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Showing posts with label NUCLEAR ISSUES. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR ISSUES. Show all posts

Thursday, 22 August 2019

पाकिस्तानी बडबड कांद्याला सूचक इशारा दिनांक 20-Aug-2019 19:43:44 TARUN BHARAT- अनय जोगळेकर


संयुक्त राष्ट्रांच्या सुरक्षा परिषदेने पाकिस्तानच्या आग्रहास्तव काश्मीर प्रश्नावर विशेष बैठक बोलावण्यास नकार दिल्यानंतर चीनने या विषयावर बंद दाराआड, अनौपचारिक चर्चा घडवून आणण्याची विनंती केली. त्यानुसार १६ ऑगस्टला अशी चर्चा पार पडली. अनौपचारिक चर्चा असल्यामुळे त्यात ठराव मांडण्याचा किंवा मंजूर करण्याचा प्रश्न नव्हता. चर्चेची नोंद ठेवण्यात येणार नसल्यामुळे या चर्चेत काय झाले, हेदेखील अधिकृतरित्या जगाला समजणार नव्हते. पाकिस्तानने, ५० वर्षांनंतर सुरक्षा परिषदेत काश्मीरच्या जनतेचा आवाज घुमणार वगैरे म्हणून स्वतःच स्वतःची पाठ थोपटून घेतली. आपला नैतिक विजय झाल्याचे घोषित केले. चीनच्या सुरक्षा परिषदेतील प्रतिनिधींनी पत्रकार परिषद घेऊन त्याबद्दल माहिती दिली खरी, पण त्यातही स्वतःचे मत हे बैठकीला उपस्थित असलेल्या देशांचे मत असल्याचे चित्र निर्माण करण्याचा प्रयत्न केला.
 
चीन वगळता बैठकीस उपस्थित अन्य कोणत्याही देशाच्या प्रतिनिधींनी बैठकीतील कामकाजाचा तपशील उघड केला नाही. हाँगकाँगमध्ये स्वतःच मान्य केलेल्या ‘एक देश, दोन व्यवस्था’ या व्यवस्थेला नख लावून लोकशाहीवादी आंदोलकांविरुद्ध दडपशाही करणारा, स्वतःच्या मुस्लीमबहुल शिनजियांग प्रांतात मुस्लीम धर्मीयांवर अनेक प्रकारची बंधने टाकून त्यांना स्वतःचा धर्म पाळण्याचेही स्वातंत्र्य न देणारा चीन काश्मीरमधील लोकांच्या मानवाधिकारांबद्दल बोलतो, हा एक विनोदच होता. भारताचे संयुक्त राष्ट्रातील राजदूत सय्यद अकबरुद्दिन यांनी पत्रकार परिषद घेऊन पाकिस्तान आणि चीनचा खरपूस समाचार घेतला.
 
पाकिस्तानने आपल्या छुप्या युद्धाचा भाग म्हणून १५ ऑगस्टला काळा दिवस पाळून ठिकठिकाणी स्थायिक झालेल्या आपल्या नागरिकांना काश्मीरसाठी आंदोलन पुकारण्यास सांगितले होते. याचा भाग म्हणून लंडनमधील भारतीय दूतावासासमोर सुमारे १५ हजार पाकिस्तानी लोक जमले होते. त्यांच्यासोबत काही खलिस्तानवादीही होते. काही आंदोलकांनी तिथे भारताचा स्वातंत्र्य दिन साजरा करायला जमलेल्या भारतीय वंशाच्या लोकांवर दगड आणि बाटल्या फेकल्या. या प्रकरणी ‘स्कॉटलंड यार्ड’ने चार जणांना अटक केली. आज ब्रिटनमध्ये अनेक छोटे पाकिस्तान तयार झाले असून असल्या कृत्यांनी पाकिस्तानी लोक सामान्य ब्रिटिश नागरिकांच्या मनात पाकिस्तानबद्दल असलेल्या रागाला खतपाणी घालतात, हे त्यांच्या लक्षात येत नाही. गेले दोन आठवडे पाकिस्तानचे पंतप्रधान इमरान खान आपले मानसिक संतुलन ढासळल्यासारखे बोलत आहेत. त्यांच्या प्रत्येक भाषणात मोदी, राष्ट्रीय स्वयंसेवक संघ, फाळणीच्या वेळेस भारताने पाकिस्तानची केलेली फसवणूक,मोदी सरकार हिटलर आणि नाझींप्रमाणे भारतीय मुसलमान आणि ते झाल्यावर पाकिस्तानला संपविण्याच्या योजना बनवत आहेत तसेच युद्ध झाले तर त्यात पाकिस्तान अण्वस्त्रांचा वापर करेल, अशा गर्भित धमक्या देत आहेत. इमरान खानचा पगार किती आणि ते बोलतात किती, हा प्रश्न त्यांची भाषणं ऐकणार्‍या कोणत्याही सामान्य माणसाला पडावा इतके ते असंबद्ध बोलत आहेत. बडबड कांदा इमरानना काही काळ सहन केल्यानंतर भारतानेही त्यांना त्यांच्याच भाषेत उत्तर दिले.
 
१६ ऑगस्ट रोजी अटल बिहारी वाजपेयींच्या पहिल्या पुण्यतिथीचे निमित्त साधून रक्षामंत्री राजनाथ सिंह ‘पोखरण २’ परीक्षण झाले, त्या जागी गेले आणि तेथे त्यांनी भारताच्या अण्वस्त्र धोरणाबद्दल सूचक वक्तव्य केले. “भारताने अण्वस्त्रांचा प्रथम वापर न करण्याचे धोरण अंगिकारले असून आजवर ते कसोशीने पाळले आहे. भविष्यात काय होईल ते सभोवतालच्या परिस्थितीवर अवलंबून असेल,” असे ते म्हणाले. हे वक्तव्य जसे भारताच्या धोरणातील संभाव्य बदलाचे सूतोवाच करणारे होते, त्याचप्रमाणे ते पाकिस्तान आणि चीनसाठी इशाराही होते. या वक्तव्याचे विश्लेषण करण्यासाठी आपल्याला इतिहासात डोकावून पाहावे लागेल. भारताच्या स्वातंत्र्यलढ्यावर अहिंसेचा मोठा प्रभाव आणि पंतप्रधान पंडित नेहरूंचा अलिप्ततावाद यामुळे भारतीय सैन्यदलांची पुनर्रचना करून त्यांचा वापर केवळ देशांच्या सीमांचे परकीय आक्रमणापासून रक्षण करण्याचे धोरण स्वीकारले गेले.
 
१९६२च्या युद्धात चीनकडून झालेल्या मानहानीनंतर आणि १९६४ साली चीनने केलेल्या अण्वस्त्र परीक्षणांनंतर भारताला जाग आली. १९७४ साली जेव्हा आपण पोखरण येथे अणुस्फोट केले, तेव्हाही आपण स्वतःला अण्वस्त्रधारी देश जाहीर न करता केवळ शांततेसाठी आपण हे परिक्षण केल्याची भूमिका घेतली होती. १९९८ साली अटलजींच्या सरकारने ‘पोखरण २’ स्फोट घडवून भारताला अण्वस्त्रधारी देश म्हणून जाहीर केले असता पाकिस्ताननेही अण्वस्त्र चाचण्या केल्या. भारताची अर्थव्यवस्था १९९१ च्या आर्थिक संकटातून नुकतीच उभारी घेऊ लागली होती. तिच्यावर आंतरराष्ट्रीय निर्बंधांचा विपरित परिणाम होऊ नये म्हणून भारताने अण्वस्त्रांचा प्रथम वापर करणार नाही, तसेच अण्वस्त्र नसलेल्या देशांविरुद्ध अण्वस्त्रांचा वापर करणार नाही, अशा दोन अटी धोरण म्हणून स्वीकारल्या. पाकिस्तानने अशा अटी स्वीकारल्या नाहीत.
याउलट जर भारत-पाकिस्तान युद्ध झाले तर पाकिस्तान अण्वस्त्रांचा वापर करेल,असे चित्र निर्माण केले. कदाचित त्यामुळेच १९९९च्या कारगील युद्धात भारताने शक्य असूनही प्रत्यक्ष नियंत्रण रेषा ओलांडली नाही. १३ डिसेंबर, २००१ रोजी पाकिस्तानपुरस्कृत दहशतवाद्यांनी संसदेवर हल्ला केल्यानंतर भारताने सीमेवर सैन्याची जमवाजमव केली. पण, त्यासाठी महिनाभराचा अवधी लागल्याने भारताच्या धोरणाच्या मर्यादा उघड झाल्या. त्यामुळे मग भारताने ‘कोल्ड स्टार्ट’ म्हणजेच अशी घटना घडल्यापासून ४८ तासांच्या आत सैन्याची जमवाजमव करून स्पष्ट उद्दिष्ट असलेले मर्यादित युद्ध लढण्याची रणनीती विकसित केली. त्याला उत्तर म्हणून पाकिस्तानने अण्वस्त्रांचा डावपेचात्मक म्हणजे टॅक्टिकल वापर करण्याची तयारी सुरू केली. पूर्वी अण्वस्त्रांचा मुख्य उद्देश शत्रूला आक्रमण करण्यापासून परावृत्त करणे हा होता. प्रतिस्पर्धी देशांकडे अण्वस्त्र असल्यास युद्धप्रसंगी दोन्ही देश एकमेकांचा पूर्ण विध्वंस (म्युच्युुअली अशुअर्ड डिस्ट्रक्शन) करण्याची भीती असल्यामुळे युद्धं टाळली जायची. सुरुवातीला अण्वस्त्रधारी देशांनी हिरोशिमा आणि नागासाकी उद्ध्वस्त करणार्‍या बॉम्बच्या अनेक पट क्षमता असणारी अण्वस्त्रे विकसित केली. पण, त्यातील फोलपणा लक्षात आल्यानंतर नंतरच्या काळात कमी क्षमतेची, पण लक्ष्यावर अचूक मारा करणारी अण्वस्त्रे विकसित केली जाऊ लागली. संपूर्ण शहराचा किंवा सर्व लोकसंख्येचा निःपात न करता केवळ आक्रमण करणारी सैन्याची तुकडी, लष्करी तळ, महत्त्वाची बंदरं किंवा प्रकल्पांनाच लक्ष्य करण्यासाठी बनवली आहेत. पाकिस्तान अशी तयारी करत असताना भारताचे हात मात्र पहिले वापर न करण्याच्या धोरणाने बांधले गेले होते.
 
