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Wednesday, 18 February 2015

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr Prime Minister, First let me tell you that many a times, I felt that some Divine Force was inspiring you – the way Sri Aurobindo said that Churchill was guided by Him to fight the Nazis… But then, I have to say, as someone who travels extensively in India & has spent a lot of time in Delhi for the last 40 years (I have interviewed 7 Indian PM’s), that nothing much has changed. Your ministers are still as unreachable as the Congress ones, functioning in the same system with four layers of secretaries. Even if you have an important work – there is no way you can meet one of your ministers unless you have some pull. Your MP’s, as the Congress ones before them, once they come to Delhi, with their cars, bungalows, countless aides, and so many sycophants coming for favours, quickly lose sight of why they were elected. You need to send them BACK to their constituencies the way Mao Tse Tung sent back all his cadres to the countryside. Delhi is a microcosm of India and you seem to have lost there some of the Hindu electorate who voted for you UNITEDLY, from the Dalit to the businessmen. Some of us had seen this coming for a few months already. You need to have around you people who will tell you what the mood of the people is – without ANY FEAR – for I have seen, even with gurus, that their followers always want to please them, flatter them and thus shield them from the truth. It is something inherent to the Hindu psyche. If this had been done, maybe we could have told you that the middle class and lower class Hindus who voted for you, want a change at the grass root level. They are not concerned about Obama and nuclear energy, or the way you are skillfully loosening the Chinese encircling grip, or the remarkable unifying of intelligence and their agencies you are doing with Mr Doval, but about the daily problems and the constant bribes that are asked by petty bureaucrats and policemen. I myself experience this in Maharashtra as I am asked bribes for getting permissions for a Museum, which is free, dedicated to Shivaji Maharaj and a sewa project ! Also they do not understand why you were so fiery and outspoken while campaigning – and now that you are elected, you do not seem any more to be promoting their Hindu causes. They cannot fathom, for instance in their simple minds, why you are being so friendly to Sonia Gandhi, who wanted you in prison or even dead – and why you are keeping away from those who supported you in your darkest hours, when nobody thought that you would become PM. These old friends of yours are still keeping quiet, out of respect for your work, but I know many who are bitter. The common Hindu man does not comprehend either why no one in your Government stands by reconversions of Christians or Muslims to Hinduism. During the last Tsunami, at least 10% of the Tamil Nadu fishermen were converted by Christian missionaries, using financial baits, such as free boats. I was there and SAW it. Or why when one of yours says that Hindus must produce more children, he is booed down. We know that Muslims produce seven to eight children per couple and in some areas of India they are now in majority and will NOT vote for you. It is true that there have been vandalizing of churches in Delhi, whether intentional, or just by some common thieves. But this is an old trick of Indian Christians to evoke sympathy from Obama and C° and bring pressure & discredit upon you. You should know better than that: Christians have been the aggressors in this country & the Pope still thinks that India is a fair target for mass conversions. We understand that you must be the Prime Minister of all Indians and that you have to rise above sectarism, but there has to be in the public a perception that you are the PRIME MINISTER OF HINDUS BECAUSE IT IS THEY WHO VOTED FOR YOU – not the Muslims – whatever Ram Madhav told you before the Kashmir elections, which is going to be another thorn in your heel (and if you do not remove article 370 soon, most Hindus will lose faith in your government). To cultivate the Muslims, thinking that they will like you in the end, as Mr Vajpayee did, under the influence of the nice but misguided Suddeendhra Kulkarni, is not only a waste of time, but also may ALIENATE YOU HINDU VOTERS, whom you are going to need in four years again and at different state elections. Let the Muslims of India know that they possess the same rights as any Hindus, Sikhs or Christians, which they actually have, including total freedom of worship, that Hindus have neither in Bangladesh, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, but do not go out of your way to please them. When the common man of Delhi sees that you received Aamir Khan, whose film PK is a deliberate insult to all Hindu gurus & Hindus, they think something is not right. Also they do not understand why so many Hindu gurus and activists such as sadhvi Pragya and Colonel Purohit, whose innocence has been proved, are still languishing in jail. Congress had no qualms in favouring their people and flouting all decent rules. This isn’t about ethics, but if your aim is just, dharmic, and I believe it is, it does not matter what means are used. The Congress got elected and elected again with mostly the Muslims votes, till Kejriwal came, You need to CULTIVATE THE HINDU ELECTORATE Sir, by making gestures, even if you let your people do them and stand back. And that has to be done QUICKLY. If they are convinced that you are working for them, you will have the two or even three terms you need to achieve a real Renaissance of India. Democracy is a beautiful but skewed system, easy to hijack by adharmic forces. To realise all the great things you have undertaken, YOU NEED A UNIFIED HINDU VOTE. The trap now is to listen to the Media which says that your party lost in Delhi because of ‘communal’ reasons – vandalizing of churches, statements by your people about reconversions, or your so-called ten lakh suit. This will prod you and your government to go more secular, let go of more of the pledges you made for the Hindu cause during your campaign, the same way the Vajpayee Government veered away gradually from its Hindu ideals – and lost the elections to Sonia Gandhi. But think of it like that : you got elected in May last year with a massive mandate BECAUSE of your dedicated, sincere and fiery HINDU promises. There is no reason why it should not work the same way now that you have the power. You need to stick by what your pledged Sir – whatever the Media, Obama, your bureaucrats or the Foreign Press says

