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Sunday, 6 October 2013

KERAN INFILTRATION -PEACENIKS CONTROL INDIAS FOREIGN POLICY

चीनविरुद्ध परराष्ट्र धोरणावर शांततावादी विचारवंतांची पकड भारताच्या आंतरिक आणि बाह्य सीमा सुरक्षित नाहीत, अशी कितीही ओरड केली, त्याबाबत कितीही निवेदने दिलीत, निदर्शने केलीत अथवा मोर्चे काढले, तरी सरकार काही त्याची दखल घेण्यास तयार नाही. सीमेवर थातूरमातूर इलाज करून सरकार तेथे शांतता प्रस्थापित करू इच्छिते. आंतरिक सुरक्षेबाबतही फारशी तत्परता दाखवून दहशतवाद आटोक्यात आणण्यासाठी पावले उचलत नाही. जम्मूतील पोलीस ठाणे आणि सांबा येथील लष्करी तळावर अतिरेकी हल्ला झाला. त्यात एका लेफ्टनंट कर्नलसह चार जवान शहीद झाले. लष्करी जवानांनी हल्ला करणारे तिन्ही अतिरेकी ठार मारले. काश्मीरच्या केरन भागातील ताबा रेषेवरून भारतीय हद्दीत घुसखोरी करण्याचा अतिरेक्यांचा मोठा डाव लष्कराने उधळून लावला आहे. तीस अतिरेक्यांचा एक गट लष्कराच्या सापळ्यात अडकला आहे. भारताच्या पथ्यावरील दोन सत्तांतरे याच वेळी चीन सीमेवर अनेक महत्त्वाच्या घडामोडींकडे पुरेसे लक्ष दिले गेले नाही. ऑस्ट्रेलिया आणि मालदिव या दोन देशांतील सार्वत्रिक निवडणुका नुकत्याच (सप्टेंबर २0१३) पार पडल्या. दोन्ही ठिकाणी जनतेने विद्यमान सरकारला पायउतार होण्यास भाग पाडून सत्तापरिवर्तनाचा कौल दिला. भारताच्या दृष्टीने यातील आनंदाची बातमी म्हणजे दोन्ही सरकारप्रमुख भारताचे चांगले मित्र व हितचिंतक आहेत. बदलत्या जागतिक राजकारणाच्या दृष्टीने भारताची ही जमेची बाजू ठरावी. चिनी सीमेवर दारुगोळा भांडार आपली चीन बरोबरची सीमा डोंगराळ भागात आहे. अशा सीमेवर लढाईकरिता अरुणाचल प्रदेशच्या वेगवेगळ्या खोर्यात हजारो टन दारुगोळा साठवावा लागतो. अरुणाचल प्रदेशात अशा प्रकारचा दारुगोळा साठविण्याकरिता कमीत कमी ४ ते ५ भांडारांची गरज आहे. प्रत्येक ठिकाणी ४00-१४00 एकर जमिनीची गरज पडू शकते, पण आपल्या पर्यावरण मंत्रालयाने पाय मोडता घातल्यामुळे इतकी वर्ष हे शक्य झालेले नाही. जमीन मिळवल्यानंतरसुद्धा भांडार बनवायला ७-१0 वर्षे लागतील. पर्यावरण मंत्रालयाला राष्ट्र सुरक्षेचे महत्त्व तितकेसे कळत नसावे, नाही तर जमीन देण्याकरिता इतकी वर्ष विलंब केला नसता. चीनचा ईशान्य भारत बंडखोरांना शस्त्रपुरवठा ३ सप्टेंबर २0१३ 'टाइम्स ऑफ इंडिया'मध्ये बातमी आली होती की, थायलंडच्या पोलिसांनी विली नावाच्या तस्कराला पकडले. त्याच्याकडून शस्त्रांचा (एके-४७चा ) मोठा साठा पकडण्यात आला. ही शस्त्रे ठरउठ (कट) नागालँडमधली बंडखोर संस्था करता होती. त्या थाई तस्कराने ही शस्त्रे चिनी कंपनी मॉरिन्कोकडून विकत घेतली होती. भारताची नॅशनल इन्वेस्टिगेशन एजन्सी (ठकअ) विली या तस्कराला भारतात आणून त्याच्यावर खटला भरण्याचा प्रय▪करीत आहे. चीनची राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षेवर श्वेतपत्रिका एप्रिल २0१३ मध्ये चीनने लष्करी सार्मथ्य, देशाची रक्षानीती आणि शेजारील राष्ट्रांबरोबर संबंध यावर आपली श्वेतपत्रिका जाहीर केली आहे. या श्वेतपत्रिकेप्रमाणे चीन सध्या जगातील नंबर दोन लष्करी ताकद म्हणून पुढे आला आहे आणि पुढल्या १५-२0 वर्षांत चीन अमेरिकेला मागे टाकून जगातला सर्वात शक्तिशाली देश बनू शकेल. चीनचा हा उदय शांतता मार्गाने होणार नाही. चीनने अनेक शेजारील राष्ट्रांशी भांडण उकरून काढले आहे. यामध्ये जपानशी सेनकाकू बेटांवरून वादविवाद, व्हिएतनामशी साऊथ चायना समुद्रावरून वाद, फिलिपिन्स व तैवानशी भांडण आणि भारताशी अरुणाचल प्रदेश व लडाख सीमेवर कुरघोडी हे वाद सामील आहेत. त्यामुळे भारताने आक्रमक चीनशी युद्धाकरिता सतर्क राहायला हवे. या श्वेतपत्रिकेत चीनने अणुबॉम्बविषयक धोरणात बदल केला आहे. याचा अर्थ असा की चीनने नो फस्र्ट यूज (ठड ऋकफरळ वरए) चा पुनर्विचार केला पाहिजे. (ठवउछएअफ हएअढडठर) हे तत्त्व गुंडाळून व वेळ पडल्यास केव्हाही अणुबॉम्ब वापर करेल, असे धोरण आखले आहे. याचा अर्थ भारताला चीनशी अणुबॉम्ब व क्षेपणास्त्रांच्या पारंपरिक व अपारंपरिक युद्धाला सामोरे जावे लागेल. आपले प्रत्युत्तर काय असावे आपण चीनच्या लष्करी सार्मथ्यावर अंतराळातून, आकाशातून, जमिनीवरून, समुद्रातून आणि सायबर स्पेसमधून लक्ष ठेवले पाहिजे. यामध्ये आपल्याला अमेरिका व चीनच्या शत्रूंची मदत घेता येईल. सैन्याची एक स्ट्राईक कोर चीनवर प्रतिहल्ला करण्याकरिता लवकरात लवकर तयार केली पाहिजे. त्याचप्रमाणे हवाई दल व नौदलाचीसुद्धा ताकद मोठय़ा प्रमाणात वाढवली पाहिजे. बॉर्डर रोड ऑर्गनायझेशन (इफड) ही संस्था भारत-चीन सीमेवर रस्ते बनवायचे काम करते. त्यांना ३७,000 कोटी रुपये किमतीचे रस्ते बनवायचे काम १0 वर्षांपूर्वी देण्यात आले होते. याप्रमाणे ३,५00 किमी रस्ते बनले जाणार होते. पण हे काम पूर्ण होण्याकरिता आपल्याला अजून १0 ते १५ वर्षे वाट पाहावी लागणार आहे. चीन मात्र अजून नवीन रस्ते, रेल्वे लाइन, विमानतळ, नदीवर धरणे तिबेटमध्ये प्रचंड वेगाने बांधत आहे. आपण अशाप्रकारच्या महत्त्वाच्या रस्त्यांना लवकरात लवकर बांधण्याकरिता इतर खाजगी कंपन्या व पब्लिक सेक्टर कंपन्यांची मदत घेतली पाहिजे, नाही तर आपल्या युद्धक्षमतेवर फार गंभीर परिणाम होऊ शकतो. जपान, व्हिएतनाम सैनिकी संबंध चीनचे शत्रू हे आपले मित्र आहेत म्हणून आपण जपान, व्हिएतनाम, तैवान, फिलिपिन्स, ऑस्ट्रेलिया, मंगोलिया यांच्याशी सामरिक संबंध आणि लष्करी सहकार्य वाढवले पाहिजे. जेणेकरून चिनी सैन्याला वेगवेगळ्या आघाड्यांवर लक्ष द्यावे लागेल. जंगलात लढाई करण्याच्या अनुभवाची व्हिएतनामबरोबर देवाणघेवाण केली पाहिजे. त्यामुळे चीनशी युद्ध झाले तर व्हिएतनामची मदत घेता येईल. अपारंपरिक युद्ध करण्याची क्षमता असणे जरुरी आपल्या परराष्ट्र धोरणावर शांततावादी (ढएअउएठकङर) विचारवंतांची फार मोठी पकड आहे, अशा विचारवंतांना वाटते की, चीन आणि पाकिस्तानशी लवकरच शांतता व मैत्री प्रस्थापित होऊ शकते. १९९0 च्या दशकापर्यंत भारतीय सैन्य आणि रॉ (फअह) गुप्तहेर संस्थेकडे चीन व पाकिस्तानविरुद्ध अपारंपरिक युद्ध करण्याची क्षमता होती. त्यामुळे आपले शत्रुराष्ट्र आपल्याविरुद्ध आतंकी हमला करायच्या आधी दोन वेळा विचार करायचे, पण १९९0 मध्ये तत्कालीन पंतप्रधान आय. के. गुजराल यांनी रॉची ही क्षमता (उडश्एफळ डढएफअळकडठर ऊकश्करकडठ) बंद केली हे आत्मघातकी पाऊल होते, कारण अशी क्षमता तयार व्हायला आपल्याला शत्रू देशात आपले गुप्तहेर आणि छुपे सेल तयार करावे लागतात. याकरिता २५-३0 वर्षे वेळ लागला होता. एवढी मेहनत घेऊन तयार केलेली क्षमता त्यांनी एका शांततावाद्याच्या हातातील लेखणीच्या फटकार्याने बरबाद केली. त्यामुळे पाकिस्तान, चीनची शिरजोरी वाढली आहे. शत्रूशी शांततेने सलोखा निर्माण करण्याकरिता शांततापूर्ण बोलण्याबरोबरच अपारंपरिक आणि पारंपरिक युद्धक्षमता असावी लागते. या क्षमतेचा मधूनमधून वापर करायला लागतोच. शत्रूशी शांतता बुद्धिबळाच्या डावाप्रमाणेच खेळावयास हवी. शांततेच्या वाटाघाटी पुढे नेण्याकरिता आपल्या शत्रूंना पारंपरिक आणि अपारंपरिक युद्धक्षमतेची जाणीव करून देणे तितकेच महत्त्वाचे आहे. २0१३ हे १९६२ जरी नसले तरी भारताला चीनसारख्या आक्रमक कुरघोडी काढणार्या शेजार्यांशी मुकाबला करायचा असेल तर आपला गोगलगायीसारखा वेग बाजूला ठेवून जेट विमानाच्या वेगाने वागून चीनशी निव्वळ बरोबरी नव्हे तर दोन पावले पुढेच गेले पाहिजे, तरच आपली खैर आहे. आपण चीनला नेहमी खूश ठेवायचे धोरण थांबवून वेगवेगळ्या क्षेत्रांत प्रत्युत्तर देणे सुरू केले पाहिजे. आपण पूर्वेकडच्या देशाशी व्यापार, मैत्री, लष्करी देवाणघेवाण वाढवून चीनला उत्तर द्यायला तयार व्हायला पाहिजे, पण त्याकरिता आपण आपल्या कुंभकर्णी निद्रेतून केव्हा जागे होणार? - ब्रिगेडियर हेमंत महाजन (नवृत्त) ?९0९६७0१२५३

