japanese Defence Ministerial Meeting on July 14, 2016 again urged parties to “show utmost respect for the UNCLOS” and more importantly expressed the two countries’ “concern over recent developments” (Chinese actions such as the landing of planes on artificial islands and the tirade against the tribunal judges, coupled with threats to declare an air defence identification zone over the SCS). India had been consistent in stressing the implementation of UNCLOS without taking a position in the dispute. However, the Chinese side projected only the first part of the statement. Indian PM Modi would meet the new President of the Philippines at the EAS and would be discussing the issue. The Philippines media has shown a great interest in this meeting as this would strengthen the position of Philippines with the support of India. The Indian security establishment had been pressing the Indian government to play a larger role in the Asia–Pacific region in view of its growing importance. Like other nations, India too does not want status quo to be destroyed in the region. India is likely to press hard for avoiding unilateral actions in the South China Sea which could lead to tensions in the region. How strongly all the nations press the parties for the implementation of the ruling would determine to some extent the future moves of China. While so far China has refused to accept the ruling, it has also shown the willingness to discuss the issue bilaterally realising that not doing so would weaken its position further in the comity of nations. A strong and effective statement could result in checking the further militarisation of the artificial islands as assured by China at the last Summit. The nations attending the EAS has an opportunity to achieve at least this objective. While China is known for breaking its assurances, this time, it would be difficult without placing itself in a highly embarrassing situation

The Closure: A Mother’s Dream! How would you feel if you were a Mother who loses her only son at his prime age of 21, and then be unable to be present for his last rites and never be able to visit her son’s grave for a lifetime? Some pains can be forgotten, some forgiven, but for Mrs. Thressiamma Joseph from Kerala, this one riled her for over 25 years.

The Closure: A Mother’s Dream! How would you feel if you were a Mother who loses her only son at his prime age of 21, and then be unable to be present for his last rites and never be able to visit her son’s grave for a lifetime? Some pains can be forgotten, some forgiven, but for Mrs. Thressiamma Joseph from Kerala, this one riled her for over 25 years. IMA-Main-Building The Indian Military Academy, Dehradun Unknown to this pain, a course of Army Officers get together to celebrate their 25 years of passing out from the Indian Military Academy. Their plans to meet up in Dehradun are being worked out. Will it be possible to gather all the mates after a gap of 25 years? How many will turn up finally? 850514869_121751 2Lt E Thomas Joseph Jun 1992, somewhere in the North East. 2Lt ET Joseph is looking forward to catch the train in a day to go back to his hometown on leave cum posting. His posting order had come few weeks ago from the Gorkha Battalion that was his home for over a year. Though commissioned to Army Intelligence Corps a year back, he felt at home in the paltan that he was serving now. He was dined out from the Unit the previous day and had been stuck off strength. The officers are relaxing in the Mess, suddenly they receive reports of some terrorist movement. The unit is tasked to neutralize them. The CO gets his Quick Reaction Team together. 2Lt ET Joseph knew the terrain well. He volunteers to go with the team for the operation at night so that he could be back by early morning to catch the first convoy out. The others asked him to chill. But ET feels that he should join the boys in the operation. He has time till the morning to get back. Unknown to many, God had other plans…..2Lt E Thomas Joseph lays down his life for the nation in the firefight that night. Far away in Shillong, the next day, another serving soldier, Sub Maj AT Joseph, is preparing for his dining out in the JCO’s Mess. He is looking forward to reaching Bangalore, his next posting station. As he reaches the JCO Mess, he receives the news. Heartbroken and devastated Sub Maj Joseph leaves for Nagaland accompanied by two of his colleagues. They reach the temporary camp location on the 3rd day after the death of his only son. The mortal remains of brave heart 2Lt ET Joseph are laid to rest in his father’s presence. Due to poor connectivity those days, it is not possible to transport the body to the soldier’s hometown. ET’s father leaves the place within two hours of burial at the Army cemetery. He is terribly broken due to the unimaginable grief of losing his son. He is in a state of shock. 