ON GOING SECTARIAN WAR IN PAKISTAN

://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/comment-no-more-a-dj-vu-but-a-new-war/article6905807.ece?homepage=true February 18, 2015 00:38 IST SUBA CHANDRAN The ongoing sectarian war in Pakistan is different from its earlier avatars, and more difficult to combat Three major sectarian attacks (in Rawalpindi, Punjab, earlier in January; in Shikarpur, Sindh, recently; and in Peshawar) after the horrific Peshawar attack in December in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa highlight the other war within Pakistan. Though there has always been a sectarian fault line within the country, what is happening today is much more lethal than the earlier violence witnessed primarily in Punjab during the 1980s and 1990s. There are at least five factors, which should make the ongoing sectarian war in Pakistan different from its earlier avatars, and more difficult to combat. Geographic spread First, the sheer geographic spread of the sectarian violence. Sectarian violence during the 1980s and 1990s was centred in a few districts of Punjab (in and around Jhang), select pockets of Karachi city, and in Khurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Today, incidents of sectarian violence cover the entire country. From attacks on the Shia pilgrims visiting Iran in Balochistan to bus passengers on the Karakoram Highway in Gilgit-Baltistan, and from Khyber and Khurram Agencies in FATA to the city of Karachi, the new sectarian war in Pakistan is not restricted to any one geographic region. The nature and extent of violence against the Hazara community in Balochistan is also a new phenomenon. In fact, Balochistan has always witnessed violence on separatism but never on a sectarian basis. Intensity and violence The second major difference in Pakistan’s sectarian war today is related to its intensity and violence. Today, militants use suicide bombing in mosques belonging to the Shia and Ahmadiyya communities; the extent of human and material damage is substantial today when compared to the past. Emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) during the last decade seems to have provided a bridge in linking the dots in this violence. In fact, the TTP and the erstwhile sectarian groups based in Punjab have become symbiotic today. The presence of Punjabi sectarian groups in the violence against Shia communities in FATA and Balochistan is no coincidence. Had it not been for this link, the sectarian groups would not have had access to either weapons or training, including training for suicide bombers. The third major difference in the sectarian war is related to its external linkages. During the 1980s and 1990s, the sectarian differences within the country were primarily fuelled by the Cold War between Pakistan and Iran. President General Zia’s zealousness led to the emergence of sectarian groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lahkar-e-Jhangvi during this period, as a counter to groups in Iran and Afghanistan. Today, the primary external driver of Pakistan’s sectarian violence is no longer limited to the differences between Tehran and Islamabad. The larger Shia-Sunni Cold War led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, and more importantly the rise of the Islamic State in the Iraq-Syria region have unleashed a new sectarian war elsewhere. Sectarian groups within Pakistan are no more dependent on local and state sources for their survival. They are well endowed, thanks to the unregulated funds pouring in primarily from the Gulf region. In the near future, dangers of the IS providing an ideological lead to sectarian groups within Pakistan cannot be completely ruled out. If that happens, the sectarian war within Pakistan may escalate even further. The fourth major difference between the sectarian war in Pakistan today and then is related to the ability of the state to control it. It was no secret that in the 1980s and 1990s, the sectarian groups in Punjab had the support of the establishment. With funding support from outside and with TTP linkages, sectarian groups in Pakistan no longer need the establishment; their survival is secure and expansion assured. Perhaps, the state may still retain some contacts and influence over the sectarian groups in select pockets, for example in Balochistan. But in Punjab today, the state may neither be able to control nor calibrate the sectarian violence. Worse, the state — both political and military establishment — seems to be afraid in targeting these sectarian groups. Consider the case of Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab. How to explain the disappearance of case records from the courts, witnesses not turning up, and the government turning a blind eye to pro-Qadri lawyers carrying him on their shoulders in full view of the courts? The fear of sectarian war expanding and becoming centred in Pakistan’s heartland (read Punjab), is the biggest nightmare for the country today. As long as the fighting takes place in the FATA, the state can use the military, air force, and even U.S. drones to target the militants. When it comes to the heartland, it cannot use any of the above, and will have to be heavily dependent on the police force. How confident is the establishment today that the local police will be able to combat sectarian militants? Change in discourse Sectarian militancy is also a new phenomenon in terms of its ability to neutralise the erstwhile ethnic and nationalist movements in Balochistan and Sindh. With no outlets to reach out to the state and with the governance process worsening day by day, the sectarian groups may be able to project themselves better than the nationalist movements — either of Sindhi or Balochi varieties. In the short term it may yield a dividend for the central government, as it is happening in Balochistan; as the sectarian war here has substantially changed the discourse from when it was led by the tribal Baloch Sardars. In the long run, however, it will hurt Pakistan even more. Sectarian violence in Pakistan is no more a déjà vu. It is a new war. (D. Suba Chandran is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.)