NEW PLAN TO REMOVE ARMY FROM KASHMIR

जम्मू कश्मीर में सेना शिविर हटाने की नई रणनीति ( डा० कुलदीप चन्द अग्निहोत्री ) जम्मू कश्मीर में पाकिस्तान प्रायोजित आतंकवाद अपनी ढलान पर है । श्रीनगर के लाल चौक में किसी कश्मीरी से बात करें तो वह यही कहता है कि अब यहाँ से गन कल्चर जा रहा है और उसके कारण पर्यटक आने शुरु हो गये हैं । मोटे तौर पर राज्य के आतंकवादियों के पक्ष में घाटी के सामान्य मुसलमानों की सहानुभूति समाप्त हो रही है । घाटी का शिया समाज , गुज्जर बक्करवाल , और पहाड़ी लोग तो पहले भी इस मामले में मुसलमानों के साथ नहीं थे । लेकिन आतंकवादियों पर विजय कैसे प्राप्त की जा सकी या फिर उनके हाथ से एनिशिएटव कैसे छीना गया , यह अपने आप में एक महत्वपूर्ण प्रश्न है । घाटी के मुसलमानों का आतंकवादियों और उन द्वारा दिखाए गये सपनों से मोह भंग हुआ , यह इसका एक कारण कहा जा सकता है । लेकिन इसका श्रेय मोटे तौर पर सेना , सीमा सुरक्षा बल और केन्द्रीय आरक्षित पुलिस बल को जाता है , जिन्होंने अपनी जान जोखिम में डाल कर भी आतंकवादियों से लोहा लिया । इसका कुल मिला कर असर यह हुआ कि आतंकवादी सशस्त्र बलों से डरने लगे थे । लेकिन लगता है कि अब आतंकवादियों ने अपनी इस पराजय से घबराकर और घटते जन समर्थन को देख कर अपनी रणनीति बदली है और इस बदली रणनीति में कहीं न कहीं राज्य सरकार का भी प्रत्यक्ष या परोक्ष सहयोग मिल रहा है ।यह सहयोग सरकार में छिपे आतंकवादियों के छदम् समर्थकों के कारण भी हो सकता है और या फिर उसकी नपुंसक प्रशासक होने के कारण भी । आतंकवादियों के सामने मुख्य प्रश्न था कि पाकिस्तान या आज़ादी समर्थक सामान्य मुसलमानों के मन से सशस्त्र बलों का जो भय बैठ गया है , उसे कैसे समाप्त किया जाये ? आतंकवादियों के रणनीतिकार जानते थे कि एक बार सशस्त्र बलों का भय समाप्त हो जाये तो एनिशिएटिव फिर उनके हाथ आ सकता है । पिछले साल सशस्त्र बलों पर धुआँधार पत्थर फेंकने की घटनाएँ इसी व्यापक रणनीति का हिस्सा थीं । योजना साफ़ थी । लडके एक साथ सशस्त्र बलों पर पत्थर फेंकेंगे तो वे गोली चलायेंगे ही । गोली से मरने वाली लाशें हुर्रियत कान्फ्रेंस और आतंकवादी , दोनों के ही अपनी अपनी राजनीति चमकाने के काम आयेंगीं और राज्य से सेना हटाने का अभियान इन्हीं लाशों से चलाया जा सकता है । आन्दोलन चलाने के लिये लगभग जितनी लाशें चाहियें , उतनी तो यह योजना दे ही सकती थी । फिर जिन्दा लड़कों के लाश में बदलने का न तो हुर्रियत कान्फरेंस को कोई ख़तरा था , न ही पाकिस्तान में बैठकर ये सारी योजनाएँ क्रियान्वित करने वाले आकाओं को , क्योंकि पत्थर फेंकने वाले ज़्यादातर लडके भाड़े पर ही लिये गये थे । अनेक तो उत्तर प्रदेश और बिहार तक से थे । यह योजना और उसमें बनाई गई लाशें हुर्रियत कान्फ्रेंस को एक मुद्दा देने में तो कामयाब रहीं , लेकिन सेना के हटाने में कामयाब नहीं हुई । पर रणनीतिकारों को इससे कोई अन्तर नहीं पड़ने वाला था । एक कहावत है । गाजर की पीपनी , बज जाये तो बज जाये , नहीं तो खाने के काम आ जायेगी । यही बात आतंकवाद के पाकिस्तानी रणनीतिकारों ने मन में थी । पत्थर फेंकने वाले लड़कों का ग्रुप जितनी लाशें मुहैया करवा देगा , वे आन्दोलन भड़काने के काम आयेंगी और ग्रुप में से जो लडके जिन्दा बचे रहेंगे उन्हें राज्य की ही पुलिस में भर्ती करवा दिया जायेगा , जो बाद में भी किसी न किसी रुप में काम आते रहेंगे । और सचमुच राज्य सरकार ने धीरे धीरे पत्थर फेंकने वाले सभी लड़कों को पुलिस में भर्ती कर लिया और जो मारे गये थे , उनके परिवारों को करोड़ों रुपये देकर सहायता की । तब इस रणनीति का दूसरा हिस्सा मैदान में उतारा गया । इस योजना में आतंकवादियों को पर्दे के पीछे रहना था । अंग्रेज़ी मीडिया ने इसे एजीटेशनल आतंकवाद का नाम दिया । यानी आन्दोलनात्मक आतंकवाद । किसी एक स्थान पर आतंकवादी या उनके समर्थक सशस्त्र बलों पर आक्रमण करेंगे या फिर उन्हें उत्तेजित करेंगे । यदि इस के कारण सशस्त्र बलों की गोली से किसी की मृत्यु हो जाती है तो हुर्रियत कान्फ्रेंस या इसी प्रकार का कोई संगठन तुरन्त सशस्त्र बलों का कैम्प उस स्थान से हटाने की मांग करेगा । इस मोड़ पर राज्य सरकार तुरन्त दख़लंदाज़ी करेगी और जनभावनाओं को शान्त करने के नाम पर सेना या अन्य सशस्त्र बल का कैम्प वहाँ से हटाने की घोषणा करेगी । इतना ही नहीं राज्य सरकार सशस्त्र बलों के कुछ जवानों पर मुकद्दमा भी दायर करेगी । लगता है राज्य सरकार अथवा राज्य की नौकरशाही के कुछ महत्वपूर्ण चुनिंदा लोगों के सहयोग से आतंकवाद की इस नई रणनीति की पटकथा लिखने के बाद इसे अमलीजामा पहनाने के लिये बारामूला जिला के सोपोर में बोमई स्थान के सैन्य कैम्प का चयन किया गया । बारामूला ज़िले में सोपोर के बोमई नामक स्थान पर सेना का शिविर था । आतंकवादी काफ़ी लम्बे अरसे से इसे हटाने का प्रयास कर रहे थे । २१फरवरी २००९ को बोमई में एक मजहबी उत्सव के दौरान आतंकवादियों ने सेना के शिविर पर हमला किया । इस गोलाबारी में फंस कर दो स्थानीय युवक मारे गये । आतंकवादियों को मानो सेना के शिविर को हटाने के लिये आन्दोलन करने का मौक़ा मिल गया हो । राज्य सरकार भी तुरन्त सक्रिय हो गई । उसने वहाँ से सेना का शिविर हटाने का आदेश जारी कर दिया । केन्द्र सरकार इन सभी मामलों में राज्य सरकार की सहायक बन कर सिद्ध हुई । राज्य सरकार को उन युवकों की हत्या की जाँच करवाने का पूरा अधिकार था , और उसने वह जांच करवाई भी । सेना ने भी घटना की जांच करवाई और उसमें तीन सैनिकों को कुछ मामलों में दोषी भी पाया । उनके खिलाफ नियमानुसार कार्यवाही भी प्रारम्भ की । लेकिन उसे बहाना बना कर सेना के शिविर को हटाना , एक प्रकार से आतंकवादियों की योजना की सहायता करना ही था । सैन्य कैम्प हटाने का दूसरा सफल प्रयोग श्रीनगर के बेमिना स्थान पर किया गया । शिव रात्रि के तीन दिन बाद तेरह मार्च २०१३ को श्रीनगर में बेमिना स्थान पर