850618175_17099 The Grave – 1992 When the news of the loss reaches Mrs. Thressiamma Joseph, she and her two daughters are inconsolable. Sub Maj AT Josephis unable to come to terms with the biggest loss in his life and on his request, gets his retirement sanctioned from Indian Army. He comes back to his family in Kerala the same year. He does his best to educate his two daughters, ensure the family lives decently, over the years he gets his daughters married. The husband and wife then look towards the twilight in their lives. Deep down, both Joseph and his wife Thressiamma try their best to overcome their grief. But a sadness that had no closure couldn’t be overcome. The mother in Thressiamma, longs to visit the burial place. But they are unable to afford the long journey. Where would they gather that kind of money? How would they travel thousands of miles? Who would know the place? Who would help them? With old age catching up, the hope just fades away. They hope to meet their son at God’s abode one day. New Delhi: Feb 2016 – Jun 2016: The plans for a big bash for the 88th Regular and 71st Technical Course to celebrate 25th year of service to the nation gets underway. The core team gather information of all the officers who had stepped out from Indian Military Academy on 08 Jun 1991. Slowly the number of officers and families who agree to travel to Dehradun increase. The show is getting bigger and better each passing day, as news of some buddy who had lost touch trickles in. Amidst all the plans to make the reunion memorable, one evening Vikram Gill one of the leading organizers of the event, calls up Sajan and says “We have to remember and honour those who have fallen amongst us. We have to make their families proud”. They decide to design an apt memento for each next of kin (NOK) of the Martyrs, invite and felicitate them. Vikram then sets out to find out the addresses of the NOK of Martyrs, who had laid down their lives at various points. His tireless efforts, reveal to him, a list of 19 brave hearts. 2Lt E Thomas Joseph is first in that list. A memento is made for each NOK of the Martyr. Their families are contacted and invited to join the celebrations at Dehradun. However Sub Maj AT Joseph and Thressiamma could not be contacted as they had shifted from their address. Eight Veer Naaris, Brothers and Sisters of Martyrs, travel from far and wide including Australia and take part in the three day celebrations in the last week of June 2016, where over 140 officers, nearly 100 ladies and over 100 children attend with full gusto. SAT_6011 88 Reg/71 Tech Course Silver Jubilee Celebration : IMA, Dehradun The events aptly commence with felicitation of the Veer Naris and NOK of the Martyrs. A film painstakingly made by Anirban & Jacob is screened which brings memories of yesteryear’s spent with these brave hearts. The course together has won 1 Ashok Chakra, 2 Kirti Chakras, 6 Shaurya Chakras, 2 Yudh Seva Medal, 32 Sena Medal Gallantry, 8 Sena Medal Distinguished, 7 Vishisht Seva Medal, 5 Mention in Dispatches. Truly we are among the bravest ones. The celebrations are great, well planned and heart touching. Bonding is amazing meeting up with buddies who are reuniting after a gap of 25 years. The Veer Naris who attend feel honoured and thankful to the course for the great gesture. Vikram requests the memento’s be personally handed over to the NOKs who could not attend. The responsibility to hand over ET Joseph’s memento rests on the shoulder’s of Shamsher who is posted at Kochi. SAT_6090 88 Regular-71 tech Course Indian Military Academy on 24 Jun 2016 Shamsher searches for ET’s parents. The address he had is old. One rainy day in 850619283_9874 Shamsher handing over the memento to ET Joseph’s proud parents Kerala lady luck finally smiles when he locates Sub Maj AT Joseph’s humble abode near Kottayam. He reaches there and presents the memento to the proud parents. The fact that their son was still being remembered and honoured by his buddies even after 25 years really makes the parents extremely happy. Over a cup of coffee, Thressiamma, pours her heart. She talks about her unfulfilled dream of making a trip to the North East and pray near her son’s grave. Shamsher returns to Kochi and informs the course in their social group the need to help a mother to fulfill her long standing dream. A decision is taken that the course will rise to the occasion. The hurdles are many. The old age of the parents, the finances, the long travel, and most of all…..to find the location of the grave. A quarter of century has passed and the knowledge of the event has faded. Not much is known. Robi who is posted in the North East volunteers to search for the grave. His efforts each day results in despondency. Then one fine day ‘Eureka’, the grave is located. It is dilapidated. So a new dimension is added to the long list of pending tasks. How to get the grave restored? 