Tuesday, 17 February 2015

MUST READ-PAKISTAN CHINA RELATIONS -BEST YET TO COME

http://www.rediff.com/news/interview/china-pakistan-axis-the-best-may-be-yet-to-come/20150216.htm?pos=10&src=NL20150217&trackid=PnhNQR4EPIrnTNXUo7cg0vKom/3RFzlX3teKqfGb9k0=&isnlp=0&isnlsp=0 February 16, 2015 10:24 IST 'Whether it's investments in Kashmir, building naval facilities, or selling top-of-the-range military equipment, Pakistan could well benefit more under Xi's watch.' 'Do Chinese concerns about the 'Islamisation' of Pakistan give it pause about how quickly to move forward with security and economic projects? At the moment the indication is quite the opposite: China is doubling down on its support to Pakistan, partly because of its fears about where the country is headed.' Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Pakistan this year, his first visit to Beijing's 'all weather friend' since taking office two years ago, and the first visit by a Chinese president to Islamabad in nine years. Xi was scheduled to visit Islamabad after he visited New Delhi last September, but the trip was put off because of Imran Khan's then onslaught against Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. There is talk that Xi will visit Pakistan as early as next month and be the chief guest at a joint Pakistan military parade (shades of Barack Obama's presence at India's Republic Day parade!) on March 23, the first time such a parade has been held in seven years. The China-Pakistan relationship and its durability has been one of the lesser discussed themes in international affairs. Even though both nations have been at the centre of consistent strategic attention -- for different reasons, of course -- their association which has withstood the swift eddy currents of the many complex issues swirling about them this half century and more has neither been probed or scrutinised as it should have. Andrew Small's much praised book, The China-Pakistan Axis intends to change all that. Researched painstakingly over six years, not merely in the ministries and think-tanks in Beijing and Islamabad, but also in places like Kashgar in Xinjiang province, where China combats an increasingly assertive insurgency, Small explains in apparently breathtaking detail the China-Pakistan axis and its role in Asian geopolitics. Beijing has never abandoned or isolated Islamabad over the years, and continues to provide it sustenance in many forms -- armaments, nuclear know-know, intelligence gathering, strategic support, money when Pakistan needs it, important projects, and other things the world does not know enough about. In this e-mail interview with Nikhil Lakshman/Rediff.com, Andrew Small -- a Transatlantic Fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United State's Asia programme, which he has helped lead since 2006 -- discusses the China-Pakistan relationship, the challenges it poses for India, a common adversary for both nations, and the direction it is likely to take under the watch of Xi Jinping, China's most powerful leader in more than 20 years. How has the China-Pakistan relationship evolved over the years? Do you believe it is as strong and resilient as ever? Has there been a re-evaluation of the association on the Chinese side in view of the concerns about Pakistan lurching towards being a rogue State? Or are the 'unshakable bonds of friendship,' as Islamabad deems the relationship, as strong as ever? The relationship today is clearly very different from that of the 1960s -- China's economic take-off, the rise of Islamic militancy in the region, the nuclearisation of South Asia, and the shifting geopolitical dynamics between the United States, China, India, and Pakistan over the last few decades put it in a very different context. But there are consistent features -- India still provides the strategic glue, and it remains a relationship dominated by security calculations, despite efforts to add a stronger economic component. The intention was that some of the grand economic projects would provide greater depth and balance to China-Pakistan ties, but in recent years that has been overshadowed by the militancy question. There have been tensions over the issue of Uighur militant safe havens, as well as major problems facing Chinese investments, and naturally China has its concerns about Pakistan's broader trajectory. But that certainly hasn't led to a fundamental reassessment on Beijing's part. The relationship has weathered an impressive array of challenges, and its resilience matters all the more over time given how few reliable friends either country has, as recent elections in Sri Lanka and Myanmar's foreign policy rebalance illustrate. At the moment it appears that China is pressing ahead with its investments despite -- and in some respects because of -- Pakistan's internal challenges, in the hope that these will help to address some of those problems. If you had to plot a graph of the China-Pakistan relationship over the years, what do you believe was the apogee and what was the nadir? If you had to identify five reasons for this relationship lasting as long as it has, what would they be? What have China and Pakistan respectively gained from this relationship? There is a temptation to assess the relationship by looking at the behaviour of the two sides during moments of crisis -- China offers to intervene on Pakistan's behalf in 1965, sits things out in 1971, and actively pushes back in 1999. But the most important phases of the relationship have been away from the spotlight: Chinese support to Pakistan's nuclear programme in the early 1980s, for instance, or its missile programme in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There has always been a sense that even though the two sides come from very different strategic cultures, and may not agree tactically, a strong, capable Pakistan is a Chinese asset in its own right and Beijing will provide consistent support to ensure that some degree of balance in south Asia is maintained. There was certainly pressure on the relationship in the 1990s, when the China-India relationship was normalising and China was prioritising economic goals in its international diplomacy. That was the period in which talk of developing greater balance in ties between India and Pakistan took off in Beijing, and Jiang Zemin's visit to the two countries in 1996, when he appeared to pull back from Chinese commitments on Kashmir, is seen by many on the Pakistani side as something of a low point. The phase after (Pakistan military ruler Pervez) Musharraf's fall was also tricky -- China struggled to get a handle on Pakistani politics during a period where they couldn't just channel everything through a single, dominant army figure. But although all the twists and turns are interesting, the underlying aspects of military cooperation have persisted and deepened. In the years ahead, reliable security partners become even more important as China takes off as a global military power and needs quasi-bases it can count on, as well as intelligence services it can trust to navigate the world of Islamic militancy. For Pakistan, China now matters far more to its economic future than it used to, and the PLA (People's Liberation Army) can increasingly supply the Pakistani army with advanced defense equipment, where it once depended entirely on the United States. If certain problems between the two sides are addressed, there is a good chance that the best period of the relationship is yet to come. The China-Pakistan relationship was spawned by their common antipathy for India. The China-India association is perhaps better today than it was, with improving trade and India and China finding themselves together in formations like BRICS. Has the improvement in India-China relations adversely affected the China-Pakistan relationship in any way? Why not? Is it because China needs Pakistan to be a strategic balance to India? Does Beijing enjoy using Islamabad as a pawn to needle and unsettle India from time to time? China believes that it can maintain these tracks simultaneously -- it can improve economic ties with India, and some coordination on global issues, even as strategic competition grows. That is exactly what has happened with the US-China relationship. It doesn't diminish Pakistan's role on the strategic track if the economic track and the global diplomatic track with India are on an upward arc. Especially as India's 'Act East' policy moves forward and ties with Washington and Tokyo strengthen, the utility of Pakistan for China is clear: It still provides a means to tie India down in its own neighborhood. But Beijing hasn't used Islamabad as a pawn -- Pakistan has pursued policies vis-a-vis India as it sees fit, which benefit China without it having to do anything to encourage them. If anything, China has pressed Pakistan to develop more stable, predictable and economically beneficial relations with India, even as its role as a strategic balancer persists. China-Pakistan ties also have a momentum that transcends India -- the economic relationship between the two sides and the handling of counter-terrorism and militancy issues don't hinge on Beijing's relationship with New Delhi. In your research for your book, did you discover any insights about China playing some sort of role in trying to improve the India-Pakistan relationship? China has never provided Pakistan with unconditional support against India -- the degree and nature of Chinese backing has always depended on the context. In particular Beijing has been reluctant to provide comprehensive support when it has felt that the problems are of Pakistan's making -- Kargil in 1999, Mumbai in 2008, or Abbottabad in 2011, for instance. But it is possible to hypothesise scenarios in which China would swing in behind Pakistan militarily if it felt that India were the culpable party, some of which I cite in the book. Economic ties with India are unlikely to be the determining factor, in my view -- it is still not that big an economic relationship by comparison with China's other major partners. And in recent years, if anything Beijing has been more willing to swallow economic costs for the sake of political and security goals. You need only look at China-Japan relations to see that, and it's a much more important economic relationship for Beijing. Privately, China certainly encourages Pakistan to improve its ties with India, particularly on the economic front -- it thinks Pakistan should be able to benefit far more from trade relations with its neighbour without jeopardising the essence of its strategic calculations. Did the Chinese officials you spoke to for your book nurse any doubts about elements in the Pakistan establishment and their encouragement of Islamist elements? Are there concerns in Beijing that separatists in Xinjiang are being trained by Islamists in Pakistan? Are the Chinese apprehensive about the ongoing battles with the Islamists within Pakistan? In what ways has China engaged Pakistan on terrorism? Has there been any Chinese initiative to nudge Pakistan to rein in the Islamists? China has its worries about the long-term future of the Pakistani army, and Islamist elements within. That isn't to say that those fears are well-founded, but there are developments in Pakistan that Beijing finds uncomfortable to navigate -- the more secular-minded the army, the more the PLA can go drinking with their Pakistani counterparts, the more at ease they are. Historically Beijing has at least acquiesced to Pakistan's use of militant proxies, and has been able to take advantage of Pakistan's relationships in this regard: The ISI could discourage Islamist groups from offering support to Uighur militants and deter them from attacks on China. Beijing has had an extremely narrow set of concerns on counter-terrorism -- the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and its backers, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan -- and hasn't much cared what went on with other groups. The concern for Beijing now though is that the whole situation has run outside the Pakistani army's control, providing risks to China and to the Pakistani State itself. Uighur groups have found safe haven in FATA (Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas) over the last decade, and China has certainly pushed Pakistan to crack down harder on them. The recent (Pakistan army's) operation in North Waziristan operation, for instance, was something the Chinese were keen to see. But they are also cautious about pushing too hard, too broadly, or too openly -- the Lal Masjid siege, for instance, which came about partly due to Chinese pressure, was clearly a disaster for Pakistan and for perceptions of China among militant groups in Pakistan. And it's important not to over-emphasise the degree to which Chinese concerns about Pakistan's handling of the Uighur issue mirror, for instance, the sort of problems that the United States has faced with Pakistan on this front. For the most part Pakistan is willing to do as China asks, not least because its requests are so specific and restricted, and mostly don't impact on the army's broader strategy. How do you perceive the Chinese projects in Pakistan going forward? Will we see real momentum or incremental acceleration? How do these projects really help China? We keep hearing of China promising Pakistan help in setting up more nuclear facilities. Is this mere talk, as a counterweight to the India-US nuclear agreement or are we going to see real assistance on this front? We are in a different phase in the economic relationship now -- at times one side has been pushing while the other has been more reluctant, but now there is real momentum from Beijing and Islamabad. The PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) government has been easier for China to work with than its predecessor, and Xi's plans for a Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as the broader stabilisation and development of China's western periphery, mean that there is more Chinese political capital behind these initiatives. The push to develop China's interior provinces through better infrastructure connections to the neighbourhood is genuinely important as the Chinese economy slows and return on investment in China for such projects diminishes. China is also concerned that the Pakistani economy is struggling and needs external support, especially for its energy sector. This doesn't mean that Chinese investments are purely a matter of goodwill, but there is a strategic calculation -- don't let Pakistan fail -- that helps to underpin them. The nuclear facilities are certainly moving ahead -- Chashma 3 and 4 were agreed in the aftermath of the US-India nuclear deal, partly as a tit-for-tat, but construction of a new phase of 1000 MW Chinese reactors is also underway, and will have a far greater impact on Pakistan's energy situation. These are a serious showcase for the Chinese nuclear industry, not just a political play. Whether some of the more ambitious infrastructure projects come off -- the Kashgar-to-Gwadar link -- is another question, but the existing initiatives that are underway will amount to a substantial increase in Chinese investment in Pakistan regardless. In recent months we have seen China taking a larger role on Afghanistan. How will the China-Pakistan relationship play out in this arena? Will China and Pakistan work to diminish India's interests in Afghanistan after the Western forces leave? Will Washington work with China to push Pakistan to rein in the Taliban so that it does not undermine President Ashraf Ghani's government? Greater Chinese involvement in Afghanistan has advantages and disadvantages for Pakistan. On the one hand, the diplomatic and economic engagement of its closest partner reduces the risk that its interests won't be accommodated. On the other hand, it means that it has a less free rein to pursue its own strategy there without taking China into account. The two sides will certainly coordinate closely, but they don't entirely see eye-to-eye -- China prizes stability in Afghanistan more highly than does Pakistan, and is particularly concerned about the prospect of safe havens for Uighur militants. It is also far more sanguine about India's role, and sees value to New Delhi's political and economic engagement if it helps to stabilise the country. The China-Pakistan relationship is too close to be prised apart over this, and any expectation that China will squeeze Pakistan hard on the Taliban issue is likely to be disappointed. But coordination between Washington and Beijing over Afghanistan has grown much closer in recent years, and China is no longer willing to outsource its policy there to Pakistan. Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to be the chief guest at Pakistan's military parade when it is held for the first time in seven years next month. What does this symbolism tell you? Is it at one level telling the Indians that if you can get President Obama for your Republic Day, we have our friends too? :) Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader in 20 years or more. How do you expect the China-Pakistan relationship to evolve on his watch? Will we see greater Chinese pragmatism towards Pakistan under Xi? Or will it much the same as before? We'll see whether that actually happens -- there is a bit of a debate underway about whether this like-for-like symbolism is entirely sensible, as that's certainly the signal that the two sides would be sending. China wasn't above receiving the chief of army staff, Raheel Sharif, on the same day as Obama's visit to India, but that was considerably less visible. From Xi, Pakistan can certainly expect pragmatism -- he is unsentimental about old principles and hang-ups in Chinese foreign policy, and if Pakistan doesn't get its act together on certain issues, he could push them quite hard or simply de-prioritise the relationship. But Xi is also far more comfortable with China's position as a great power than his immediate predecessor, which means less nervousness about other countries' reactions to Chinese strategic moves and greater willingness to work with friends and allies. Whether it's investments in Kashmir, building naval facilities, or selling top-of-the-range military equipment, Pakistan could well benefit more under Xi's watch. What can India expect from the China-Pakistan relationship going forward? What must the strategists in Delhi watch for in the signs coming from Beijing and Islamabad? What can the world expect from the China-Pakistan relationship? In the event that Islamists take power in Islamabad, what role will China take in subduing their expected hostility towards India and anyone else it considers an enemy? In the highly unlikely scenario that Islamists took power in Islamabad it would have extremely far-reaching consequences for the relationship, and China would do its very best to help head off such an eventuality. More important is whether Chinese concerns about the 'Islamisation' of Pakistan give it pause about how quickly to move forward with other security and economic projects, though at the moment the indication is quite the opposite: That China is doubling down on its support to Pakistan, partly because of its fears about where the country is headed. A few aspects of interest to follow in the coming years are: Will the strategic economic projects come off, and how quickly? A lot will hinge on whether they actually happen, or just get embroiled in another set of political, security and logistical problems. Will China-Pakistan ties move more openly in the direction of a quasi-alliance? Of course, Beijing doesn't want to take on treaty obligations, but there are various aspects in which Pakistan could de facto become China's only real ally (North Korea doesn't count...); the development and use of facilities for the PLA navy, whether at Gwadar or Karachi, will be an interesting indicator. How much of the PLA;s very best equipment will Pakistan get its hands on? This mattered less in the past when the PLA was still relatively technologically backward in many areas, but in the next decade and beyond it will start to have more of an effect on the conventional balance. Will China move from its extremely narrow focus on Uighur groups to look at the enabling conditions for terrorism in the region? The North Waziristan operation and China's shifting stance in Afghanistan is an indication of the sort of pressure that could be brought to bear if the terrorism problem in China continues to worsen and if Beijing decides that its previous approach is no longer working. Broadly speaking, this whole region of the world is one where a more assertive Chinese stance in looking out for its interests would be beneficial to all parties, including India. Please tell us about your book. You spent six years researching the China-Pakistan relationship, not only in the ministries in Beijing and Islamabad it is said, but also in places like Kashgar and Gilgit. What did you discover? Did you encounter a loquaciousness in Islamabad and a reticence in Beijing to discuss the association? What can we expect to find in your book that we have not known before? It is somewhat true that there is more openness on the Pakistani side about the relationship than from the Chinese, but when it comes to the most sensitive aspects both sides keep pretty tight-lipped. Chinese officials and analysts did grow more willing to talk about the relationship though -- especially as their worries about developments in Pakistan grew, alongside the need to start coordinating more closely with the West over the militancy situation in the region. The book benefits from some of that frankness, which made it easier to give behind-the-scenes accounts of a host of different episodes in the relationship, and probe more fully into current issues between the two sides than had been possible in the past. Much of the book focuses on recent political history -- from the Red Mosque to the present day, and ranges from China-Taliban relations to the story of the Obama administration's effort to solicit Chinese cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some of the early reviews have focused on the previously unreported levels of tensions between China and Pakistan, whether over kidnappings, Pakistan's handling of Uighur militant groups, or even the PLA's worries about major contingencies that it might have to address in Pakistan. The book goes further back through the history of the relationship too -- at almost every important juncture for Pakistan in recent decades, somewhere in the background the Chinese have been present, and that parallel set of stories have rarely been laid out before. The book was also intended to pull together in one place a lot of the disparate material that is out there -- on China's support to Pakistan's nuclear programme, on China's involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or on Pakistan's role in the Saudi-China relationship. These all help to place in context the current debates in Beijing about the future role that Pakistan should play in Chinese foreign policy: There are some wild rumours that the book refutes, but the China-Pakistan relationship has been at the heart of some of the most dramatic and strategically consequential developments in Chinese policy in recent decades and that is likely to remain true. Nikhil Lakshman/Rediff.com