मोदी सरकारने सुरक्षेला सर्वोच्च प्राधान्य दिले आहे. दहशतवाद्यांच्या हल्ल्याची वाट न बघता प्रत्यक्ष नियंत्रण रेषा आणि वेळ पडल्यास आंतरराष्ट्रीय सीमा पार करून भारत ते उद्ध्वस्त करेल, हे आपण प्रत्यक्ष करून दाखवले. बालाकोट येथील हवाई हल्ल्यापासून इमरान खान सातत्याने अण्वस्त्र युद्धाची आणि परस्परांच्या विध्वंसाची शक्यता वर्तवत आहेत. आपण एक जबाबदार अण्वस्त्रधारी देश असल्याचे भारताने गेली २० वर्षं जगाला दाखवून दिले आहे. राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षेसाठी बदलत्या काळानुसार धोरणात बदल करणेही आवश्यक असते. अफगाणिस्तानमध्ये पुन्हा एकदा तालिबानची सत्ता आली तर भारताच्या पश्चिम सीमेवर दहशतवादी कारवायांमध्ये मोठ्या प्रमाणावर वाढ होणार आहे. अण्वस्त्रे किंवा त्याबाबतचे तंत्रज्ञान अतिरेकी किंवा पाकिस्तानमधील धर्मांध लष्करी अधिकार्‍यांच्या हातात पडण्याची भीतीदेखील आहे. या पार्श्वभूमीवर पाकिस्तान आणि चीनला इशारा देणे भारतासाठी आवश्यक होते. रक्षामंत्री राजनाथ सिंहांनी नाव न घेता तेच केले आहे

Wednesday, 7 November 2018

संरक्षणसज्जतेचा ‘त्रिशूल’ (अग्रलेख) सकाळ

यंदाची दीपावली समस्त भारतीयांसाठी एक शुभ वर्तमान घेऊन आली आहे! भारतीय नौदलाच्या इतिहासात सुवर्णाक्षरांनी नोंदला जाणारा हा क्षण असून, त्यामुळे अवघ्या भारतवर्षाची मान ताठ झाली आहे. एका अर्थाने धनत्रयोदशीच्या दिवशी, स्वदेशी बनावटीची पहिली आण्विक पाणबुडी ‘आयएनएस अरिहंत’च्या रूपाने भारतीयांना मोठीच भेट मिळाली आहे. ‘अरिहंत’मुळे आता जमीन, सागरी आणि आकाश अशा तिन्ही मार्गाने आण्विक मारा करण्याची क्षमता आपल्याकडे निर्माण झाली आहे. त्यामुळे ‘अण्वस्त्रांच्या जोरावर भारताला धमक्‍या देणाऱ्या देशांना आपण दिलेले हे ठोस उत्तर आहे,’ असे सार्थ प्रतिपादन पंतप्रधान नरेंद्र मोदी यांनी केले आहे. या निमित्ताने काही जुन्या स्मृती जागृत होणे स्वाभाविकच म्हणावे लागेल. भारताने १९७१ मध्ये बांगलादेश मुक्‍तिसंग्रामात उडी घेतली, तेव्हा भारतावर दबाव आणण्यासाठी अमेरिकेने आपले ‘सातवे आरमार’ बंगालच्या उपसागरात आणले होते. त्या वेळी अर्थातच भारतीय नौदलाकडे अशी अणुसज्जता नव्हती. तरीही इंदिरा गांधी यांच्या नेतृत्वाखालील भारत त्या दबावाला बळी पडला नव्हता. त्यानंतरच्या पाच-साडेपाच दशकांत पुलाखालून बरेच पाणी वाहून गेले. सत्तरच्या त्याच दशकात भारताने पोखरणमध्ये यशस्वी अणुचाचणी करून, आपल्या सामर्थ्याचे दर्शन घडविले. पुढे नव्वदच्या दशकांत पुनश्‍च एकवार अणुचाचणी करून भारत आता मागे नाही, याची प्रचिती तत्कालिन पंतप्रधान अटलबिहारी वाजपेयी यांनी जगाला आणून दिली. तेव्हापासून भारत संरक्षणसज्जता वाढविण्यासाठी सातत्याने प्रयत्नशील आहे आणि आता ‘अरिहंत’ या आण्विक पाणबुडीने आपली पहिली गस्त यशस्वीरीत्या पुरी केल्यामुळे भारत हा आण्विक पाणबुडी बनविणारा अमेरिका, रशिया, चीन अशा काही देशांनंतरचा सहावा देश ठरला आहे.
खरे तर अशा प्रकारच्या आण्विक पाणबुडीच्या निर्मितीस १९७० मध्ये मंजुरी दिली गेली होती. त्यानंतर या पाणबुडीच्या निर्मितीची योजना तपशीलवारपणे आखली गेली. मात्र, अनेक कारणांनी ती प्रत्यक्षात उतरू शकली नाही. पुढे २००९ मध्ये तत्कालिन पंतप्रधान डॉ. मनमोहनसिंग यांच्या उपस्थितीत ‘अरिहंत’ नौदलामध्ये दाखल झाली. ‘न्यूक्‍लिअर कमांड ॲथॉरिटी’च्या अखत्यारीत असलेल्या या पाणबुडीची अनेक महत्त्वपूर्ण वैशिष्ट्ये आहेत. मुळात ‘अरिहंत’ या शब्दाचा अर्थच शत्रूचा विनाश करणारा, असा आहे. मात्र, ‘भारताची अण्वस्त्रक्षमता ही कोणत्याही देशावर आक्रमण करण्यासाठी नाही,’ असे पंतप्रधानांनी या पाणबुडीवरील कर्मचारी व अधिकाऱ्यांचा सत्कार करताना स्पष्ट केले आहे. यापूर्वी भारताकडे भूपृष्ठावरून म्हणजे जमिनीवरून अण्वस्त्रे डागणारी ‘अग्नी-पाच’ क्षेपणास्त्रे उपलब्ध होती. आता या पाणबुडीमुळे जलपृष्ठावरून म्हणजेच सागरातून अण्वस्त्रे डागण्याची क्षमता आपण संपादन केली आहे. त्यामुळे अण्वस्त्रांचा धाक दाखवून भारताला ‘ब्लॅकमेल’ करू पाहणाऱ्या देशांना एका अर्थाने दिलेला हा स्पष्ट संदेशच आहे. ‘अरिहंत’मुळे कोणत्याही प्रकारच्या संघर्षात प्रतिस्पर्धी आक्रमकाला जशास तसे उत्तर देण्याच्या भारताच्या क्षमतेत मोठीच वाढ झाली आहे. गेली काही दशके भारतीय नौदल अशा प्रकारची पाणबुडी आपल्या ताफ्यात कधी दाखल होते, याची वाट बघत होते. आता ते काम पूर्ण झाल्यामुळे समस्त नौदल सैनिकांनी ‘शं नो वरुण:’ या आपल्या ब्रीदवाक्‍याचा गजर केला असणार, यात शंकाच नाही.
‘अरिहंत’ पाणबुडीचे आणखी एक वैशिष्ट्य म्हणजे ती पाण्याखाली असताना सहजासहजी कोणत्याही यंत्रणेच्या माध्यमातून ‘डिटेक्‍ट’ होऊ शकत नाही! शिवाय, अणुभट्टीच्या माध्यमातून मिळणाऱ्या ऊर्जेवर ती चालत असल्यामुळे ‘अरिहंत’ प्रदीर्घ काळ पाण्याखाली राहू शकते. या पाणबुडीवर ७५० ते ३५०० किलोमीटर इतक्‍या प्रदीर्घ अंतरापर्यंत डागता येणारी शस्त्रास्त्रे आहेत. त्यापेक्षा जास्त म्हणजे पाच हजार किलोमीटरपर्यंत अण्वस्त्रे डागता येणाऱ्या अशा प्रकारच्या पाणबुड्या फक्‍त अमेरिका, रशिया आणि चीन यांच्याकडेच आहेत, हे लक्षात घेतले की या पाणबुडीच्या निर्मितीनंतरही भारताला पुढे बरीच प्रगती करावयाची आहे, हे लक्षात येते.
अर्थात, जागतिक स्तरावर रोजच्या रोज आधुनिक शस्त्रांस्त्रांच्या निर्मितीत होत असलेली वेगवान प्रगती लक्षात घेतली, तरीही भारताच्या वाटचालीतील हा एक गौरवशाली क्षण आहे. अशा प्रकारच्या आण्विक पाणबुडीच्या निर्मितीने भारताने एक मोठी झेप घेतली आहे. आपल्या शेजाऱ्यांच्या वाढत्या उपद्रवामुळे संरक्षणधोरणात अशा प्रकारच्या सामर्थ्यसंपादनाला अलीकडील काळात अधिक महत्त्व आले आहे. देशाच्या सीमा सुरक्षित राहण्यासाठी आणि शांतता नांदण्यासाठी सदैव संरक्षणसज्ज असणे गरजेचे आहे आणि ‘अरिहंत’ हे त्या दिशेने टाकलेले दमदार पाऊल आहे, हे निःसंशय.