850620563_18558 The Grave- 2016 Egged on by Shamsher, the course contributions starts pouring in. Course mates of E Thomas Joseph, from Army, Navy and Air Force, from 78 NDA Course and 88 Regular/71 Tech Course rise to the occasion. As I write this, the figure has crossed Rs 2,30,000. Indigo Airlines Salute to the Martyr. A course mate working with Indigo Airlines, contacts their Management, who on hearing the story straightaway agree to sponsor the travel of the parents and sisters from Kochi- Bangalore- Kolkatta- Dimapur through Indigo airlines. The tickets sponsored by Indigo for Sub Maj AT Joseph , Thressiamma and two sisters are already with the parents. This is an extraordinary gesture by the airline and goes a long way in giving it back to the nation in their own way. Kudos to Team Indigo for showing a unique way to the country, how to show gratitude and salute its heroes! Course mates in various places are arranging stay at all these places. The grave is being done up. Permission is being sought from various authorities to ensure the visit goes on without any hassles. The Army will also play a part to ensure the visit goes well. A Senior Officer in the rank of Army Commander has assured all help. 78 NDA & 88 Regular/ 71 Tech courses are unique. ET’s parents lost one son but got back 300+. Each of the sons are striving hard to ensure the trip goes smooth. Vikram Chauhan in Delhi, Robi in North East, Shamsher in Kochi, Manoj with Indigo, RN at Kolkatta, Atul Salunkhe, Lalli Virk, Sanjay Tripathi, Viju Sundaresh, Joseph George and many others are working tirelessly to make The Closure. This journey also reveals the kind of passion the service officers work with qualities like Camaraderie, Regimentation, Sacrifice, Selflessness, Espirit-de-Corps, Bonhomie, Commitment and Friendship which all were the essence of the Silver Jubilee Celebrations. The trip is planned for October 2016. Cheers to this Band of Brothers, and to Indigo Airlines who have magnanimously chipped in

Sky is limit to India-Vietnam ties

Sky is limit to India-Vietnam ties Thursday, 01 September 2016 | Vineeta Pandey Sky is limit to India-Vietnam ties Daily Pioneer.com Prime Minister Modi’s scheduled visit to Vietnam on September 2 is a good time to touch base with the new leadership in Hanoi. It is also expected that this visit will take the relationship between the two countries to a different level that involves defence, economy, security No date could have been more auspicious than September 2 for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s maiden visit to Vietnam. This day marks Vietnam’s struggle for self-determination and independence which India unwaveringly supported. And apart from the deep historic connect between the two countries that spans several centuries, the strong emotional bond made the then Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, abruptly cut short his Beijing visit when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping announced military intervention against Vietnam in 1979. India has also provided strong moral, political and diplomatic support to Vietnam during its Liberation War against the United States. During the 1960s and 1970s, universities and colleges, roads and rallies in India, slogans like ‘Amar naam, tomar naam, Vietnam, Vietnam’ (My name, your name Vietnam, Vietnam) and ‘Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh’ (We shall fight, we shall win), raised in solidarity for Vietnam were common. In fact, it was the deep connect with Vietnam that made President Pranab Mukherjee emotional during his trip to Hanoi in 2014. Mukherjee, who has seen transformation of modern Vietnam and its struggle in the past, reportedly could not help talking about India-Vietnam bonding and narrated several incidents to journalists while on his way to Hanoi. This bonding has only become deeper over the years and from ‘most trusted friends’, India and Vietnam are today ‘strategic partners’ as well. With both being fastest growing economies, India has backed modern Vietnam to the hilt in its international aspirations and domestic growth. In the 1970s, India helped set up a rice research centre in Vietnam for a country that was facing food shortage those days. Today, Vietnam has emerged as the third largest rice exporting country after India and Thailand. That is why Vietnam has always regarded India as a benign friend who has no ‘other’ interest, not at least something against it. And, as President Mukherjee said, the political relation between the two countries has been “cloudless.” India and Vietnam have always witnessed high-level exchanges, however, the last time an Indian Prime Minister went to Hanoi was Manmohan Singh in 2010 but that was for the multilateral India- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) summit. Prior to him, Vajpayee travelled to Vietnam in 2001 for bilateral talks. However, ever since the Narendra Modi Government took over in May 2014, President Mukherjee went to Hanoi in 2014 and now we have Prime Minister Modi travelling to Vietnam — the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in the last 15 years. There have been high-level visits from the Vietnamese side too and the last time Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung came to New Delhi was in 2014. But now there has been a change in the leadership in Vietnam with Nguyen Xuan Phuc as the new Prime Minister. In this context, Modi’s visit is a good time to touch base with the new leadership in Vietnam which will be in power for the next five years. Besides, the visit will give Modi a first-hand opportunity to understand the priorities and policies of the new