Revisiting the Pathankot Air base fiasco June 23, - Deepak Sinha

I am not quite sure what top media executives smoke, but I am guessing it must be something pretty strong or why would they, in their unquenching thirst for TRP’s, make mountains out of molehills and that too the wrong molehill. I daresay New Year’s Day 2016 wasn’t a particularly happy start to the year for all those responsible for the security of the Pathankot Air Base, least of all Air Commodore J S Dhamoon, the Base Commander. Sure, the fiasco left a lot of red faces not just within the Air Force, but also in the Punjab Police, the NSG and off course, the Army. Truth is, it left even the Prime Minister and National Security Advisor quite embarrassed as well because, the militant attack on the Air Base was a rather unwanted return gift following a bizarre attempt to woo Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by halting over at Lahore, and visiting his ancestral residence just a week before. There is no doubt that the Base Commander’s acts of commission and omission would have resulted in lapses that resulted in the fiasco, but surely he wasn’t the only one to blame, especially for the manner in which subsequent operations to neutralize the terrorists were conducted. Also to be fair he is a flyer and tactical counter- terror operations would hardly have been up his street, though that in no way excuses him from facing the music. In that sense he was plain unlucky and paid the price for it, which may very well have been his motivation for putting in his papers prematurely. This was hardly any reason for the media to indulge in character assassination and some pretty uncalled for speculation. If the Prime Minister was unhappy or angered, as has been suggested, it certainly would not have been at this time but much earlier. He must have been aware of all the shortcomings in our response from the other inquiries conducted, even if the Air Force had gone slow in its own investigation, which seems far-fetched. Be that as it may, hindsight gives us twenty- twenty vision but as those handling such operations are well aware, an encounter can leave you blind-sided at that time which can result in errors of judgment that would never have occurred if the full facts were known. If indeed the media was keen to highlight issues from this episode, it really needed to question the fact that despite an Infantry Divison being located adjacent to the Air Base why was there a delay in deploying a battalion for perimeter defence, especially once the hijacked vehicle had been located. Does this lack of synergy not point to the single most important flaw that besets our Armed Forces, the complete lack of jointness and integration? So, if Prime Minister Modi has any reason to be angry, it should be about why the Chief of Defence Staff has not been appointed and the whole slew of reforms for enhancing jointmanship and synergy not yet implemented? If action is to be initiated it should be against those in the Services and the Ministry of Defence who are complicit and responsible for delaying these much needed reforms for their own selfish ends. While individuals can and must be held responsible for lapses, what about the systemic flaws that exist? The media highlighted the fact that the detachment of the Garud, the so-called Special Forces (SF) of the Air Force, deployed at the base, were unable to respond effectively due to their lack of combat experience and were being sent for live training with the Army in counter insurgency operations. This is of little relevance and if the Air Force hierarchy actually believes that deploying Garuds for counter insurgency operations for a limited duration will make them battle hardened, they are in for a real surprise as establishment compulsions, administrative difficulties and high turnover rates in such organizations make it a very difficult ask. A more important and relevant question that needs to be debated is what was their raison d’etre for having formed the Garuds in the first place? It should come as no surprise that the concept was copied from the UK’s RAF Regiment, though that Regiment is not a part of the UK’s Special Forces. It was formed in 1942 with responsibility for the protection of the RAF’s air assets and air bases, including forward operational bases. At that time the Army was not in a position to provide security for air bases. Over the years they have been given the additional responsibility for providing CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) defence as well. Unfortunately, in our context, the Army has the responsibility for providing protection elements to the Air Force in the form of Defence Security Corps units, which are basically manned by retired army personnel. In war time some Territorial Army units are also utilized for Air Field Protection. Thus, the concept of forming an IAF Regiment, which the Air Force was keen to, made little sense. But since the Army and the Navy each had their own SF, the Air Force was insistent on forming its own as well. It therefore proposed the establishment of an organization that would provide Quick Reaction Troops (QRT) at air bases, over and above the airfield perimeter protection elements provided by the Army (DSC/TA). As this was not a specialized role, they added additional (more glamorous) missions such as hostage rescue, combat search and rescue and suppression of enemy air defences. The last mentioned involves operating behind enemy lines to destroy enemy radars and other air defence weapons, tasks for which a whole range of Special Operations Forces already exist. Clearly, in their enthusiasm to keep up with the other Services, they have bitten off much more than they can chew. There is a Bengali parable Dui Naukāya Pā, or Feet in Two Boats, written by Śrīla Bhakti Siddhānta Saraswatī Ṭhākur. He writes “If you put your feet into two boats, you will fall into deep water. If someone stands with their feet in two different boats while the boats are moving together, they can fall into the water if a gap opens between the boats. If the boats move in two different directions, you will not go in either of them. Rather, you will lastly fall into great danger.” The Air Force brass would do well to pay heed to this story and stick to their core capability of conducting air operations. I am sure the other Services would be more than happy if Air Force Special Operations capability included a couple of transport and helicopter squadrons capable of insertion into enemy air space using specialized techniques rather than replicating the Army’s SF capability for conducting ground operations behind enemy lines. The last time I heard, we were all on the same side