Tuesday, 10 February 2015

INVITATION SEMINAR O KASHMIR AT MIT PUNE 22 FEB 1000 AM-5 PM-BRIG HEMANT MAHAJAN

A seminar jointly arranged by M. I. T College, Pune & Jammu Kashmir Study Centre Pune, Western Maharashtra 22nd February 2015 10.00am to 5pm Venue : Dnaneshwar Sabhagriha, M. I. T. Kothrud Topics and speakers Registration 10.00am to 10.30am 1 Strategic importance of J&K in present happenings in the neighbourhood 10.30am to 11.15am Brig. Hemant Mahajan 2 Making of Constitution of India 11.15am to 12.00 Adv. Nitin Apte Tea break 12 to 12.15 3 Article 370, Clause 35 A of the Constitution of India 12.15 to 1.15pm Adv. Anirudhha Rajput Lunch break 1.15pm to 2.00pm 4 Tourism in Jammu and Laddakh 2.00pm to 2.30pm 5 POK and COK Gilgit, Baltistan, Skardu 2.30pm to 3.30pm Shri. Raka Sudhakar Rao Kasturi Tea break 3.30pm to 3.45pm 6 Present situation in Jammu & Kashmir 3.45pm to 4.30pm Shri. Kashinath Pandita 7 Concluding remarks 4.30pm to 5.00pm