leadership. There is an expectation that Modi’s visit will take the relationship between the two countries to a different level that involves defence, economy, security, people to people because significance of Vietnam in the foreign policy vision of Modi Government is very high. While Vietnam is looking towards India on a whole range of issues like IT, cyber security, defence, health, trade and spirituality, India views Vietnam as an important pillar of Look East-Act East policy. Vietnam is also an important partner for India’s engagement in the Asean being the coordinator country for India-Asean ties for 2015-2018. Ever since the establishment of strategic partnership in 2007, India has been helping Vietnam in capacity building. India has trained Vietnamese security and defence personnel including roughly 500 Naval officers and now the training of Sukhoi pilots for Vietnam is also under discussion. On counter-terrorism too there is deep and steady cooperation. Besides, India runs information technology programmes for Vietnamese apart from helping in pharmaceutical and health sectors. India is also an important partner for Vietnam to help meeting its defence and security needs. From providing military products to upgrade, maintain its own equipments and joint production of defence products — India can provide a lot to Vietnam to modernise its military apart from strengthening its intelligence and surveillance technologies. Trade between Vietnam and India has increased five times between 2007 and 2015, expectations are high to increase it further. Already Indian investment in Vietnam is $1.1 billion, and it ranks among the top 28 investing countries in Vietnam. With TATA, Larson and Toubro, Adani, Escort, Eicher exploring opportunities in Vietnam, investment figures are expected to shoot up dramatically over the next five years. India and Vietnam have their own dynamics in relationship with China but on South China Sea disputes, both New Delhi and Hanoi, are on the same page. India has constantly emphasised a rules-based international order, freedom of navigation, need to avoid threat and use of force on settling issues — a view Vietnam endorses. Freedom of navigation and sea links is important for India as significant amount of trade passes through the South China Sea, and any conflict or tension in the area is an issue of concern for India as well. There have often been comparisons between India-Vietnam relationship with that between China and Pakistan ties. But the dynamics between India-Vietnam is different from China-Pakistan as Pakistan hardly has any friend in the world and Vietnam’s list of friends is getting bigger. Moreover, the India-Vietnam relationship is based on mutual respect while China-Pakistan ties are more of patron-client nature. Due to the country’s growing importance in the present global set up, US President Barack Obama travelled to Vietnam in May this year before completely lifting the US ban on sale of weapons. Similarly, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a visit to Hanoi in November 2015. However, India’s relationship with Vietnam has neither been as complicated as the US and China nor full of ups and down. Spirituality has given a fresh and interesting aspect to India-Vietnam relationship. With the resurgence of Buddhism in Vietnam, the country has found a deep connect with India, home to Buddhism. There has been a sharp rise in visits to Bodh Gaya by the Vietnamese leadership, pilgrims and students. Several students are also coming to India to learn Sanskrit and given the interest India may soon have to increase its quota of scholarships to the Vietnamese students. Yoga has gained immense popularity in Vietnam and during my recent trip to Hanoi, I found several Indian yoga instructors teaching Vietnamese the art of living healthy. Indian Bollywood films and serials dubbed in Vietnamese are a rage. Indian soap opera Balika Badhu, dubbed as ‘eight-year-old bride’ was one of the most popular serials in Vietnam. Improving connectivity through direct flights to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City is also need of the hour to increase people-to-people connect, business and tourism. The Vietnamese Ambassador to India Ton Sinh Thanh recently said that it is time to lift bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership. In India-Vietnam relations, sky is the limit

HOW MEDIA MAKES FORTUNES

