क्वाड्रिलॅटरल को ऑपरेशन चीन की आक्रमक कारवाया रोकने के लिये बहुत ही जरुर...

चिनी सैन्याची लडाख मध्ये माघार,अमेरिकन नौदल प्रत्युत्तर देण्यासाठी साऊथ ...

रशीया चीन और भारत संबध्द ,किसका मित्र चीन या भारत का?-INDIA CHINA RUSSIA...

ALL IS NOT QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi

 Intelligence Failure

It is surprising that China’s transgression in Eastern Ladakh went un-noticed and unreported till the first clashes commenced with our border guarding force – ITBP (Indo Tibetan Border Police) in May. One reason for intelligence failure is wrong selection of border guarding force and dual command and control.  While the ITBP is deployed on a border guarding role, so is the army responsible for it. The ITBP has not been placed under command of the army despite repeated requests, although when an incursion/incident occurs, it is the army that is asked for details, while the ITBP slinks away. This is due to our political leadership not wanting to ruffle the feathers of the police, as they depend on them so heavily for a host of activities! 

Unlike the army, ITBP sub-units carry out tasks of border management in a lackadaisical manner. In addition, unit headquarters of ITBP do not deploy with the troops they command but are located in more congenial rear areas, thus effective leadership is lacking at the border. Like all central armed police forces, ITBP sub units first send reports through their channels, instead of sharing it with army units and formations. This results in loss of vital time for the army to take quick action. 

Besides the ITBP, our intelligence agencies were once again involved in other activities as in the past! They became active only after the event. Yet, one has not heard of even one case of anyone being held responsible/accountable in the last nearly six months for such a major incursion!

Crisis Management

When China’s major incursion in Ladakh came to light, the Indian Military reacted with force and with alacrity. However, the various core groups dealing with security strategies could not properly advise the policy makers at the apex level. Besides structural and legacy reasons, such inaction is probably also due to the highly personalised and centralised control that our Prime Minister exercises. In addition, loyalists instead of professionals hold important appointments! Resultantly, we again opted for the policy of ‘appeasement’, as we have done in the past. This can hardly be called strategy. To make up for their inability to take a decision, military level talks continue to be scheduled to show forward movement, although the situation requires vigorous political and diplomatic action. Military commanders are constrained by laid down parameters and have no lee-way to change them. 

China’s incursion in Ladakh, though apparently military, is deep-rooted and concerns many non-military aspects too. Since the drama started, however, it is apparent that our government, led by the diplomat-bureaucrat-intelligence combine seems to be sold on continuing the policy of ignoring the intrusion by China’s PLA, like all earlier governments. Details of our past blunders are well known and need no repetition, except to state that the timid approach adopted by us has ballooned into one of the biggest strategic problems for India. The Indian Military had many times advised that legalistic and spineless approaches against China will not work, as China only understands power.

On account of our diplomatic-driven policy, we have neglected our military and continuously lowered its capabilities, by starving it of funds. Even in other fields, like economy, we have allowed China to have an upper hand. Resultantly, China has weaned away our immediate neighbours and in some cases our long-standing friends too, by both our internal and external policies. The overall result is that we are unable to influence events on our borders, as well as in the political; economic; energy; social; law and order; and other fields. Major reasons for this state of affairs are lack of a well drafted strategic planning policy document that is long overdue; linear structures and thinking of our successive governments that remains unchanged from colonial days; weakening our long-established institutions for short term, mainly electoral gains; egos and turfs; a slow and ponderous bureaucracy devoid of any vision; and under the present dispensation highly individualistic and centralised control.

When the policy makers at Delhi have no plan of action, they resort to jingoism. Our TRP-oriented electronic media that believes only in sensational and breaking news steps in with a bang and soon highlights it to feverish pitch, which is hardly conducive to rational decision-making. Sadly, many veterans are coaxed to join trite panel discussions, and foolishly divulge information of value to the enemy, at the behest of the anchors. The overall result is irrelevant noise; lack of clarity; unnecessary speculations; and high expectations.  

Besides lack of a strategic policy; core groups tasked to advice the political leadership give coloured advice, which they feel the political leaders want to hear. As an example, the China Study Group (CSG) that was set up to harmonise different views and present specific options/plans  keeps scheduling military-level talks, which serve little purpose. The CSG itself has over the years become yet another ponderous committee that has failed to come up with concrete proposals. Since I have been a part of the CSG from its inception and was also its co-chairman when I was the Vice Chief of the Army, along with the Foreign Secretary, I note with dismay its ballooning with a dozen very senior additional members, resulting in further reducing, if not eliminating its usefulness to provide cogent advice.

Like a wag had mentioned, our various committees are in a state of ‘analysis by paralysis’.

Prognosis

The Chinese leadership must have planned what they wanted to achieve in political, economic and military terms, before they had launched their forces in the area. This would include their appreciation about the risks of armed conflicts of some type that may ensue. Besides counting costs and benefits by the incursion in Ladakh, flare-up in other areas of the border would have been catered for, which also need troops. Their opening of many fronts around their periphery have already been highlighted. On the face of it, opening multi fronts, like in South China Sea; and against Taiwan; Japan; and South Korea, on the one hand and against USA, India and to an extent Australia, appears fairly irrational and thoughtless. Great powers and even super powers do not behave like this, unless they have a death wish!

In an important statement following the Quad Meeting of Foreign Ministers only two days back, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sharply criticised Beijing for its “Bad Behaviour”. The US National Security Advisor went a step further and stated “The time has come to accept that dialogue and agreements will not persuade or compel the People’s Republic of China to change. There is nothing to be gained from looking the other way or turning the other cheek. We’ve been doing that for far too long”.

Many reports have indicated that the major Chinese military incursion in Eastern Ladakh was also on account of two important domestic reasons. Firstly, Xi’s assumption of full powers in all aspects of decision-making, although endorsed by the powerful CCP (Chinese Communist Party), was carried out by purging many senior and influential members of the hierarchy, who are now disgruntled. Hence, there is an undercurrent of mistrust in Xi. Secondly, despite propaganda and not revealing statistics about the Virus in Wuhan and surrounding areas accurately; widespread unemployment due to slowing down of the economy; and hiding the number of casualties suffered in Ladakh; there is widespread resentment against the establishment.  

The best time for military action at the local level was soon after the incident of 15 June, when enemy troops were still moving in. We had the capability; the ‘causes- belli’; highly motivated troops and sufficient force to launch a local attack to take on the motley force China was still assembling. Such a foray would have given great dividends and would have made the enemy pause and re-think. However, this fleeting opportunity was lost on account of our slow decision-making.  

As China has achieved the bulk of its objectives, a full-fledged war is unlikely. The fast approaching winter also precludes such an action. Should however a shooting war starts, our troops are likely to maul the enemy badly. The main reasons are that structurally our troops are better organised and equipped for high altitude warfare; have much better trained and led troops than the puny Chinese conscript soldiers; have already shown their prowess in June and August; and know that the nation is fully supportive. 

Since both sides have massed huge forces facing each other, a flare-up can take place, which both sides would like to localise.  However, we would be forced to keep the large number of troops and equipment that the military has pumped in and the logistics to sustain them, in the area. Unless some modus vivendi is worked out at Delhi, our troops will have to stay put, despite the approaching winter, which will make the situation worse. This applies to Chinese troops too, but they have much better infrastructure already existing on their side. The important point is that delays in resolving the issue increase our difficulties and affect our image in military, economic, social, and political arenas. 

While concluding, I suggest that we re-explore the erstwhile package deal with China by giving up Aksai Chin in the west for China’s giving up its claim in Arunachal Pradesh, with some modifications. It will require biting the bullet, deft diplomacy, strengthening our military and close political oversight and would take a number of meetings at many levels over a few years, but it can be achieved, provided political/electoral considerations are set aside by our political leaders of all hues and colours.

Simultaneously, we must increase our capabilities, both militarily and economically, as well as by strengthening relations with our neighbours and friends further afield, like the Quad, Taiwan and the littoral nations of South East Asia. This must be done on a war footing. Unless we are strong in all these fields, we would be unable to do well for the nation. 

Yechury's absurd views on India-Pakistan ties reflect Indian communists are ailing ANIRBAN GANGULY 05-10-2016  Yechury's absurd views on India-Pakistan ties reflect Indian communists... By Anirban Ganguly For them, the nation is always secondary and not first, and the fulfilling of her interests tertiary or non-exis... For them, the nation is always secondary and not first, and the fulfilling of her interests tertiary or non-existent. The infatuation of Indian communists with "internationalism" at times borders on the absurd or simply reveals their out-of-depth status in India. This obsession with "internationalism", which I have termed as the "Comintern syndrome", sees Indian communists come up with the most ludicrous and insensitive statements, ideas or actions right in the midst of a crisis or challenge which India and the Indian state is trying to handle with great dexterity and determination. Like Alzheimer's afflicts memory and renders the immune system and the discerning powers weak, the Comintern syndrome also blurs the power to reflect and to rationalise, it acutely affects the capacity to feel connected to one’s mother country or to understand her national interest and prevents one from advocating the need for its fulfilment. The Comintern syndrome, in short, de-rationalises, de-nationalises and de-links and always compels the one afflicted with it to side with India’s adversaries, with those whose compelling aim is to see her dissolved, dismembered and disintegrated. Comrade Sitaram Yechury’s recent bombast, insisting that we must hold talks with Pakistan and that it is India’s responsibility to ensure that there was no escalation and that peace prevailed in the area, coming as it did just around the time when constable Nitin was martyred trying to foil a terrorist attack on the Army base at Baramulla, is the manifestation of the Comintern syndrome. His ideological ancestors too have fallen victims to that syndrome ever since the Communist Party of India was founded in Tashkent! The position that Indian communists took during the 1942 Quit India movement – in fact in a secret memo to the then British home member in the viceroy’s council, PC Joshi, had termed the entire movement a "national suicide" – their call to armed rebellion against free India in the aftermath of Independence and their kowtowing to Chinese and Soviet communist parties and allowing them to set the agenda for their Indian operations are all the expressions of that acute affliction, syndrome or malady. In fact, right up till 1955, the Indian communists refused to accept that Independence had come. The then CPI’s mouthpiece, The People’s Age,for example, described the advent of freedom as "sham freedom" in line with the Cominform’s own mouthpiece which dubbed India’s freedom as a "sham independence bestowed on India". Remember how the CPI’s policy review "proudly" argued that the party had "separated" itself from the August 9 struggle – that is, Quit India. The report also noted how it had unfortunately termed Gandhi as "anti-fascist" and should have instead denounced him as a "leader whose movement sought to exploit fascist invasion of India." Of course, the communist role during the 1962 Chinese aggression has been well documented and discussed – such treacherous behaviour is rare perhaps even in the annals of world history. A question may be asked at this juncture: Are Delhi chief minister, Arvind Kejriwal, and P Chidambaram, the once "formidable" home minister of the Indian Union, both suffering from the Comintern syndrome, since they have both raised doubts over the operations valiantly carried out by the Indian forces? The answer is an obvious no – the Comintern malady only afflicts those who have had some ideological nurturing or understanding. The Indian communists – despite their rapid de-idelogisation still have some vestiges of it left. At least for purposes of theoretical discussions and for cobbling up tactical, read opportunistic, alliances ideological angles are bandied about. For the likes of Chidambaram and Kejriwal, whose primary political raison d’être is survival and opportunism, the Comintern malady does not affect. Their calculated aspersions on our armed forces – calculated because they know well that such buffoonery will be lapped up by a section of the Paki-Talibani audience back in Pindi or Islambad – and on the prime minister is the expression of plain lumpenism – in case of Kejriwal it is political lumpenism and in the case of Chidambaram it is intellectual lumpenism. These, therefore, need not be taken too seriously and if at all taken note of, may be dismissed as manifestations of intellectual and political thuggery. But lest I digress, from jumping to the defence of the "Bharat ki Barbadi" types in JNU, to knocking at the doors of separatists whose only slogan and world-view revolves around "go back India" to justifying cries of "Pakistan Zindabad" on India soil, to hectoring India on the need to de-escalate and initiate talks with a recalcitrant neighbour whose seule raison d’être is the end of India, Indian communists and especially their senior ideologues and leader don’t cease to surprise or exasperate. Comrade Yechury’s evening walk to Geelani’s house in Srinagar and his offer of talks on behalf of god knows whom, his recent insistence that India hold talks with Pakistan when the latter just massacred our jawans, his hesitant acceptance of the surgical strikes are signs that the Comintern malady has made deep inroads in him – the only permanent solution perhaps is a permanent withdrawal from public life or at least a sabbatical which can see a systematic treatment being undertaken. For that matter, almost the entire CPI(M) politburo, and the leaders of its marginal affiliates is afflicted with this syndrome and is in need of urgent and immediate treatment. Indian communists are passing through their worst phase. In the last few years they have been incapable of attracting fresh blood while seeing their numbers dwindle. Internal squabbles under the garb of ideological debates have generated intense confusion among the rank and file, its unabashed kowtowing to the Congress – and in it especially to the family, its whiling away time in the name of inane and calcified debates – such as "is India a fascist or an authoritarian state" – has seen it badly drift. Indian communists find it hard to internalise the fact that India is witnessing one of the most decisive periods of leadership in nearly three decades under Prime Minister Modi, a man they had, till the other day, dismissed as someone who will never be able to win or command a national mandate. In a sense, the decline, confusion of Indian communists augurs well for the health and future of the Indian polity as a whole, but such a state of drift has also clouded their leaderships’ capacities for clear thinking and deliberation. Unfortunately, despite all their verbosity and access to the so-called higher intellectual echelons, Indian communists have never evolved a true understanding of India and have always desisted from dispassionately and unequivocally articulating her national interest. For them India is always secondary and not first, and the fulfilling of her interests tertiary or non-existent. The entire basis of their politics has essentially been this neglect of India. Interestingly, comrade Yechury’s ongoing volley of gratis advice on what India should do brings to mind the words of Khasa Subba Rao, that intrepid patriot-journalist, freedom fighter and founder editor of the Swarajya. Writing his column in the Swarajya in the context of the Chinese aggression, Rau caustically observed, that Indian communists were a "special brand of dangerous nationals to beware of, fit only to be distrusted and guarded against incessantly for some chronic betrayal or other of the country’s interests and security." Five decades down the line nothing seems to have changed, as comrade Yechury’s homilies show