आतंकवादियों के एक फ़िदायीन दस्ते ने केन्द्रीय रिज़र्व पुलिस बल पर आक्रमण किया । पुलिस बल के पाँच ज़वान मौक़े पर ही मारे गये और पाँच अन्य गंभीर रुप से घायल हुये । फ़िदायीन दस्ते के दोनों आतंकवादियों को भी बाद में मार दिया गया । कश्मीर के हालात पर गहराई से नज़र रखने वालों का कहना है कि इस प्रकार का फ़िदायीन हमला तीन साल बाद हुआ है । दरअसल सोनिया कांग्रेस और नैशनल कान्फ्रेंस की मिली जुली राज्य सरकार ने पहले ही आदेश निकाल दिया था कि सुरक्षा बल गश्त लगाते समय अपने पास अपने हथियार न रखें , क्योंकि उनकों हथियारों के साथ देखकर लोग भड़क उठते हैं । इतना ही नहीं , राज्य सरकार ने इस आदेश को सख़्ती से लागू भी करवाया । अब सारा मामला सीधा हो गया था । हमले के दिन हड़ताल के कारण चारों ओर सुनसान था । सड़क पर गश्त लगाते सी आर पी के पन्द्रह जवान निहत्थे थे । इसलिये वे फ़िदायीन के लिये आसानी से “सिटिंग डकस” में परिवर्तित हो गये । पाँच मारे गये और पाँच बुरी तरह ज़ख़्मी हुये । बाक़ी बाद में हुये मुक़ाबले में फ़िदायीन को तो मरना ही था । क्योंकि वे तो घर से आये ही मरने के लिये थे । फ़िदायीन का अर्थ ही मरना होता है । आत्मघात । लेकिन इस आक्रमण के बाद भूमिगत आतंकवादियों और प्रत्यक्ष रुप से काम कर रहे उनके घोषित अघोषित समर्थकों ने राज्य से सशस्त्र बलों के कैम्प हटावाने का मानों आन्दोलन ही चला दिया हो । आन्दोलनात्मक आतंकवाद को पहली सफलता इस नई रणनीति के तहत प्राप्त हो गई । इसके बाद एक अन्य स्थान का तुरन्त चयन किया गया । यह था चिनाव घाटी में रामबन ज़िला में संगलदान-धर्मपुर का क्षेत्र । यहाँ भी 18 जुलाई 2013 को कुछ लोगों को आगे करके सीमा सुरक्षा बल के जवानों पर क़ुरान शरीफ़ का अपमान करने का आरोप लगाया गया और एकत्रित भीड़ पर राज्य पुलिस ने ही गोली चला कर एक युवक की हत्या कर दी । उसके तुरन्त बाद राज्य के मुख्यमंत्री ने ही कहना शुरु कर दिया सीमा सुरक्षा बलों ने निहत्थे लोगों पर गोली चलाई है । आश्चर्य तो इस बात का है तहसीलदार ने ही घोषणा कर दी कि धर्मपुर से सीमा सुरक्षा बल का कैम्प धर्मपुर से हटा लिया जायेगा । परन्तु उससे भी ज़्यादा आश्चर्य तब हुआ जब केन्द्र सरकार ने उस कैम्प को वहाँ से हटा दिया । अब शोपियाँ का केन्द्रीय आरक्षित पुलिस बल का कैम्प आतंकवादियों की लिस्ट में आ गया था । वहाँ भी केन्द्रीय आरक्षित पुलिस बल का शिविर है । शोपियाँ , कुलगाम और पुलवामा जिलों के सीमांत पर स्थित गैगरेन गाँव में यह शिविर सामरिक लिहाज़ से अत्यन्त महत्वपूर्ण है । आतंकवादी लम्बे अरसे से उसे वहाँ से हटवाने के प्रयास में थे । श्रीनगर में ज़ुबान मेहता का कन्सर्ट उनको उचित अवसर मिल गया । एक निशाने से दो शिकार हो सकते थे । हुर्रियत कान्फ्रेंस ने इस कार्यक्रम का विरोध करना शुरु कर ही दिया था । वह किसी भी योजना का पहला हिस्सा होता है । हुर्रियत ने अपना हिस्सा पूरा कर दिया । दूसरा हिस्सा पाकिस्तान द्वारा संचालित आतंकवादियों ने सुरक्षा बलों के शिविर पर हमला करना होता है । योजना का वह हिस्सा उन्होंने भी ठीक समय पर पूरा कर दिया । सात सितम्बर २०१३ को उन्होंने इस शिविर पर धावा बोल दिया । दोनों और से गोलियां चलीं , जिनमें लश्करे तोयबा के अब्दुल्ला हारुन समेत पांच लोग मारे गये । पूरी योजना में आतंकवादियों का हिस्सा पूरा हो चुका था । उसके तुरन्त बाद राज्य सरकार का काम शुरु होता है । उसे सुरक्षा बलों को हतोत्साहित करने के लिये सुरक्षा बल के सैनिकों के खिलाफ प्राथमिक सूचना रपट दर्ज करने के बाद सुरक्षा बलों का वह शिविर वहाँ से हटाना होता है । राज्य सरकार ने योजना के उस हिस्से को भी पूरा कर दिया । शोपियाँ के गैगरेन गांव से के.आ.पु.बल का शिविर हटा दिया गया । इस प्रकार अल्पकाल में ही जम्मू कश्मीर से सुरक्षा बलों के चार शिविर हटा दिये गये । यह एजीटेशनल आतंकवाद की अल्पकाल में ही भारी सफलता कही जायेगी । इसका सबसे बडा दुष्परिणाम यह हुआ कि सुरक्षा बलों का भय समाप्त होने लगा है । जिस प्रकार पुलिस का भय या प्रभाव समाप्त होने से समाज में गुँडा एवं अपराधी तत्वों का भय व्याप्त हो जाता है । इसी प्रकार सुरक्षा बलों का भय समाप्त हो जाने से राज्य में आतंकवादियों का भय पुनः बढ़ सकता है , जिसे सेना ने अनेक बलिदान देकर समाप्त किया था । अब आतंकवादियों के निशाने पर सेना के दो और शिविर हैं , जिन्हें वे हटवाने चाहते हैं । सेना के ये शिविर हटवाने में पाकिस्तान की ज़्यादा रुचि है , क्योंकि ये शिविर सैन्य दृष्टि से महत्वपूर्ण हैं । बडगाम ज़िला में तोसमदां स्थान पर सेना का प्रशिक्षण स्थल है । यहाँ सैनिक चांदमारी का अभ्यास करते हैं । पाकिस्तान की सीमा भी यहाँ से ज़्यादा दूर नहीं है । १९६४ में सेना ने राज्यसरकार से यह ज़मीन लीज़ पर पचास साल के लिये ली थी । कुछ महीने बाद २०१४ में यह लीज़ समाप्त हो रही है । राज्य सरकार किसी भी प्रकार से सेना से यह ज़मीन वापिस ले लेना चाहती है । जबकि सेना के लिये यह शिविर अत्यन्त महत्वपूर्ण है । सेना का दूसरा शिविर बारामुल्ला के ओल्ड एरिया में है । आतंकवादी इसे भी यहाँ से हटवाने चाहते हैं । यह जानना रुचिकर ही रहेगा कि सरकार इन शिविरों को हटाने के लिये कौन सा तरीक़ा अपनाती है । लेकिन कुल मिला कर जम्मू कश्मीर में हालत यह हो गई है कि सशस्त्र बल अपने शिविरों को बचाने और आतंकवादियों से लड़ने के बाद राज्य सरकार द्वारा दर्ज किये गये मुक़द्दमों की तारीखें भुगतने को ही विवश हो गये हैं । राज्य में आतंकवाद से लम्बी लड़ाई लड़ने के बाद , सुरक्षा बलों ने मनोवैज्ञानिक तौर पर भी और सैन्य लिहाज़ से भी आतंकवादियों को सुरक्षात्मक रवैया अपनाने और बचाव पक्ष वाली स्थिति में पहुँचा दिया था । लेकिन अब राज्य सरकार आतंकवादियों की योजना के अनुसार सैन्य शिविरों को स्थान स्थान से हटवाकर शायद एक बार फिर पहल आतंकवादियों के हाथ में दे देना चाहती है । MinimiseClose 0

