RELOCATE THE SECURITY FORCES TO LIFT ECONOMIC BLOCKADE ON NH-2 IN MANIPUR
A significant section of National Highway (NH) no. 2 (earlier known as NH-39) connecting the border state of Manipur remains cut off from mainland India due to (an indefinite) economic blockade imposed by the Sadar Hills District Demand Committee (SHDDC) in Senapati district since July 31, 2011. The SHDDC’s demand for the conversion of Sadar hill areas, originally dominated by Kuki tribes, into a full-fledged district has been opposed by several Naga organisations including the United Naga Council (UNC). The Nagas are apprehensive that the creation of the Sadar hills as a new district would split them. In protest against the demands of SHDDC, the UNC began its own blockade from August 21, 2011. As a result, life in the Imphal valley is being held to ransom, and rising tensions among the various communities could lead to open conflict. Despite two meetings held on this issue in the state legislature in August 2011, no amicable solution has been arrived at. The state government with support from the Centre has been striving for a solution to secure the line of transportation. What can be considered is the strategic positioning of troops along the vulnerable points of the highway in order to deny the blockaders the ability to continue with their blockade.
The economic blockade of national highways in Manipur has been a frequent practice in recent years. It has become a new means of protest for the hill tribes of the state. Geographically, 90 per cent of the state area is hilly and contains 35.45 per cent of the tribal population; these encircle the valley which contains 64.55 per cent of the state’s total population. Such blockades have greatly affected the people of the valley, primarily the Meities, as well as other settlers (including non-Manipuri businessmen), and has created hatred and distrust against the tribes.
Manipur is connected with three national highways - NH-2, NH-202 and NH-37 (see map). Besides these, NH-102 extends from Imphal to Moreh (an Indo-Myanmar border town) which is a part of the Asian Highway and linked to Bangkok through Myanmar. Among these highways, only NH-2 is operational but it is full of potholes and broken culverts. Successive blockades have created shortages of basic commodities like medicines, oil, cooking gas, etc. This has led to black marketing in petrol and cooking gas, which are sold at more than Rs. 120 per litre and Rs. 1000 per litre, respectively.
The blockade also demonstrates the lack of strategic planning to ensure that the road network remains operational in insurgency stricken states like Manipur. Though much has been projected at the national level to enhance road connectivity for integrating the remote border areas of the northeast, the ground reality is different. For instance, during the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007), the central government had sanctioned Rs. 1690.26 crore for building 36 roads of a total length of 1905.60 km and Rs. 31,000 crore in the 11th Five Year plan under the Special Road Development Programme for the North East (SARDP-NE). But, till now, these roads have not been completed; they are said to be in various stages of construction. This state of affairs is particularly sensitive because numerous insurgent groups are exploiting the fact of poor governance and negligence. In addition, the prolonged economic blockade has also damaged the image of state and the central governments. With national highways being continuously blocked, the people of the Manipur valley have started looking to the Indo-Myanmar border trade even for daily essential commodities. Items like petrol and rice that do not appear in the list of 22 items that are exchangeable under the Indo-Myanmar border trade agreement are being smuggled in. This could have a negative impact in the long run, wherein the affiliation of the masses towards the country may start weakening, besides encouraging black marketing and smuggling. Ironically, this is in contrast to the national strategy of countering insurgency which talks about winning the hearts and minds of the masses and encouraging national integration.
The blockade has meant trucks loaded with essential commodities remain stranded on NH-2 at the Mao gate along the Manipur-Nagaland border, which is a mere 110 km from Imphal. Manipur has thus been held to ransom by the local tribes. One option to end the blockade could be the strategic deployment of troops on the highways instead of the present practice of providing convoys for transportation of vehicles. In many cases convoy deployment has proved ineffective. Whenever there has been an economic blockade on NH-2, the choke points are between Keithelmanbi and Mao (a distance of 76 km), where the local tribes block the roads near the towns and villages they inhabit and at a few U-curves on the hill roads. In all there are approximately eight main locations (as shown in the satellite image of NH-2) between Keithelmanbi and Mao, namely Kangpokpi, Hengbung, Taphou Kuki, Senapati, Karong, Lairouching, Maram and Tadubi. This stretch of 76 km can rationally be secured by a force of merely four battalions, giving the responsibility of keeping 5 km open to each company (approximately 125 personnel). The normal practice is to allot 10 km to a ROP (Road Opening Party) company in the plains. Currently, the state has six battalions of Manipur Rifles (MR) and an equal number of India Reserve Battalions (IRB). The paramilitary forces deployed in the state include 28 battalions of Assam Rifles, six battalions of the Border Security Force (BSF) and seven battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Moreover, 10 battalions of the army comprising the Maratha Light Infantry, J&K Light Infantry and Gorkha Rifles are assisting the state. Given the presence of these forces, the government can redeploy them at the choke points to prevent the various tribal groups from imposing the blockade and keep the line of communications open
Militarism and the Future of Democracy in Manipur:
While most of the states in Northeast India are slowly but steadily edging towards the resolution of the multiple armed conflicts that have plagued them for decades, Manipur continues to remain unstable. In Assam, the dialogue process is underway with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). In Nagaland, peace talks between the Union Government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim--Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) have witnessed significant progress in recent months. In Manipur, on the other hand, while Suspension of Operations (SoO) have been signed with the Kuki armed groups, the Meitei armed groups like the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF), the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) and its armed wing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) have not signed any ceasefire or SoO with the Union government and continue to operate with impunity in the state. Added to this is the Naga-Meitei divide, with the NSCN-IM staking claim over 90 per cent of the state’s territory.
