General Thimmayya's Resignation
In 1959, the Chinese had extended their occupation of Aksai Chin, illegally ceded to them by Pakistan, by taking over the heights overlooking Chushul and Rezang La. The Chinese openly rejected the McMohan Line as the international boundary between China and India, and declared that Tibet was an "inalienable part of China." The Indian armed forces were in a poor state. There was pressure to reduce the defence budget, which was already low at just Rs 305 crore. General K.S. Thimayya, Chief of Army Staff, conducted two exercises cum war games in the Eastern and Western Theatres. "Timmy" personally directed the exercises, with Major General P.P. Kumaramangalam leading a force acting as the Chinese. The main conclusion of Exercise Lal Qila in the North East Frontier Area, led by Major General S.P.P. Thorat, was that available troop and equipment levels would not be sufficient to contain or even delay the Chinese aggression. Combined with the results of the other exercise, Sheel, in Shimla, an increase in forces and an initial deployment pattern was recommended by Army Headquarters to the Ministry of Defence, headed by V.K. Krishna Menon. But when it reached Menon, he shelved it, finally taking it up only after much prodding. A meeting was organised, and he asked Timmy to explain the rationale for such a large force. The COAS duly did so, only to have Menon declare that it was "too much" and it needed to be "pruned down." Timmy resisted. And Menon’s stand changed from discussion to confrontation. Excerpts from Thimayya, An Amazing Life.
Thimayya was aware that the minister of defence had been "not too happy" with the earlier recommendations based on Exercises Lal Qila and Sheel but he attributed it to his perspective nuances as well as comprehension. After all, it was his job to make the prime minister, defence minister and president understand the strategic requirements of defence of the border and the country. None of them was a military man, nor exposed to the process of strategic thinking. He was perturbed at the "bickering" as he called it, that had ensued between him and Menon a month earlier.
The overall deduction of the study in early 1959 saw clearly the "Chinese intention of crossing the Rubicon" and that "with the present state of development, the Chinese could launch a major incursion across any part of the border or create a situation where there would be the likelihood of a major operation taking place unless threatened by major retaliatory action by India."
Thimayya was getting disenchanted, terribly disappointed that his "brilliant boss," was refusing to see reality.
Menon was the dictator whom the service chiefs chose to secretly nickname "God Almighty." Another problem with Menon, as observed by Navy Chief R.D. Katari, was his "inherently devious ways." He would even go to the extent of tempting any officer pliant enough to be cultivated. In doing so, he often ran into the unexpected. Major General Manekshaw, for example, was asked by Menon what he thought of General Thimayya, Sam, blunt as ever, replied, "Sir, as a junior officer, we are not permitted to express an opinion on our superior officer. We respect our seniors and we have no two opinions on it." That was a good enough rebuff to see that a "rebellious" Sam was "fixed" at a suitable time!
Because Menon (contrary to his own tall claims) could understand neither technical nor tactical issues, he would call junior officers directly to explain cases to him although the same would already have been done by the chiefs themselves or their PSOs and directors. Worse still, he would issue orders to the chiefs through these officers. This did not appeal to the disciplined minds of the defence services. When the chiefs tried to explain the established ethos, protocol and operating procedures as norms for the services, he would not only get angry but also show contempt for their suggestions.
"I will not be bound by your sterile rules and procedures," he once told his chiefs angrily," and I know how to manage the services. I will call any one, any time and for that I need no permission from you."
The prime cause of differences, besides Menon’s abrasive personality, was one of perspectives. For, the chiefs, principally Thimayya, advocated that the strategy to be adopted by India against the two perceived enemies it faced had to be "dissuasive." Time and again, he would explain assiduously that it implied the "adoption of a strategy of adequate and appreciable counterpoise, causing damage to the aggressor, by striking deeper inside his territory and thus forcing him to recoil from his aggression. "He would then explain through individual cases. Against China, he would emphasise that the strategy had to be one of a calibrated response — a mix of defensive-offensive postures that would be viable. But because Indian defence capability against China was limited, it had to be one of a mix of the military and diplomacy. It had to go along with a diplomatic flexibility of give and take. Concurrently, for the defensive capability to be effective, a build-up on the border, and raising and equipping of forces were imperative; so were improvement in logistics and communications. It called for an immediate evaluation of the threat posed, in both long and short periods of time.