Friday, 6 February 2015

‘अग्नी ५’ आणि हिंदुस्थानी क्षेपणास्त्रसिद्धता

‘अग्नी ५’ आणि हिंदुस्थानी क्षेपणास्त्रसिद्धता देशाची युद्धक्षमता वाढण्याच्या आणि सुधारण्याच्या दृष्टीने अनेक महत्त्वाच्या घडामोडी गेल्या आठवड्यात घडल्या. अमेरिकेशी झालेल्या करारामुळे अत्याधुनिक शस्त्रास्त्रे, विमाने तसेच आण्विक, जैविक तसेच रासायनिक युद्धाच्या दृष्टीने सैनिकांना आवश्यक कपडे आता आपल्या देशात तयार होतील. त्याशिवाय जपानकडून आपल्याला पाणबुड्यांचे संशोधन आणि निर्मिती यासाठी सहकार्य अपेक्षित आहे. त्याशिवाय आपण स्वदेशी बनावटीच्या ‘अग्नी ५’ या अण्वस्त्रवाहू आंतरखंडीय क्षेपणास्त्राची यशस्वी चाचणी केली. या सर्व गोष्टी आपल्या युद्धक्षमता वाढीच्या निदर्शक मानाव्या लागतील. स्वदेशी बनावटीच्या अण्वस्त्रवाहू आंतरखंडीय क्षेपणास्त्र ‘अग्नी-५’ या क्षेपणास्त्राची आपण नुकतीच यशस्वी चाचणी केली. अग्नी-५ क्षेपणास्त्राची उंची १७ मीटर आणि वजन ५० टन आहे. अग्नी-५’चा पल्ला पाच हजार किलोमीटर असल्यामुळे संपूर्ण चीन, आशिया आणि युरोप खंडातला बहुतेक भाग तसेच आफ्रिकादेखील अग्नी-५च्या टप्प्यात आला आहे. या क्षेपणास्त्राचा वेग आवाजाच्या २४ पट जास्त आहे. ‘अग्नी-५’ची चाचणी घेताना टाट्रा ट्रकवरून कॅनिस्टर पद्धतीने त्याला आकाशात प्रक्षेपित करण्यात आले. ‘अग्नी-५’ हे टाट्रा ट्रकवरून फायर करता येते. त्यामुळे देशाच्या कुठल्याही भागात त्याची वाहतूक होऊ शकते. कॅनिस्टर तंत्रज्ञानामुळे या क्षेपणास्त्राचे प्रक्षेपण रस्त्यावरून वा रेल्वेवरूनही करणे शक्य आहे. नव्या तंत्रज्ञानामुळे ‘अग्नी-५’ची गोपनीयता आणि मारक क्षमतादेखील वाढली असल्याने ते अधिक प्रभावी आणि अधिक परिणामकारक ठरणार आहे. आतापर्यंत लॉंचर प्लॅटफॉर्मवरूनच क्षेपणास्त्र डागण्याची सोय होती. तथापि नव्या तंत्रज्ञानामुळे ‘अग्नी-५’ एका ठिकाणाहून दुसर्‍या ठिकाणी वाहून नेणे सोपे झाले आहे. त्यामुळे हिंदुस्थानने अतिशय महत्त्वाचा पल्ला क्षेपणास्त्र युद्धामध्ये गाठला आहे. त्यासाठी आपण आपल्या शास्त्रज्ञांचे नक्कीच कौतुक केले पाहिजे. आज हिंदुस्थान-चीन किंवा हिंदुस्थान-पाकिस्तान युद्ध तीन पद्धतीने होऊ शकते. पहिल्या पद्धतीत दहशतवाद्यांच्या घुसखोरीच्या माध्यमातून. सध्या चीन पाकिस्तानच्या मदतीने कश्मीरमध्ये गडबड करण्याच्या प्रयत्नात आहे. मध्य हिंदुस्थानमध्ये पसरलेल्या माओवाद्यांना आर्थिक आणि शस्त्रास्त्रांची मदतही चीन करत आहे. दुसरी पद्धत असेल पारंपरिक युद्धाची. हिंदुस्थान आणि पाकिस्तान यांच्यात १९४७, १९६५, १९७१ आणि १९९९मध्ये तर चीनशी १९६२मध्ये युद्ध झाले. अशा प्रकारचे युद्ध आता पुन्हा २०२० ते २०२५मध्ये सीमावादामुळे चीनशी होऊ शकते. सध्या आपली शस्त्रे जुनाट आहेत. दारुगोळा कमी आहे. सीमेवर रस्ते आणि रेल्वे मार्गांची कमतरता आहे. विद्यमान सरकारने यावर अनेक पावले उचलायला सुरुवात केली आहे. मात्र या त्रुटी भरून यायला पुढील १० ते १५ वर्षे लागतील. अर्थात या संभाव्य पारंपरिक युद्धामध्ये वापरण्याकरिता आपल्याकडे पृथ्वी, ब्रह्मोस आणि अग्नी-१ आणि २ अशी क्षेपणास्त्रे आहेत. क्षेपणास्त्र अणुयुद्ध केव्हा होईल याचा अंदाज बांधणे सोपे नाही. १९४५नंतर अणुबॉम्बचा वापर जगात कुठेही झालेला नाही. तरीही पाकिस्तान आणि चीनकडून वेळोवेळी मिळणार्‍या धमक्यांमुळे आपल्याला अणु तसेच क्षेपणास्त्र युद्धाकरिता जय्यत तयार राहणे आवश्यक आहे. अणुबॉम्ब टाकण्याकरिता दोन गोष्टींची गरज असते. एक म्हणजे अणुबॉम्ब आणि दुसरे म्हणजे त्याला घेऊन जाणारे वाहन (कॅरिअर). आकाशातून अणुबॉम्ब टाकण्याकरिता आपल्या हवाई दलात सुखोई आणि मिराज अशी विमाने सध्या आहेत. सध्यापुरती तरी ती पुरेशी आहेत. मात्र पाणबुडीतून अणुबॉम्ब टाकण्यासाठी जी क्षमता लागते ती आपल्याकडे नाही. त्या सज्जतेसाठी अजून १० ते १५ वर्षे लागू शकतात. जमिनीवरून क्षेपणास्त्र डागण्याकरिता आपल्याकडे पृथ्वी आणि अग्नी ही दोन क्षेपणास्त्रे आहेत. पृथ्वी क्षेपणास्त्राचा पल्ला १०० ते ७५० किलोमीटर आहे. सध्या हे हिंदुस्थानी सैन्यामध्ये कार्यरत आहे. आज पाकिस्तानमध्ये १०० ते १२० अणुबॉम्ब असावेत. याशिवाय त्यांच्याकडे शाहीन आणि घौरी ही चीन आणि दक्षिण कोरियाच्या मदतीने तयार केलेली क्षेपणास्त्रे आहेत. ‘शाहीन-२’चा पल्ला २५०० किलोमीटर तर ‘घौरी-२’चा पल्ला १८०० किलोमीटरच्या आसपास आहे. थोडक्यात, मध्य हिंदुस्थान आजच पाकिस्तानच्या क्षेपणास्त्र टप्प्यात आहे. सध्या पाकिस्तान नासीर नावाचे ६० किलोमीटर पल्ल्याचे एक क्षेपणास्त्र तयार करत आहे. याचा वापर पारंपरिक युद्धात करता येईल. चीनकडे २५०च्या आसपास अणुबॉम्ब असावेत. त्यांच्याकडे विमानातून फायर करणारी, जमिनीवरून फायर करणारी आणि समुद्रातून किंवा पाणबुडीतून फायर करणारी क्षेपणास्त्रेही आहेत. अणुबॉम्बच्या युद्धात याला ट्रायेड असे म्हटले जाते. शक्तिशाली देशांकडे जमिनीवरून, पाण्यामधून आणि आकाशातून फायर करण्याची क्षमता असते. ही क्षमता चीनकडे आहे. हिंदुस्थानकडे ९० ते ११० अणुबॉम्ब असावेत, जे सध्याच्या गरजेला पुरेसे आहेत. अणुबॉम्ब जमिनीवरून फायर करण्याकरिता ‘पृथ्वी-१,२’ (३५० कि.मी.), ‘अग्नी-१’ आणि ‘अग्नी-२’ (२००० कि.मी.), ‘अग्नी-३’ (३००० कि.मी.) आदी क्षेपणास्त्रे हिंदुस्थानी सैन्यात आहेत. ‘अग्नी-४’ची (४००० कि.मी.) मागच्या वर्षी चाचणी घेण्यात आली होती. ते हिंदुस्थानी सैन्यात येण्याकरिता अजून २-३ वर्षे लागू शकतात. ‘अग्नी-५’ची चाचणी यशस्वी झाली असली तरी जमिनीवरून फायर करण्याकरिता (५००० किलोमीटर) या क्षेपणास्त्राला प्रत्यक्ष सैन्यात येण्याकरिता ५-७ वर्षे लागतील. थोडक्यात आज आपल्याकडे जी क्षेपणास्त्रे आहेत त्यांच्या मदतीने आपण पाकिस्तानशी युद्ध करण्याकरिता सक्षम आहोत. मात्र चीनशी अणुबॉम्ब युद्धात मुकाबला करण्यासाठी आपल्याकडे पुरेशी क्षेपणास्त्रे नाहीत. ‘अग्नी-५’च्या यशस्वी चाचणीमुळे ही गरज मोठ्या प्रमाणात पूर्ण होण्याची शक्यता आहे. ‘अग्नी-४’ आणि ‘अग्नी-५’ यांचे उरलेले संशोधन आपल्या शास्त्रज्ञांनी लवकर पूर्ण करावे आणि ही क्षेपणास्त्रे शस्त्र म्हणून आपल्या सैन्याला लवकरात लवकर मिळावीत. कमीत कमी अणुबॉम्ब आणि क्षेपणास्त्रे (Minimum Deterrence ) तयार करावीत. ९० ते १०० अणुबॉम्ब आणि २५ ते ३० अग्नी क्षेपणास्त्रांची आपल्याला गरज असू शकते. चीन आणि पाकिस्तानशी युद्ध करण्याकरिता आपल्या देशाला सगळ्या प्रकारचे लष्करी सामर्थ्य वाढवणे जरुरीचे आहे, पण गेली १० वर्षे सैन्याचे आधुनिकीकरण पूर्णपणे थांबले होते. आपण लष्करी तयारीत चीनच्या मागे आहोत. आपल्याला शांतता हवी आहे, पण आर्य चाणक्याने म्हटल्याप्रमाणे आपण लढाईकरता सदैव तयार राहणे गरजेचे आहे