भारत आणि चीन यांच्यात सीमावाद चर्चेची अठरावी बैठक:

भारत आणि चीन यांच्यात सीमावाद चर्चेची अठरावी बैठक: सीमा प्रदेशात दळणवळण,सैन्याची तयारी आणि क्षमता वाढवण्याची गरज पंतप्रधान नरेंद्र मोदी यांनी २९ मार्चला सिंगापूर दौऱ्यात या देशातील वरिष्ठ नेत्यांशी परस्पर मैत्री संबंध वृद्धिंगत करण्याच्या दृष्टीने चर्चा केली. सिंगापूरचे संस्थापक व पहिले पंतप्रधान ली कुआन यू यांच्या अंत्यसंस्काराला उपस्थित राहण्यासाठी येथे दाखल झालेल्या मोदींनी इस्रायल, अमेरिका व ऑस्ट्रेलिया या देशांच्या नेत्यांचीही भेट घेऊन परस्पर सहकार्याबाबत चर्चा केली.ली कुआन यांच्या कार्यकाळात सिंगापूर-भारतादरम्यान सुरू झालेले सहकार्याचे पर्व भविष्यात कायम राहावे या उद्देशाने मोदींनी या देशाच्या वरिष्ठ नेत्यांशी चर्चा केली. भारत चीन संबधात गेल्या आठवड्यात अनेक महत्वाच्या घटणा घडल्या. भारत श्रीलंकेमध्ये ढवळाढवळ करतो चीनचा आरोप आशिया खंडातील छोट्या-मोठय़ा देशांकडे चीनचे बारीक लक्ष आहे. त्याला आपले साम्राज्य आशिया खंडात वाढवायचे असून जगातील अव्वल देश बनायचे आहे.. मागच्या १० वर्षात दहा वर्षांत भारत देशाच्या आत भ्रष्टाचार प्रकरणात आड्कला होता. या दरम्यानच चीनने भारताच्या शेजारील छोट्या-छोट्या देशांना आपल्या जाळ्यात अडकावायला सुरुवात केली आहे. पाकिस्तान, बांगलादेश, भूतान, नेपाळ, श्रीलंका यांसारख्या भारताच्या शेजारील राष्ट्रांना आपल्या जाळ्यात अडकवून भारताच्या विरोधात त्यांची भूमिका तयार केली जात आहे. मात्र, नरेंद्र मोदी यांनी आपल्या शेजारील राष्ट्रांशी संबंध वाढवण्यास सुरुवात केली. आपल्या शेजारील राष्ट्रांशी जेव्हा आपले सलोख्याचे संबंध असतात तेव्हा आपल्याला प्रगती साधणे सोपे जाते. नुकताच मोदी यांनी दोन दिवसांचा श्रीलंकेचा दौरा काढला होता. त्या दौर्यायनंतर चीनच्या एका प्रकल्पाचे काम श्रीलंकेने रोखले आणि त्यामुळे चीनशी तळपायाची आग मस्तकाला जाणे साहजिकच होती. श्रीलंका आणि भारत यांच्यात काही गोष्टींत वाद असले तरी चीनपेक्षा भारतच श्रीलंकेचा चांगला मित्र होऊ शकतो, हे श्रीलंकेलाही माहीत आहे. मात्र, चीनला फटका बसल्यामुळे भारत श्रीलंकेमध्ये ढवळाढवळ करत असल्याचा आरोप चीनकडून केला जात आहे. शांघाय इन्स्टिट्युट फॉर इंटरनॅशनल स्टडीजचे सहाय्यक संशोधक लियु जॉँग यी यांनी चीन सरकारच्या मालकीच्या ग्लोबल टाइम्समधून एक लेख लिहिला. श्रीलंकेने तामीळ मासेमार्यां च्या विरोधात कितीही कार्यवाही करणार नाही, असे म्हटले तरी त्यांना ते शक्य नाही आणि ते सलोख्याने राहूच शकत नाही, असेही त्यांनी म्हटले आहे. भारताशी हा सलोखा फार काळ काही टिकणार नाही, असा दावाही या लेखात यी यांनी केला आहे. एकूणच भारताबरोबर श्रीलंका चांगले संबंध ठेवणार नाही, याची काळजी चीन घेताना दिसते आहे. तीच ती चर्चा… पुन्हा पुन्हा! भारत आणि चीन यांच्यात पुन्हा एकदा चर्चेची फेरी पार पडली. दोन्ही देशांतील संबंध अगदी मधुर नसले, तरी चर्चा कायम ठेवण्यापुरते तरी नक्कीच चांगले आहेत. चीनबरोबर तीच ती वाटणारी चर्चा करताना काही गोष्टी त्याच्याकडून शिकण्याचीही गरज आहे. भारत आणि चीन यांच्यात २३ मार्चला दिल्लीत सीमावादावर उच्चस्तरीय चर्चा झाली. १९८८मध्ये सुरू झालेल्या चर्चेची ही अठरावी आणि केंद्रात मोदी सरकार सत्तेवर आल्यानंतरची ही पहिलीच बैठक होती. भारताचे प्रतिनिधित्व राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा सल्लागार अजितकुमार डोवल यांनी केले, तर चीनतर्फे कम्युनिस्ट पक्षाचे खास शासकीय अधिकारी (स्टेट कौन्सिलर) यांग जियेची उपस्थित होते. स्टेट कौन्सिलर हे पद दर्जाने परराष्ट्र मंत्र्यांपेक्षा बरेच वरचे आहे. मागील वर्षी नियुक्त झालेल्या यांग जियेची यांचीही भारताशी चर्चा करण्याची ही पहिलीच वेळ होती. या फेरीत नेमके काय ठरले, याच्याबद्दल अधिकृत घोषणा झाली नसली, तरी सीमेवर शांतता ठेवण्यावर व सीमावाद कसा सोडवावा याची चर्चा झाली असेल, असा अंदाज आहे. शिवाय, येत्या मे महिन्यात पंतप्रधान नरेंद्र मोदी चीन भेटीवर जाणार आहेत; त्याच्या पूर्वतयारीची चर्चा झाली असेल. गेली पंचवीस वर्षे अशा बैठका चालू असल्या, तरी यांचा काही उपयोग आहे का, असा प्रश्न निर्माण होतो. याचे विश्लेषण करण्यासाठी इतिहासाची उजळणी करणे आवश्यक आहे. चीनला फक्त बळ आणि सामर्थ्याचा आदर आता दोन्ही देशांमध्ये भेटींचे प्रमाण वाढले आहे. गेल्या वर्षी सप्टेंबरमध्ये चीनचे अध्यक्ष शी जिनपिंग यांची भेट झाली. त्यातुन काय निष्पन्न झाले? भारतात चीनच्या उद्देशांबद्दल शंका कायम आहेत. कूटनीतीच्या क्षेत्रात चीन भारताला कमी लेखायची एकही संधी सोडत नाही, पाकिस्तान चीनला सार्वकालीन मित्र समजतो. भारताची खोडी काढण्यासाठी चीनकडून अजूनही अरुणाचल प्रदेश हा आपला भूभाग असल्याचे नकाशातून दाखवले जाते. हिंदी महासागरात भारताभोवती बंदरांची माळ (सागरमाला) गुंफण्यासाठी चीन प्रयत्नशील आहे. गेल्या दोन वर्षांत लडाख सीमेचे चिनी सैनिकांनी दोनदा उल्लंघन केले. चीनला फक्त बळ आणि सामर्थ्याचा आदर आहे. जगभरातील दुर्बल देशांमध्ये ते भारताचा समावेश करतात. त्यामुळे तुच्छतेचे वागणूक ओघाने आलीच. तसेच, चीन विचाराशिवाय काहीही करत नाही. जिंनपिंग यांच्या भेटीच्या पार्श्वभूमीवर अतिक्रमण होते, याचाच अर्थ आपले सैनिक बळ दाखविण्याचा त्यांचा उद्देश होता. चीन जे बोलतो ते करत नाही आणि करतो त्याबद्दल बोलत नाही. अशा परिस्थितीत चीनशी चर्चा करण्यात, त्यांच्याशी व्यापार वाढवण्यात, वेळप्रसंगी सहकार्य करण्यात आणि स्पर्धा करण्यास काहीच हरकत नाही. पण आपण चीनइतकी पूर्वतयारी करून चर्चेच्या रणांगणावर उतरतो का? आपल्याकडे चीनचा अभ्यास करणारे तज्ञ मोठ्या प्रमाणावर आहेत. आज चीनबद्दल खोलात अभ्यास करण्याची गरज आहे. हा सीमावाद गेली सत्तर वर्षे चालू आहे. पुढेही चालू राहिल. आपण सतर्क आणि सज्ज राहिलो पाहिजे. सैन्याची तयारी आणि क्षमता, सीमा प्रदेशात दळणवळण, विकास वाढवणे गरजेचे आहे. गाफील होणे किंवा अवाजवी विश्वास ठेवणे घातक ठरेल . २०१५ चीनचा अर्थसंकल्प २०१५ च्या अर्थसंकल्पात चीनने संरक्षण सिध्दतेसाठी केलेली १४५ बिलीयन डॉलर्सची तरतूद भारताला नजरेआड करता येणारी नाही.चीनचा हा आकडा हिंदुस्थानच्या तरतुदींपेक्षा (४० बिलियन डॉलर्स) सुमारे चार पट अधिक आहे. चीनने नुकताच आपला अर्थसंकल्प जगासमोर आणला.सर्वात जास्त वेगाने वाढणारी अर्थसत्ता म्हणून चीनची ओळख तर आहेच, पण संरक्षण सिध्दतेसाठी जगातील दुसरी सर्वात मोठी तरतूदही चीनच करतो. व्यापारातून होणारा फायदा चीनने लष्करी आधुनिकतेसाठी मोठ्या प्रमाणात वापरला आहे. २००८ साली युनायटेड किंगडमला मागे टाकत चीन संरक्षण यंत्रणेवर अफाट खर्च करणारा दुसरा सर्वात मोठा देश ठरला. तेव्हापासून या क्रमांकावर ते कायम आहेत. फ्रान्स, जपान, यू. के. या राष्ट्रांपेक्षा तीनपट तर आशियाई राष्ट्र भारतापेक्षा सुमारे चारपट अधिक तरतूद यंदा चीनने केली आहे. हिंद महासागरातील राष्ट्रांना आपल्या बाजूने खेचण्यासाठी व सागरी वर्चस्वाच्या लढाईसाठी हा पैसा वापरला जाणार असल्याने भारताकरिता ही तरतूद नक्कीच चिंतेचा विषय आहे. चिनी अर्थव्यवस्था वाढत गेली व संरक्षण क्षेत्रावर पैसा खर्च करण्यास मोठी तरतूद त्यांना शक्य झाले. १९९८ ते २००७ या सात वर्षांमध्ये चीनची आर्थिक वाढ १२.५ टक्क्यांनी होत राहिली. या काळात त्यांची संरक्षण यंत्रणेवरील खर्चाची तरतूद १५.९ टक्के प्रतिवर्ष होती. हा खर्च करणे त्यावेळी चीनला सहज शक्य झाले.पण यानंतर त्यांची आर्थिक वाढ काही प्रमाणात घसरली व २०१५ साली हा आकडा ७ टक्क्यांपर्यंत खाली येण्याची शक्यता आहे.तरीही संरक्षण क्षेत्रासाठी अर्थसंकल्पात १० टक्क्यांनी झालेली वाढ झाली आहे. सागरी सामर्थ्य वाढवण्यास चीनने अनेक प्रकल्प हाती घेतले अर्थसंकल्पात केलेली भरघोस वाढ आशियाई राष्ट्रांसाठी फार चांगला संदेश देणारी नाही. चीनचे सागरी संबंध जपान व कोरियाशी फारसे चांगले नाहीत. दक्षिण चीन समुद्रातील वाद अधून-मधून तापत असतात. हिंद महासागरात आपले वर्चस्व सिध्द करण्यास आपले सागरी सामर्थ्य वाढवण्यास चीनने अनेक प्रकल्प हाती घेतले आहेत. विमानवाहू युध्दनौका तर आहेच पण पाणबुड्यांच्या संख्येतही चीन मोठी वाढ यंदा करणार आहे. विकसित राष्ट्रांपेक्षा चीनला लष्कर आधुनिकीकरणासाठी अधिक खर्च व अडचणी येतात, असा दावा चीनने केला आहे.सगळ्या शस्त्रांचे आधुनिकीकरण कोणत्याही आयातीशिवाय करावे लागत असल्याने हा अवाढव्य खर्च करावा लागत असल्याचे चिनी संरक्षण मंत्रालयाला वाटते. पण लष्करी कामांसाठी चीन मुक्तहस्ताने व प्रसंगी छुपा खर्चही करतो.त्यामुळे हा आकडा आणखी वाढवायला चीन मागे पुढे पाहणार नाही. २०० कोटी लोकांचं पाणी चीनच्या हातात गेली ६५ र्वष तिबेटच्या नैसर्गिक साधनसामग्रीचे शोषण चीनकडून सुरू आहे.निषेधाचे आवाज थोडे, तेही दाबलेच जाणारे, अशा स्थितीत भारत आणि बांगलादेशसारख्या शेजारी देशांना तरी या चिनी पर्यावरण-संहारामुळे आपापल्या देशांवर काय गुदरणार आहे याची कल्पना आहे का? असं मायकेल बकले यांनी 'मेल्टडाउन इन तिबेट- चायनाज रेकलेस डिस्ट्रक्शन ऑफ इकोसिस्टीम्स फ्रॉम दि आयलँड्स ऑफ तिबेट टू द डेल्टाज ऑफ एशिया' या पुस्तकातून साधार विश्लेषण केलं आहे. १३५ टन सोने, ६६६० टन चांदी, ५० लाख टन तांबे, पाच लाख टन मॉलिब्डेनम, सहा लाख टन शिसे व जस्त असा खनिज भांडार तिबेटच्या ग्यॅमा परिसरात असल्याचा शोध १९५० साली चीनला लागला. त्यानंतर खणण्याची व्याप्ती झपाटय़ाने वाढत जाते आहे. चीनला कच्चा मालपुरवठा वसाहत एवढंच चीनसाठी तिबेटला स्वरूप आलं. महाकाय चीनची ऊर्जा, पाणी व खनिज पदार्थाची भूक राक्षसीच असल्यामुळे 'उपयुक्त' देशांना अंकित ठेवण्याचा कित्ता चीन गिरवीत आहे. चीनने आफ्रिका खंडालाही वसाहतीचं स्वरूप आणलं असल्याची भावना त्या देशांमध्ये आहे. अन्नधान्यापासून खनिज पदार्थापर्यंत सर्व काही आफ्रिकेतून चीनकडे येत आहे. हिमालयातील तिबेट हे ब्रह्मपुत्रा, इरावती, मेकाँग, साल्विन, यांग्त्झे आणि पीत या मोठय़ा नद्या व हजारो हिमनद्यांचं उगमस्थान आहे. भारत, नेपाळ, बांगलादेश, भूतान, पाकिस्तान, म्यानमार, थायलंड, लाओस, कंबोडिया व व्हिएतनाम या देशांच्या जीवनरेखा तिबेटमधून निघतात. आशिया खंडातील सुमारे २०० कोटी लोकांचं पाणी चीनच्या हातात आहे. नद्यांचा ताबा असल्यामुळे चीनची भूराजकीय दांडगाई चालू आहे. अरुणाचल प्रदेशला 'ते' दक्षिण तिबेट म्हणतात. प्रस्तावित धरणांच्या चिनी नकाशात अरुणाचलचा समावेश आहे. 'चीनमधून सर्वाधिक आंतरराष्ट्रीय नद्या वाहत असूनही एकाही देशाशी जल करार न करणारा आडमुठा देश' अशी कुख्याती लाभली आहे. सगळे शेजारी नाराज, कुठे संताप तर कुठे हिंसक आंदोलनं झाली तरी चीनला पर्वा नाही. महासत्ता होण्याचा मार्ग पाण्यातूनच जातो, हे वेळीच ओळखून चीनच्या वेगवान हालचाली चालू आहेत. बांगलादेशातील एकंदर पाण्याच्या साठय़ांपकी निम्मे साठे ब्रह्मपुत्रेच्या पाण्याचे आहेत, तर भारताच्या आवश्यकतेपकी तीस टक्के पाणी व चाळीस टक्के वीज देण्यासाठी ब्रह्मपुत्रेचे पाणी अनिवार्य आहे. चीनने तिबेटच्या पूर्व भागात 'नामचा बार्वा' येथे ब्रह्मपुत्रेवर अजस्र धरण बांधून ४०,००० मेगावॅट क्षमतेची जलविद्युत निर्माण केली आहे. हे धरण झाल्यानंतर चीनला दया आली तरच भारत व बांगलादेशाला पाणी मिळणार आहे. 'येत्या दहा वर्षांत पाणी हे प्रभावी अस्त्र होणार आहे. या जलयुद्धात नदीच्या वरील बाजूस असणारी बलाढय़ राष्ट्रे खालच्या बाजूस जाणारा पाणीपुरवठा अडवून अथवा तोडून टाकतील'.त्याची प्रचीती भारत बांगलादेशला येत आहे.

