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Saturday 12 May 2018

Nepal – fast becoming ISI Control Centre?By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch


 11 May , 2018

On the night of April 17, 2018, a pressure cooker bomb went off outside the Indian Consulate office in Nepal’s Biratnagar, damaging the wall of the premises. Biratnagar is the industrial capital of Nepal and six km north of the border of Bihar. The explosion happened at around 8:20 pm and caused a hole in the compound wall. According to Nepalese media, the investigating officers suspect cadres of a local political group caused the blast; of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) that is banned by  US Treasury since 2012 and is getting support from the ISI.
Nepal for years has been haven for ISI operations. Radicals and jihadis from India have been escaping into Nepal.
This incident was followed by another incident on April 29, 2018, when suspected Jihadi elements targeted office of Arun-III, a 900 MW hydropower project in Sankhuwasabha being developed by India’s Sutlej Jala Vidhyut Nigam. The attack on the power station came a time when Nepalese government was preparing to host Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was to lay the foundation stone for the project jointly with Nepalese PM KP Sharma Oli in second week May 2018. No one claimed responsibility for the blast.
The Project Development Agreement (PDA) for Arun-III was signed between India and Nepal on November 25, 2014 during Modi’s visit to Nepal. The project is expected to bring in USD 1.5 billion foreign direct investment into Nepal,  create jobs for thousands of Nepalese, and come into operation by 2020. The State Bank of India is investing Rs 8,000 cr in the project. On completion of the project, Nepal will get 21.9% of the total electricity produced in a year, and 197 MW electricity with 86 cr units will be free for Nepal every year.
Nepal for years has been haven for ISI operations. Radicals and jihadis from India have been escaping into Nepal. Conversely, ISI-sponsored terrorists have been frequenting into India via Nepal though the open borders for terrorist acts including targeting our trains and the railway network.  Recently, in January 2018, our intelligence agencies had provided Nepal details of five suspected terror-facilitators operating from Biratnagar and Kathmandu that were also involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking and counterfeit Indian currency.
The curious case of retired Pakistani Lt Col Mohammad Habib who went missing in Nepal during April 2017 is highly suspicious. Retired in 2014, he was offered a job by the UN at Lumbini at a salary package of $3500-8500 per month. He reportedly flew into Kathmandu where he was received by one Javed Ansari who provided Habib with a   Nepalese mobile sim-card. Habib then reportedly flew to Lumbini, messaged home he had reached his destination and then vanished.
It is well known that ISI cells active in Kathmandu facilitate visas for terrorists to move in and out of the country before planning sabotage operation.
There are too many questions here that remain unanswered: was Habib ISI agent; who is Javed Ansari who received him in Kathmandu and provided local sim-card to him – is Javed also part of the ISI network;  did Javed accompany Habib to Lumbini; did Habib apply for the UN job in Lumbini merely to get free air ticket and excuse to get into the Terai Region of Nepal; on arrival by air from Kathmandu to Lumbini, who received him at the airport – did the UN not arrange his reception, if so, who received him, and finally; did Habib dump the lucrative UN job to coordinate ISI operations in the Terai Region of Nepal? More the mystery remains unresolved including of Javed Ansari (which may be cover name), more the reason to believe, Habib was on covert mission. It is well known that ISI cells active in Kathmandu facilitate visas for terrorists to move in and out of the country before planning sabotage operation.
Organizations in Nepal like Tehfuzul Madrasa are safe houses that Pakistan’s ISI and LeT has been using for sleeper cells for targeting India; lie low, regroup, arrange material and funds before planning an infiltration into Indian territory. Pakistani Prime Minister SK Abbasi’s visit to Nepal in early March 2018 needs to   be seen in context of not only a well-oiled network in Nepal giving protection to ISI-backed terrorists, but becoming a “Control Centre” as per the Intelligence Bureau.