Thursday, 6 April 2017

सीरियातील विषारी संहार Maharashtra Times

यादवीने ग्रस्त असलेल्या सीरियाला रासायनिक हल्लेही नवीन नसले, तरी खान शेखून या शहरामध्ये मंगळवारी झालेल्या हल्ल्याने धोक्याची सीमा ओलांडली आहे. लहान मुले आणि महिलांसह सुमारे ७५ जणांचा बळी घेणाऱ्या आणि अनेकांना अपंगत्व आणणाऱ्या या हल्ल्याने जग हादरले असून, अमेरिका आणि रशिया यांच्यातील सीरियावरून असलेली दरी आणखी रुंदावण्याची चिन्हे निर्माण झाली आहेत. बंडखोरांचा बीमोड करण्यासाठी सीरियाचे अध्यक्ष बशर अल असद यांनीच हा हल्ला घडवून आणल्याचा आरोप अमेरिका, ब्रिटन, फ्रान्स आदी अनेक देशांनी केला असून, संयुक्त राष्ट्रांच्या सुरक्षा परिषदेत असद यांच्या विरोधात ठराव आणण्याचे संकेतही दिले जात आहेत. सुन्नी बंडखोर, कुर्दिश बंडखोर आणि इस्लामिक स्टेट असे विविध बंडखोर गट आणि सीरिया सरकार यांच्यातील गेल्या सहा वर्षांच्या यादवीत आतापर्यंत पाच लाख लोकांचा बळी गेला असून, तेथील सुमारे एक कोटी जनतेने स्थलांतर केले आहे. क्रौर्याच्या सर्व सीमा ओलांडणाऱ्या या यादवीत असद राजवटीने केलेली दडपशाही काही कमी नाही. २०१३ मध्ये दमास्कस येथे रासायनिक हल्ला झाला होता आणि त्यामध्ये सुमारे दीड हजार जणांचा बळी गेला होता. हा हल्लाही असद यांनी घडवून आणल्याचा आरोप होता. त्यावेळी अमेरिकेने सीरियावर कारवाई करू नये म्हणून असद राजवटीने रशियाच्या मदतीने रासायनिक अस्त्रांबाबतच्या करारावर सही केली. मात्र, त्यानंतरही त्यांचा वापर सुरूच असल्याचे खान शेखून हल्ल्यातून स्पष्ट झाले आहे. २०१३ प्रमाणेच रशिया असद यांच्यामागे ठामपणे उभी आहे. बंडखोरांकडून टाकण्यात येणाऱ्या शस्त्रांतील रसायनांची गळती झाली असल्याची शक्यता मॉस्कोने व्यक्त केली आहे. सीरियाला असलेला आपला पाठिंबा कायम राहणार असल्याचे रशियाने निःसंदिग्ध शब्दांत सांगितले आहे. खान शेखून हल्ल्यात सरिन नर्व्ह गॅसचा वापर झाल्याचा अंदाज अमेरिकी गुप्तचर संस्थांनी व्यक्त केला आहे. अमेरिकेचे अध्यक्ष डोनाल्ड ट्रम्प हे रशियाबरोबरील संबंध मधुर करतील, असे बोलले जात असले, तरी सीरियावरून या दोन देशांमधील मतभेद वाढण्याची चिन्हे आहेत. ट्रम्प यांनी सुरुवातीला असद यांच्याबाबत सौम्य भूमिका घेतली होती. सीरियामधील अमेरिकेच्या भूमिकेबाबत मत मांडताना, असद यांना हटविण्यावर भर देणार नसल्याचे मत ट्रम्प प्रशासनाने गेल्याच आठवड्यात मांडले होते. मात्र, मंगळवारच्या हल्ल्यानंतर असद यांच्याकडे पाहण्याचा आपला दृष्टिकोन बदलल्याचे त्यांनी जाहीर केले आहे. त्याचबरोबर अमेरिकेचे माजी अध्यक्ष बराक ओबामा यांच्यावरही ट्रम्प बरसले आहेत. ओबामा यांनी रासायनिक अस्त्रांबाबत ‘रेड लाइन’ आखणार असल्याचे म्हटले होते. मात्र, ओबामांनी प्रत्यक्षात काहीही केले नसल्याचा आरोप करीत ट्रम्प यांनी, मंगळवारच्या हल्ल्यांनी ‘लाल रेषा’च नव्हे, तर अन्य अनेक रेषा ओलांडल्याचे म्हटले आहे. अशा प्रकारे सीरियावरून अमेरिका आणि रशिया समोरासमोर उभे ठाकले आहेत. सीरियातील यादवीत बड्या देशांचे हितसंबंध असल्याने त्याला आंतरराष्ट्रीय परिमाण लाभले आहे. त्यामुळे तेथील प्रश्नाची गुंतागुंत वाढतच चालली आहे. सीरियातील रासायनिक हल्ल्यानंतर वाहिले जाणारे अश्रू हे नक्राश्रू असल्याची शंका म्हणून दृढ होते.

Friday, 10 February 2017

WATCH ME LIVE TV 9 MARATHI 0830-9 PM TODAY PAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS


1) पाकिस्तान के अखबार 'द डॉन' में लिखा गया है कि भारत ने एक 'सीक्रेट न्यूक्लियर सिटी' बनाई है. जिसके चलते दक्षिण एशिया में रणनीतिक संतुलन बिगड़ने का खतरा है. पाकिस्तान के विदेश मंत्रालय के प्रवक्ता नफीस जकारिया ने आरोप लगाया है कि भारत ने परमाणु हथियारों का जखीरा जमा किया है. इतना ही नहीं उनका आरोप है कि भारत ने आईसीबीएम यानी अंतर-महाद्वीपीय मिसाइलों (inter continental ballistic missiles) का परीक्षण भी किया है. पाकिस्तान के इन आरोपों में कितनी सच्चाई है. अगर यह सच है तो इसका क्या प्रभाव पड़ेगा. इस खबर पर अपनी राय दें. 2) डॉन में छपी खबर के मुताबिक नफीस जकारिया ने गुरुवार को ये जानकारी दी कि भारत द्वारा 'सीक्रेट न्यूक्लियर सिटी 'बनाने से साउथ एशिया के पॉवर बैलेंस पर असर पड़ रहा है. पाकिस्तान की नजर में किस तरह पावर बैलेंस पर असर पड़ेगा. और पाकिस्तान को इससे क्या डर है और क्यों डर है? 3) पाकिस्तान के विदेश मंत्रालय के प्रवक्ता नफीस जकारिया ने यह भी आरोप लगाया है कि भारत पाकिस्तान को दुनिया में अलग-थलग करने के चक्कर में लगा हुआ है. और पाकिस्तान को अलग-थलग करने की भारत की इन कोशिशों का खुलासा हो चुका है. भारत अपने मंसूबे को पूरा करने में कामयाब नहीं सका है.' उन्होंने आगे कहा कि 'भारत सरकार को शांति के लिए पाकिस्तान की तरफ से उठाए गए कदमों का समर्थन करना चाहिए.' पाकिस्तान के इस स्टैंड पर अपनी राय दें. 4) इंस्टीट्यूट ऑफ स्ट्रैटजिक स्टडीज इस्लामाबाद की तरफ से पिछले साल एक रिपोर्ट प्रकाशित की गई थी. जिसमें कहा गया था कि भारत के पास 356 से 492 न्यूक्लियर बम बनाने के लिए पर्याप्त सामग्री और तकनीकी क्षमता है. 'इंडियन अनसेफगार्ड न्यूक्लियर प्रोग्राम' के नाम से जारी की गई इस रिपोर्ट का मकसद भारत के जटिल न्यूक्लियर प्रोग्राम के सही इतिहास, आकार और क्षमता की जानकारी इकट्ठा करना था. भारत की न्यूक्लियर कैपेबिलिटीज के बारे में आपका क्या कहना है? 5) एक ख़ुफ़िया रिपोर्ट से खुलासा हुआ है कि सर्जिकल स्ट्राइक के बाद पाकिस्तान अपनी सीमा के अंदर भारी किलेबंदी कर रहा है और बंकर बना रहा है. वह पक्के निगरानी चौकी भी बना रहा है. मल्टी एजेंसी सेंटर (MAC) ने इस बारे में पूरी रिपोर्ट गृह मंत्रालय और NSA को भेजी है. भारतीय सुरक्षा एजेंसियों को पाकिस्तान के बड़े निर्माण और बंकर की चौकाने वाली तस्वीरें और वीडियो मिले हैं. रिपोर्ट के अनुसार पाकिस्तानी सीमा के अंदर बंकर और बड़े-बड़े निर्माण कार्यों में तेजी हो रही है. पाक ने अंतररास्ट्रीय सीमा पर रह रही जनसंख्या को भी हटा दिया है. रिपोर्ट के अनुसार राजस्थान के नॉर्थ जैसलमेर और श्री गंगानगर में सीमा के उस पर पाकिस्तान द्वारा भारी निर्माण किया जा रहा है. पाकिस्तान में हो रहे इस डेवलपमेंट को आप किस नजर से देखते हैं. 6) चीन का कहना है कि मसूद अजहर पर यूएन की पाबंदी से पाक पर भारतीय दबाव बढ़ सकता है. मसूद अजहर पर बैन को रोकने की वजह उसने यह बताई कि भारत और पाकिस्तान को मिलकर बातचीत से इसका हल ढूंढना चाहिए, जबकि भारत की नजर में यह ग्लोबल टेररिज्म से जुड़ा मुद्दा है और सिर्फ भारत और पाकिस्तान से इसका संबंध नहीं. और ग्लोबल टेरर से निपटने के लिए पूरी दुनिया को साथ आना चाहिए. आप चीन के इस रूख पर और इस डेवलपमेंट पर अपनी राय दें. 7) भारत, पाकिस्तान और चीन से जुड़े रिसेंट डेवलपमेंट पर आप अपनी तरफ से कुछ कहना चाहें तो जरूर कहें.