PRIME MINISTER MODI MUST CANCELL HIS VISIT TO CHINA

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ChanakyaCode/chinas-reaction-on-modis-arunachal-pradesh-visit-pragmatism-demands-a-change-in-indias-policy/ February 22, 2015, 11:26 PM IST SD Pradhan Recent Chinese reaction to PM Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh clearly reveals that Chinese expansionism continues unabated. The harsher and shriller statements this time were surprising as during Xi Jinping’s visit to India hopes were generated that China would stop such activities. Continuation of such activities establishes beyond doubt that China has sinister plans on our bordering areas and is not sincere in resolving the irritants through negotiations. PM Modi was in Itanagar in connection with the celebration of the 29th State Day function and inauguration of Naharlagun-New Delhi Express train. Chinese reaction was stronger as compared to its response when former PM Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh in 2009. At that time China expressed its dissatisfaction with the visit. However this time the Chinese reactions are more stinging. Chinese spokesperson threatened that this visit would “complicate” the boundary issue and could obstruct the movement towards “good momentum towards the bilateral ties”. The spokesperson used the language that not only reflected the higher level of Chinese opposition to the presence of Modi but also claimed that Arunachal Pradesh is the Chinese area. Arunachal Pradesh was referred to as the “disputed area of eastern part of China-India boundary.” The statement also urged the Indian side to take the Chinese solemn concerns seriously. Later the Indian Ambassador was summoned and the Chinese protest was handed over to him. The pungent statements coming soon after the Xi’s visit and just before the Indian PM’s forthcoming visit in May suggest that Chinese policy of expansionism in its periphery has not been changed. The agreements signed since 1993 to maintain peace at the border have been violated by China several times. The Chinese incursions into the Indian terrirtory since then have increased in geometrical progression. India has only routinely registered its protests in the past. Often such incursions are termed as caused by the differences in perception about the boundary line – a justification given by the Chinese. However it is not only India which is facing Chinese aggressive designs but Vietnam and Philippines in South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea are also the victims of Chinese expansionist designs. There are similarities in the Chinese policies towards all these areas. First China has an over-all strategy to acquire the areas in its periphery since long. Soon after 1949, in accordance with its strategy, it militarily annexed Tibet and then began to move towards other areas. China’s strategy has two dimensions-projecting claims and providing justification for those claims with the help of distorted historical facts. It made clear that it would not recognise the McMahon line as far as India was concerned. It placed claims on the Indian territory. Similarly it also claimed the Senkaku islands and almost entire South China Sea through the nine dashed lines on the areas of Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia. The publicity campaign included cartographic aggression. Chinese passports began to claim all areas in the periphery attracting severe criticism from the concerned countries including India. Second common element is aggressive patrolling by its armed forces of the claimed areas to project that it can use muscular means to achieve its objectives. In the Indian territory, China is sending PLA patrols and their frequency of incursions have increased as also the number of troops crossing over to the Indian side. On the Indian side, several times the Chinese troops write on rocks that the area belongs to China. In the East China and South China Seas, vessels of reorganised Chinese Coast Guards, backed by PLA (N) are aggressively patrolling the area. They are also using aircraft raising the level of tension. While in India they have been sending helicopter, in Senkaku area they had sent jets. China also demarcated a maritime Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that covers Senkaku islands. In South China Sea they are also creating artificial islands to increase their EEZ. Third common element is developing facilities which can be used for military operations. Along the Sino-Indian border railway lines and airfields have been constructed. In South China Sea, in the occupied islands, construction work is going on and it is expected that the facilities there could be used for military purposes. The deployment of troops and missiles only raise the fear among other powers about the Chinese intents. Fourth common element is that it is trying to use its economic relations with other countries to dissuade them to challenge its claims. For this purpose, it is showcasing that by maintaining close relations the countries in its periphery could gain. For this purpose it is focusing on four issues- (i) promoting the establishment of a new maritime silk road for the 21st century linking the Pacific and Indian oceans; (ii) the creation of free trade zones along China’s periphery; (iii) deepening regional financial cooperation by creating an Asian infrastructure bank; (iv) pushing for the conclusion by the end of 2015 of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement that would include the ten ASEAN member states and its FTA partners (Australia, China, India, Korea, and New Zealand). While this aspect may appear quite justified, its ulterior motive is to pressurise its opponents to accept its claims and establish its hegemony in the region. In view of the forgoing, India needs to assess the Chinese aggressive actions holistically and evolve an appropriate strategy. Chinese incursions and sharp and shrill noises it makes on the visit of our leaders in our areas are indicate the Chinese sinister designs and its game plan to usurp our territory. Our lack of response or weak response on such incidents only encourages the Chinese to be more aggressive. This is perceived by China as India’s acceptance of their point of view. Indian top leaders need to learn from history that the policy of appeasement towards Hitler prior to the World War II led to only whet his appetite for expansion. India had committed a mistake by accepting Tibet as a part of China. Pragmatism demands that the Indian policy towards China should be revisited. As a first step India should make a firm statement that such acts of China would lead to deterioration in the bilateral ties. India should cancel all meets till China apologises. India’s stern message that Indian territory is non-negotiable. Second PM Modi should postpone his visit to China and make it clear that unless such activities come to an end he would not visit China. In fact the visit should take place when there is a substantial progress on the border issue. There is no point in signing another agreement which China would not honour. And third, it could convey to China that as a reaction to such acts India is going to revisit its Tibet policy. We have not achieved anything by pursuing the current policy. China continues with its policy of supporting Pakistan in nuclear and missile fields causing serious security problem for India