The disappearance of Pakistani Lt Col Mohammad Habib could well imply his positioning as the overall in-charge of ISI operations in Terai Region, which fits into his forsaking the lucrative UN job in Lumbini. Group these developments with the long-term plans of Mao Zhedong, whose Ministry of Foreign Liaison embedded and the Maoists movement in Nepal, carefully nurtured over the years by successive Chinese governments, Maoists rise, revolution, and takeover of Nepal, underscoring the strategic success of China. Take this further to the ISI-supported CPN, Communist China’s hard and soft power ingress into Nepal and Oli government’s willingness to let Nepal be subsumed by China, and you have a potent hybrid threat forming, particularly at the sub-conventional level.
In dealing with India, aims of China and Pakistan coalesce – to limit India’s strategic space, keep it confined to South Asia, keep India’s development retarded (as possible), and grab as much Indian Territory. It will be prudent to acknowledge that the red carpet rolled out to Prime Minister Modi at Wuhan is temporary relief till the China-US economic war subsides – whatever time it takes.
Chinese media in recent past threatening it could destabilize the northeast if India pressured Pakistan on Kashmir should make it amply clear.
As far as China is concerned, the possibility of linking trade, investment and commerce with territorial claims (however illegal) just does not exist.  Examining China-Taiwan and China-Japan relations should not leave any doubts in this aspect. The proactive sub-conventional asymmetry built by Chinese intelligence and Pakistan’s ISI vis-à-vis India is substantial in favour of the former two. This is not going to recede in any manner, and will continue to be applied, given its nature of being incremental and ambiguous  – even though we may not link the killing of five LeT-HM terrorists in Kashmir Valley and simultaneous abduction of seven Indian engineers working on a power project in Baghlan Province of Afghanistan by Pakistan-supported Taliban. How active Chinese intelligence has been in India’s northeast and in Myanmar needs no reiteration.
Chinese media in recent past threatening it could destabilize the northeast if India pressured Pakistan on Kashmir should make it amply clear. Most importantly, it is the capabilities that need to be kept in focus, not the intentions which can change any time. In this context, the danger is much more at the hybrid and sub-conventional levels.  Nepal’s MoU with China for drilling oil in Terai and such-like other projects will bring Chinese intelligence to the area, which is already ISI infested.
Significantly, about 97% of the Muslim community of Nepal (numbering 12,77,492 – some 4.4% of total Nepalese population) live in the Terai region, while the other 3% are located mainly in the city of Kathmandu and the western hills. According to a 2017 report, quoting Khorshid Alam, head of Nepal’s Islamic Society, some 100,000 Nepalese have converted to Islam over past 15 years and the number is expected to rise (https://www.timesheadline.com/world/conversion-islam-growing-nepal-7551.html). It is not the Muslim population per se that matters but how many the ISI (in conjunction Chinese intelligence) could radicalize and use against India. This also must be viewed in conjunction demographic changes in J&K, where the focus is more on Rohingyas, radicalization of Bakarwals and radical influx in Jammu region, but Ladakh is ignored. Ladakh, where Muslim population was traditionally Shias has seen steady influx of Muslims from the Valley, particularly in Dras-Kargil areas.
What must to be kept in mind is the ISI activities in Nepal and Kashmir Valley, and how the changing demography can be exploited by them.
Nepalese youth in considerable numbers come to Ladakh for employment by the Army as porters. They are young and handsomely paid for hauling loads up the mountains to Army posts. They are permitted to marry Muslim girls (mostly by families that have migrated from the Valley) provided they first convert to Islam. This has been happening past decade plus.
Interfaith marriages are not new to Ladakh and Buddhist-Muslim marriages were common even in ancient days, especially after the King of Skardu gave the hand of his daughter to the Buddhist King of Hunder in Ladakh. Many personnel of Ladakh Scouts too have Muslim wives who were free to continue practicing their own religion even after marrying, albeit such marriages abated after the 1971 Indo-Pak War. What must to be kept in mind is the ISI activities in Nepal and Kashmir Valley, and how the changing demography can be exploited by them. There is clear and present danger.

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