Sunday, 18 December 2016

The long awaited fourth test of India’s Agni-V missile will mark a major milestone in the development of India’s Credible Minimum Deterrent posture (CMD).


The long awaited fourth test of India’s Agni-V missile will mark a major milestone in the development of India’s Credible Minimum Deterrent posture (CMD). Expected in late 2015 or early to mid-2016, this test has been delayed for a number of reasons, technical and political. Now reportedly scheduled for either the last week of December (the 26th being mentioned as a possible launch date) or early January 2017, it is to be hoped that nothing prevents the test from being conducted and that it is successful when it finally does take place. It is pertinent for readers to appreciate the quite dramatic shift that the eventual deployment of the Agni-V will mark in the evolution of the Indian nuclear arsenal. While the first two launches of the Agni-V – on 19 April 2012 and 15 September 2013 respectively – were of the standard Indian uncanisterised missile, following the patter set with the Agni variants I through IV, the last test on 31 January 2015 was of a canisterised system mounted on a road mobile platform. The planned fourth test will seek to validate the canister launch system as well as the missile’s performance. Where the Agni-V is a potential game changer is in respect of the implications of its canister-launch system. This enables a missile to be kept in a state of readiness which permits rapid launching as well as offering the potential for reloading the launcher. By being placed on a road-mobile launcher, the missile will be much more survivable in the event of a preemptive strike. This is in contrast to the Agni II and Agni III, which are rail-mobile and thus less flexible. It is interesting to note that India has chosen to keep all of its land-based missiles on mobile launchers as opposed to basing them in underground silos. This has been done to enhance the survivability of these assets. Compared to the Agni-V, the Agni-I through IV variants are shorter ranged and are not encapsulated in a canister. This may be rectified in the case of the Agni-V as the missile lends itself to the canister-based format. Having missiles in a ready-to-launch mode would invariably mean mating the nuclear warheads to the missiles. It has been the subject of much speculation – some informed and much uninformed – about whether India keeps its missile warheads mated or de-mated. While de-mating warheads is an option with missiles such as the Agni-I to IV, it is not practical with canister-based systems – or with ballistic missile submarines for that matter. The Agni-V thus portends a shift in India’s nuclear deployment strategy. Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) claims that the Agni-V has a range of “more than 5,500km”. This is a masterly example of obfuscation. Chinese analysts have speculated that the range of the Agni-V exceeds 8,000km and that India is understating the missile’s range deliberately. This assertion has found some support with Indian analysts such as Dr Bharat Karnad agreeing with the estimation and urging India to conduct a full-range test. Whether it is true or not, India should not be shy about declaring the full range of its missiles and testing them accordingly. The upcoming test of the Agni-V is officially listed as a development trial – the final such test before production begins. However, it is suggested that the opportunity be taken to bring the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) into the trials process and even familiarise them with the production facilities at an early stage. Treating this test as a development-cum-user trial will facilitate faster induction of the Agni-V into the SFC. Beyond the Agni-V tests, India must start articulating a clearer outline of what its CMD might envisage. This need not be made fully public but right now there is a deafening silence in respect of what CMD entails. Some degree of ambiguity is expected but now, with canister-based ready-to-launch missiles with mated warheads, it may be useful for India to shed a bit more light on its deterrent posture, if only to reassure its own citizens in the face of regular nuclear sabre-rattling from Pakistan and some thinly-veiled threats from China every time India defies Beijing. Indeed, since India began producing the Agni-II back in 2002, there have been questions about production capacity and the rate of induction of missiles. When Dr Christopher, director general of DRDO indicated that as of 2015 DRDO had met only 20 per cent of the SFC’s missile production capacity requirement and was only now boosting production, eyebrows should have been raised. Indeed, Dr Christopher was very clear that Agni-I and Agni-II would be produced in greater numbers. Where does that leave production of Agni-III, IV and V? Furthermore, given that the range of Agni-III is deemed to be roughly that of Agni-IV, does production of the former make sense? It is reported that thus far, the three launches of Agni-III and two of Agni-IV have been undertaken entirely by the SFC. Does this mean that Agni-III and Agni-IV are in serial production? The answers to these questions have often been somewhat vague with terms like “inducted into service” being common. This does little to give any guidance on what capacity has been developed. That the Agni-I and Agni-II are continuing to be produced and the III and IV being deemed “inducted into service” suggests that multiple production lines exist. Moreover, how do production facilities intend to cope with the pending induction of the INS Arihant and its K-15 (and later K-4) missiles? The answers to these questions cannot, for obvious reasons, be made public, but it is hoped that all necessary consideration and priority is being accorded to developing and sustaining the requisite production capacity. Furthermore, the SFC has given little indication of its functioning or its capabilities. Only a speech delivered by Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary of India, in 2013, shed some light on command, control and communications features and the chain of command. This was most welcome but it is suggested that some controlled communication from the SFC is necessary and indeed essential to demonstrate the maturity and credibility of the country’s CMD. Thus, as the intended date for the fourth Agni-V test draws near, it is recommended that the SFC, in consultation with the government, release some information on itself and its functioning and capabilities. In trying to hide everything, there is the risk of the credibility of the deterrent being compromised or excessive ambiguity being raised. As a mature nuclear power on the verge of deploying fully mated warheads on ready to launch missiles, it behooves India to be a little clearer as to its current nuclear status without compromising essential secrecy. In the meantime, it is hoped that India pursues its missile testing programme as aggressively as possible, accepting neither caps nor restrictions on range, production, or deployment of ballistic and induct such systems as are required in as rapid a time as possible. The nation deserves nothing less.

Sunday, 20 November 2016

Breaking the N-silence Parrikar has broken a tradition of sphinx-like silence, wherein his two UPA predecessors rarely acknowledged the existence of India’s nuclear deterrent or even mentioned the ‘N’ word.