Saturday, 5 October 2013

KANNUR BOMB BLASTS-ANDHRA POLICE CAPTURE TWO TERRORISTS

Security forces have, in a tactical operation, captured two Islamic extremists along with a woman and three children from their hideout at Puttur, a tiny town on the Andhra Pradesh-Tamil Nadu border, on Saturday. A crack team of OCTOPUS, the exclusive anti-terror commando force of the Andhra Pradesh police, rushed to the rescue of the Tamil Nadu police to lay seige at the hide-out and persuade the terrorists, who threatened to set off explosives, to surrender in a tense, action packed seven-hour long operation. A team of the Tamil Nadu police descended on Puttur, better known for its traditional bone setters, acting on information provided by activist Fakruddin of the Islamic Liberation Front, (ILF) a group founded by a fundamentalist Imam Ali of Madurai. While in custody Fakruddin gave up details of their hideout across the border in Andhra Pradesh. He told them that two of his associates, Bilal Malik and Panna Ismail, who were also allegedly involved with Fakhruddin in a series of violent acts targeting leaders of Hindu groups in Tamil Nadu were staying at Puttur. The overzealous Tamil Nadu police team decided to get into action without contacting the Andhra Pradesh police. When the posse of Chennai Police knocked at the door of the Puttur hideout - a dowdy building sandwiched between two tall ones - on Saturday morning, the terrorists took them by surprise. One of them stunned the team leader, an inspector, by stabbing him with a knife and retreated inside the house, threatening to blow themselves and the locality with explosives. It is only then that the shocked Tamil Nadu police sought the help of their Andhra Pradesh counterparts which rushed a team of OCTOPUS commandos from one of its nearby bases in Tirupati. They laid a seige and, at first, appealed to the men to come out and surrender. Malik and Ismail refused to negotiate, withdrew to an inside room and shouted that they will trigger explosives. The rumble of a gas cylinder made the commandos wary about the next move. As renewed appeals to come out and negotiate failed, the commandos drilled holes in the roof through which they slipped a periscope like device to have firsthand appraisal. When the terrorists tried to pull the recce device, the device was withdrawn and stun grenades and tear gas shells were lobbed inside, forcing the men to push out the woman and the three children - two girls and a boy aged between two and five - to surrender. Skilful negotiators then told the woman to go in and tell the men that they will not be harmed if they came out and then they surrendered. Police found some IEDS and detonators inside and learnt that Fakhruddin was also staying nearby. They seized a pistol, more IEDs and ten kgs of gelatin following an immediate raid on his hideout. The three men, between 30 and 40 years old, inspired by the leadership of the ILF, had been periodically targetting Hindu activists in Tamil Nadu and retreating to Puttur where they ran a small electrical repairs shop. Fakhruddin is allegedly responsible for placing a pipe bomb on the route of the BJP leader LK Advani during his visit to Madurai in 2011. The three are wanted for the bombs that went off near the BJP headquarters in Bengaluru in April 2013 and three murders in Tamil Nadu – a Hindu activist on June 26, S. Velliyappan, Tamil Nadu state secretary of the Hindu Munnani at Vellore on July 1 and the Tamil Nadu BJP general secretary V. Ramesh at Salem on July 19 this year Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/elite-andhra-octopus-commandos-capture-islamic-extremists-wanted-for-murders-in-tamil-nadu/1/313279.html

Watch "Nawaz Sharif calling Indian Prime Minister a dehati aurat( Village woman)" on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a47HFJ0imYk&feature=youtube_gdata_player

On Pakistan TV, their journalist is confirming the quote and says Barkha Dutt was present. Please watch. - AP Subject: Watch "Nawaz Sharif calling Indian Prime Minister a dehati aurat( Village woman)" on YouTube Watch "Nawaz Sharif calling Indian Prime Minister a dehati aurat( Village woman)" Did Barkha Dutt hide the facts?never comes out clean- she is a perpetual liar!! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a47HFJ0imYk&feature=youtube_gdata_player