Wednesday, 4 February 2015

Sandeep Sinha, the Sindhuratna commander facing court martial-'Scapegoats' to cover battery leak:

'Scapegoats' to cover battery leak: Officers Samyabrata Ray goswami Mumbai, Jan. 30: Sandeep Sinha, the Sindhuratna commander facing court martial, and the others have been made "scapegoats" as the fire was caused by "expired" batteries, officers at the Western Naval Command said today. "These people came back from the jaws of death and now, they are being made the scapegoats as it is too tough for the bureaucrats in the defence ministry to accept that they messed up by forcing the navy to use expired batteries on its subs," said an officer. The inquiry found the seven officers, including Commodore Commanding S.R. Kapoor, guilty of "dereliction of duty". The charge against them: they mistook the first fire alarm for simulated alarms set off by an inspection team on the sub and did not take the alert seriously. The moments lost in the process - though less than a minute according on some accounts - led to the tragedy, said the board of inquiry set up by the navy to investigate the accident. Resentment was high today especially on the court martial ordered against Sinha, 41. "Sinha had commandeered the vessel for nearly two hours after the accident despite inhaling deadly gases that nearly killed him. It (the court martial announcement) has made the atmosphere at the naval command here very tense," said the officer. Sinha had to be put on ventilator later along with some of the other officers who have been indicted by the inquiry. It all began after the battery leak started a fire and poisonous extinguisher fumes filled two compartments of the Sindhuratna. Sinha and some others rushed into Compartment Three of the sub after learning that two officers - Lieutenant Commander Kapish Muwal and Lieutenant Manoranjan Kumar who died in the blaze - were trapped inside. "Sinha had gone in to try to rescue them, not thinking once about of his own safety. But his heroic efforts failed to save the two juniors' lives," said a navy source. Despite taking in the gases and fully aware that they could be fatal, Sinha manned the controls personally and brought the submarine to the surface. He then stood by till every sailor had climbed out and revived themselves. "Sinha insisted he wouldn't leave till every person on board had done so. Then, after ensuring shutdown of the controls, he was the last to go," the source said. Sinha was very ill but still refused to be air-lifted with the first lot of seven critically ill crew members. "He agreed to go only when a ship came after three hours to evacuate 22 more sailors and officers. This worsened his condition," said the source who was on the board of inquiry that probed the accident. Sinha is the son of a retired naval commander of the logistics directorate and the son-in-law of a retired rear admiral from the naval armament inspectorate. The Sindhuratna, a Kilo-class submarine, was on a "Task 2" mission to check whether the refitted vessel was fit to be deployed at sea when the blaze broke out on February 26 last year.