MUST READ-PAKISTAN CHINA RELATIONS -BEST YET TO COME

http://www.rediff.com/news/interview/china-pakistan-axis-the-best-may-be-yet-to-come/20150216.htm?pos=10&src=NL20150217&trackid=PnhNQR4EPIrnTNXUo7cg0vKom/3RFzlX3teKqfGb9k0=&isnlp=0&isnlsp=0 February 16, 2015 10:24 IST 'Whether it's investments in Kashmir, building naval facilities, or selling top-of-the-range military equipment, Pakistan could well benefit more under Xi's watch.' 'Do Chinese concerns about the 'Islamisation' of Pakistan give it pause about how quickly to move forward with security and economic projects? At the moment the indication is quite the opposite: China is doubling down on its support to Pakistan, partly because of its fears about where the country is headed.' Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Pakistan this year, his first visit to Beijing's 'all weather friend' since taking office two years ago, and the first visit by a Chinese president to Islamabad in nine years. Xi was scheduled to visit Islamabad after he visited New Delhi last September, but the trip was put off because of Imran Khan's then onslaught against Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. There is talk that Xi will visit Pakistan as early as next month and be the chief guest at a joint Pakistan military parade (shades of Barack Obama's presence at India's Republic Day parade!) on March 23, the first time such a parade has been held in seven years. The China-Pakistan relationship and its durability has been one of the lesser discussed themes in international affairs. Even though both nations have been at the centre of consistent strategic attention -- for different reasons, of course -- their association which has withstood the swift eddy currents of the many complex issues swirling about them this half century and more has neither been probed or scrutinised as it should have. Andrew Small's much praised book, The China-Pakistan Axis intends to change all that. Researched painstakingly over six years, not merely in the ministries and think-tanks in Beijing and Islamabad, but also in places like Kashgar in Xinjiang province, where China combats an increasingly assertive insurgency, Small explains in apparently breathtaking detail the China-Pakistan axis and its role in Asian geopolitics. Beijing has never abandoned or isolated Islamabad over the years, and continues to provide it sustenance in many forms -- armaments, nuclear know-know, intelligence gathering, strategic support, money when Pakistan needs it, important projects, and other things the world does not know enough about. In this e-mail interview with Nikhil Lakshman/Rediff.com, Andrew Small -- a Transatlantic Fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United State's Asia programme, which he has helped lead since 2006 -- discusses the China-Pakistan relationship, the challenges it poses for India, a common adversary for both nations, and the direction it is likely to take under the watch of Xi Jinping, China's most powerful leader in more than 20 years. How has the China-Pakistan relationship evolved over the years? Do you believe it is as strong and resilient as ever? Has there been a re-evaluation of the association on the Chinese side in view of the concerns about Pakistan lurching towards being a rogue State? Or are the 'unshakable bonds of friendship,' as Islamabad deems the relationship, as strong as ever? The relationship today is clearly very different from that of the 1960s -- China's economic take-off, the rise of Islamic militancy in the region, the nuclearisation of South Asia, and the shifting geopolitical dynamics between the United States, China, India, and Pakistan over the last few decades put it in a very different context. But there are consistent features -- India still provides the strategic glue, and it remains a relationship dominated by security calculations, despite efforts to add a stronger economic component. The intention was that some of the grand economic projects would provide greater depth and balance to China-Pakistan ties, but in recent years that has been overshadowed by the militancy question. There have been tensions over the issue of Uighur militant safe havens, as well as major problems facing Chinese investments, and naturally China has its concerns about Pakistan's broader trajectory. But that certainly hasn't led to a fundamental reassessment on Beijing's part. The relationship has weathered an impressive array of challenges, and its resilience matters all the more over time given how few reliable friends either country has, as recent elections in Sri Lanka and Myanmar's foreign policy rebalance illustrate. At the moment it appears that China is pressing ahead with its investments despite -- and in some respects because of -- Pakistan's internal challenges, in the hope that these will help to address some of those problems. If you had to plot a graph of the China-Pakistan relationship over the years, what do you believe was the apogee and what was the nadir? If you had to identify five reasons for this relationship lasting as long as it has, what would they be? What have China and Pakistan respectively gained from this relationship? There is a temptation to assess the relationship by looking at the behaviour of the two sides during moments of crisis -- China offers to intervene on Pakistan's behalf in 1965, sits things out in 1971, and actively pushes back in 1999. But the most important phases of the relationship have been away from the spotlight: Chinese support to Pakistan's nuclear programme in the early 1980s, for instance, or its missile programme in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There has always been a sense that even though the two sides come from very different strategic cultures, and may not agree tactically, a strong, capable Pakistan is a Chinese asset in its own right and Beijing will provide consistent support to ensure that some degree of balance in south Asia is maintained. There was certainly pressure on the relationship in the 1990s, when the China-India relationship was normalising and China was prioritising economic goals in its international diplomacy. That was the period in which talk of developing greater balance in ties between India and Pakistan took off in Beijing, and Jiang Zemin's visit to the two countries in 1996, when he appeared to pull back from Chinese commitments on Kashmir, is seen by many on the Pakistani side as something of a low point. The phase after (Pakistan military ruler Pervez) Musharraf's fall was also tricky -- China struggled to get a handle on Pakistani politics during a period where they couldn't just channel everything through a single, dominant army figure. But although all the twists and turns are interesting, the underlying aspects of military cooperation have persisted and deepened. In the years ahead, reliable security partners become even more important as China takes off as a global military power and needs quasi-bases it can count on, as well as intelligence services it can trust to navigate the world of Islamic militancy. For Pakistan, China now matters far more to its economic future than it used to, and the PLA (People's Liberation Army) can increasingly supply the Pakistani army with advanced defense equipment, where it once depended entirely on the United States. If certain problems between the two sides are addressed, there is a good chance that the best period of the relationship is yet to come. The China-Pakistan relationship was spawned by their common antipathy for India. The China-India association is perhaps better today than it was, with improving trade and India and China finding themselves together in formations like BRICS. Has the improvement in India-China relations adversely affected the China-Pakistan relationship in any way? Why not? Is it because China needs Pakistan to be a strategic balance to India? Does Beijing enjoy using Islamabad as a pawn to needle and unsettle India from time to time? China believes that it can maintain these tracks simultaneously -- it can improve economic ties with India, and some coordination on global issues, even as strategic competition grows. That is exactly what has happened with the US-China relationship. It doesn't diminish Pakistan's role on the strategic track if the economic track and the global diplomatic track with India are on an upward arc. Especially as India's 'Act East' policy moves forward and ties with Washington and Tokyo strengthen, the utility of Pakistan for China is clear: It still provides a means to tie India down in its own neighborhood. But Beijing hasn't used Islamabad as a pawn -- Pakistan has pursued policies vis-a-vis India as it sees fit, which benefit China without it having to do anything to encourage them. If anything, China has pressed Pakistan to develop more stable, predictable and economically beneficial relations with India, even as its role as a strategic balancer persists. China-Pakistan ties also have a momentum that transcends India -- the economic relationship between the two sides and the handling of counter-terrorism and militancy issues don't hinge on Beijing's relationship with New Delhi. In your research for your book, did you discover any insights about China playing some sort of role in trying to improve the India-Pakistan relationship? China has never provided Pakistan with unconditional support against India -- the degree and nature of Chinese backing has always depended on the context. In particular Beijing has been reluctant to provide comprehensive support when it has felt that the problems are of Pakistan's making -- Kargil in 1999, Mumbai in 2008, or Abbottabad in 2011, for instance. But it is possible to hypothesise scenarios in which China would swing in behind Pakistan militarily if it felt that India were the culpable party, some of which I cite in the book. Economic ties with India are unlikely to be the determining factor, in my view -- it is still not that big an economic relationship by comparison with China's other major partners. And in recent years, if anything Beijing has been more willing to swallow economic costs for the sake of political and security goals. You need only look at China-Japan relations to see that, and it's a much more important economic relationship for Beijing. Privately, China certainly encourages Pakistan to improve its ties with India, particularly on the economic front -- it thinks Pakistan should be able to benefit far more from trade relations with its neighbour without jeopardising the essence of its strategic calculations. Did the Chinese officials you spoke to for your book nurse any doubts about elements in the Pakistan establishment and their encouragement of Islamist elements? Are there concerns in Beijing that separatists in Xinjiang are being trained by Islamists in Pakistan? Are the Chinese apprehensive about the ongoing battles with the Islamists within Pakistan? In what ways has China engaged Pakistan on terrorism? Has there been any Chinese initiative to nudge Pakistan to rein in the Islamists? China has its worries about the long-term future of the Pakistani army, and Islamist elements within. That isn't to say that those fears are well-founded, but there are developments in Pakistan that Beijing finds uncomfortable to navigate -- the more secular-minded the army, the more the PLA can go drinking with their Pakistani counterparts, the more at ease they are. Historically Beijing has at least acquiesced to Pakistan's use of militant proxies, and has been able to take advantage of Pakistan's relationships in this regard: The ISI could discourage Islamist groups from offering support to Uighur militants and deter them from attacks on China. Beijing has had an extremely narrow set of concerns on counter-terrorism -- the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and its backers, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan -- and hasn't much cared what went on with other groups. The concern for Beijing now though is that the whole situation has run outside the Pakistani army's control, providing risks to China and to the Pakistani State itself. Uighur groups have found safe haven in FATA (Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas) over the last decade, and China has certainly pushed Pakistan to crack down harder on them. The recent (Pakistan army's) operation in North Waziristan operation, for instance, was something the Chinese were keen to see. But they are also cautious about pushing too hard, too broadly, or too openly -- the Lal Masjid siege, for instance, which came about partly due to Chinese pressure, was clearly a disaster for Pakistan and for perceptions of China among militant groups in Pakistan. And it's important not to over-emphasise the degree to which Chinese concerns about Pakistan's handling of the Uighur issue mirror, for instance, the sort of problems that the United States has faced with Pakistan on this front. For the most part Pakistan is willing to do as China asks, not least because its requests are so specific and restricted, and mostly don't impact on the army's broader strategy. How do you perceive the Chinese projects in Pakistan going forward? Will we see real momentum or incremental acceleration? How do these projects really help China? We keep hearing of China promising Pakistan help in setting up more nuclear facilities. Is this mere talk, as a counterweight to the India-US nuclear agreement or are we going to see real assistance on this front? We are in a different phase in the economic relationship now -- at times one side has been pushing while the other has been more reluctant, but now there is real momentum from Beijing and Islamabad. The PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) government has been easier for China to work with than its predecessor, and Xi's plans for a Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as the broader stabilisation and development of China's western periphery, mean that there is more Chinese political capital behind these initiatives. The push to develop China's interior provinces through better infrastructure connections to the neighbourhood is genuinely important as the Chinese economy slows and return on investment in China for such projects diminishes. China is also concerned that the Pakistani economy is struggling and needs external support, especially for its energy sector. This doesn't mean that Chinese investments are purely a matter of goodwill, but there is a strategic calculation -- don't let Pakistan fail -- that helps to underpin them. The nuclear facilities are certainly moving ahead -- Chashma 3 and 4 were agreed in the aftermath of the US-India nuclear deal, partly as a tit-for-tat, but construction of a new phase of 1000 MW Chinese reactors is also underway, and will have a far greater impact on Pakistan's energy situation. These are a serious showcase for the Chinese nuclear industry, not just a political play. Whether some of the more ambitious infrastructure projects come off -- the Kashgar-to-Gwadar link -- is another question, but the existing initiatives that are underway will amount to a substantial increase in Chinese investment in Pakistan regardless. In recent months we have seen China taking a larger role on Afghanistan. How will the China-Pakistan relationship play out in this arena? Will China and Pakistan work to diminish India's interests in Afghanistan after the Western forces leave? Will Washington work with China to push Pakistan to rein in the Taliban so that it does not undermine President Ashraf Ghani's government? Greater Chinese involvement in Afghanistan has advantages and disadvantages for Pakistan. On the one hand, the diplomatic and economic engagement of its closest partner reduces the risk that its interests won't be accommodated. On the other hand, it means that it has a less free rein to pursue its own strategy there without taking China into account. The two sides will certainly coordinate closely, but they don't entirely see eye-to-eye -- China prizes stability in Afghanistan more highly than does Pakistan, and is particularly concerned about the prospect of safe havens for Uighur militants. It is also far more sanguine about India's role, and sees value to New Delhi's political and economic engagement if it helps to stabilise the country. The China-Pakistan relationship is too close to be prised apart over this, and any expectation that China will squeeze Pakistan hard on the Taliban issue is likely to be disappointed. But coordination between Washington and Beijing over Afghanistan has grown much closer in recent years, and China is no longer willing to outsource its policy there to Pakistan. Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to be the chief guest at Pakistan's military parade when it is held for the first time in seven years next month. What does this symbolism tell you? Is it at one level telling the Indians that if you can get President Obama for your Republic Day, we have our friends too? :) Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader in 20 years or more. How do you expect the China-Pakistan relationship to evolve on his watch? Will we see greater Chinese pragmatism towards Pakistan under Xi? Or will it much the same as before? We'll see whether that actually happens -- there is a bit of a debate underway about whether this like-for-like symbolism is entirely sensible, as that's certainly the signal that the two sides would be sending. China wasn't above receiving the chief of army staff, Raheel Sharif, on the same day as Obama's visit to India, but that was considerably less visible. From Xi, Pakistan can certainly expect pragmatism -- he is unsentimental about old principles and hang-ups in Chinese foreign policy, and if Pakistan doesn't get its act together on certain issues, he could push them quite hard or simply de-prioritise the relationship. But Xi is also far more comfortable with China's position as a great power than his immediate predecessor, which means less nervousness about other countries' reactions to Chinese strategic moves and greater willingness to work with friends and allies. Whether it's investments in Kashmir, building naval facilities, or selling top-of-the-range military equipment, Pakistan could well benefit more under Xi's watch. What can India expect from the China-Pakistan relationship going forward? What must the strategists in Delhi watch for in the signs coming from Beijing and Islamabad? What can the world expect from the China-Pakistan relationship? In the event that Islamists take power in Islamabad, what role will China take in subduing their expected hostility towards India and anyone else it considers an enemy? In the highly unlikely scenario that Islamists took power in Islamabad it would have extremely far-reaching consequences for the relationship, and China would do its very best to help head off such an eventuality. More important is whether Chinese concerns about the 'Islamisation' of Pakistan give it pause about how quickly to move forward with other security and economic projects, though at the moment the indication is quite the opposite: That China is doubling down on its support to Pakistan, partly because of its fears about where the country is headed. A few aspects of interest to follow in the coming years are: Will the strategic economic projects come off, and how quickly? A lot will hinge on whether they actually happen, or just get embroiled in another set of political, security and logistical problems. Will China-Pakistan ties move more openly in the direction of a quasi-alliance? Of course, Beijing doesn't want to take on treaty obligations, but there are various aspects in which Pakistan could de facto become China's only real ally (North Korea doesn't count...); the development and use of facilities for the PLA navy, whether at Gwadar or Karachi, will be an interesting indicator. How much of the PLA;s very best equipment will Pakistan get its hands on? This mattered less in the past when the PLA was still relatively technologically backward in many areas, but in the next decade and beyond it will start to have more of an effect on the conventional balance. Will China move from its extremely narrow focus on Uighur groups to look at the enabling conditions for terrorism in the region? The North Waziristan operation and China's shifting stance in Afghanistan is an indication of the sort of pressure that could be brought to bear if the terrorism problem in China continues to worsen and if Beijing decides that its previous approach is no longer working. Broadly speaking, this whole region of the world is one where a more assertive Chinese stance in looking out for its interests would be beneficial to all parties, including India. Please tell us about your book. You spent six years researching the China-Pakistan relationship, not only in the ministries in Beijing and Islamabad it is said, but also in places like Kashgar and Gilgit. What did you discover? Did you encounter a loquaciousness in Islamabad and a reticence in Beijing to discuss the association? What can we expect to find in your book that we have not known before? It is somewhat true that there is more openness on the Pakistani side about the relationship than from the Chinese, but when it comes to the most sensitive aspects both sides keep pretty tight-lipped. Chinese officials and analysts did grow more willing to talk about the relationship though -- especially as their worries about developments in Pakistan grew, alongside the need to start coordinating more closely with the West over the militancy situation in the region. The book benefits from some of that frankness, which made it easier to give behind-the-scenes accounts of a host of different episodes in the relationship, and probe more fully into current issues between the two sides than had been possible in the past. Much of the book focuses on recent political history -- from the Red Mosque to the present day, and ranges from China-Taliban relations to the story of the Obama administration's effort to solicit Chinese cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some of the early reviews have focused on the previously unreported levels of tensions between China and Pakistan, whether over kidnappings, Pakistan's handling of Uighur militant groups, or even the PLA's worries about major contingencies that it might have to address in Pakistan. The book goes further back through the history of the relationship too -- at almost every important juncture for Pakistan in recent decades, somewhere in the background the Chinese have been present, and that parallel set of stories have rarely been laid out before. The book was also intended to pull together in one place a lot of the disparate material that is out there -- on China's support to Pakistan's nuclear programme, on China's involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s, or on Pakistan's role in the Saudi-China relationship. These all help to place in context the current debates in Beijing about the future role that Pakistan should play in Chinese foreign policy: There are some wild rumours that the book refutes, but the China-Pakistan relationship has been at the heart of some of the most dramatic and strategically consequential developments in Chinese policy in recent decades and that is likely to remain true. Nikhil Lakshman/Rediff.com