BAT ACTION IN KASHMIR

The Downside of BAT Actions by: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain 10/2/2013 During the 06 Aug 2013 flare up on the LC (LoC) in Poonch Sector and the beheading incident in Jan 2013 the common string of information was that the targeted killing of Indian Jawans on the LC was executed by BATs. Even in the Army, not many would boast of knowing what BATs are, how do they function (modus operandi), what effects they have and how the Indian Army handles the threat. In the typical lackadaisical way that the public treats matters military not many sought more information on BATs, preferring to leave them to our professional Army to handle. In a way that is a positive because the world of the LC is the domain of just a few who have had the honour and the 'sugar high' of serving in the razor sharp environment that presents itself daily in the 'border areas' of Jammu & Kashmir. It may be appropriate to clarify some of the basic ingredients of this high drama environment. What is the LC? The LC is different to the LAC (Line of Actual Control), different to the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and much different to the Working Boundary (a term used only by Pakistan). The LAC alludes to the land boundary between the areas currently held by China and India along the Northern borders and the AGPL refers to the un-demarcated area north east of NJ 9842. To detail these aspects would be to digress from the main issue the LC, which is quite often called LoC by the media but the Army prefers to shorten it to the more colloquial LC. The LC is an imaginary line running along the current frontier between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Although the Instrument of Accession of 26 Aug 1947 and Joint Resolution of the two Houses of Parliament of Jul 1994 place the whole of Jammu and Kashmir with India, the actual ground position has emerged over the last 65 years commencing with Pakistan's invasion in 1947 the conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Kargil), as also the proxy war launched by Pakistan since 1989. The LC runs well east of the actual International Boundary (IB) and is the alignment along which the operations of 1947-48 came to a halt thus creating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK-often referred as Azad Kashmir, or AK, by Pakistan). Unlike the IB there are no boundary pillars (BPs) delineating the LC, however, there are a series of mostly unrecognizable landmarks such as boulders, trees and nullahs which have undergone change over years. The Indian and Pakistan Armies are in eyeball contact in their various pillboxes and picquets all along the alignment but at places terrain constraints may separate the two by two or more km. It is an environment little known to the outside world, where the notion of 'Grabbers, Keepers' exists. Translating this into reality it means that any side grabbing a piece of ground for a tactical advantage gets to keep it unless forcibly evicted (recall Kargil 1999). Events Leading to Current Status All was well on the LC till 1989 or so except the sporadic shootouts of lower intensity which took place for the sake of 'moral ascendancy'. A much misunderstood term, 'moral ascendancy' remains even today a task for the wily infantrymen and encompasses a range of sub tasks primary being the sanctity of the LC, (no loss of ground) and prevention of rogue actions by Pakistan. In 1989 things started to change drastically with the belief among the Kashmiri populace that 'Azadi' or merger with Pakistan was becoming a reality. The proxy war within the Valley had to be sustained by Pakistan through induction of terrorists, explosives, military hardware and finances. The LC became the obvious conduit through which all this happened. Much against the common belief that the LC is manned metre to metre the ground reality is that there are large gaps dictated by terrain factors, logistics and climatic constraints. It is these gaps which were exploited and converted to 'highways' (a terrorist term) for movement of terrorists, potential terrorists(recruits), hardware, explosives and finances. The Army was forced to redeploy and selectively reinforce at the cost of its counter terrorist operational grid in the Valley floor. This left many of its LC picquets weaker as a new dimension was added to the task of 'sanctity of the LC' this was Counter Infiltration. Sensing a great opportunity the Pakistan Army commenced selectively targeting Indian picquets with a mix of regular troops and well trained terrorists (those who had undergone Daura-e-Khas training). The purpose force back Indian Army counter infiltration ambushes, located between picquets and thus create the gaps needed for infiltration. Unprovoked firing by Pakistani posts further forced the creation of gaps. All this occurred in the Nineties and progressive lessons learnt by the Pakistan Army refined the BAT concept. Characteristics of BATs Border Action Teams comprise a mix of Pakistan Army regulars, Pakistan Special Forces elements and high profile terrorists (Jihadis) who are trained to cross the LC to execute raids on Indian picquets, ambush and patrol parties or logistics elements. Strength has mostly been experienced to be 15 to 20. Beheading has been one of the modus operandi adopted by these teams to cause scare and impose immense caution on their targets. The immediate effect of information about concentration of a BAT opposite a particular segment of the LC is an inevitable strengthening of the defensive stance; stronger patrols, more protection for logistics elements such as mule trains which carry advance winter stocking stores; all this at the cost of the counter infiltration grid. The situation can then be exploited for strong infiltration bids through gaps. Quite obviously BAT actions are in the mould of terrorist acts launched with the intent of imposing caution and creating the tactical conditions for terrorist infiltration. The Coming of the LC Fence The inevitable question does the Indian Army sit on its haunches waiting to be attacked; far from it. Indian infantry units are known to have wreaked revenge and delivered telling blows on the Pakistan Army and terrorists. In years before the Cease Fire came into place on 26 Nov 2003 exchange of Arty Fire and direct firing heavy weapons was common place. Many an ingenius Indian gunner and infantry commander innovated and caused much destruction on the Pakistan Army. Among others the name of Brigadier JasbirLidder (later Lt Gen), Commander of the high profile 12 Infantry Brigade (Uri) is well known for his famous quip “When Uri rumbles, Chakhoti (PoK town opposite Uri) crumbles”. The ingenius LC fence constructed along the 16 & 15 Corps frontages under the outstanding leadership of then COAS Gen NirmalVij greatly altered the odds of infiltration. This needs to be understood in the right perspective as the annual reconstruction of the Fence (an expensive exercise in men and material) is very often questioned within the Army and the less informed bureaucratic circles. The LC Fence The LC Fence changed much more than just the awe inspiring landscape of the PirPanjal and Shamshabari ranges. It altered what we call the 'mathematics of terror' in Jammu & Kashmir. Prior to 01 Jul 2004 (the date the Fence officially came in existence) Pakistan successfully infiltrated 2000-3000 terrorists across the LC each year. On an average 1400-1500 were killed in engagements with the Indian Army on the LC or in the hinterland. The residual figures were always in favour of Pakistan. Then came General Nirmal Vij who led the construction of the Fence from the plains to the obscene heights of the Shamshabari, flaying the 'nay sayers'. It altered everything. The Indian Army now had an obstacle to concentrate upon and converted it from a mere line of barbed wire to a system comprising steel, lead, electronics, ether and human beings. By 2006 the Indian Army had acquired the knowledge and experience of exploiting the LC Fence which was leaking just a few hundred terrorists annually while the Army eliminated double the number in its CI/CT operations. The mathematics were now reversed leading to the situation in 2011-12 when less than 300 terrorists roamed the Valley and 19 top terrorists leaders were eliminated with focused CT operations. The transformational 'Heart Doctrine' combined with this approach almost brought Kashmir to the doorstep of conflict stabilization awaiting conflict resolution. The media and the public have often questioned how BATs can enter 400 500 meters into our side and conduct an operation. There is a simple answer to this. In 2003-4 when the LC Fence was constructed there was no ceasefire for most of the period; hence the Fence had to be constructed well away from the LC at most places. Where ever we were/are in domination the construction was well forward, hugging the LC. The Fence gives natural protection against rogue actions but where it is aligned well inside we per force have picquets/posts/detachments ahead but not necessarily on the LC as long as the area ahead can be dominated by fire. Small patrols are used to dominate this space and these are the patrols which are vulnerable to BAT actions. BATs can therefore enter minefields with considerable risk but no other obstacle prevents them from accessing the Indian Army's patrol bases or routes of patrolling near (400-500 metres) the LC. To expect Pakistan Army to use BATs more extensively after the Indian Army's successful handling of the situation in J&K in 2011-12, is to state the obvious. We often hear of the phrase 'keeping the pot boiling' in Kashmir while Pakistan handles the Afghan border and its internal security threats. To execute this concept Pakistan requires its terrorist foot soldiers (boots on the ground) in J&K; to allow the fast dwindling strength to reduce even further would be a catastrophe for the ISI's post 2014 strategy in J&K. Hence the necessity to once again force creation of gaps on the LC to facilitate infiltration. Many veterans of the Army would recall some of the well known BAT actions which were launched against Indian Army units and the counter actions taken by the same units. The Indian Army has foiled many more BAT actions than the ones which have succeeded. Only a year ago 16 PUNJAB foiled a major action in the Tangdhar Sector. Handling BATs at Different Levels In my long years handling the LC from unit to a Corps Commander I always found the threats from BATs as the most challenging and relished countering these. In 2008 a Pakistan Army unit decided to send a 15 man officer led team across the LC to dislodge a small detachment of my brave Rajputs who had temporarily occupied a patrol base to dominate an area of the LC not usually visited or patrolled. In the ensuing clash between four young Rajput soldiers without a senior leader and the 15 Pakistanis the Rajputs lost one soldier and killed 7 Pakistanis. All hell broke loose on the LC in a frontage of about 3 to 4 Km. My orders to the CO were crystal clear “'the night is yours, I do not want the Pakistani bases, from where the soldiers had emerged, to remain standing”. The Rajputs shocked me next morning when they reported the destruction caused to the Pakistan Army posts. The last hurrah was when a Pakistan Army helicopter emerged late the next afternoon and took away the Pakistani Brigade Commander; it was later learnt that he was removed from command; so much for the moral ascendancy achieved by the Rajputs. As the General Officer of the division I asked no one and no one advised me. It was my calling and the risk was also mine. The above example displays just how Pakistan Army's proactive and provocative stance on the LC needs to be handled. The offensive response by Indian Army units has to be reflected in their attitude from the moment they step into their area of responsibility. Most BAT actions take place during handing/taking over between units when command and control is supposedly loose. Infantry units do not realize that each action of theirs even before they arrive in their AOR is under surveillance. Many units having fearsome reputation will never be tested; others with lesser credentials and poor body language of their troops would get tested early. The first engagement if handled with professional aggression will allow a unit a tenure with little turbulence. Destiny has brought many units of both Armies from the Kargil war once again face to face on the LC. The reader must not go away with the impression that the Pakistan Army and terrorists rule the roost on the LC, far from it. Yet, it is imperative that our commanders be bold, trust their instinct, train their troops hard and wargame contingencies regularly. This is 24 x 7 soldiering where every movement has to be controlled and reactions kept ready; most important of all -- time is the worst enemy of effectiveness on the LC. As a sector cools down so does the vigil and then one fine day it happens; there is only one solution to this constant reminders to all at the oddest time of the day or night. There is no rest on the LC; those who rest seldom live to tell the tales