Tuesday, 3 February 2015

Col MN Rai at the Last Post-MUST READ

Col MN Rai at the Last Post : 02 Feb , 2015 “Listen to me…. Are you listening…. I am saying something to you…” As the mortal remains of Late Col Munindra Nath Rai were finally being lifted for performing last rites at the capital’s Brar Square cemetery, these were the last words of Priyanka Rai, the ill-fated wife of the colonel. She wanted to touch her tricolor-clad husband for the last time. “I want to touch him… allow me,” pleaded a bewildered Priyanka, realising last stages of preparations. The otherwise crumbling Priyanka swiftly gathered courage to elevate her body and rolled her wavering fingers on the face of her husband. “Listen to me…. Are you listening…. I am saying something to you,” she cried hoping against the hope to hear a response. It was the treacherous betrayal of trust which cost the 39 year old colonel his life, 24 hours after he was honoured for his bravery with a Yudh Seva Medal (YSM) on Republic Day. For a second, Priyanka revisited each moment lived with her brave husband. A short while earlier, relatives helped her stand with (a handful of) wreaths/ flowers in her hands but she collapsed before laying them. Bereaved family members and close relatives struggled to console Priyanka all this while at Brar Square where the wreath laying ceremony was performed. It was the treacherous betrayal of trust which cost the 39 year old colonel his life, 24 hours after he was honoured for his bravery with a Yudh Seva Medal (YSM) on Republic Day. The officer made the supreme sacrifice fighting terrorists in Kashmir. The Army received an input about two terrorists hiding in Hardoona village of Tral in Pulwama district. The valiant and high-spirited commanding officer decided to lead the operation and his troops surrounded the village. The Army reached the home of the militants. Col MN Rai was told by the family that the military need not kill the ‘boys’ as they would instead, surrender. It is part of Army’s widely known tradition in Kashmir that it tries its best to provide an opportunity to surrender, barring notorious and hardcore terrorists. It was when the so-called ‘surrender’ was being discussed, that the militants emerged and fired at the officer. Both the terrorists, Abid Khan and Shiraz Dar, were killed in retaliatory fire by the Army. But the officer too could not be saved. Abid Khan, son of Jammu and Kashmir police constable Jalaluddin Khan, joined Hijbul Mujahideen in September 2012. Tral, a known militant hotbed, had witnessed growing engagements of youngsters in cricket and football tournaments in recent times, thanks to the initiatives taken by Col MN Rai. When the mortal remains of the tricolor clothed Col MN Rai were brought in at Brar Square, the six year old son of Rai was saluting the martyr. Unable to comprehend the loss, he was not weeping. Eight year old Richa sat close to her father embracing his portrait and holding his medals in hands. Alka rose in a flash, saluted and shouted Gurkha war cry- ‘Hoyke hoyena….’ with a choked throat. The Gurkhas responded several times over ‘Hoyke Hoyena…. Honu Hi Parchha’. Tears were ceaselessly rolling own the cheeks of eleven year old Alka, who was very young to bear the excruciating pain. She rose in a flash, saluted and shouted Gurkha war cry- ‘Hoyke hoyena….’ with a choked throat. The Gurkhas responded several times over ‘Hoyke Hoyena…. Honu Hi Parchha. This means- ‘Will you be able to accomplish the task…. Yes, surely we will…’ Alka may have thought her father will respond to the war cry like earlier times. But this time it was not to be. The Chief of Army Staff Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag arrived to meet the family. He hugged colonel’s ageing father tightly. To find the chief approaching at her, an already inconsolable Priyanka burst into a fresh spell of tears. “They killed…. they killed…. My husband,” she cried. “Madam you please don’t worry, we will take care of everything. This is our duty. I am here my child,” replied Gen Suhag looking at the children. “He always believed in leading from the front,” recalls Maj DP Singh, one of the course mates of Col Rai. “He had the ability and guts to simplify tough situations with sound planning,” he adds. Maj Rajesh Arora, who pursued Battalion Weapon Support Course with the martyr, remembers him as a simple, courageous and fun-loving officer. Col Rai, originally belonging from 9, Gurkha Rifles, was on deputation with 42, Rashtriya Rifles. Maj Gen Anil Bhatt, colonel of the regiment, 9 Gurkha Rifles, has seen the martyr from close quarters. He remembers Rai as an officer who had the passion to lead such operations. …it is the valour of soldiers like Col Rai that all of us sleep peacefully, everyday, all the year and throughout over lives. “Last year Col Rai killed three terrorists in an operation in Kashmir,” recalls Maj Gen Bhatt. He, along with his wife and some officers, went to inform the irreversible loss to the family. The Major General was surprised to take note of the firmness and grit of Col Rai’s daughter. “My father has laid down his life for our motherland and I am proud of him,” she said to the senior officer showcasing her nerves of steel. Col Rai was the youngest in the family of three brothers. His eldest brother, Lt Col Dhirendra Nath Rai too serves in the Army. The other, Yatindra Nath Rai, is a Commandant in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Yatindra too sustained bullet injuries in the infamous Raghunath Temple attack in Jammu in 2002. The last status update of Col Rai on whatsapp illustrates heroism in his personality. The screenshot displays, “Zindagi mein apna kirdar aise nibhao ki; Parda girne ke baad bhi taaliyaa bajti rahein.” The couplet means: “Let’s perform the assigned role in life in a manner that it keeps others clapping even when the show gets over.” As the cremation comes to a close, we will be left with only memories of Late Col MN Rai. What needs to be reminded/ realised is the fact that it is the valour of soldiers like Col Rai that all of us sleep peacefully, everyday, all the year and throughout over lives. Else, the enemy never halts attempts to annihilate this country.

China is placing key generals on India border near Ladakh

China is placing key generals on India border near Ladakh JAYADEVA RANADE 01 February 2015 New Delhi As Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares to visit Beijing to build bilateral relations and explore additional economic opportunities, it is the right time to analyse China's ambitions and intentions. The unceasing intrusions by Chinese troops especially in the Ladakh sector are one area that merit attention. Pertinent are the intrusions by Chinese troops especially in the Depsang plains just days prior to the visit of Premier Li Keqiang in April 2013, and in the Chumar area of Ladakh last September. The latter, very unusually, broke with pattern and continued throughout Chinese President Xi Jinping's stay in India and for many days thereafter. Some observers at the time sought to suggest that either these were solitary actions by a local commander, or that Xi Jinping's control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is lax. While credible reports clearly indicated that the actions were planned and deliberate in both cases, additional confirmation is available from the latest round of promotions in the PLA. The recently announced promotions in the PLA not only further consolidate Xi Jinping's grip over the PLA as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, but are also of relevance to India. Nine officers in the Lanzhou Military Region, which along with the Chengdu Military Region has operational responsibility for the Sino-Indian border, made the significant jump from senior colonel to the rank of major general on 12 January 2015. Among them, the promotions of particular significance for India are the appointments of Hālǐmùlātí Ābùdōurèhémàn as Deputy Commander of the Southern Xinjiang Military District; Liu Lin, as Chief of Staff of the Southern Xinjiang Military District; and Zhang Limin, as Director of the Political Department of the Southern Xinjiang Military District. All are from the Southern Xinjiang Military District, which exercises front-line responsibility and jurisdiction over the Hetian and Ali Military Sub-Districts. The Hetian Military Sub-District (MSD) has front-line responsibility and jurisdiction over the areas of Daulet Beg Oldi and the Depsang Plains. The PLA's Ali Military Sub-District (MSD) includes the three Chinese counties of Ritu (Rutok), Gar (Gartok) and Zhada (Tsamda). Chusul and the Indian portion of Pangong Lake are opposite Ritu (Rutok) County, Indian Demchok is opposite Gar (Gartok) County and Chumar and the Shipkila Pass are opposite Zhada (Tsamda) County. The commanders of the Hetian and Ali MSDs both hold the rank of senior colonel in the PLA. The commander of the Hetian MSD is Senior Colonel Kuang Dewang and the commander of the Ali MSD is Senior Colonel Liu Geping. The two have been in position since at least late 2013 and, as senior colonels are on the verge of the big promotion to the rank of major general. Both the Hetian MSD and Ali MSD report to the South Xinjiang Military District based in Kashgar, which, in turn, reports directly to the Lanzhou Military Region Headquarters. Their action orders come from Lanzhou, via Kashgar, where the generals are based. At least as far as the border with India is concerned, the South Xinjiang Military District does not channel its reporting through the Xinjiang Military District headquartered in Urumqi. The commander of the South Xinjiang Military District, presently, is 55-year-old Lt Gen Li Haiyang. He assumed command between late December 2013 and early January 2014. Li Haiyang spent six months in 2003-2004 studying in a Russian military institute and later, in mid-2010 after only six months as chief of staff in the South Xinjiang Military District, Li Haiyang was suddenly transferred to the PLA's General Staff Department (GSD) in Beijing as director of its Combat Rapid Response Office. After two years in this post, he returned to his previous job as chief of staff in the South Xinjiang Military District. This experience makes him an officer who is known, and probably trusted, in Beijing and Lanzhou. He additionally has the requisite experience and knowledge about rapid troop deployments. Maj Gen Zhang Jiansheng, Li Haiyang's predecessor, was promoted and posted as a deputy commander of the Lanzhou Military Region. He was the first officer from the South Xinjiang Military District in the last 22 years to be promoted directly to Lanzhou. He was also commander of the Ali MSD a decade ago. He can be expected to oversee all matters concerning the South Xinjiang Military District (including the Hetian and Ali MSDs) on behalf of Lanzhou Headquarters. It is interesting too that the South Xinjiang Military District now has one lieutenant general and seven officers of the rank of major general posted at its headquarters. A few other indicators point to Beijing's increased interest in the Sino-India border. One is the upgrading of China's defence attaché in Delhi to the rank of major general, with effect from January 2015. Of the 113 countries where China has defence attaché, it has posted Major Generals only in 12. These appointments suggest Beijing's increased interest in the Sino-Indian border and consequent growing importance of the South Xinjiang Military District. This was substantiated by an article in the influential Communist Youth League (CYL) newspaper Zhongguo Qingnian Bao on 14 May 2013, which implicitly laid claim to Ladakh and described it as part of Tibet. Jayadeva Ranade is a former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and is president of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal. ------------------------------ -------------------- RELATED PLEASE : High on rhetoric, but ill-prepared on ground Claude Arpi 29 January 2015 If we are to be prepared to counter Chinese designs along the Line of Actual Control and China’s claim over States like Arunachal Pradesh, we need to dramatically ramp up road infrastructure at the borders http://www.dailypioneer.com/ columnists/edit/high-on- rhetoric-but-ill-prepared-on- ground.html