China is placing key generals on India border near Ladakh

China is placing key generals on India border near Ladakh JAYADEVA RANADE 01 February 2015 New Delhi As Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares to visit Beijing to build bilateral relations and explore additional economic opportunities, it is the right time to analyse China's ambitions and intentions. The unceasing intrusions by Chinese troops especially in the Ladakh sector are one area that merit attention. Pertinent are the intrusions by Chinese troops especially in the Depsang plains just days prior to the visit of Premier Li Keqiang in April 2013, and in the Chumar area of Ladakh last September. The latter, very unusually, broke with pattern and continued throughout Chinese President Xi Jinping's stay in India and for many days thereafter. Some observers at the time sought to suggest that either these were solitary actions by a local commander, or that Xi Jinping's control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is lax. While credible reports clearly indicated that the actions were planned and deliberate in both cases, additional confirmation is available from the latest round of promotions in the PLA. The recently announced promotions in the PLA not only further consolidate Xi Jinping's grip over the PLA as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, but are also of relevance to India. Nine officers in the Lanzhou Military Region, which along with the Chengdu Military Region has operational responsibility for the Sino-Indian border, made the significant jump from senior colonel to the rank of major general on 12 January 2015. Among them, the promotions of particular significance for India are the appointments of Hālǐmùlātí Ābùdōurèhémàn as Deputy Commander of the Southern Xinjiang Military District; Liu Lin, as Chief of Staff of the Southern Xinjiang Military District; and Zhang Limin, as Director of the Political Department of the Southern Xinjiang Military District. All are from the Southern Xinjiang Military District, which exercises front-line responsibility and jurisdiction over the Hetian and Ali Military Sub-Districts. The Hetian Military Sub-District (MSD) has front-line responsibility and jurisdiction over the areas of Daulet Beg Oldi and the Depsang Plains. The PLA's Ali Military Sub-District (MSD) includes the three Chinese counties of Ritu (Rutok), Gar (Gartok) and Zhada (Tsamda). Chusul and the Indian portion of Pangong Lake are opposite Ritu (Rutok) County, Indian Demchok is opposite Gar (Gartok) County and Chumar and the Shipkila Pass are opposite Zhada (Tsamda) County. The commanders of the Hetian and Ali MSDs both hold the rank of senior colonel in the PLA. The commander of the Hetian MSD is Senior Colonel Kuang Dewang and the commander of the Ali MSD is Senior Colonel Liu Geping. The two have been in position since at least late 2013 and, as senior colonels are on the verge of the big promotion to the rank of major general. Both the Hetian MSD and Ali MSD report to the South Xinjiang Military District based in Kashgar, which, in turn, reports directly to the Lanzhou Military Region Headquarters. Their action orders come from Lanzhou, via Kashgar, where the generals are based. At least as far as the border with India is concerned, the South Xinjiang Military District does not channel its reporting through the Xinjiang Military District headquartered in Urumqi. The commander of the South Xinjiang Military District, presently, is 55-year-old Lt Gen Li Haiyang. He assumed command between late December 2013 and early January 2014. Li Haiyang spent six months in 2003-2004 studying in a Russian military institute and later, in mid-2010 after only six months as chief of staff in the South Xinjiang Military District, Li Haiyang was suddenly transferred to the PLA's General Staff Department (GSD) in Beijing as director of its Combat Rapid Response Office. After two years in this post, he returned to his previous job as chief of staff in the South Xinjiang Military District. This experience makes him an officer who is known, and probably trusted, in Beijing and Lanzhou. He additionally has the requisite experience and knowledge about rapid troop deployments. Maj Gen Zhang Jiansheng, Li Haiyang's predecessor, was promoted and posted as a deputy commander of the Lanzhou Military Region. He was the first officer from the South Xinjiang Military District in the last 22 years to be promoted directly to Lanzhou. He was also commander of the Ali MSD a decade ago. He can be expected to oversee all matters concerning the South Xinjiang Military District (including the Hetian and Ali MSDs) on behalf of Lanzhou Headquarters. It is interesting too that the South Xinjiang Military District now has one lieutenant general and seven officers of the rank of major general posted at its headquarters. A few other indicators point to Beijing's increased interest in the Sino-India border. One is the upgrading of China's defence attaché in Delhi to the rank of major general, with effect from January 2015. Of the 113 countries where China has defence attaché, it has posted Major Generals only in 12. These appointments suggest Beijing's increased interest in the Sino-Indian border and consequent growing importance of the South Xinjiang Military District. This was substantiated by an article in the influential Communist Youth League (CYL) newspaper Zhongguo Qingnian Bao on 14 May 2013, which implicitly laid claim to Ladakh and described it as part of Tibet. Jayadeva Ranade is a former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and is president of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal. ------------------------------ -------------------- RELATED PLEASE : High on rhetoric, but ill-prepared on ground Claude Arpi 29 January 2015 If we are to be prepared to counter Chinese designs along the Line of Actual Control and China’s claim over States like Arunachal Pradesh, we need to dramatically ramp up road infrastructure at the borders http://www.dailypioneer.com/ columnists/edit/high-on- rhetoric-but-ill-prepared-on- ground.html

भारत व अमेरिका यांचे संबंध आता स्नेहाचे झाल्याने पाकिस्तान व चीनचा संताप उडाला

• भारत आणि अमेरिका यांच्या संबंधांचा स्तर उंचावणे ही बाब चीन व पाकिस्तान या दोन्ही शेजारी देशांच्या भुवया उंचावणारी ठरली आहे. त्यातला पाकिस्तान हा देश आंतरराष्ट्रीय राजकारणाच्या संदर्भात अधिक उथळ असल्याने त्याने लागलीच एका जागतिक व्यासपीठावर काश्मीरचा प्रश्न उकरून काढला व तो तात्काळ सोडविण्याचे आवाहन अमेरिकेसह सगळ्या जगाला केले. चीनने तेवढा सवंगपणा दाखविला नसला तरी आपल्या सरकारच्या अधिकृत मुखपत्रातून भारत व अमेरिका यांच्यातील करारांवर ‘नापसंती’चा शिक्का उमटविला आहे. विशेषत: ‘भारत व अमेरिका हे दोन्ही देश त्यांच्या चिरस्थायी मूल्यांविषयी पुन्हा एकवार निष्ठा जाहीर करीत असून त्यांचा पाठपुरावा करणे हे ते आपले कर्तव्य समजतात’ या बराक ओबामा व नरेंद्र मोदी यांच्या संयुक्त वक्तव्यावर त्याचा विशेष आक्षेप आहे. त्या वक्तव्यात दडलेली काही राजकीय सत्ये चीनला न आवडणारी आहेत. आंतरराष्ट्रीय समजल्या जाणाऱ्या सर्व हवाई व नाविक क्षेत्रात सगळ्या देशांना मुक्त प्रवेश असेल हे त्यात ध्वनीत असलेले सूत्र दक्षिण चीनच्या समुद्री प्रदेशावर आपला मालकी हक्क आहे असे समजणाऱ्या चीनला निश्चितच डिवचणारे आहे. चीनला चिनी समुद्रासह सगळ््या हिंदी महासागरावरच त्याचे समुद्री वर्चस्व हवे आहे. काही काळापूर्वी भारताशी साधी चर्चाही न करता आपल्या पाणबुड्या श्रीलंकेपर्यंत नेण्याची आगळिक त्याने केली होती. चीनचे लष्करी व आर्थिक सामर्थ्य मोठे आहे. त्याचा भारताभोवतीच्या सर्व देशांवर आर्थिक दबावही मोठा आहे. त्यामुळे त्याच्याशी संबंध राखताना आपला हात दाबून धरावा लागणे भारताला भाग आहे. चीनचे अध्यक्ष झी शिनपिंग हे दिल्लीत असताना चिनी सैन्याने भारताच्या चुमार क्षेत्रात केलेली घुसखोरी त्याचमुळे भारताला निमूटपणे खपवून घ्यावी लागली आहे. भारत आणि जपान यांच्या नाविक दलांच्या संयुक्त कवायती थांबवून ठेवण्याचा निर्णयही चीनच्या संभाव्य कोपामुळेच भारताला घ्यावा लागला आहे. या पार्श्वभूमीवर अमेरिकेशी दृढ होत असलेले भारताचे संबंध त्याचे बळ वाढविणारे आणि चीनला जाचक वाटू शकणारे आहेत. मोदी आणि ओबामा यांच्यातील चर्चेचा सर्वाधिक वेळही चीनच्याच प्रश्नावर खर्ची पडल्याचे वृत्त या संदर्भात महत्त्वाचे आहे. अमेरिकेच्या पुढाकाराच्या बळावर भारत, जपान, द. कोरिया व आॅस्ट्रेलिया या चार देशांना एकत्र आणण्याचा व त्यातून चीनच्या वाढत्या समुद्री बळाला आळा घालण्याचे प्रयत्नही त्याचसाठी आहेत. चीनने आशिया खंडातील देशांसोबतच सगळ््या आफ्रिकी देशांना आर्थिक व अन्य स्वरूपाच्या साहाय्याचा रतीब चालविला आहे. मध्य आशियातील अनेक देशही चीनच्या या साहाय्यामुळे दबले आहेत. ही स्थिती आशिया व आफ्रिका या खंडात चीनला पहिल्या क्रमांकाचे स्थान मिळवून देणारी आहे. शिवाय चीन ही जगातली दुसऱ्या क्रमांकाची अर्थसत्ता आहे आणि अमेरिकेच्या या क्षेत्रातील सामर्थ्याला आव्हान देण्याची तिची महत्त्वाकांक्षा आहे. तिला प्रत्युत्तर म्हणून अमेरिका, भारत, द. कोरिया, जपान आणि आॅस्ट्रेलिया यांना एकत्र आणण्याचा पाश्चिमात्त्य देशांचा प्रयत्न आहे. ओबामा यांच्या भारतभेटीने या संबंधांना एक संभाव्य बळ दिले आहे. हे एकत्रिकरण तात्काळ होईल याची शक्यता नाही. आंतरराष्ट्रीय क्षेत्रात स्वतंत्र धोरण राखण्याची भारताची आजवरची वाटचाल महत्त्वाची व त्याच्या हिताची ठरली आहे. अमेरिका आणि रशिया या दोन्ही महासत्तांशी त्याने सारखीच जवळीक व सारखाच दुरावा आजवर राखला आहे. मात्र चीनचा अलीकडचा उदय व त्याचे वाढते लष्करी आणि आर्थिक सामर्थ्य हा साऱ्या जगाएवढाच भारताच्याही चिंतेचा विषय आहे. शिवाय चीनने पाकिस्तानला आपला सर्वकालीन मित्र जाहीर केले आहे. पाकिस्तानचे भारताशी असलेले वैरही जगजाहीर आहे. या स्थितीत भारत व अमेरिका यांनी परस्परांच्या अधिक जवळ येणे ही बाब नैसर्गिक मानावी अशी आहे. बराक ओबामा यांनी भारताला परवा दिलेल्या भेटीमुळे ही बाब अधोरेखित झाली व त्यांच्या संबंधातील जुने सारे गैरसमजही दूर झाले. अमेरिकेचे माजी परराष्ट्रमंत्री जॉन फास्टर डलेस यांनी अमेरिका व रशिया यापैकी कोणा एकाशी जे मैत्री करीत नाहीत ते सारे देश व त्यांची धोरणे अनैतिक आहेत असे अफलातून विधान १९५० च्या दशकात केले होते. तेव्हापासूनच भारत आणि अमेरिका यांच्या मैत्रीत एक दुराव्याचा धागा कायम राहिला होता. भारताचे अमेरिकेशी आर्थिक व औद्योगिक क्षेत्रातील संबंध मजबूत होते. मात्र भारताचे रशियाशी असलेले राजकीय व अन्य संबंध अमेरिकेला नेहमीच संशयाचे वाटत आले. पाकिस्तान हा देश अमेरिकेच्या लष्करी करार संघटनेतही सहभागी झाला होता. हे अडसर आजवरच्या भारत-अमेरिका यांच्या संबंधात अडचणीचे ठरत आले. चीन आणि पाकिस्तान यांची शिरजोरीही त्याच बळावर चालत आली. भारत व अमेरिका यांचे संबंध आता सरळसाध्या स्नेहाचे झाल्याने पाकिस्तान व चीन या दोहोंचा संताप उडाला असेल तर तो त्याचमुळे स्वाभाविक मानला पाहिजे. या पार्श्वभूमीवर भारताच्या परराष्ट्र मंत्री सुषमा स्वराज या चीनला भेट देणार आहेत. या भेटीचा प्रमुख उद्देश चीनचा होत असलेला गैरसमज दूर वा कमी करणे हा अर्थातच राहणार आहे.