Critical issuesare, growing militarism and the impact of violence on society and especially on women, ideological issues, counter-insurgency and the politics of development, and the challenging task of upholding democratic norms and institutions.
Six critical propositions that merit serious attention from the policy perspective can be identified based on the seminar’s proceedings and the author’s field experience in Manipur. First, there is the compression of democratic space in Manipur due to the existence of multiple armed groups as well as the presence of a large counter-insurgency force. Second, ‘ethnic assertion’ limits the space for inclusive democratic politics. Third, the overwhelming feeling of ‘under-representation’ in national policy making structures adversely impacts the local perceptions of India. Fourth, people genuinely believe that the Union government is interfering in almost all local issues. Fifth, the absence of efficient local state structures creates a ‘fearful psyche’ with regard to physical wellbeing among the people of the state. Sixth, central development schemes are viewed as counter-insurgency measures instead of being viewed as efforts by the Indian state to meaningfully uplift the local people.
There are number of policy options that merit consideration.
First, there was an urgent need for a balanced discourse on the issue of militarism in Manipur. the growing militarism was due to a psychologically oriented ‘mindset of militarism’ fuelled by the visible presence of the security forces personnel and non-state armed groups in such large numbers among the civil society. This leaves a deep seated negative impression on the minds of the younger generations, thereby blocking out values that are intrinsic to democracy like inclusiveness, pluralism, individual rights, and the impression of a public welfare oriented state.
Second, there exists an ideational gap between the ‘idea of India’ as a pluralistic, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, inclusive and vibrant democratic entity and the perception of the actual behaviour of the Indian state in conflict prone states like Manipur. Therefore, while there is expressed hope in the idea of a democratic India, there is need for a concerted effort to bridge the democracy deficit.
Third, ethnic communities in Manipur should reconsider their own perception of ‘victimisation’, which was described by a local scholar as the “psyche of a defeated people”. Hence, while political discourses within Manipur tend to be located within two overarching conceptual parameters, British India and post-colonial India, where Manipur is portrayed as a victim of discrimination, little serious effort has been made by local actors to construct an elegant rational discourse on how to create a pluralistic, multi-ethnic and democratic Manipur.
Fourth, centre-state relations and democratic norms were the central focus in local discourses. A lot of political anxiety was noticeable with regard to the presence of military personnel in the state, lack of a responsible government, and the state’s inability to gain monopoly over organised violence. People wish to move beyond the narrow prism of armed groups and armed conflict to a non-violent public sphere.
Fifth, local political communities argue that the political destiny of the people of Manipur is decided by national elites with little input from local elites. A larger visible presence of able local politicians and public intellectuals in the national decision making process and representative structures will help to assuage these grievances.
While the two core national security objectives of India, territorial integrity and sovereignty, stand the country in good stead, individual progress and overall societal happiness, especially of its ethnic minorities, would help achieve these objectives. Therefore, local grievances and the perception in Manipur of India as a mechanical bureaucratic state should not be taken lightly. It is critical that continuing extortions, intimidatory tactics and kidnapping by the armed groups in the state be controlled through strict law enforcement measures. There is also an urgent need for greater democratic outreach with the local population which is living in a militarised zone, by putting in place responsive, accountable and humane state structures
The challenges in Manipur are crystal clear; there is a failure of the state to provide the very services that it is supposed to the people. The unemployment rate is 25 percent in Manipur; no effort is being made to generate even nominal employment leading to dependence of the youth on the largesse of the terrorist groups or the state in various forms. The result is evident with the people continuing to be on the brink despite a very high police to population ratio.
We are looking at the various North East states as a vehicle for the country's Look East policy, boundary with China, contesting China in Myanmar and so on. Militancy transformed into pure terrorism and has become an instrument for the state as well as the terrorists to extend its security structure thus there is no effort for final resolution on both.
The time has come for the state to initiate a shift to human security if succour is to be provided to the people of the North East. Only then we can hope to find the right solutions in the years ahead, else the people will continue to be victims caught in the spiral of violence
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