Friday, 4 October 2013

GOGOI WANTS SPECIAL STATUS TO MIGRANT HINDUS FROM BANGLADESH

Photo: Arkadripta Chakraborty Assam and illegal migrants are so inseparable in the political lexicon of the country that any new mention of it hardly raises any eyebrows. So, why has a statement by Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi on the issue suddenly become so important? Maybe, because “illegal migrants”, commonly used to refer to the migrant Muslim population from Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan), has now been applied to the Hindus who came to Assam. At a press conference in the state capital, the Assam chief minister said, “We have suggested to the Centre to give them (Bangla-speaking Hindus) refugee status on humanitarian grounds; they entered Assam illegally, fearing religious persecution. If the Centre agrees in principle, then a detailed time frame and modality can be thought of, and this is an issue which is part of our manifesto as well.” Cries have since got louder about how the Congress is now playing the Hindutva card to thwart the challenge of a growing BJP influence in the Northeastern state. And not all protesting are politicians. Madhab Chandra Ghosh, 87, a rice trader from lower Assam’s Bongaigaon district, had come to Assam in 1962 through the Bangladesh-West Bengal border. His name first figured in the voters’ list in 1965 and ever since he has voted in every single election until the 2011 Assembly polls, when he was identified as a “doubtful voter”, also known as D-voter, a unique way of identifying alleged illegal migrants from Bangladesh in the state’s voters list. The 2011 Assembly polls had barred D-voters from casting their ballot. “There are six votes in my family,” says Madhab. “My wife, our two sons and two daughters-in-law were allowed to cast their votes and I was marked as a D-voter. I have proper land documents, ration cards, National Population Register certificate and bank documents. I don’t understand how all of a sudden I have become a doubtful citizen.” Madhab feels cheated and used by the Gogoi government; in fact, he is totally disillusioned with the Congress, who, he feels, used him. “All this while we have voted for the Congress,” he says bitterly. “But the Congress has always preferred Bengali-speaking Muslims over us, simply because they are a vote bank.” Madhab’s words ring true for the thousands of Bengali-Hindu voters who continue to languish under the “refugee” tag and are classed as D-voters despite having valid documents like land deeds and ration cards. Gogoi’s announcement is largely being seen as aimed at garnering these Bengali-Hindu votes, something that has benefited the Congress in the 2011 Assembly election. While touring the Barak Valley region of southern Assam, comprising the three districts of Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi, Gogoi had asked for ‘refugee status’ for Bengali-Hindu migrants in Assam. It got him handsome returns. For the first time in Assam’s electoral history, the Congress was able to win 13 out of the 15 seats in the Barak Valley, a traditional stronghold of the RSS and the BJP. With the 2014 General Election looming, the chief minister has once again unbottled his favourite genie — asking the Centre to come up with special laws to grant refugee status to those who came from Bangladesh due to religious persecution. It is an open secret in Assam that since Independence, the demography of the state has undergone a major change due to the illegal influx of refugees from Bangladesh. Today, Bengali-speaking Muslims comprise 32 percent of the total population, and they are all seen as a sustained vote bank of the Congress. Compound it with the consistent rejection of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), the face of Assamese nationalist politics, in elections post 2001, and the growing clout of the Maulana Badruddin Ajmal-led All India United Democratic front (AIUDF), and you get an idea of why this move is important for the Congress. Over the years, the Bengali-speaking Muslim voters have gradually shifted from the Congress, helping the AIUDF win 18 Assembly seats in 2011, to become the main Opposition party in Assam. “It is very clear that the AIUDF favours illegal migrants,” says Pankaj Sharma, an entrepreneur from the upper Assam town of Jorhat. “The 2012 Bodo-Muslim riots in Kokrajhar have created a huge fear among the indigenous communities that the Congress will not protect them. Both the Assamese and Bengali Hindus cannot rely on the AGP, so a lot of people like me will switch to the BJP.” Gogoi is aware of this and is, therefore, leaving no stone unturned in finding new voters. At the Northeast Conclave held two weeks ago in Guwahati, BJP president Rajnath Singh made it clear that his party is taking all 25 Lok Sabha seats in the Northeast, including Sikkim, very seriously. As of now, he said, the party would contest the polls alone in Assam. “All state units of the BJP in the Northeast are strong supporters of Narendra Modi and he will himself spearhead the party’s campaign in the region,” says former BJP MP Kiren Rijiju. “The Congress has used Muslims only as a votebank, sidelined the Hindus and meted out a step-motherly treatment to the tribals. We will work for each and every community.” According to sources, the Congress high command is giving a “serious thought” to a poll alliance with the AIUDF , given that the latter also supports the UPA at the Centre. If that happens, the Congress could lose more votes of indigenous communities. All the more reason, therefore, for Gogoi to look for another votebank, in this case, the 18 percent Bengali-Hindu population of Assam. But, the AIUDF , which has made its own overtures to other communities in the state, is not openly cosying up to the ruling party. “The Congress is playing the politics of divide and rule in Assam,” says AIUDF Organising Secretary Aminul Islam. “It tries to brand us a party that favours only Muslims, but the reality is that we have members from different communities. Many prominent Bengali-Hindus have shown their willingness to contest the Lok Sabha polls on our ticket.” Back in Bongaigaon, Madhab believes that the Congress move is only driven by a need to gather votes. “The genuine Indian is harassed as a D-voter, the Congress is not bothered, and now it wants votes,” he says. Close to where Madhab stays is a “refugee colony”. In 1959 and 1970, in two phases, 108 Bengali-Hindu families, who had migrated from Bangladesh, were given land to settle by the Congress government in Assam. Decades have passed, but these families are yet to get their land documents. “We pay municipality and water tax, we have been writing to the state government to regularise our settlements by giving us our land deeds, but they have not done it,” says Sunil Poddar, one of the residents of the colony. “There are 108 families here, everyone has their ration cards and other documents. There is not a single D-voter among us, yet land has not been allocated to us. This shows the indifference of the Congress towards Bengali-Hindus in Assam.” This gives the BJP its carpe diem moment. “If Gogoi is so caring about the Bengali-Hindus, what has he done to stop their harassment in the name of D-voters?” quips state BJP spokesperson Shiladitya Dev. “What has he done to improve the employment of Bengali-Hindus in government service? First, the Congress plays the politics of minority appeasement in Assam, and now they are turning to Bengali-Hindus.” In 2009, the Congress had won seven out of 14 Lok Sabha seats in Assam. The BJP had won four. With the Congress facing anti-incumbency after being in power for 10 years at the Centre, Gogoi is in for a tough ride. If he fails, the dissident camp in his party will have more reasons to attack him. One of the keys to averting failure is to earn the trust of the Bengali-Hindu voter of lower Assam. Will that too be affected by the Modi euphoria that has gripped the rest of the country? The CM would surely hope not. ratnadip@tehelka.com (Published in Tehelka Magazine

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

GEN VK SINGH CONTROVERSIAL TIMES

Controversial times SUNIL SHARAN Published 2013-10-01 07:04:12 THE Indian army, once hailed for its professionalism, is fast losing its sheen. Previous chiefs must be turning in their graves at how the recent lot is turning upon one another. The chief is venerated within the army. He is supposed to be a paragon of virtue. Military children grow up gawking at the portraits of chiefs in army installations. Civilians may order the chief into battle, but unless his men hear the clarion call from him, they will not issue forth. And once his tenure was over, he would pass on the baton with a bear hug, and seldom, if ever, utter a word in public against a predecessor or successor. The current chief, Gen Bikram Singh, took over from V.K. Singh, and was expected to draw down the curtain on the latter’s tumultuous tenure. Instead, Bikram’s staff started investigating an undercover military unit that V.K. had set up. Their findings, which were submitted to the prime minister’s office six months ago, have only now come into the public domain. V.K. has been accused of spying on the defence minister, trying to topple the government of Indian Kashmir, scuttling Bikram’s own appointment as army chief, and tarnishing the records of serving officers. The army has recommended a thorough probe of V.K. The charges are serious enough to invite his court martial. Court martial. That is exactly what V.K. had threatened his predecessor, Deepak Kapoor, with, when the latter was suspected of having his hand in the till. Many an officer, in many a military, has contemplated suicide over the ignominy of facing a court martial. In India, where their predecessors refrained from even criticising one another, chiefs are now freely waving the flag of court martial. Just imagine what their officers and soldiers are talking about. That instead of focusing on the top job upon assumption, their head honcho goes after his previous boss. And they must ask why such wrongdoing is happening, and question its veracity. Bikram was commissioned in 1972, which means that he has not seen action in a large-scale war. Nuclear deterrence ensures that unless things go horribly awry, a major war is not forthcoming. Officers can expect to have higher survival rates and longer careers than their predecessors. Any army is all about camaraderie, and as any military man will tell you, war builds it like nothing else. In an extended time of relative peace, an army’s espirit de corps can wane. Careerism begins to take hold. Further, even though Indian military salaries have improved, they are substantially below those in the private sector. A roughly million-man army consequently faces a shortage of over 10,000 officers. Lifestyles only become good once the rank of brigadier is attained, and keep getting better thereafter. But the path to higher ranks is clogged because a big conflict, with its attendant attrition, has skipped a generation. While the army has, in general, maintained high standards of probity, it is not insulated from the miasma of corruption pervading the country. With the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimating that India imported close to $5 billion in arms in 2012, there are temptations galore for the military brass. Most resist, a few succumb. Bikram might be right in pursuing V.K., but should a top-secret military operation have been revealed so unabashedly by the government? And why just days after V.K. shared centre stage with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi? Their carefully orchestrated bonhomie was lost on none. V.K. has exposed his political affiliation. Now it seems that the government wants to expose him. The move might backfire. Both Modi and V.K., for all their shortcomings, have built a reputation for personal financial integrity. Modi is planning to make corruption, and how it is eroding India, the central plank of his general election campaign. The Congress, hobbled by venality, would be wise to duck the issue and focus elsewhere. By luring V.K. to his side, Modi is attempting to burnish himself. By going after V.K., the Congress risks just the opposite. Hindsight may be 20:20 but Manmohan Singh has missed several opportunities to clip the wings of his generals. Deepak Kapoor and a couple of other ex-service chiefs had acquired properties that they were not entitled to, and returned them only after the media raised a storm. Pleading ignorance, the generals escaped governmental censure. When V.K., during his ascent to chiefdom, continually questioned army records of his age, the civilians fretted over his suitability for the job, but overruled their own gut. Finally when V.K. took the government to court, an unprecedented action by a serving chief, they could have summarily dismissed him. Some in the army might have been miffed, but the country at large would not have brooked a general seen fighting a personal battle. V.K. had lost the trust of the government when it denied his age claim. If he had demitted office then, he would have risen in most eyes. But his sense of injustice, and doggedness, led him to the Indian Supreme Court. Even when thwarted there, he stuck to his chair, giving and taking flak for months on end. And what about Bikram? India’s general elections are coming up this May; Bikram’s tenure winds up at the end of August. Were Modi to become prime minister,( possible. ) and place V.K. in some position of authority over Bikram, ( possible ) say as defence minister or national security advisor,{ Me : This is what I anticipate to happen - most likely. } Will the two keep locking horns? Six years of wrangling at the top have demoralised a once-cohesive force. Future chiefs will have to follow in the footsteps of predecessors of yore, instead of those of more contemporary ones, if they wish to reverse the decline of their institution. The writer is a freelance journalist. sunil_sharan@...