'मेक इन इंडिया'त नागरिकांचा सहभाग अत्यावश्यक

पंतप्रधान श्री. नरेंद्र मोदी यांनी देशाला स्वयंपूर्ण आणि आर्थिक महासत्ता करण्यासाठी २५ सप्टेंबर २०१४ या दिवशी 'मेक इन इंडिया'ची घोषणा केली. या प्रकल्पातून श्री. मोदी यांना भारत देश हे जागतिक व्यापाराचे केंद्र झाले पाहिजे, असा उद्देश साध्य करायचा आहे. प्रामुख्याने चीन, जपान, तैवान, अमेरिका या देशांनी भारताची बाजारपेठ कह्यात घेतली आहे. अगदी साध्या टाचणीपासून, लेखणी, कागद, कोणतीही इलेक्ट्रॉनिक वस्तू, भ्रमणभाषसंच, तसेच दैनंदिन जीवनात लागणार्‍या प्रत्येक वस्तू त्यांनी कह्यात घेतल्याचे चित्र दिसत आहे. दिसण्यास सुबक, अल्प मूल्य आणि सहज उपलब्धता यांमुळे भारतियांना त्यांनी भूरळ पाडली आहे. यामुळे देशाच्या अर्थव्यवस्थेवर, तसेच उद्योगधंद्यांवर गंभीर परिणाम होत आहे. सहस्रोंच्या संख्येने लघुउद्योग बंद पडत असून आता या स्पर्धेत 'अ‍ॅमेझॉन' 'फ्लीपकार्ट' 'ई-बे' अशा अब्जावधी रुपयांचा उद्योग करणार्‍या आस्थापनांचे मोठे आव्हान भारतीय विक्रेत्यांसमोर आहे. त्यामुळे या सर्व पार्श्‍वभूमीवर श्री. मोदी यांच्या 'मेक इन इंडिया'च्या महत्त्वाकांक्षी प्रकल्पाला पुष्कळ महत्त्व आले आहे. चीनमध्ये उद्योगाभिमुख धोरणे, तर भारतात उलट स्थिती ! स्वातंत्र्यानंतर काँग्रेस शासनाने देशातील उद्योगधंदे विकसित होण्यासाठी, त्यांच्या समस्या सोडवण्यासाठी कधीच रस घेतला नाही. येथील क्लिष्ट नियम आणि करप्रणाली, भूमी मिळण्यात येणार्‍या अडचणी, किचकट कायदे, लालफितीत अडकलेले प्रशासन यांमुळे एखाद्याला नवीन उद्योग चालू करणे अवघड बनत गेले. खरे तर कोट्यवधी निरुद्योगांसाठी 'लघुउद्योग' ही सुर्वणसंधी होती; मात्र याकडे कधी लक्षच दिले गेले नाही. याउलट चीनमध्ये कच्च्या मालाची उपलब्धता करून देण्यापासून निर्यातीपर्यंतच्या सर्व सुविधा तेथील शासनाने लहान-लहान उद्योजकांनीही उपलब्ध करून दिल्या. यामुळे दिवाळीच्या काळात लहान लहान दिवे, आकाशकंदील, लहान विजेर्‍या यांपासून भारतियांना जीवनावश्यक असणार्‍या प्रत्येक लहान-सहान वस्तूही भारतातील गल्लीबोळातील बाजारपेठेत दिसू लागल्या, नव्हे जणू त्या आज येथील अविभाज्य घटकच बनल्या आहेत. अब्जावधी रुपयांची उलाढाल असणारी आस्थापने ! एकदा भारतात खुले आर्थिक धोरण स्वीकारल्यानंतर विदेशातून आस्थापने भारतात येणे, हे ओघाने आलेच. तुम्हाला जर अन्य देशात व्यापार करण्याची इच्छा असेल, तर अन्य देशांतील आस्थापनांना तुमच्या देशात येण्यापासून अडवणे तुम्हालाही शक्य नाही. भारतात येणार्‍या विदेशी आस्थापनांची उलाढाल कोट्यवधी नव्हे, तर अब्जावधी रुपयांची आहे. 'अ‍ॅमेझॉन' 'फ्लीपकार्ट' 'ई-बे' अशा 'इंटरनेट'द्वारे वस्तू विकणारी विदेशी आस्थापने थेट वस्तू निर्मिती करणार्‍या आस्थापनांतूनच वस्तू विकत घेतात. यामुळे बाजारातील कोणत्याही वस्तूंपेक्षा या वस्तू ग्राहकांना पुष्कळ स्वस्तात मिळतात. या आस्थापनांमुळे 'खरेदी-विक्री'ची संकल्पनाच पालटत असून त्यासमोर भारतीय आस्थापने टिकाव धरणे जवळजवळ अशक्यच झाले आहे. दिवसेंदिवस व्यापारी संकुल (मॉल) ही संकल्पना अत्यावश्यक बनत असून लहान-लहान किराणा मालाची दुकाने ही संकल्पनाच मोडीत निघेल का, अशी भीती निर्माण झाली आहे. मोदींचे 'मेक इन इंडिया' यशस्वी बनवायचे असेल, तर देशातील नागरिकांची भूमिका अत्यंत महत्त्वाची आहे. 'विदेशी ते चांगले आणि भारतीय ते टाकाऊ', अशी मानसिकता सोडून भारतियांनी आता सजग राहून प्रत्येक वस्तू भारतीय बनावटीचीच घेण्यावर भर देणे अपेक्षित आहे. असे केले, तरच इथले उद्योगधंदे टिकाव धरू शकतील. जपानी लोकांप्रमाणे येथील नागरिकांनीही राष्ट्रप्रेम दाखवत स्वदेशीचाच पुरस्कार करणे अत्यावश्यक आहे !

WILL CHINAS AGRESSION BRING WAR I ASIA-

From the air, the Spratly Islands, a cluster of miniature rocks and sandbars 425,000 kilometres square in the middle of the South China Sea, are almost imperceptible. Even up close, the Spratlys do not look like much – a few islands have tiny rocky beaches or occasional makeshift buildings. A tiny contingent of Filipino marines camps on a rusty hulk of an American ship from the Second World War grounded in the Spratlys. It’s hard to believe these outcroppings could be at the centre of an international dispute, let alone one that could lead to a future Asian war. But the Spratlys are not only claimed by China as Beijing’s exclusive economic zone. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei angrily retort that parts of the South China Sea belong to them, including areas that Beijing insists is China’s alone. The South East Asian countries and China have been unable to resolve their overlapping claims to the sea, believed to be rich in oil and strategically vital – more than US$5 trillion (Dh18.4 trillion) in trade passes through annually. The Philippines and Vietnam have asked an international tribunal to rule on what areas of the South China Sea are within Beijing’s exclusive economic zones but any decision will be meaningless; China argues that the tribunal has no power. In the past three years, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has for the first time since Mao stated its desire to be the dominant power in Asia. China’s leadership is asserting long-dormant claims to unsettled land borders and large portions of Asia’s waters, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea in North East Asia, and demanding that it, not America or Japan, lead regional organisations. With the United States desperately trying to maintain its influence in Asia, countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and many others that relied on US protection are scrambling to build up their own armies and navies. China does not appear threatened. In November, during a forum sponsored by a Chinese military organisation, China’s vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin declared that “Asian countries bear primary responsibility for the security of their region”, a statement interpreted as a warning to the United States. While the forum was being held, satellite photos revealed that China had been secretly building a landing strip in the Spratlys – one that could allow Chinese military aircraft to land in the archipelago in case war broke out. Despite the increasingly bellicose climate in the region, some Asian businesspeople and leaders believe that growth and trade in Asia, increasingly the powerhouse of the entire world economy, will prevent tensions from escalating. Asia’s economies are becoming increasingly integrated. China already has a free trade deal in place with the 10 countries of South East Asia, and Beijing has become the major trading partner of most other Asian economies, as well as a huge aid donor to poorer Asian countries. “Asia will experience a new golden era of peace and prosperity over the next 10 years” because of integration and trade, notes Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore. But these trade ties might not stop a future war. In many respects, the situation in East Asia today resembles Europe before the First World War. Just as in East Asia today, at that time in Europe rising powers challenged established ones, militarism spread, and countries maintained intricate webs of economic ties. Yet even while they traded with each other, European powers in the 1900s and 1910s launched an arms race, and trade links ultimately did not guarantee peace. The Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has admitted that the comparison is apt, telling reporters last year that despite growing Japan-China trade, the two countries are in a “similar situation” as Britain and Germany were shortly before the First World War, when the European powers engaged in a naval arms race while also becoming major trading partners. As happened then in Europe, today’s East Asian standoff could end bloodily. China and South East Asian countries are becoming more openly hostile to each other. Beijing has warned ExxonMobil and other big oil and gas companies not to launch joint ventures with South East Asian nations to explore the South China Sea. Chinese officials also have become explicit in warning South East Asian countries not to challenge Beijing’s claims to water and land. “China is a big country and other countries [in South East Asia] are small countries, and that’s just a fact,” the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi declared at a summit of China and South East Asian countries in 2010. In an interview last year with The New York Times, Philippines President Benigno Aquino III pointedly compared China’s rising assertiveness to the Nazis’ domination of Europe before the Second World War, though some Filipino officials also have compared the situation in Asia to the period before the First World War. “If we say yes to something we believe is wrong now [giving China its claims to the South China Sea], what guarantee is there that the wrong will not be further exacerbated down the line?” Aquino said. “At what point do you say: ‘Enough is enough’? Well, the world has to say it – remember that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War Two.” Asia’s dangerous environment stems in part from American weakness. Coming into office, Barack Obama launched a policy that would be called “the pivot” to Asia, although the White House now calls it “the rebalance”. The policy was supposed to shift American economic, diplomatic and military resources to Asia from other parts of the world. The Obama administration publicly denied that one rationale for the pivot was to contain China’s growing power and strengthen American partners that might confront Beijing. But in private administration officials, and many members of the US Congress, admitted that containing China was indeed a reason for the pivot. Some said so publicly. The former US senator James Webb, head of the Senate subcommittee on Asia during Obama’s first term, pushed for the United States to restore close relations with Myanmar, a pariah for decades because of its brutal military regime. “Sanctions by western governments have not been matched by other countries, particularly Russia and China. Indeed, they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar, furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region,” Webb wrote in one prominent op-ed in 2009. Yet despite its ambitions, the pivot has fallen far short of its promises, leaving many Asian states wondering whether the United States can really serve as a guarantor of security in the coming decades. “The pivot is seen by many in Asia as a slogan but not much more than that,” says one former senior South East Asian leader. Indeed, despite pledges to boost US assistance to Asian countries, a recent report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found that America is still only spending a measly 4 per cent of its aid money in South East Asia. In addition, although the Obama administration promised to move the bulk of America’s naval assets into the Pacific by the end of this decade, it now appears it will fall well short of that goal. Although this delay is due, in part, to the real threat of conflict along Russia’s borders, the slowdown in moving more of the American navy into the Pacific is perceived, several South East Asian officials say, as a worrying sign that the United States will never be able to divorce itself from events in Europe and the Middle East. While the pivot has faltered, China’s new leadership has become the most politically powerful within China and the most nationalistic in foreign affairs since the time of Mao. After Mao’s death, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping issued a maxim on Chinese foreign policy that, until 2013, dictated how Beijing acted abroad: “Keep a low profile [in the world] and bide our time.” In the 1990s and early 2000s, Beijing started a new charm offensive towards its neighbours, boosting aid and investment to Asian countries, tempering any military moves and launching cultural diplomacy across the region. During that time, Beijing also played down its existing disputes over waters in the South and East China seas. As it does now, Beijing still claimed nearly all of the South China Sea, and those claims were challenged by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Indonesia. But China generally stopped publicising its vast claims. Yet in the past three years, new Chinese president Xi Jinping, and the group of leaders around him, have shattered Deng’s maxim of humility and abandoned the charm offensive. Today’s Chinese leaders are the first generation that rose up in the party after the Cultural Revolution, and have only known an increasingly rich and powerful China – yet one that still had to play by international rules created by the West. As president, Xi has made clear he believes China should regain its regional and global pre-eminence, and he has not been shy of staking that claim. Xi has declared that his goal is to build what he calls the “Chinese dream” – a phrase his confidants explain as meaning he wants to restore China to the power it enjoyed in the world for millennia. Xi has backed up his words with action. On the one hand, Xi’s power within the Chinese leadership, which he has amassed through skilful backdoor manoeuvring, has allowed him to deliver major domestic and international accomplishments. Last autumn, he agreed on a landmark emissions reduction deal with Obama. Within China, Xi has launched a major crackdown on graft in the Communist Party. Senior officials like former minister of public ­security Zhou Yongkang have been charged with corruption. In October, China also launched a bold new development bank focused on Asia. China has pledged up to $50 billion for the bank. Yet at the same time, Xi’s assertive style has fostered a foreign policy that seems, to many of China’s neighbours, increasingly threatening. Besides rhetorically claiming much of the South and East China seas, under Xi the Chinese government has had Chinese state oil companies move oil rigs, accompanied by naval or coastguard vessels, into disputed waters as a means of claiming them. Last May, such a move by one of China’s state oil companies triggered anti-China riots in Vietnam that killed at least 20 people and raised the possibility of a war between the two countries. Top Chinese and Vietnamese leaders refused to speak to each other for a month; only in June did their leaders talk and finally cool tensions, for the time being. Beijing also has started buzzing US surveillance planes in Asia, moved thousands of troops to its Himalayan border with India, and declared in 2013 that it controls areas of airspace relatively close to Japan. Since that 2013 declaration, Japanese and Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly buzzed each other, coming close to deadly crashes. Many countries in East Asia are now clearly frightened of China’s growing power and willingness to use it. Vietnam’s leaders increasingly seem willing to boost ties with the US, even at the risk of totally alienating China, Vietnam’s leading trading partner and longtime strategic ally. This past autumn, the US dropped a ban on selling arms to Hanoi. Several congressional sources predict that the US will, within the next five years, sell significant quantities of weapons to Hanoi and will start large-scale joint military exercises with Vietnam’s armed forces. The Philippines, which in the early 1990s kicked US armed forces out of the bases it maintained in its former colony, is now so worried about Beijing’s rise that it has essentially welcomed the US army back. Last April, Manila signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Act with Washington, a 10-year deal that basically allows American forces to be stationed in the Philippines again. Philippine national security advisers have also gone privately to Washington repeatedly in the past three years to beg US officials to sell Manila advanced military equipment. Washington agreed to sell the Philippines more arms. Other countries also have responded to China. Under its new president, Joko Widodo, Indonesia has announced a new foreign policy doctrine that, Jakarta says, will make the country into a maritime power. To show Jakarta is serious, in December Indonesia sank several foreign fishing boats it claimed were illegally operating in Indonesian waters. A senior adviser to the president, Rizal Sukma, told a forum in Washington that the sinking was designed to send a message primarily to China. “We sank Vietnamese boats last week … maybe we will sink Chinese boats after that also,” Sukma said. Japan has pushed back as well. Last year, Tokyo approved a five-year budget plan to dramatically increase military spending on new fighter planes, submarines and amphibious warfare carriers. Unfortunately, Japan’s growing willingness to defend itself also has come along with historical revisionism. While Abe has pushed to rewrite Japan’s post-Second World War constitution, written by the US occupiers, so that Tokyo can expand its military, he also has appointed senior officials who deny that Japan committed massive atrocities against other Asian peoples during that war, such as forcing captured women into sexual slavery and slaughtering civilians during the occupation of Nanjing in China. This revisionism has only further poisoned Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, Asia is now in the middle of a rapid arms race. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks country-by-country military spending, reports that arms sales to East Asia are up by more than 100 per cent since 2005. Clashes in the South and East China seas – between Chinese and Vietnamese boats, Chinese and Filipino boats, Chinese and Japanese boats, and others – occur now on an almost daily basis. On several recent occasions, such as the standoff between Beijing and Hanoi last May, war was only narrowly averted. If war erupted in East Asia, it could easily draw in America. Although the Obama administration has not explicitly stated how it would respond to conflict in the South or East China seas, the US is a treaty ally of the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, bound to defend these countries against attacks. America also has increasingly close military partnerships with Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and other Asian countries. If China occupied disputed islands in the South China Sea, “of course” the United States would help the Philippines to respond, the head of US naval operations declared last February. Barack Obama only has two years left in the White House. But after he leaves, there is little guarantee a new American president would help restore calm in Asia. As secretary of state during Obama’s first term, Hillary Clinton was a central architect of the pivot and was believed to be more hawkish about confronting China than the president. During a trip to Asia in July 2010, Clinton asserted that the South China Sea was a central US “national interest”, the first time an American official had made such a claim. Clinton, the likely Democratic front-runner for the presidency in 2016, is hardly backing down now. She has repeatedly suggested that Obama’s foreign policy is too weak, and that, as president, she would be much tougher on national security affairs. But even Clinton would not risk war between the biggest powers. Of course, people said the same thing about German and British leaders before the outbreak of the First World War.