Written by Arun Prakash | Published:November 19, 2016 12:28 am Manohar Parrikar, India, India nuclear power, nuclear power india, india nukes, nukes in india, india news, india military, india defenceDefence Minister Manohar Parrikar comes out of Rajya Sabha on the opening day of the winter session of Parliament in New Delhi on Wednesday. (PTI Photo) Raksha Mantri (RM) Manohar Parrikar’s seemingly wayward remarks about India’s nuclear posture may have stirred a hornet’s nest in the media, but if they are indicative of a new-found interest in security matters amongst decision-makers, this occurrence needs to be lauded. Given their preoccupation with electoral politics, it is worrying to see how little time and mental space our political leaders devote to national security. Nowhere is this neglect more worrisome than in the area of higher defence management and the existential complexities of our nuclear deterrent. Even if he was expressing personal views, which may or may not be in consonance with state policy or media perceptions, Parrikar has broken a tradition of sphinx-like silence, wherein his two UPA predecessors rarely acknowledged the existence of India’s nuclear deterrent or even mentioned the ‘N’ word. The RM’s off-the-cuff remarks will serve a useful purpose if they trigger a debate on nuclear issues that include India’s hastily made commitments to no-first-use (NFU), a “minimal” arsenal and the self-imposed moratorium on testing. After all, the BJP’s 2014 election manifesto had promised to”study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times”. Defence Minister Parrikar bats for 'be unpredictable' policy in nuclear strategy  India’s hesitant journey to nuclear weaponisation was shaped, on the one hand, by a utopian vision of a nuclear-free world and, on the other, by the persistent urging of scientists like Homi Bhabha. Janus-faced, India embarked on this programme in which the task of charting the nation’s path in the fields of nuclear and missile technology was entrusted, in entirety, to the country’s scientific enclave. While enabling “plausible deniability” on the part of the politician, this paradigm perpetuated two flaws which persist till today: The omission of any independent oversight for evaluation of, often unrealistic, scientific plans and claims; and the exclusion of the armed forces from all aspects of our strategic programmes. Come Pokharan II, in which the only military involvement related to site excavation work, a draft nuclear doctrine was released in mid-1999, which promised “punitive” retaliation against a nuclear attack, and made a pledge of “no-first-use”, in respect of states which were non-nuclear and had no nuclear umbrella. Four years later, in the finalised nuclear doctrine, the term “punitive retaliation” was replaced by the somewhat implausible “massive retaliation” and the principle of NFU applied to all nations except those posing chemical or biological weapon threats. India’s espousal of a credible “minimum” deterrent conveyed the impression that it would be content with a small number of nuclear devices, and politicians, unfamiliar with the subject, spoke of “a few” nuclear weapons as sufficient to deter a nuclear adversary. However, a simple calculation would have revealed such beliefs to be delusional and even dangerous. The restraint imposed by NFU would require India to suffer the loss of a substantive number of its warheads to an enemy first-strike and then be in a position to retaliate (using the surviving warheads) with a strike that would inflict “unacceptable damage”. This clearly shows that a state pledged to NFU must always have more warheads than our enemies can launch in a first strike. Given that China has a large stockpile and Pakistan is racing ahead with production of plutonium warheads, the concept of “minimum” becomes irrelevant. If the enemy comes to believe that India cannot launch a massive retaliatory strike — for want of enough warheads or other reasons — our deterrent will lose its credibility. But “deterrence breakdown” is a scenario never contemplated by our strategists. Pakistan is now brandishing low-yield short-range missiles — termed tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) — with the intention of lowering the nuclear threshold and, thus, deterring India’s putative “Cold Start” doctrine. So far, India’s stance has been that no matter what label Pakistan puts on its nukes, India will persist with its doctrine of massive retaliation. This posture should provoke thought firstly, because the destruction of a densely populated Pakistani metropolis in response to a TNW attack on a small Indian military unit (possibly on Pakistani soil or even at sea) will flout the principle of proportional response as well international opinion. Secondly, a nuclear first-strike will not only inflict casualties and mayhem, but the accompanying electro-magnetic pulse would also “fry” computer systems and jam communications. Given the entropy in our cities, political authorisation and launching of a retaliatory strike may become problematic. So, when Parrikar asks rhetorically, “Why should I bind myself to NFU. Why say that I am not going to use it?”, he is implying that ambiguity may have a role in deterrence. India has a well-deserved reputation for responsible conduct in the nuclear domain. Do we need to provide a cast-iron guarantee to potential adversaries that they are immune from attack, even if seen to be preparing for a first strike? The NFU option is best left open-ended or unstated. Two other observations of the RM call for brief comments. Firstly, while doctrinal “unpredictability” may be a virtue as far as adversaries are concerned, the total absence of white papers, defence reviews and, above all, a security doctrine, constitutes a huge void in India’s strategic domain. Secondly, the one factor that detracts from the credibility of India’s deterrent posture is the stark absence of a chief of defence staff. India’s adversaries, no doubt, reason that a country that permits a part-time rotational military functionary to preside over its nuclear arsenal could not be serious about nuclear deterrence. There is absolutely no need for the PM or RM to seek a consensus from the service chiefs to install a CDS. If the government considers it necessary in the national interest, they must appoint a CDS by fiat without further delay

Wednesday, 16 November 2016

Don’t nuke the debate-Manohar Parrikar has suggested a re-evaluation of ‘no-first-use’. nuclear doctrines are not written in stone-The essence of the defence minister’s introspection was that ambiguity enhances deterrence.


. While speaking at the launch of The New Arthashastra: A Security Strategy for India (HarperCollins India, 2016), the book I have edited on India’s national security strategy, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said that there should be an element of unpredictability in the country’s military strategy. Thinking aloud while answering a question, he wondered whether India’s nuclear doctrine should be constrained by a “no first use” posture. He mentioned the advantages of unpredictability and said, “If a written strategy exists, you are giving away your strength. Why should India bind itself (to no first use)? India is a responsible nuclear power and (it should suffice to say that) we will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly.” The essence of the defence minister’s introspection was that ambiguity enhances deterrence. This view has been expressed by several nuclear strategists. However, he emphasised several times that there was no change in India’s nuclear doctrine and that he was expressing a personal view. While he has been criticised, there can be no doubt that fresh thinking is invaluable to the discourse on the subject. There is no justification for the belief held by some that the nuclear doctrine should be debated only in government circles and not in public. Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling et al and, nearer home, K. Subrahmanyam, Jasjit Singh and several others have made sterling contributions to advancing thought on nuclear deterrence. With a pacifist strategic culture steeped in Gandhian non-violence, India is a reluctant nuclear power. India believes that nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting; their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. India’s nuclear doctrine is built around “credible minimum deterrence” and professes a “no first use” posture. As a corollary, India is willing to absorb the damage that a nuclear first strike may cause and has declared its intention to launch massive retaliation to cause unacceptable damage in return. Consequently, India follows a policy of deterrence by punishment through a counter value targeting strategy aimed at the destruction of the adversary’s major cities and industrial centres. A doctrine is a set of beliefs and principles that guide the actions of military forces in support of a nation’s objectives. According to C. Von Clausewitz in On War: “Doctrine is a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books: It will light their way, ease their progress, train their judgement and help them to avoid pitfalls. Doctrine is meant to educate the minds of future commanders… not to accompany them to the battlefields.” Nuclear doctrines are not written in stone and are never absolutely rigid. They are not binding international treaties that must be adhered to in letter and spirit. The purpose of doctrine is partly declaratory — that is, to enhance deterrence by making public one’s intentions; partly to provide the basis for organising a country’s nuclear force structure, including the command and control system; and, partly to reassure one’s own people and, where applicable, one’s allies. If deterrence breaks down, publicly declared doctrine becomes irrelevant and goes out of the window. During a crisis involving nuclear exchanges, the essence of national military strategy would lie in preventing escalation and minimising civilian and military casualties and material damage while ensuring the survival of the state. The Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) will decide how to retaliate based on the advice given by the Executive Council, of which the army, navy and air force chiefs are members. The method and mode of the retaliation will take into account the prevailing operational-strategic situation and the likely responses of the adversary, especially the probability of further nuclear exchanges. The assessment will also include the reactions of the international community — the threats held out, the appeals made and the course of the discussions held in the United Nations Security Council. Almost 14 years have passed since India’s nuclear doctrine was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) after reviewing the progress in the operationalisation of nuclear deterrence. The doctrine was enunciated in the Government of India statement issued on January 4, 2003. Since then, many new developments have taken place, including the development of “full spectrum deterrence” by Pakistan. Hence, a review of the nuclear doctrine is long overdue. In fact, a review should be carried out every five years. In its manifesto for the general elections of May 2014, the BJP had promised such a review, but no move appears to have been made in this direction so far. Credible minimum deterrence and the posture of no-first-use have stood the test of time. There is no conceivable operational contingency that justifies a first strike, because it is guaranteed to result in the destruction of several great cities when the adversary retaliates with the nuclear forces that it will still have left in its kitty after absorbing India’s first strike. India’s declared strategy is that of massive retaliation. Ideally, the retaliatory strategy should have been “punitive retaliation, to inflict unacceptable damage”, as envisaged in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 17, 1999, prepared by the first National Security Advisory Board headed by K. Subrahmanyam. This would have permitted flexible response that offers a range of options. However, massive retaliation is a viable deterrence strategy that has served India well; any change now would not be beneficial. It would even deter Pakistani plans to use tactical nuclear warheads (TNWs) against Indian forces on Pakistani soil as they cannot possibly risk massive retaliation that would result in the destruction of all major cities and lead to the end of Pakistan as a cohesive nation state. However, the credibility of massive retaliation needs to be enhanced through a carefully formulated signalling plan. Signalling should be based on an elaborate plan designed to showcase the preparedness of India’s nuclear forces and the firmness of its political will