SAMBA TERROR ATTACK - HOW 16 CAVALARY KILLED TERRORISTS

The most authentic account of events in 16 Cav lines - Brave Hearts of 16 CAV Having just returned from the unit, filling in on the events on 26 Sep - Sep has truly been a 'BLACK SEP' this year, losing 4 x offrs and 3 men!:((. After PT that morning, the unit did not break off but moved on for gun cleaning, as the guns needed to be ready for 'after fire insp'. The CO and 2 i/c had moved back, and were at home. That is when these militants struck. They had already attacked Hiranagar police stn and killed 4 JKP pers and killed 2 x civs. They had commandeered a truck and were coming towards Samba, they stopped 2 kms short and were coming on foot. The 16 CAV Mess complex is the first army camp that side. They shot the lone sentry, and entered the Mess from the rear. One staff qtrs door was open - they shot the mess house keeper and threw a grenade inside for a good measure. They ran into the Mess and did proper room clearing drill of throwing 1-2 grens and spraying auto fire - this they did in the dining hall and lounge. They found no one - all YOs at gun cleaning!!! Meanwhile the 2 i/c and another jawan raced towards the guardroom at the gate, to pick up some weapons. One of the militants who had come out saw the 2 1/c running and shot him with 2 x bursts. The jawan running behind was hit by the militant who had gone up to the 1st floor of the empty G/Room block(except for one house on the first floor where a young lady of the family was alone - Mukul's wife, and the militants did not know then). The CO and the qrt had surrounded them and started engaging them. The two militants who were outside, ran to the G/Room block spraying bullets over their shoulders. That was when the CO was hit on his left elbow, shattering it. Meanwhile the unit had put a tight outer cordon and a tight net around the unit perimeter, and moved 5x tanks. Unmindful of injury the CO got into the 1st tank and tried to run down one militant who had come out. he dodged back into the bldg, and his comrade shot at the CO from the first floor. The CO was hit on the chest - by then he had lost a lot of blood and was evacuated in the tk. During this time, the militants on the first floor realised there was a lady trapped in the opposite house, but the brave girl had locked all the doors of the house and was in the bedroom facing the rear with a kitchen knife to kill the first SOB who came in. She was guided by Maj Balwan to push out the cooler and jump down - which she did. Seeing this, our YO, Capt Arpan Bose angry at the injury caused by these SOBs and seeing Mrs Mukul was safe, shot off 2x HE rds into the bldg, wherein one mo-bike next to the staircase caught fire. That frightened the sods and they hid between the water tks on the roof of the servants qrs of this blosk - access from the first floor. The qrts of 2 SIKH had come by then - how? One of their boys was att with us undergoing cmptr course and he rang up his unit. Hence the unit and the bde reached there swiftly. In hind sight, they should have permitted our brave hearts to bring down the block with 2 - 3 more HE rds and the sods would have been dead quickly. But fearing collateral damage the sr offrs would not permit our brave hearts to do this, and they then took more time and had to bring in 9 SF - an unnecessary delay. An outstanding reaction and response by the unit prevented a greater conflagaration - as ack by all the Sr offrs up the chain of comd. Hope the 'GHOST OF AUG 12' is now off our shoulders.

GEN VK SINGH CASE NATION SHOULD KNOW THE TRUTH

If the report of the Board of Officers submitted by General Bhatia had indicted General VK Singh or any other officer relating to the working of the Technical Support Division (TSD), the proper course would have been to go in for disciplinary proceedings either through the Court Marshal route or the Courts in accordance with the laws of the land. The entire case would have been brought to a logical conclusion without muck being thrown around. Or else the government ought to have come clean on the entire issue. Instead, the government, or one of the senior officers within the government, chose to leak the whole or a part of the report to a particular newspaper to mislead the people, tarnish the General’s image by projecting him as an individual subverting democracy and bribing an NGO to alter the line of succession in the Army. How an NGO can alter the line of succession defies my understanding. Or, are we doubting the integrity of the J&K High Court which is currently engaged in hearing the case of a 70-year-old man who was branded a foreign terrorist and killed in an encounter? Is it not the court which is responsible for declaring the officer concerned guilty or not? Incidentally, at least while I was in service, there was nothing called a ‘line of succession’ in the army. If something of that nature has since been invented, it goes against the principle of natural justice and fair play in the system of promotions in the army. By the way, I had put the blame on senior officers for the leak, as, such classified reports are handled by officers not below the rank of joint secretaries in the government and the blame for the leak should not be allowed to be shifted to some junior ranking officer in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to further confuse the issue. When the report appeared in the newspaper, the Government ought to have reacted immediately to set the record straight. The damage could have been contained then and there. Instead it kept quiet. Why? Was the government a party to the leak or were the leak and the blame game played out for some ulterior motive? This is not the first time that a classified document has been leaked. The top Secret letter addressed by General VK Singh in the capacity of the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) appraising the Prime Minister about the state of the Indian Army was leaked in 2012. He was only doing his duty which is a customary practice in the Army and is regularly done by all the Army Chiefs. That leak was followed by a denunciation game again to malign the General. The General was condemned for the leak. We were told that the General had compromised National Security. Members of the Parliament, including Lalu Prasad Yadav who today heads for jail, not knowing the truth, demanded that the General be sacked. Subsequently a news report appeared that the report was leaked by a joint secretary level lady officer in the cabinet secretariat. Another media report stated that “the probe ordered by the PMO had cleared Gen. Singh of any wrongdoing in the episode,” The question is, what was the punishment meted out to the officer for leaking a top secret letter, an act of treason? The very procedure and sanctity attached to the production, accounting and safe custody of top secret documents in the Army is mind boggling to say the least. Losing or misplacing a top secret letter is a court martial offence. Why this double standards in dealing with offences? The very same newspaper published a coup story in Apr 2012 bringing out something which is alleged to have taken place in Jan 2012 attributing motives and blaming the General for it. Isn’t launching a coup against a democratically elected government treason? We were told that the matter will be investigated. Over 20 months has passed. What has happened to the investigations? If the General was guilty punish him. If not, by now the newspaper ought to have been taken to task and the people told of the facts. Admiral Ramdas, the former Naval Chief along with a host of other senior officers had written to the PM as far back as June 2012 asking him to seriously look into these leaks, but nothing was done. The sustained misinformation campaign to tarnish the image of General VK Singh conditioned the media to refer to the TSD as the ‘Rogue unit created by General VK Singh’. The fact is, neither the unit was a ‘rogue unit’ nor was it ‘created by General VK Singh’ The Indian Express article states that “instructions have been given that, henceforth, no special units, such as the TSD, are to be raised without authorization from the Ministry of Defence, giving an impression to the people of this country that the Unit was created by the General on his own without Government approval to give credence to the Coup story. The fact is the COAS of the Indian Army does not have the authority to authorize even a single man to any army unit’s strength even on war establishment leave alone creating a ‘rogue unit’. It has been reported in the media that this unit had an annual budget of 20 crores. The General has also gone on record stating that the quarterly accounts of the unit have been countersigned by him and the Defence Secretary. If these are true, this organization ought to have been raised with the approval of the Raksha Mantri (RM) and the National Security Advisor (NSA). If indeed the Unit was raised without the knowledge of these representing the Government, the concerned should come up and categorically state so. If not, one cannot but conclude that these personalities lack the moral courage needed to hold such high offices. One now hears that the TSD has been disbanded. Have we done the right thing? The reaction only exposes lack of strategic understanding of the realities in our borders and the need for keeping various options open to counter threats to our people and national integrity. Now about the ‘Rogue’ issue of the TSD. The General has categorically stated that this unit was based on ‘human intelligence’. Obviously then, the TSD is unlikely to have had the ‘Off the air interceptors” in its inventory. How then could the unit have snooped on the political class in Delhi or on the chief minister of J&K? Isn’t this a serious matter? This fact doesn’t require more than two hours to verify and the air could have been cleared by the MOD and the General could have been saved the harassment and agony of going through false allegations and the vilification campaigns. Another story titled “V.K. Singh counters charges, admits ‘pro-India NGOs’ were funded” was published by ‘The Hindu’ on 24 Sep 2013. General VK Singh in his rejoinder published in ‘Outlook’ has stated that he was waylaid by the reporter at a friend’s place and at her insistence had answered a few questions thereby implying that he had not given any formal interview to the newspaper. He has gone on to state that half-truths and distortions were deliberately inserted in the news story published by the newspaper. The Hindu story quotes the General as saying that “the panchayat elections of 2011 and the sudden end to the stone-throwing agitation in Kashmir in 2010” were the two major achievements of the TSD. Does the author imply that Rs 1.19 crores had been allegedly given to the minister to manipulate the panchayat elections thereby implying that he was thus attempting to topple the government? In J&K no action of the Army can ever go unnoticed. The local press is very vibrant. Despite this fact, till date no civilian or newspaper has complained about any manipulation in the panchayat elections conducted in 2011 either by the Army or General VK Singh. The government in power has not complained. The opposition has not said a word about it. Why has this story then been concocted? Rs 1.19 crores, the alleged money involved works out to Rs 360 per individual in a state where there are 33000 panchs and sarpanchs!! Obviously the fiction creators have no clue of what it means to topple a state government. Does this not question his integrity and loyalty to the elected Government and damage his reputation as a soldier? Incidentally, if TSD could end stone throwing in J&K as alleged, we might as well go in for many more TSDs consisting of an handful of people and an expenditure of just Rs 1 crore!!! Till today not a word has been said about the investigations or its findings on various allegations made against the General which include the Military Intelligence (MI) planting a bug in the office of the RM, snooping on the MOD officials and the political class by the TSD, leak of Top Secret letter addressed to the PM by the Chief, the General’s refusal to sign the bulk Tatra truck order, the bribe offer story, the coup story and the likes. If these allegations were indeed true, the General ought to have been punished by now or the people ought to have been told the truth categorically so that the doubts in the minds of the nation are set to rest. Considering the suspicion that the media reports and the leaks have created in the minds of the people, it is time the RM spoke about it and cleared the air. He cannot continue to remain silent and be the instrument for planting doubts in the minds of the people including the Army and its soldiers. If in doubt, the entire matter covering all the allegations made against the General should be investigated duly supervised by the Supreme Court lest the evidences, witnesses and the truths are manipulated. The blog post will be incomplete without the people being told a few things about the working of the Army. In the Army, no one waits for written orders. A telephonic message is taken as an order and acted upon. That is the reason one sees the Army formations moving out within hours of an incident including in aid to civil authorities or relief operations. Every resource within one’s control at every level is utilized when it comes to matters relating to intelligence, operations, maintaining the level of violence at an acceptable level, protecting the lives of the civil population and maintaining good relations with the local population. This happens both in insurgency affected areas and in other operational areas. Audits, financial sanctions, approvals and such niceties are ignored when speed and results are the aims. Even in major operations, attacks are launched and withdrawals effected based on verbal orders. If actions initiated by people in national interests are handled in this manner and individuals hounded to suit partisan interests will commanders at various levels provide rations, military equipment, troop labor, canteen stores etc. in a situation like flood relief? Incidentally, the Army was told that utilizing a soldier for managing a unit run canteen is misuse of manpower. If that is so, how are troops being used to develop or repair roads and tracks in insurgency and operational areas? How are units utilizing troop’s rations to feed civilians in an emergency or provide refreshments to them in certain circumstances? If that faith between the government and the Army is lost will not every army officer at his own level demand that instructions be issued in writing for everything that one is required to do? Does the country want that to happen? If those in power cannot come up and hold the hands of their Chief when he is being blamed and hounded for creating a ‘rogue unit’ do people understand the effect of such an attitude on troops and junior commanders? The question is why should anyone in uniform take a risk by exposing himself to post audit, scrutiny and become a scape goat for someone else’s follies or ulterior motives