CHINA MILITARY TRAINING INADEQUETE TO WIN WAR

China military training inadequate for winning a war - army paper (Reuters) - Weaknesses in China's military training pose a threat to the country's ability to fight and win a war, China's official military newspaper said on Sunday. China's military authority has sent a document to military units detailing 40 weaknesses in current training People's Liberation Army methods, the (PLA) Daily said in a front-page story. "These problems reflect shortcomings and weak-points in the makeup of our military fighting force. If they are not promptly dealt with, then they will certainly affect and hinder our army's ability to go to war," the paper said, citing the PLA general staff headquarters. President Xi Jinping has been pushing to strengthen the fighting ability of China's 2.3 million-strong armed forces, the world's largest, and stepping up efforts to modernize forces that are projecting power across disputed waters in the East and South China Seas. The country's armed forces came under fire earlier this year from serving and retired Chinese officers and state media who questioned whether the force was too corrupt to win a war. The military newspaper said China needed to find a cure for the "peace disease" affecting its training regime to ensure the armed forces could master the ability to win a real conflict. Military authorities identified issues for the country's army, navy and air force, including training standards and styles by commanders and military units. The problems were identified through supervision of drills, including joint exercises with foreign armed forces, the PLA Daily said. China has developed stealth jets and has built one aircraft carrier.

चीनची घुसखोरी.. प्रचार साहित्यात

चीनची घुसखोरी.. प्रचार साहित्यात पंतप्रधान नरेंद्र मोदी एकीकडे 'मेक इन इंडिया'चा नारा देत आहेत, दुसरीकडे सरसंघचालक मोहन भागवत यांनी चिनी बनावटीच्या वस्तूंवर बहिष्कार टाकण्याचे आवाहन केले आहे. मात्र, असे असतानाही स्वदेशी व मेक इन इंडियाच्या पुरस्कर्त्यांनीच चिनी बनावटीच्या प्रचारसाहित्याला सर्वाधिक पसंती दिल्याचे निदर्शनास येत आहे. निवडणूककाळात वाढणाऱ्या प्रचार साहित्याच्या मागणीचा पुरवठा करण्यासाठी चीनने याही क्षेत्रात घुसखोरी करत भारतीय बनावटीच्या प्रचार साहित्याला केव्हाच मागे टाकले आहे. दोन्ही काँग्रेस व अन्य राजकीय पक्षांकडूनही चिनी टोप्यांना सर्वाधिक मागणी आहे. गेल्या काही वर्षांपासून भारतीय बाजारपेठेत चिनी वस्तूंनी आक्रमण केले आहे. अगरबत्ती, दिवाळीतील कंदील, पणत्या, मोबाइलबरोबरच याचा विळखा आता निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्यालाही पडला आहे. मुंबईत लालबाग येथे निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्याची मोठी बाजारपेठ असून हे प्रचार साहित्य खरेदी करण्यासाठी येथे सध्या एकच झुंबड उडाली आहे. जवळपास प्रत्येक लहान-मोठय़ा दुकानात प्रचार साहित्य घेण्यासाठी सर्वपक्षीय कार्यकर्ते आणि पदाधिकाऱ्यांची लगबग सुरू आहे. निवडणुकीच्या निमित्ताने सर्वच राजकीय पक्षांच्या उमेदवारांकडून पदयात्रा, प्रचार फेऱ्या, चौक आणि जाहीर सभा, घरोघरी प्रचार यावर भर असल्याने या सगळ्यात वातावरण निर्मिती करण्यासाठी प्रचार साहित्याला मोठय़ा प्रमाणात मागणी असल्याचे लालबाग येथील व्यापाऱ्यांकडून सांगण्यात आले. 'पारेख ब्रदर्स'चे दिलीप पारेख यांनी सांगितले, निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्यात चायना टोप्यांना सर्वच राजकीय पक्षांकडून अधिक प्रमाणात मागणी आहे. एका चायना टोपीची किंमत साधारण चार ते सहा रुपयांपर्यंत आहे. तर भारतीय बनावटीच्या एका टोपीची किंमत किमान दहा ते ३० रुपयांपर्यंत आहे. भारतीय टोप्यांच्या तुलनेत चायना टोप्या स्वस्त असल्याने साहजिकच त्यांना जास्त मागणी आहे. टोप्यांसबरोबरच मनगटावर बांधायचे बॅण्ड, टी शर्ट, मफलर/उपरणे, बिल्ले यांनाही अधिक उठाव आहे. गेल्या विधानसभा निवडणुकीच्या वेळी शिवसेना-भाजप यांची युती तरकॉंग्रेस आणि राष्ट्रवादी कॉंग्रेस यांची आघाडी होती. यावेळी हे चौघेही वेगवेगळे लढत आहेत. त्याशिवाय 'मनसे' आणि अन्य राजकीय पक्षांचे उमेदवारही निवडणूक िरगणात आहेत. त्यामुळे तुलनेत यावेळी सर्वच उमेदवारांकडून आपापल्या पक्षांच्या प्रचार साहित्याला मागणी असल्याचे निरीक्षणही पारेख यांनी नोंदविले. तर 'श्रीराम ड्रेसवाला'चे हेमंत म्हणाले, प्रचार साहित्यात टोप्या व मफलर/उपरणे यांची विक्री जास्त प्रमाणात होते. दिवसाला सुमारे एक ते दीडहजार नग असे याचे प्रमाण असते. या निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्याबरोबरच विविध राजकीय पक्षांची निवडणूक चिन्ह किंवा राजकीय नेत्यांची चित्रे असलेल्या अंगठय़ा तसेच बांगडय़ा, मंगळसुत्र आदी प्रकारही बाजारात आले असले तरी त्याला फारशी मागणी नाही. राजकीय पक्षांच्या प्रमुख नेत्यांचे चित्र असलेले टी शर्टही विक्रीस आले असून त्यांना चांगली मागणी आहे. टी शर्टवर प्रामुख्याने पंतप्रधान नरेंद्र मोदी, शिवसेनाप्रमुख बाळासाहेब ठाकरे, उद्धव ठाकरे, राज ठाकरे, सोनिया गांधी, शरद पवार यांचे चित्र असलेल्या टी शर्टना त्या त्या राजकीय पक्षाच्या तरुण/युवा कार्यकर्त्यांकडून विशेष मागणी असल्याचे लालबाग येथील अन्य एका व्यापाऱ्याने सांगितले. झेंडे, मफलर गुजरातमधून निवडणुकीच्या काळात जाहीर सभा, प्रचार फेऱ्या, पदयात्रा यासाठी झेंडे आणि मफलर/उपरणे हे जास्त प्रमाणात लागतात. मुंबईत हे साहित्य प्रामुख्याने नवी दिल्ली, मथुरा आणि गुजरात मधून येत असल्याची माहितीही काही व्यापाऱ्यांनी दिली. शिवसेना आणि भाजप यांच्या साहित्याची अधिक खरेदी शिवसेना आणि भाजप यांची युती या निवडणुकीत नाही. दोन्ही पक्ष वेगवेगळे लढत असल्याने दोन्ही पक्षातून स्वतंत्र उमेदवार निवडणूक िरगणात आहेत. दोन्ही कॉंग्रेस, मनसे, अन्य राजकीय पक्ष आणि अपक्ष उमेदवार निवडणूक िरगणात असले तरीही शिवसेना आणि भाजपकडून निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्याला सर्वात जास्त मागणी असल्याचे निरीक्षण व्यापाऱ्यांनी नोंदविले. निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्याचा दर पुढीलप्रमाणे (वस्तू, आकार आणि किंमत या नुसार) * रस्त्यावर लावण्यासाठी निवडणूक चिन्ह असलेले कापड, १३ रुपये मीटर * झेंडे, १६ बाय २४, ५ रुपये ५० पैसे, * झेंडे- २० बाय ३०, ८ रुपये * झेंडे- ३० बाय ४०, ४० रुपये * झेंडे- ४० बाय ६०, ७० रुपये * भगवा झेंडा- अर्धा मीटर १० रुपये, पाऊण मीटर-२५ रुपये, १ मीटर-३० रुपये, दीड मीटर-५० ते ६० रुपये, ३ मीटर-१०० रुपये * मफलर/उपरणे, साधे- ५ रुपयांपासून पुढे, सॅटीनचे- १० रुपयांपासून पुढे * बिल्ले- २ रुपयांपासून पुढे * बॅच- ४ रुपये * टी शर्ट- ८० ते ९० रुपये पंचरंगी लढतीमुळे प्रचार साहित्याचा तुटवडा राज्यात होणाऱ्या पंचरंगी लढतीमुळे गेल्या विधानसभा निवडणुकीच्या तुलनेत यावेळी निवडणुकीतील उमेदवारांची संख्या प्रचंड प्रमाणात वाढली आहे. त्यामुळे निवडणूक प्रचार साहित्याचा तुटवडा जाणवत आहे. मालाचा तुटवडा असल्याने मोठय़ा प्रमाणात खरेदी करण्यासाठी येणाऱ्या राजकीय पक्षांचे पदाधिकारी, कार्यकर्ते यांना एक-दोन दिवस जरा थांबा, माल लवकरच येईल, असे सांगावे लागत आहे. प्रचार साहित्यात 'टोपी' हा प्रकार चीनी बनावटीचा असून अन्य साहित्य हे स्वदेशी आहे.