Monday, 2 February 2015

The Arab Oil Bubble is going to burst: A Fascinating article - Oil

The Arab Oil Bubble is going to burst: A Fascinating article - Oil No one believed this would happen so fast, but the US is already the world's biggest oil manufacturer, bigger than Saudi Arabia, thanks to the oil shale technology which changed the world of energy. Within a year, the US is expected to export about one million barrels of oil a day and produce 12 million barrels a day. Iran, for the same of comparison, manufactures about a million and a half barrels a day. This means that oil prices will continue to drop, as the US is already competing against other manufacturers. As a result, Russia will be crushed, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states will fall flat on their face, the cartel will collapse, and all the dictatorships which were mainly based on oil – like Iran – will face a gloomy future. At the same time, democracies like Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria and even little Israel will enter the market. The Arab oil era is over, and so is the destructive power of the Persian Gulf's oil dictatorships. These dictatorships have disgracefully controlled the failing Europe: Buying politicians, bribing companies, taking over the economy and gaining political power which was also used against Israel. It will take a few months, but both the Europeans and the Americans will realize that the era of the destructive Arab power is over, because the Gulf states will have no money to spend. On the contrary, they will be rocked from the inside by social, ethnic and terroristic shocks, as they will have no money left to continue satisfying terror. The signs of the drop in Arab power can already be seen. Twenty-two Arab states made a huge effort last week to pass an anti-Israel resolution at the United Nations Security Council, but failed. The US was undeterred by them, and so were strong Western countries. It's true that France and Luxemburg are still controlled by the Arab capital, or think they are, but they will also realize that the era of Arab money is over. But as oil prices continue to drop, what will happen to Russia? The country is collapsing and could turn to a European war to save itself. And what will happen to Egypt, which is funded by Saudi Arabia? The latter is already cutting its aid to Cairo, because the money is no longer obvious. And what about the rich Gulf states, like Qatar? They are deluding themselves that someone will be interested in them if they don’t have oil. Some are even toying with the idea of tourism. Well, if there is no oil, no one will want to come there at all, and the sand will once again cover the towers rising in the air which they have built. And Mahmoud Abbas' Palestinian Authority? Well, no one in the Gulf actually donated money to this entity even before the crisis, although there were always festive declaration. As the year 2015 begins, we are facing a new world: A world of a revolution of information, mind, personal strength, innovation and inventions. And in this world, Israel is a real princess. The Arab oil era is over, and the global and Israeli mind era begins. It's a fact that countries which wouldn't dare approach us in the past – because of the Arab extortion – are now doing so hastily, as if to make up for the lost time of so many years. Israelis becoming a close friend of countries which were distant in the past but are close today, like India, Japan, China and South Korea. They too understand that those who are not innovative and lack a creative mind will just not be. And in this field, Israel has a lot to offer them, just like they have a lot to offer in return

Sunday, 1 February 2015

Dilemma of martyred officer, just before he was killed

Dilemma of martyred officer, just before he was killed Newspoint Bureau New Delhi, January 29 His body was wrapped in a tri-colour today. A martyr he was. A brave soldier with a soft heart. A father of two teenage daughters and a 7 year old son, with a caring wife. Three days ago the family was flying high when Colonel Munindra Nath Rai was awarded a Republic Day gallantry medal-Yudh Seva medal (YSM). Two days ago, he was standing in front of a house in a village in Tral area of South Kashmir, with two hard core terrorists of Hizbul Mujahideen trapped inside. And the end game began to unfold in a very dramatic manner. As if, a scene from film Haidar was being reenacted...in real. Since a battal ion level operation was on, Commanding Officer of the unit, Colonel Rai was not only present there but leading from the front. A buddy and a J&K police constable was assisting him in the nerve breaking operation. The prize catch was inside, with all escape routes sealed perfectly. As the order to storm the house was to be given a yelling voice shattered the uneasy calm. ''Please don't kill my son...'' an old man with folded hands approached the officer. ''I will convince my son to surrender,''father of the trapped terrorist was on his knees. Colonel Rai was faced with a very hard choice. To kill the militants or listen to the voice of a sobbing father? The Colonel had earned a reputation of a brave officer having soft corners in his heart. Some months ago when entire Kashmir Valley submerged in flash floods, he was a man in full action. He saved hundreds of lives. And he was the one who had sent a group of 50 apple-growers sometime back from the Valley to Shimla to learn the tricks of the trade so that they can earn more profit. It was biting cold out there and the Colonel's finger was placed on an icy trigger. He had to decide fast, either way--to storm the house or allow the father to go inside to make last attempt to convince his terrorist son to surrender. And the Commanding officer opted for the latter. Colonel Rai ordered not to fire. Everything came to a standstill. Soldiers involved in the operation stopped crawling around the house. It must have been a very tense moment. The father went inside the house. Nothing happened in next couple of minutes. Each passing moment was becoming tense for Colonel Rai, who was hoping that the old man will come out with his terrorist son. And suddenly the door flung open. A blaze of fire started. Two hardcore terrorists were raining the bullets. Terrorists killed Colonel Rai, his buddy and the policeman before being gunned down by the troops. Was he right when Colonel Rai decided to give the father a chance to go in and convince his son to surrender? ''Yes,'' said Colonel Rohan Anand,spokesperson of the Army, who narrated the entire sequence of the Tral encounter. ''He wanted to give a chance to insaniyat(humanity),''he said. Colonel Anand said, ''Colonel Rai's Whatsapp status sums up the mission of his life. It says: Zindagi mein badi shiddat se nibhao apna kirdar, ki parda girne ke baad bhi taaliya bajti rahe (Play your role in life with such dedication that people applaud you even after your death Do we have human rights applicable to our soldiers!!!!😔