Interesting NDTV has a huge list of financial controversies listed on its wikipedia page . Here is the latest by the IT department on a 150 million $ concealment of investment. The page also states they are left leaning. Prannoy Roy is right now in his mansion in South Africa claiming he is in ill health and cant answer the IT department notices . In a show of solidarity , most media houses have not carried this story. On May 16, 2016, India’s Income Tax Department (ITD) has slapped a fine of Rs.525 crores on New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV) for fooling, concealing more than Rs.642 crore income earned through sham transactions in 2008. When caught for the unexplained money of how more than Rs.642 crores reached its kitty via Bermuda, NDTV claimed that they “sold a dream”. This curious answer was given to the ITD by NDTV by claiming that this unexplained money was through some inflated share transfer and dividend from a tax haven based firm. Income Tax Dept. observes that a deliberate attempt was made by NDTV to conceal a $150 million investment. The 14 page Income Tax notice was served to NDTV was on June 15, 2016 The others are Allegation of corruption and criminal conspiracy On 20 January 1998 Central Bureau of Investigation filed cases against New Delhi Television (NDTV) managing director Prannoy Roy, former director general of Doordarshan R. Basu and five other top officials of Doordarshan under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for criminal conspiracy and under the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to the CBI charge-sheet, Doordarshan suffered a loss of over Rs 35.2 million due to the "undue favours" shown to NDTV as its programme The World This Week (TWTW) was put in 'A' category instead of 'special A' category.[16][17][18][19][20][ 21] Radia tapes controversy Main article: Radia tapes controversy In November 2010, OPEN magazine carried a story which reported transcripts of some of the telephone conversations of Nira Radia with senior journalists, politicians, and corporate houses, many of whom have denied the allegations. The Central Bureau of Investigation has announced that they have 5,851 recordings of phone conversations by Radia, some of which outline Radia's attempts to broker deals in relation to the 2G spectrum sale.[22] The tapes appear to demonstrate how Radia attempted to use some media persons including NDTV's Barkha Dutt to influence the decision to appoint A. Raja as telecom minister.[23] She always denied her role in this episode with stating her role as simply error of judgment. Barkha Dutt is being investigated by the CBI. Allegation of tax fraud NDTV, through its foreign subsidiaries, is alleged to have violated Indian tax and corporate laws.[24] NDTV has denied these allegations. The Sunday Guardian ran a story which exposed the NDTV's financial misdemeanours and malpractices in connivance with ICICI Bank. "NDTV-ICICI loan chicanery saved Roys"provides details of how NDTV's major stake holders raised funds by misdeclaration of the value of shares in NDTV. NDTV has denied the allegations and the NDTV CEO replied to the Sunday Guardian along with the threat of "criminal defamation". On 19 November 2015 the ED served ₹2,030 crore (US$300 million) notice to NDTV for alleged violations under the FEMA act,[25] however the company said it has been advised that the allegations are not "legally tenable".[26] Commonwealth Games Contract On 5 August 2011 Comptroller and Auditor General of India's report on XIX Commonwealth Games was tabled in Parliament of India. In section 14.4.2 of the report, CAG alleged that while awarding contracts worth Rs 37.8 million for production & broadcasting of commercials for promoting CWG-2010 to NDTV & CNN-IBN, the Commonwealth Games Organizing Committee followed an arbitrary approach. Proposals were considered in an ad hoc manner, as and when a proposal was received; no form of competitive tendering was adopted. The CAG further said in its report that, "We had no assurance about the competitiveness of the rates quoted by these channels and the need and usefulness of these proposals. From March 2010 to June 2010, the entire pre games publicity and sponsorship publicity was done only on NDTV & CNN-IBN."[27][28][29] Suit against TAM India News broadcaster company sued television audience measurement company, TAM India and its global parent firms for over a billion dollars in the Supreme Court of New York, alleging TAM of manipulating ratings in return for bribes to its officials.[30]

China Will Have to Get Used to Being a Terrorist Target

China Will Have to Get Used to Being a Terrorist Target Hannah Beech / Shanghai @hkbeech Aug. 31, 2016 China Will Have to Get Used to Being a Terrorist Target Its plans for a Eurasian trade route will only expose it to more risk Its plan to forge a trade route across Eurasia, through the dangerous territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan, will only expose Beijing to more risk China isn’t immune to global terrorism. That’s one of the troubling lessons of yesterday’s suicide attack on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The driver of the car managed to only kill himself but he wounded five embassy employees after storming through the diplomatic mission’s gates. And by detonating his deadly charge, the attacker proved that China cannot avoid the surge in religious and ethnic strife that has roiled international geopolitics. Echoing media reports in Kyrgyzstan, Li Wei, a terrorism expert at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, which is associated with China’s Ministry of State Security, tells TIME he believes the attack was instigated by a separatist group of ethnic Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority native to China’s northwest and other parts of Central Asia. Beijing has previously tied