HONGKONG SOFT UNDERBELLY OF CHINA-हॉंगकॉंगमधील आंदोलन

हॉंगकॉंगमधील आंदोलन दडपण्यासाठी चीनने विविध मार्गांचा अवलंब -SAKAL . हॉंगकॉंगची पुनरावृत्ती अन्य वांशिक गटांकडूनही होऊ शकते, अशी चिंता चीन सरकारला वाटते. हॉंगकॉंगमध्ये चार ऑक्टोबरला दोन लाखांहून अधिक लोक रस्त्यांवर आले. अनेक दशकांमध्ये या बेटावर अशा प्रकारचे आंदोलन झाले नव्हते. प्रक्षुब्ध जनतेने सरकारी कार्यालये बंद पाडली. जवळजवळ आठवडाभर सुरू असलेल्या निदर्शनांनी केवळ आशियाचेच नाही, तर जगाचे लक्ष वेधून घेतले. हॉंगकॉंगचे मुख्य कार्यकारी अधिकारी लिऊंग चुन यिंग यांच्या राजीनाम्यासाठी सर्वसामान्य लोकांकडून दबाव येत होता. सोशल मीडियावरून तशी मागणी मोठ्या प्रमाणावर करण्यात येत होती. "सरकारी कार्यालये त्वरित सुरू करा; अन्यथा कायदा-सुव्यवस्थेचा गंभीर प्रश्न निर्माण होईल,‘ असा इशारा यिंग यांनी दिला व त्यासाठी सहा ऑक्टोबरची अंतिम मुदत दिली. या दिवशी आंदोलन हळूहळू ओसरले; परंतु त्याने अनेक महत्त्वाचे प्रश्न उपस्थित केले आहेत. ब्रिटिश साम्राज्याची वसाहत असलेल्या या बेटावर लोकशाहीचा किरणही पोचला नव्हता. नव्वदनंतर हे बेट चीनच्या ताब्यात आले, त्या वेळी पहिल्यांदा तेथे काही लोकशाही हक्क मिळाले. ब्रिटनच्या कारकिर्दीत हॉंगकॉंगला लोकशाही हक्क मिळू नयेत आणि सर्वंकष, पोलादी राजवटीबद्दल प्रसिद्ध झालेल्या चीनकडून मिळावेत, हा एक विरोधाभासच म्हणावा लागेल. हॉंगकॉंग ताब्यात घेताना जो करार झाला होता, त्यानुसार 2017 पर्यंत प्रौढ मताधिकारावर आधारित लोकशाही प्रणाली तेथे प्रस्थापित करण्यात येईल, असे आश्वासन चीनने दिले होते. तेथे जो आधारभूत कायदा लागू करण्यात आला, त्यानुसार पन्नास वर्षांपासून चालू असलेली हॉंगकॉंगची वैशिष्ट्यपूर्ण अशी कायदेशीर आणि राजकीय व्यवस्था सुरूच राहील; परंतु हॉंगकॉंग हा चीनचा सार्वभौम भाग असेल, असे ठरविण्यात आले. "एक देश, दोन व्यवस्था‘ असे हे स्वरूप होते; परंतु त्या कराराचा जो गाभा होता, त्यालाच चीनच्या नव्या आदेशाने हरताळ फासला आहे. हॉंगकॉंग ब्रिटिशांकडून ताब्यात घेताना चीनने त्याचे वेगळेपण टिकविण्याचे आश्वासन दिले होते. लोकशाहीशिवाय ते टिकविणे शक्य नाही. परंतु, आता लक्षात आले आहे की, ही "चिनी पद्धती‘ची लोकशाही आहे. म्हणजे नवा मुख्य कार्यकारी अधिकारीपदासाठी रिंगणात कोण उतरणार, हे चीन सरकारच ठरविणार. तसा आदेश त्यांनी जाहीर करताच लोक संतापले. कारण, जनतेसमोर निवडीचा अधिकार असणार आहे तो फक्त चीनने ठरवून दिलेल्या उमेदवारांतूनच. जनतेच्या आशा-आकांक्षांवर पाणी टाकण्यासारखेच हे झाले आणि त्यामुळेच जनता रस्त्यांवर उतरली. तेथे उफाळलेल्या असंतोषाचे लोण चीनच्या मुख्य भूमीवर पोचेल की काय, अशी भीती चीन सरकारला वाटत आहे. आंदोलकांनी या चळवळीला "अंब्रेला रिव्होल्यूशन‘ असे नाव दिले. त्यामुळे हा वणवा पसरणार की काय, असे चीनला वाटले. आंदोलन शमविण्यात सरकारने तूर्त यश मिळविले असले तरी, पुन्हा भडका उडणारच नाही, असे सांगता येत नाही. चीन सरकार या आंदोलनामुळे एवढे अस्वस्थ का झाले, हा महत्त्वाचा प्रश्न आहे. उघियार वांशिक अल्पसंख्याक समुदायालाही या आंदोलनापासून प्रेरणा घ्यावीशी वाटते आहे. उघियारांचे निर्वासित नेते व वर्ल्ड उघियार कॉंग्रेसचे अध्यक्ष रेबिया कादिर यांनी सांगितले की, हॉंगकॉंगवासीय जिंकले तर आम्हालाही त्याचा लाभ होईल. चीनला हे सगळे सहन होणारे नाही. हॉंगकॉंगच्या आंदोलनाची माहिती देणारी पोस्टर लावणाऱ्यांवर किंवा ती माहिती इतरांना देण्याऱ्यांवर सरकारने कडक निर्बंध लादले. त्याविषयीच्या संशयावरून शांघाय, बीजिंग, हुनान, ग्वांत्झू, शेंझान या शहरांमधून किमान वीस जणांना ताब्यात घेण्यात आले. चिनी प्रसारमाध्यमांनी अत्यंत सावधपणे या घटनांचे वार्तांकन केले. वृत्तपत्रांतून आंदोलनाचे एकही छायाचित्र प्रसिद्ध होणार नाही, याची काळजी घेण्यात आली. हॉंगकॉंगमधील विविध देशांच्या दूतावास अधिकाऱ्यांना चिनी परराष्ट्र मंत्रालयातर्फे बजावण्यात आले की, आंदोलकांशी कोणत्याही प्रकारे संवाद साधू नका. तसे केलेत तर तो चीनच्या अंतर्गत कारभारातील हस्तक्षेप मानला जाईल. चिनी भाषेत प्रसिद्ध होणाऱ्या वृत्तपत्रांनी सर्व आंदोलक ख्रिस्ती असल्याचे नमूद केले. या आंदोलनामागे परकी शक्ती असल्याचे सुचविण्याचा हा प्रयत्न होता. परदेशांतून स्वयंसेवी संस्थांना मिळणाऱ्या निधीची छाननी करण्याच्या कामाला आणखी गती देण्यात आली. "नॅशनल डेमोक्रॅटिक इन्स्टिट्यूट फॉर इंटरनॅशनल अफेअर्स‘ ही संस्था अमेरिकी कॉंग्रेसच्या निधीवर चालते. या संस्थेने हॉंगकॉंगमधील विद्यार्थ्यांना, नागरिकांना देशातील राजकीय व्यवस्थेत सुधारणा घडविण्यासाठीच्या पर्यायांची चाचपणी करण्यासाठी चार लाख साठ हजार डॉलर एवढी मदत केली आहे. चीनचे अध्यक्ष शी जिनपिंग हे खंबीर नेते असल्याने आंदोलनापुढे चीन नरम झाल्याचे चित्र कदापि निर्माण होऊ देणार नाहीत. मात्र, हॉंगकॉंगमधील असंतोषाचा प्रश्न शांततापूर्ण मार्गाने सोडविला जावा, यासाठीच ते प्रयत्नशील असणार, यात शंका नाही; परंतु चीनने आपल्या खास पद्धतीने हे आंदोलन दडपण्यासाठी प्रयत्न केले. "पीपल्स डेली‘ या सरकारी वृत्तपत्राने आंदोलकांचा उल्लेख "अतिरेकी‘ असा केला. "कायद्याचे राज्य‘ या संकल्पनेला आंदोलक हरताळ फासत असल्याची टीका करण्यात आली. हॉंगकॉंगमधील राजकीय व्यवस्थेवर भाष्य करताना या दैनिकाने नमूद केले की, तेथे कोणती व्यवस्था असावी, हे ठरविण्याचा अंतिम अधिकार चीन सरकारचाच आहे. आंदोलनामुळे सामाजिक सलोख्याला तडा गेला आहे, अर्थव्यवस्थेचेही नुकसान झाले. या सगळ्याची कायदेशीर जबाबदारी आंदोलकांनाच घ्यावी लागेल, असे धमकीवजा विवेचन लेखात करण्यात आले. चीन सरकारचा एकूण नूर पाहता, आंदोलन दडपण्यासाठी सर्व मार्गांचा तो वापर करेल. आंदोलकांना उद्युक्त करणाऱ्यांना कठोर शिक्षा दिली जाईल. तेथील संघटनांवर कडक निर्बंध घातले जातील. यावरून दिसते ते असे, की चीनला आपली पोलादी पकड जराही ढिली होऊ द्यायची नाही. एका ठिकाणी आंदोलकांना यश मिळत आहे, असे दिसले तर विविध भागांतील वांशिक अल्पसंख्य समुदाय उठाव करतील, अशी धास्ती या राजवटीला आहे. त्यामुळे हॉंगकॉंगमधील आंदोलनाकडे चीन सरकार कायदा-सुव्यवस्था आणि चीनचे सार्वभौमत्व याच दृष्टिकोनातून पाहात आहे. • व्हिएतनामचा दावा असणाऱ्या एका बेटावर चीनने धावपट्टीचे काम पूर्ण केले असून, लष्करी विमान तिथे उतरवण्याची सोय केली आहे. या बेटावर चीन आपला हक्क सांगत आहे. वूडी आयलँड असे या बेटाचे नाव असून, पॅरासेल साखळी बेटांचा हा एक भाग आहे, असा चीनचा दावा आहे, पॅरासेल साखळी बेटावर व्हिएतनाम व तैवान यांचाही दावा आहे. या बेटावरील तेलाचे उत्खनन व बांधकाम यावर व्हिएतनामने आक्षेप घेतला आहे. विमानासाठी धावपट्टी हे चीनचे या बेटावरील नवे बांधकाम आहे. दोन वर्षांपूर्वी या बेटावरील सान्शा शहराचे नाव चीनने याँगशिंग असे ठेवले आहे. या बेटावरून दक्षिण चीन समुद्रावर नियंत्रण ठेवता येते,त्यामुळे चीन त्यावर आपला दावा सांगत आहे. फिलिपाईन्स, व्हिएतनाम, मलेशिया, ब्रुनेई व तैवान यांचाही या समुद्राच्या भागावर दावा आहे. या बेटावर चीनने आॅईल रिगही बसविली असून, मे महिन्यात ही रिग बसविल्यानंतर व्हिएतनाममध्ये दंगली उफाळल्या होत्या. भारत अमेरिकेला इशारा बीजिंग- दक्षिण चीन समुद्रातील वादात भारत व अमेरिका यांनी हस्तक्षेप करू नये. चीन संबंधित देशांशी थेट वाटाघाटी करेल व सागरी सीमेची ही समस्या सोडविली, जाईल असे चीनने म्हटले आहे. (वृत्तसंस्था)