The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar

The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels, 1 October 2013: Unless there is an effective government response and change in societal attitudes, violence against Myanmar’s Muslim communities could spread, jeopardising the country’s transition as well as its standing in the region and beyond. In its latest report, The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar, the International Crisis Group examines the recent violence against Muslim communities. Anti-Muslim violence is nothing new in Myanmar but has been growing in the past two years, the product of reduced authoritarian controls and a history of intolerant Burman/Buddhist nationalism. Issued on the day President Thein Sein begins a visit to Rakhine State, the centre of much violence, this report urges a stronger government effort to combat bigotry and protect its Muslim population. The report’s major findings and recommendations are: •Frustration and anger built up under years of authoritarianism, together with a legacy of Burman nationalism, are now being directed towards Muslims by a populist political force that cloaks itself in religious respectability and moral authority. The lifting of state controls and the greater availability of modern communications create a much greater risk of violent outbreaks. •The violence has regional implications. There has been a sharp increase in the number of Rohingya Muslims making the treacherous journey by boat from Rakhine State to other countries in the region, prompting public criticism of Myanmar from some of those countries. Intercommunal tensions have also spilled over Myanmar’s borders with the murder of Myanmar Buddhists in Malaysia and related violence in other countries. There have also been threats of jihad against Myanmar and plots and attacks against Myanmar or Buddhist targets in the region. •President Thein Sein has spoken publicly on the dangers of the violence and announced a “zero-tolerance” approach. The police response has been improving somewhat, with faster and more effective interventions bringing incidents under control more quickly. And after some delay, perpetrators of these crimes are being prosecuted and imprisoned. However, much more needs to be done. Beyond improved riot-control training and equipment for police, broader reform of the police service is necessary so that it can be more effective and trusted, particularly at the community level. Finally, humanitarian access to those displaced by the violence, principally Muslims, must be ensured. “A security response is not sufficient. The government and society at large must also do more to combat extremist rhetoric, in public, in the media and online”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “Political, religious and community leaders need to condemn hate speech”. “At a moment of historic reform and opening, Myanmar cannot afford to become hostage to intolerance and bigotry”, says Della-Giacoma. “Those who are spreading messages of intolerance and hatred must not go unchallenged. Otherwise, this issue could come to define the new Myanmar, tarnishing its international image and threatening the success of its transition away from decades of authoritarianism”. Executive Summary | Full PDF report The Executive Summary is also available in Burmese. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Following the outbreak of deadly intercommunal clashes in Rakhine State in 2012, anti-Muslim violence has spread to other parts of Myanmar. The depth of anti-Muslim sentiment in the country, and the inadequate response of the security forces, mean that further clashes are likely. Unless there is an effective government response and change in societal attitudes, violence could spread, impacting on Myanmar’s transition as well as its standing in the region and beyond. The violence has occurred in the context of rising Burman-Buddhist nationalism, and the growing influence of the monk-led “969” movement that preaches intolerance and urges a boycott of Muslim businesses. This is a dangerous combination: considerable pent-up frustration and anger under years of authoritarianism are now being directed towards Muslims by a populist political force that cloaks itself in religious respectability and moral authority. Anti-Indian and anti-Muslim violence is nothing new in Myanmar. It is rooted in the country’s colonial history and demographics, and the rise of Burman nationalism in that context. Deadly violence has erupted regularly in different parts of the country in the decades since. But the lifting of authoritarian controls and the greater availability of modern communications mean that there is a much greater risk of the violence spreading. Among the most discriminated against populations in Myanmar is the Muslim community in northern Rakhine State, the Rohingya. Most are denied citizenship, and face severe restrictions on freedom of movement as well as numerous abusive policies. In June and October 2012, clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State left almost 200 people dead and around 140,000 displaced, the great majority of them Muslims. Communities remain essentially segregated to this day, and the humanitarian situation is dire. In early 2013, the violence spread to central Myanmar. The worst incident occurred in the town of Meiktila, where a dispute at a shop led to anti-Muslim violence. The brutal killing of a Buddhist monk sharply escalated the situation, with two days of riots by a 1,000-strong mob resulting in widespread destruction of Muslim neighbourhoods, and leaving at least 44 people dead, including twenty students and several teachers massacred at an Islamic school. There has been strong domestic and international criticism of the police response. In Rakhine State, the police – who are overwhelmingly made up of Rakhine Buddhists – reportedly had little ability to stop the attacks, and there are allegations of some being complicit in the violence. The army, once it was deployed, performed better. In Meiktila, the police were apparently incapable of controlling the angry crowds that gathered outside the shop, and were hopelessly outnumbered and ineffective when the clashes rapidly escalated. The violence has regional implications. There has been a sharp increase in the number of Muslims making the treacherous journey by boat from Rakhine State to other countries in the region, prompting public criticism from some of those countries. The intercommunal tensions have also spilled over Myanmar’s borders, with the murders of Myanmar Buddhists in Malaysia, and related violence in other countries. There have also been threats of jihad against Myanmar, and plots and attacks against Myanmar or Buddhist targets in the region. As Myanmar prepares to take over the rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2014, this could become a serious political issue. The Myanmar government understands what is at stake. President Thein Sein has spoken publicly on the dangers of the violence, and announced a “zero-tolerance” approach. The police response has been improving somewhat, with faster and more effective interventions bringing incidents under control more quickly. And after some delay, perpetrators of these crimes are being prosecuted and imprisoned, although there are concerns that Buddhists sometimes appear to be treated more leniently. But much more needs to be done. Beyond improved riot-control training and equipment for police, broader reform of the police service is necessary so that it can be more effective and trusted, particularly at the community level, including officers from ethnic and religious minorities. This is only just starting. The government and society at large must also do more to combat extremist rhetoric, in public, in the media and on­line. At a moment of historic reform and opening, Myanmar cannot afford to become hostage to intolerance and bigotry. Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels, 1 October 2013