Menon’s perspective was different. He harped on India-China friendship, while Pakistan to him was like a red rag to a bull. He saw no need for the growth of the army at the rate that Thimayya regarded as inescapable. He, however, accepted the need for modernisation, but only at his own pace of inducting indigenous equipment and arms. He was so obsessed with the public sector under the MoD, that the private sector dealing with defence production was ignored, starved to such an extent that they rebelled and cultivated the Opposition.
Menon’s concept of indigenisation of defence industry and production, nonetheless, was a plausible one. But the policy he followed had mixed results due primarily to his own limited vision, obfuscation of priorities and obdurate belief in his own infallibility in everything, including tactics and strategy.
"If only tactics and strategy were so simple," reflected Thimayya, why would he and other masters, have wasted their life-time to learn, practise and relearn them. He began to wonder if Menon would ever develop the humility to learn from others or would continue to bully and bluster. Then as if to exert his rights, as he had conveyed to them earlier, Menon began to call the chiefs for "consultations," at all hours of the day and even at odd hours of the night, at his home, at the office, at the airport and railway stations. In the office especially, they would have to wait in an ante-room while he scribbled through files, made long telephone calls, or dealt with other visitors, a number of whom would be sitting with him inside or waiting outside.
On August 7, 1959, the news of a fresh Chinese intrusion into Khinzemane, in North East Frontier Area (NEFA), came in. It was on this day that Thimayya again met Menon, this time determined to convince the minister of the need to see the Chinese (and Pakistani) threats realistically, rather than ignore them.
He urged the minister to apprise the prime minister what the army felt about the defence of the Chinese border.
Thimayya saw Menon grow not only cold to anything he, or the other chiefs suggested, but actually hostile to them. While appeals for accretions were being ignored, their professional soundness was being questioned. What was bothering Menon? Thimayya wondered.
In the meeting with Nehru, Thimayya apologised for bothering him about defence matter when there was a full time minister and he was fully aware of the worsening situation on the border and of the imminence of hostilities.
He then drew Prime Minister Nehru’s attention to the need to raise additional force for the northern borders, equip them and develop communications at priority. He pointed out how averse the defence minister was to those inescapable requirements, that had, indeed, been based on professional deliberations and analyses. He highlighted the lacunae in the defence set-up and how it needed to be urgently refurbished.
Nehru heard him uninterruptedly, sipping his whisky and smoking his cigarette. Thimayya then told him how Menon refused to see the service chiefs’ points of view and how often he would tear his hair’ when they persisted with their needs for improvement of their services, integration resources, etc. for a real threat from China, and how treating them as school boys they had been told to "look west" and "forget the north." He argued that politicians could understandably make political statements for general public morale, but as service chiefs, they could not "sweep the facts under the carpet."
Thimayya suggested that the prime minister should rather call Menon and make him see the gravity of the situation and if he deemed it fit, he and other chiefs could join him (Nehru) to review the border situation at a suitable place. Nehru insisted that Thimayya first talk to Menon in a day or two after he returned telling him (Menon) that he had discussed the problems with him too. Thimayya demurred, "I doubt," said Thimayya, "If he would listen to me or any one of us. I fear he might misconstrue the whole thing."
Nehru said bypassing a minister may not be in order, though he would personally not treat the contents of the present discussion as bypassing him. And after Thimayya had spoken with Menon, he could meet him (Nehru) again. Thimayya could read the prime minister’s mind and his desire. There could be no further argument.
As Thimayya returned, the prime minister called Air Chief Subroto Mukerjee and Katari for a brief discussion with a view to ascertain their views. Menon returned on the night of August 19 and dispensed with the regal reception at the airport. He met the prime minister the following morning and was badly upset. He then gave a diatribe on his chiefs and repeated his criticism of them — some of it in public. Still fuming, Menon told Nehru that he would ask Thimayya to "resign" and go, if he wanted.
"He is not indispensable. The others too could follow," he remarked caustically.
"None of us is indispensable," said Nehru, "but time is a vital factor. We need him but ‘tame’ him along with the other service chiefs." He advised Menon not to talk to Katari and Mukerjee as he already had talked to them. "Don’t let them take up a collective stand," was the final word of counselling.
Thimayya met Menon on the evening of August 21. Dressed in a jacket and slacks, Thimayya walked in and wished the minister before sitting down. He gave him a summary of his meeting with the prime minister, the ensuing discussion on defence preparedness for the Chinese border, and, how things needed to be expedited. Menon asked Thimayya as to why he had met the prime minister without his permission. "It was the prime minister who asked me to give him an update," said Thimayya.
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