Sunday, 6 October 2013

Nuclear effects of Agni-V

Nuclear effects of Agni-VBy Bharat karnad Published: 04th October 2013 07:22 AM Last Updated: 04th October 2013 07:22 AM The Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), Hyderabad, along with the other project in mission-mode, Advanced Technology Vehicle (the nuclear-powered ballistic missile-firing Arihant submarine, SSBN), are the two jewels in the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) crown. Under high-class chiefs R N Agarwal, Avinash Chander (recently promoted to head DRDO), and now G K Sekharan, ASL has rescued DRDO’s reputation, of course. But it has, with the second launch of the Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile on September 16, also saved the credibility of India’s strategic deterrent with thermonuclear pretensions from being completely eroded. But, first, why is India’s claim to thermonuclear status mere pretence? Well, because, Dr R Chidambaram, the one-time chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and, for the last decade, adviser on science and technology to the PM, despite being a scientist doesn’t believe in collecting empirical data! Along with strategic enclave stalwarts like the late K Subrahmanyam and the school of thought the latter spawned, he urged the Narasimha Rao government in the mid-90s, for instance, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, arguing that the data collected from the single 1974 8-12 kiloton (KT) nuclear test was quite enough for the country to have an adequate deterrent and that India need never test again. After the BJP government ordered the 1998 Shakti-series of nuclear tests anyway, and consistent with his previous advocacy, Chidambaram averred that the obvious malfunctioning of the thermonuclear weapon design tested in 1998 notwithstanding, India can rectify the flawed design and even update the weapons inventory by simply using computer simulation. By this standard, the Indian Air Force ought to operate combat aircraft entirely computer designed but never test-flown, and the army to induct an artillery piece that came out of a computer-assisted design shop but not test-fired. His unexplained and incomprehensible antipathy to nuclear testing has made a mockery of the country’s strategic wherewithal. On this issue, however, it is difficult to know where Chidambaram’s counsel ends and prime minister Manmohan Singh’s inclination to stick with the “no testing” central predicate of the nuclear deal with the US, begins. Consider this: China has conducted over 80 tests to India’s six tests in all. It has advanced technology such as inertial confinement fusion (to replicate thermonuclear explosions in miniature) and a Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility (to simulate and study the implosion of an atom bomb triggering the combustion of the thermonuclear fuel), which India lacks. Chinese computing speeds will reach some 100 petaflops (million-billion functions per second) by 2015 while Indian super computers at present are at the 250 terraflop (trillion functions per second) level. With all these advantages, China has embarked on a new round of nuclear arsenal modernisation and US weapons designers have warned that without new tests the performance of American nuclear arms cannot be guaranteed. New Delhi, in contrast, has all but sworn off nuclear testing, whence its boast of the Indian deterrent featuring high-yield thermonuclear weapons in the 125KT-275KT categories risks an enemy calling India’s bluff and borders on foolhardiness. So, that’s the problem: An Indian 275KT fusion bomb may, by fluke, reach the full yield or, as is more likely, produce yields anywhere between the high figure and the fission trigger level of 20KT! It’s this appalling uncertainty about the effects of the Indian thermonuclear weapons that’s created a real operational dilemma for the Strategic Forces Command. The ASL retrieved this intolerable deterrence situation somewhat with the accurate, lightweight, Agni-V missile. This Agni will eventually be all-composite, including the casing and rocket motors made of Kevlar-carbon-carbon, Guidance on Chip for terminal accuracy, and distributed communications nodes through the length of the missile to minimise wiring. As the two tests of this missile have proved, using the Russian Glonass GPS and the on-board inertial guidance system and ring laser gyroscope, 15-20 meter CEP (circular error probable — a measure of accuracy) at 5,500km range has been achieved. Moreover, armed with 4-8 MIRV (Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles) warheads — a technology permitting a single missile to carry multiple bombs for dispersed targeting that has been a “screwdriver’s turn away” from being test-ready but whose testing has not been approved by Manmohan Singh, the Agni-V range can be extended to intercontinental distances. In any case, even before this precision targeting capability was proved, official strategists trying to justify the test-moratorium began claiming that Agni missiles with single or MIRVed 20KT fission warheads will be just as daunting for any adversary, and that the strategic credibility and clout of India’s deterrent is, therefore, not in doubt. MIRVed Agni missiles do afford the strategic forces certainty of impact and versatility but 20KT warheads are not prime dissuaders. Missile accuracy at extreme range is fine but it is only the high-yield, preferably, high-yield thermonuclear armaments that really matter. The sheer scale of destruction promised by a single incoming megaton (MT)-warheaded missile can be guaranteed to induce the worst sort of dread in, and impose immense psychological stress and pressure on, the adversary state’s leadership, something the relatively small yield 20KT bomb simply cannot do. In any test of wills, the country armed with the 20KT weapons will fold before a state with MT weapons, call off the confrontation and, whatever is at stake, accept a compromise on the former’s terms. Then again, the Indian government has little understanding of conventional and, even less, nuclear deterrence when dealing with a powerful foe. In fact, India is so self-damagingly Pakistan-fixated on both counts it does not see the folly of training strategic weapons on a tactical-level threat. India is also an exception to the rule of nuclear weapons states nursing high-yield fusion arsenals. The standard issue warheads for the long range Dong Feng missiles being one megaton or 3.3MT, China can deter America. Weak-kneed Indian governments have not shown the gumption to resume thermonuclear testing to obtain a host of safe, proven, and reliable fusion weapons including the MT type to deter China

Monday, 9 May 2011

INDOPAK NUCLEAR WAR

Indo pak nuclear war WHY INDIA IS GREAT?


During the Cold War, if USA launched a nuke-loaded missile, Soviet
Satellites would inform the Soviet army in 3 seconds and in less than
45 seconds Soviet counter-missiles would be on their way.

Recent studies commissioned by US department of Defense included one
on nuclear war between India and Pakistan :

This was the scenario................

The Pakistan army decides to launch a nuke-missile towards India . They
don't need any permission from their government, and promptly order
the countdowns.

Indian technology is highly advanced. In less than 8 seconds, Indian
army detects the Pak countdown and decides to launch a missile in
retribution.

But they need permission from the Government of India.

They submit their request to the Indian President. The President
forwards it to the Cabinet. The Prime Minister calls an emergency Lok
Sabha session.

The LS meets, but due to several walkouts and severe protests by the
opposition, it gets adjourned indefinitely.

The President asks for a quick decision.

In the mean time, the Pak missile failed to take off due to technical
failure. Their attempts for a re-launch are still on.

Just then the Indian ruling party is reduced to a minority because a
party that was giving outside support withdraws it. The President asks
the PM to prove his majority within a week.

As the ruling party fails to win the confidence vote, a caretaker
government is installed.

The caretaker PM decides to permit the armed forces to launch a
nuclear missile. But the Election Commission says that a caretaker
government cannot take such a decision because elections are at hand.

The Election Commission files Public Interest Litigation in the
Supreme Court alleging misuse of power.

The Supreme Court comes to the rescue of the PM, and says the acting!
PM is authorized to take this decision in view of the emergency facing
the nation.

Just then one of the Pak missiles successfully took off, but it fell
367 miles away from the target, on its own government building in
Islamabad at 11.00AM.

Fortunately there were no casualties as no employee had reached the
office that early. In any case, the nuclear core of the missile had
detached somewhere in flight.

The Pakistan army is now trying to get better technologies from China
and USA . The Indian Government, taking no chances, decides to launch a
nuclear missile of its own, after convening an all-party meeting. This
time all the parties agree.

Its three months since the army had sought permission. But as
preparations begin, "pro-humanity",

"anti-nuclear" activists come out against the Government's decision.
Human chains are formed and Rasta rokos organized.

In California and Washington endless e-mails are sent to Indians
condemning the government and mentioning "Please forward it to as many
Indians as possible".

On the Pakistan side, the missiles kept malfunctioning. Some missiles
deviate from target due to technical failures or high-speed wind
blowing over Rajasthan.

Many of them land in the Indian Ocean killing some fishes.

A missile (smuggled from USA ) is pressed into service. Since the
Pakistan army is unable to understand its software, it hits it
original

destination: Russia .

Russians successfully intercepts the missile and in retaliation
launches a nuclear missile towards Islamabad . The missile hits the
target and creates havoc.

Pakistan cries for help. India expresses deep regrets for what has
happened and sends in a million dollars worth of Parle-G biscuits.

Thus India never gets to launch the missile

Saturday, 23 April 2011

Why I am not Worried About Japan’s Nuclear Reactors

This post is by a research scientist in Menlo Park, California. He is a PhD  Scientist, whose has extensive experience in the industry. I asked him to   write this information. It is a few hours old, so if any information is out   of date, blame me for the delay in getting it out. This is his text in full and unedited. It is very long, so get comfy.
Why I am not Worried About Japan’s Nuclear Reactors
I am writing this text (Mar 12) to give you some peace of mind regarding   some of the troubles in Japan, that is the safety of Japan’s nuclear   reactors. Up front, the situation is serious, but under control. And this   text is long! But you will know more about nuclear power plants after   reading it than all journalists on this planet put together.
There was and will *not* be any significant release of radioactivity.
By “significant” I mean a level of radiation of more than what you would   receive on – say – a long distance flight, or drinking a glass of beer that   comes from certain areas with high levels of natural background radiation.
I have been reading every news release on the incident since the   earthquake. There has not been one single (!) report that was accurate and  free of errors (and part of that problem is also a weakness in the Japanese crisis communication). By “not free of errors” I do not refer to  tendentious anti-nuclear journalism – that is quite normal these days. By  “not free of errors” I mean blatant errors regarding physics and natural   law, as well as gross misinterpretation of facts, due to an obvious lack of  fundamental and basic understanding of the way nuclear reactors are build  and operated. I have read a 3 page report on CNN where every single  paragraph contained an error.
Now, where does that leave us?