the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party, to other deadly assaults in China, claiming the group maintains links to al-Qaeda. “Terrorist attacks around China have risen in recent years,” Li says, “due to the continuous penetration of Islamic states and organizations from western Asia.” Other security analysts, however, have downplayed ETIM’s ability to organize terrorist plots and instead characterize the violence as disparate outbreaks without a unifying mastermind. For years, Beijing has placed its foreign policy in a kind of silo, maintaining that it stays out of other nations’ internal affairs and doesn’t attach strings to its foreign aid. The West might meddle with clumsy attempts at regime change, the official Chinese thinking went, but Beijing was savvier and more respectful of other nations’ sovereignty. “The overall safety of Chinese diplomats stationed overseas is better than that of Western personnel,” wrote the Chinese Communist Party–linked Global Times in an Aug. 31 editorial. “This is because China has barely made enemies in the world.” China attracts nowhere near the vitriol that an interventionist power like the U.S. does. But Beijing’s foreign policy and foreign aid do have profound effects on other nations, from the Southeast Asian countries that rim the contested South China Sea to African nations where controversies over Chinese investment have helped determine elections. And as more and more Chinese globe-trot, they have turned into targets. In some cases, Chinese have been simply been caught in the cross fire. After all, Chinese state-owned companies have dispatched thousands of workers to resource-rich but unstable places like South Sudan and northern Iraq. In 2011, the Chinese navy evacuated some 30,000 Chinese nationals, mostly employed by Chinese state oil firms, who were stranded in strife-ridden Libya. Last year, a bombing at a Mogadishu hotel that housed the Chinese embassy in Somalia claimed the life of a Chinese security guard. One of the three bystanders killed by the 2013 Boston marathon bombings was a Chinese graduate student. In other cases, Chinese have been attacked because of who they are. In May, a Pakistani separatist group planted a roadside bomb in Karachi, as a Chinese engineer and his driver passed by, injuring both. Pakistani Taliban militants have kidnapped Chinese workers and tourists alike. Pakistani authorities blamed a bomb attack in Quetta, which killed dozens of people at a hospital on Aug. 8, on militants hoping to disrupt a planned trade corridor between Pakistan and China — a project on which Beijing plans to lavish billions of dollars. In Bangkok last year, 20 people were killed in a pipe-bomb attack that Thai officials have blamed on Uighur perpetrators. The attack occurred at the Erawan Shrine, a popular destination for Chinese tourists, and most of the bombing’s victims were ethnically Chinese. Earlier in 2015, Thailand deported around 100 Uighurs back to China after they had escaped to Thailand with hopes of reaching refuge in Turkey and other nations. Human-rights groups protested the forcible return, claiming that the Uighurs would surely face persecution back home. Amid ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, the region where Uighurs live, local officials have heightened religious and cultural repression. The rights crackdown has fueled further resentment of the Chinese state among Uighurs, many of whom feel more cultural affinity with Central Asia than with faraway Beijing. The Chinese central government, however, contends the Thailand deportees were not refugees at all but militants intent on joining a global jihadist movement. Uighur militants have launched deadly attacks, both in Xinjiang and other parts of China, sowing terror among the nation’s Han majority. Other Uighurs have joined extremist groups in nations as disparate as Indonesia and Syria. But whether the deportees, many of whom traveled to Thailand with their entire families, were truly radical supporters of ETIM is not known. After the Thai mass deportation, protesters in Turkey demonstrated in front of the Chinese embassy in Ankara and smashed the windows of Thailand’s honorary consulate in Istanbul. The Uighur cause has catalyzed regional unrest before. In 2002, a Chinese diplomat was shot dead in a car in Bishkek in an incident blamed on Uighur separatists. That killing — along with Tuesday’s suicide bomb attack and a 2014 incident in which Kyrgyz border forces shot dead a group of Uighurs who were trying to sneak into the country from China — raises security concerns for China’s grand plan to forge a trade route across Eurasia. Dubbed One Belt, One Road, the well-funded initiative championed by China’s President Xi Jinping happens to cross some of the world’s most dangerous territory, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. “Most countries along the One Belt, One Road initiative have security problems,” says terrorism expert Li. “If we can’t solve the problems, it will influence the promotion of One Belt, One Road. It means the projects will have high risks.” Beijing will need to get used to such global hazards.