    ● The plant is safe now and will stay safe.
    ● Japan is looking at an INES Level 4 Accident: Nuclear accident with local consequences. That is bad for the company that owns the plant, but not for anyone else.
    ● Some radiation was released when the pressure vessel was vented. All radioactive isotopes from the activated steam have gone (decayed). A very small amount of Cesium was released, as well as Iodine. If you  were sitting on top of the plants’ chimney when they were venting, you should probably give up smoking to return to your former life expectancy. The Cesium and Iodine isotopes were carried out to the sea and will never be seen again.
    ● There was some limited damage to the first containment. That means that  some amounts of radioactive Cesium and Iodine will also be released into the cooling water, but no Uranium or other nasty stuff (the Uranium oxide does not “dissolve” in the water). There are facilities for treating the cooling water inside the third containment. The radioactive Cesium and Iodine will be removed there and eventually stored as radioactive waste in terminal storage.
    ● The seawater used as cooling water will be activated to some degree.
      Because the control rods are fully inserted, the Uranium chain reaction is not happening. That means the “main” nuclear reaction is not happening, thus not contributing to the activation.The intermediate radioactive materials (Cesium and Iodine) are also almost gone at this stage, because the Uranium decay was stopped a long time ago. This further reduces the activation. The bottom line is that there will be   some low level of activation of the seawater, which will also be   removed by the treatment facilities.
    ● The seawater will then be replaced over time with the “normal” cooling water.
    ● The reactor core will then be dismantled and transported to a processing facility, just like during a regular fuel change.
    ● Fuel rods and the entire plant will be checked for potential damage. This will take about 4-5 years.
    ● The safety systems on all Japanese plants will be upgraded to withstand  a 9.0 earthquake and tsunami (or worse).
    ● I believe the most significant problem will be a prolonged power shortage. About half of Japan’s nuclear reactors will probably have to  be inspected, reducing the nation’s power generating capacity by 15%.
·    This will probably be covered by running gas power plants that are usually only used for peak loads to cover some of the base load as well. That will increase your electricity bill, as well as lead to potential power shortages during peak demand, in Japan

Monday, 28 March 2011

NUCLEAR POWER I AM NOT WORRIED

This post is by a research scientist in Menlo Park, California. He is a PhD  Scientist, whose has extensive experience in the industry. I asked him to   write this information. It is a few hours old, so if any information is out   of date, blame me for the delay in getting it out. This is his text in full   and unedited. It is very long, so get comfy.

  Why I am not worried about Japan’s nuclear reactors

  I am writing this text (Mar 12) to give you some peace of mind regarding   some of the troubles in Japan, that is the safety of Japan’s nuclear   reactors. Up front, the situation is serious, but under control. And this   text is long! But you will know more about nuclear power plants after   reading it than all journalists on this planet put together.

  There was and will *not* be any significant release of radioactivity.

  By “significant” I mean a level of radiation of more than what you would   receive on – say – a long distance flight, or drinking a glass of beer that   comes from certain areas with high levels of natural background radiation.

  I have been reading every news release on the incident since the   earthquake. There has not been one single (!) report that was accurate and  free of errors (and part of that problem is also a weakness in the Japanese crisis communication). By “not free of errors” I do not refer to  tendentious anti-nuclear journalism – that is quite normal these days. By  “not free of errors” I mean blatant errors regarding physics and natural
  law, as well as gross misinterpretation of facts, due to an obvious lack of  fundamental and basic understanding of the way nuclear reactors are build  and operated. I have read a 3 page report on CNN where every single  paragraph contained an error.

  We will have to cover some fundamentals, before we get into what is going  on.

  Construction of the Fukushima nuclear power plants

  The plants at Fukushima are so called Boiling Water Reactors, or BWR for  short. Boiling Water Reactors are similar to a pressure cooker. The nuclear  fuel heats water, the water boils and creates steam, the steam then drives
  turbines that create the electricity, and the steam is then cooled and  condensed back to water, and the water send back to be heated by the  nuclear fuel. The pressure cooker operates at about 250 °C.

  The nuclear fuel is uranium oxide. Uranium oxide is a ceramic with a very  high melting point of about 3000 °C. The fuel is manufactured in pellets  (think little cylinders the size of Lego bricks). Those pieces are then put  into a long tube made of Zircaloy with a melting point of 2200 °C, and  sealed tight. The assembly is called a fuel rod. These fuel rods are then  put together to form larger packages, and a number of these packages are  then put into the reactor. All these packages together are referred to as  “the core”.

  The Zircaloy casing is the first containment. It separates the radioactive  fuel from the rest of the world.

  The core is then placed in the “pressure vessels”. That is the pressure  cooker we talked about before. The pressure vessels is the second  containment. This is one sturdy piece of a pot, designed to safely contain  the core for temperatures several hundred °C. That covers the scenarios  where cooling can be restored at some point.

  The entire “hardware” of the nuclear reactor – the pressure vessel and all  pipes, pumps, coolant (water) reserves, are then encased in the third  containment. The third containment is a hermetically (air tight) sealed,  very thick bubble of the strongest steel and concrete. The third  containment is designed, built and tested for one single purpose: To
  contain, indefinitely, a complete core meltdown. For that purpose, a large  and thick concrete basin is cast under the pressure vessel (the second  containment), all inside the third containment. This is the so-called “core  catcher”. If the core melts and the pressure vessel bursts (and eventually  melts), it will catch the molten fuel and everything else. It is typically
  built in such a way that the nuclear fuel will be spread out, so it can  cool down.

  This third containment is then surrounded by the reactor building. The  reactor building is an outer shell that is supposed to keep the weather  out, but nothing in. (this is the part that was damaged in the explosion,  but more to that later).

  Fundamentals of nuclear reactions

  The uranium fuel generates heat by nuclear fission. Big uranium atoms are  split into smaller atoms. That generates heat plus neutrons (one of the  particles that forms an atom). When the neutron hits another uranium atom,  that splits, generating more neutrons and so on. That is called the nuclear
  chain reaction.

  Now, just packing a lot of fuel rods next to each other would quickly lead  to overheating and after about 45 minutes to a melting of the fuel rods. It  is worth mentioning at this point that the nuclear fuel in a reactor can  *never* cause a nuclear explosion the type of a nuclear bomb. Building a
  nuclear bomb is actually quite difficult (ask Iran). In Chernobyl, the  explosion was caused by excessive pressure buildup, hydrogen explosion and  rupture of all containments, propelling molten core material into the  environment (a “dirty bomb”). Why that did not and will not happen in
  Japan, further below.

  In order to control the nuclear chain reaction, the reactor operators use  so-called “control rods”. The control rods absorb the neutrons and kill the  chain reaction instantaneously. A nuclear reactor is built in such a way,  that when operating normally, you take out all the control rods. The  coolant water then takes away the heat (and converts it into steam and
  electricity) at the same rate as the core produces it. And you have a lot  of leeway around the standard operating point of 250°C.

  The challenge is that after inserting the rods and stopping the chain  reaction, the core still keeps producing heat. The uranium “stopped” the  chain reaction. But a number of intermediate radioactive elements are  created by the uranium during its fission process, most notably Cesium and  Iodine isotopes, i.e. radioactive versions of these elements that will
  eventually split up into smaller atoms and not be radioactive anymore.
  Those elements keep decaying and producing heat. Because they are not  regenerated any longer from the uranium (the uranium stopped decaying after  the control rods were put in), they get less and less, and so the core  cools down over a matter of days, until those intermediate radioactive
  elements are used up.

  This residual heat is causing the headaches right now.

  So the first “type” of radioactive material is the uranium in the fuel  rods, plus the intermediate radioactive elements that the uranium splits  into, also inside the fuel rod (Cesium and Iodine).

  There is a second type of radioactive material created, outside the fuel  rods. The big main difference up front: Those radioactive materials have a  very short half-life, that means that they decay very fast and split into
  non-radioactive materials. By fast I mean seconds. So if these radioactive  materials are released into the environment, yes, radioactivity was  released, but no, it is not dangerous, at all. Why? By the time you spelled  “R-A-D-I-O-N-U-C-L-I-D-E”, they will be harmless, because they will have  split up into non radioactive elements. Those radioactive elements are
  N-16, the radioactive isotope (or version) of nitrogen (air). The others  are noble gases such as Argon. But where do they come from? When the  uranium splits, it generates a neutron (see above). Most of these neutrons  will hit other uranium atoms and keep the nuclear chain reaction going. But
  some will leave the fuel rod and hit the water molecules, or the air that  is in the water. Then, a non-radioactive element can “capture” the neutron.
  It becomes radioactive. As described above, it will quickly (seconds) get  rid again of the neutron to return to its former beautiful self.

  This second “type” of radiation is very important when we talk about the  radioactivity being released into the environment later on.

  What happened at Fukushima

  I will try to summarize the main facts. The earthquake that hit Japan was 5  times more powerful than the worst earthquake the nuclear power plant was  built for (the Richter scale works logarithmically; the difference between  the 8.2 that the plants were built for and the 8.9 that happened is 5  times, not 0.7). So the first hooray for Japanese engineering, everything
  held up.

  When the earthquake hit with 8.9, the nuclear reactors all went into  automatic shutdown. Within seconds after the earthquake started, the  control rods had been inserted into the core and nuclear chain reaction of  the uranium stopped. Now, the cooling system has to carry away the residual  heat. The residual heat load is about 3% of the heat load under normal
  operating conditions.

  The earthquake destroyed the external power supply of the nuclear reactor.  That is one of the most serious accidents for a nuclear power plant, and  accordingly, a “plant black out” receives a lot of attention when designing  backup systems. The power is needed to keep the coolant pumps working.
  Since the power plant had been shut down, it cannot produce any electricity  by itself any more.

  Things were going well for an hour. One set of multiple sets of emergency  Diesel power generators kicked in and provided the electricity that was  needed. Then the Tsunami came, much bigger than people had expected when  building the power plant (see above, factor 7). The tsunami took out all
  multiple sets of backup Diesel generators.

  When designing a nuclear power plant, engineers follow a philosophy called  “Defense of Depth”. That means that you first build everything to withstand  the worst catastrophe you can imagine, and then design the plant in such a  way that it can still handle one system failure (that you thought could
  never happen) after the other. A tsunami taking out all backup power in one  swift strike is such a scenario. The last line of defense is putting  everything into the third containment (see above), that will keep  everything, whatever the mess, control rods in our out, core molten or not,  inside the reactor.

  When the diesel generators were gone, the reactor operators switched to  emergency battery power. The batteries were designed as one of the backups  to the backups, to provide power for cooling the core for 8 hours. And they  did.

  Within the 8 hours, another power source had to be found and connected to  the power plant. The power grid was down due to the earthquake. The diesel  generators were destroyed by the tsunami. So mobile diesel generators were  trucked in.

  This is where things started to go seriously wrong. The external power  generators could not be connected to the power plant (the plugs did not  fit). So after the batteries ran out, the residual heat could not be  carried away any more.

  At this point the plant operators begin to follow emergency procedures that  are in place for a “loss of cooling event”. It is again a step along the  “Depth of Defense” lines. The power to the cooling systems should never  have failed completely, but it did, so they “retreat” to the next line of  defense. All of this, however shocking it seems to us, is part of the  day-to-day training you go through as an operator, right through to
  managing a core meltdown.

  It was at this stage that people started to talk about core meltdown.  Because at the end of the day, if cooling cannot be restored, the core will  eventually melt (after hours or days), and the last line of defense, the  core catcher and third containment, would come into play.

  But the goal at this stage was to manage the core while it was heating up,  and ensure that the first containment (the Zircaloy tubes that contains the  nuclear fuel), as well as the second containment (our pressure cooker)  remain intact and operational for as long as possible, to give the  engineers time to fix the cooling systems.

  Because cooling the core is such a big deal, the reactor has a number of  cooling systems, each in multiple versions (the reactor water cleanup  system, the decay heat removal, the reactor core isolating cooling, the  standby liquid cooling system, and the emergency core cooling system).
  Which one failed when or did not fail is not clear at this point in time.

  So imagine our pressure cooker on the stove, heat on low, but on. The  operators use whatever cooling system capacity they have to get rid of as  much heat as possible, but the pressure starts building up. The priority  now is to maintain integrity of the first containment (keep temperature of
  the fuel rods below 2200°C), as well as the second containment, the  pressure cooker. In order to maintain integrity of the pressure cooker (the  second containment), the pressure has to be released from time to time.
  Because the ability to do that in an emergency is so important, the reactor  has 11 pressure release valves. The operators now started venting steam  from time to time to control the pressure. The temperature at this stage
  was about 550°C.

  This is when the reports about “radiation leakage” starting coming in. I  believe I explained above why venting the steam is theoretically the same  as releasing radiation into the environment, but why it was and is not  dangerous. The radioactive nitrogen as well as the noble gases do not pose
  a threat to human health.

  At some stage during this venting, the explosion occurred. The explosion  took place outside of the third containment (our “last line of defense”),  and the reactor building. Remember that the reactor building has no  function in keeping the radioactivity contained. It is not entirely clear  yet what has happened, but this is the likely scenario: The operators
  decided to vent the steam from the pressure vessel not directly into the  environment, but into the space between the third containment and the  reactor building (to give the radioactivity in the steam more time to  subside). The problem is that at the high temperatures that the core had  reached at this stage, water molecules can “disassociate” into oxygen and
  hydrogen – an explosive mixture. And it did explode, outside the third  containment, damaging the reactor building around. It was that sort of  explosion, but inside the pressure vessel (because it was badly designed  and not managed properly by the operators) that lead to the explosion of  Chernobyl. This was never a risk at Fukushima. The problem of  hydrogen-oxygen formation is one of the biggies when you design a power  plant (if you are not Soviet, that is), so the reactor is build and  operated in a way it cannot happen inside the containment. It happened  outside, which was not intended but a possible scenario and OK, because it  did not pose a risk for the containment.

  So the pressure was under control, as steam was vented. Now, if you keep  boiling your pot, the problem is that the water level will keep falling and  falling. The core is covered by several meters of water in order to allow  for some time to pass (hours, days) before it gets exposed. Once the rods  start to be exposed at the top, the exposed parts will reach the critical
  temperature of 2200 °C after about 45 minutes. This is when the first  containment, the Zircaloy tube, would fail.

  And this started to happen. The cooling could not be restored before there  was some (very limited, but still) damage to the casing of some of the  fuel. The nuclear material itself was still intact, but the surrounding  Zircaloy shell had started melting. What happened now is that some of the  byproducts of the uranium decay – radioactive Cesium and Iodine – started
  to mix with the steam. The big problem, uranium, was still under control,  because the uranium oxide rods were good until 3000 °C. It is confirmed  that a very small amount of Cesium and Iodine was measured in the steam  that was released into the atmosphere.

  It seems this was the “go signal” for a major plan B. The small amounts of  Cesium that were measured told the operators that the first containment on  one of the rods somewhere was about to give. The Plan A had been to restore
  one of the regular cooling systems to the core. Why that failed is unclear.
  One plausible explanation is that the tsunami also took away / polluted all  the clean water needed for the regular cooling systems.

  The water used in the cooling system is very clean, demineralized (like  distilled) water. The reason to use pure water is the above mentioned  activation by the neutrons from the Uranium: Pure water does not get  activated much, so stays practically radioactive-free. Dirt or salt in the  water will absorb the neutrons quicker, becoming more radioactive. This has  no effect whatsoever on the core – it does not care what it is cooled by.
  But it makes life more difficult for the operators and mechanics when they  have to deal with activated (i.e. slightly radioactive) water.

  But Plan A had failed – cooling systems down or additional clean water  unavailable – so Plan B came into effect. This is what it looks like  happened:

  In order to prevent a core meltdown, the operators started to use sea water  to cool the core. I am not quite sure if they flooded our pressure cooker  with it (the second containment), or if they flooded the third containment,  immersing the pressure cooker. But that is not relevant for us.

  The point is that the nuclear fuel has now been cooled down. Because the  chain reaction has been stopped a long time ago, there is only very little  residual heat being produced now. The large amount of cooling water that  has been used is sufficient to take up that heat. Because it is a lot of  water, the core does not produce sufficient heat any more to produce any
  significant pressure. Also, boric acid has been added to the seawater.
  Boric acid is “liquid control rod”. Whatever decay is still going on, the  Boron will capture the neutrons and further speed up the cooling down of  the core.

  The plant came close to a core meltdown. Here is the worst-case scenario  that was avoided: If the seawater could not have been used for treatment,  the operators would have continued to vent the water steam to avoid  pressure buildup. The third containment would then have been completely
  sealed to allow the core meltdown to happen without releasing radioactive  material. After the meltdown, there would have been a waiting period for  the intermediate radioactive materials to decay inside the reactor, and all  radioactive particles to settle on a surface inside the containment. The
  cooling system would have been restored eventually, and the molten core  cooled to a manageable temperature. The containment would have been cleaned  up on the inside. Then a messy job of removing the molten core from the containment would have begun, packing the (now solid again) fuel bit by bit
  into transportation containers to be shipped to processing plants.
  Depending on the damage, the block of the plant would then either be  repaired or dismantled.

  Now, where does that leave us?

    ● The plant is safe now and will stay safe.
    ● Japan is looking at an INES Level 4 Accident: Nuclear accident with      local consequences. That is bad for the company that owns the plant, but not for anyone else.
    ● Some radiation was released when the pressure vessel was vented. All      radioactive isotopes from the activated steam have gone (decayed). A very small amount of Cesium was released, as well as Iodine. If you  were sitting on top of the plants’ chimney when they were venting, you  should probably give up smoking to return to your former life      expectancy. The Cesium and Iodine isotopes were carried out to the sea and will never be seen again.
    ● There was some limited damage to the first containment. That means that  some amounts of radioactive Cesium and Iodine will also be released     into the cooling water, but no Uranium or other nasty stuff (the      Uranium oxide does not “dissolve” in the water). There are facilities      for treating the cooling water inside the third containment. The      radioactive Cesium and Iodine will be removed there and eventually     stored as radioactive waste in terminal storage.
    ● The seawater used as cooling water will be activated to some degree.
      Because the control rods are fully inserted, the Uranium chain reaction is not happening. That means the “main” nuclear reaction is not     happening, thus not contributing to the activation. The intermediate      radioactive materials (Cesium and Iodine) are also almost gone at this stage, because the Uranium decay was stopped a long time ago. This
      further reduces the activation. The bottom line is that there will be   some low level of activation of the seawater, which will also be   removed by the treatment facilities.
    ● The seawater will then be replaced over time with the “normal” cooling   water
    ● The reactor core will then be dismantled and transported to a processing facility, just like during a regular fuel change.
    ● Fuel rods and the entire plant will be checked for potential damage.  This will take about 4-5 years.
    ● The safety systems on all Japanese plants will be upgraded to withstand  a 9.0 earthquake and tsunami (or worse)
    ● I believe the most significant problem will be a prolonged power shortage. About half of Japan’s nuclear reactors will probably have to  be inspected, reducing the nation’s power generating capacity by 15%.
      This will probably be covered by running gas power plants that are usually only used for peak loads to cover some of the base load as well. That will increase your electricity bill, as well as lead to potential power shortages during peak demand, in Japan.