For decades New Delhi has refused to acknowledge Beijing's increasing belligerence and the need to meet its challenges head on.
Unfortunately, we have also failed to learn from history. At this rate we may well be faced with an undesirable crisis ast September, Chinese troops intrudL ed into south-eastern Ladakh and stopped construction of a civilian shelter. District authorities approached the Leh Army authorities, who helplessly told them that the area being close to the Line of Actual Control, the Union Ministry of External Affairs needs to first take Chinese permission. Further, although the locals say that Chinese motorcycle patrols frequently intrude into the area, the Army has been compelled to deny Chinese intrusions -sheltering euphemistically behind on the explanation that “perceptions differ on where the LAC runs on ground“. In effect, India has ceded control of territory even within the LAC to Chinese. Could this be because Government lacks the will or the military capability to defend our territory?
It could be both.
In 1962, then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had rebutted charges that the forces were poorly equipped by retorting, “It is the man behind the gun that counts.“ Today, not only do our defence forces have huge material deficiencies but military families with generations in the defence forces are snapping the tradition.
This led to a severe staff shortage and warwinning capability. The Army alone is down a third of its officer strength.
Highlighting the Union Government's dismal approach towards national defence, Harsh V Pant (of King's College, London) says, “The higher defence organisational setup in India continues to exhibit serious weaknesses with its ability to prosecute wars... remaining doubtful. The institutional structures today are not effective enough to provide single-point military advice to the Government or to facilitate the definition of defence objectives...The Indian Government is yet to demonstrate political will to tackle the defence policy paralysis...
rendering all claims of India's rise as a military power increasingly hollow. There has been no long-term strategic review of India's security environment and no overall defence strategy has been articulated.“
Last year, then Air Chief PV Naik bluntly informed the nation that half of its aircraft and equipment were either obsolete or obsolescent. Meanwhile, munitions and equipment levels in the Army are below 50 per cent and will need 20 years and `43,000 crore to gain full defence preparedness. The induction of modern Howitzers has been hanging fire for a quarter-century while air defence systems need urgent replacement. As for the Navy, analysts have warned that India's naval power is actually shrinking.
Despite all these warning signs, defence budgets continue to languish below 2 per cent of GDP. At last week's Combined Commanders' Conference, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh parroted the hollow slogan, “No expense will be spared to equip the Defence Forces.“ One doubts if he himself believed it; the services certainly cannot! Defence modernisation is thus in limbo, just as it has been since at least the 7th Defence Plan (1987). Only the 9th Plan had been approved, that too in the aftermath of the Kargil war. George Tanham, an American expert, states that, “Indians have no strategic doctrine and formulate strategy on purely ad hoc basis.“ No wonder, each year the Ministry of Defence surrenders large proportions of even the meagre budget through sheer sloth and redtape in Defence and Finance Ministries.
And Parliament's Standing Defence Committee remains blithely oblivious of all these issues.
In 1962, Nehru sent the Army to a frozen Ladakh and the NEFA regions in summer cotton uniforms as he begged the US for assistance. Things today are much the same. While Chinese patrols are motorcycle-mounted, clad in smart, warm jackets and ultra-light, fur-lined boots; our jawans are issued leaking rubber boots and woollen socks made of jute fibre -keeping the feet wet and icy.
Our armed forces are unique in having absolutely no say in the quality of clothing or equipment thrust onto them. Neither are they formally in the defence policy and planning loop. Echoes of Kargil 1999, the Army chief was constrained to state, “We will fight with what we have.“ Consequently, a half-century after 1962, our force-correlation vis-à-vis China is far worse. Then our infrastructure was dismal, but the adversary's was not much better. Today, the Chinese have excellent infrastructure, ultra-modern weapons and logistics. The two nations' new fighter aircraft exemplify the stark disparity. India's Tejas is a second-generation fighter, (dubbed MiG-21 plus) with a 40-year old vintage technology. China's J-20 is a fifthgeneration stealth aircraft, which has even the Americans worried.
The Government appears complacent in the belief that with nuclear-armed adversaries, a conventional conflict is precluded. This, despite lacking a credible N-deterrence! Therefore, succumbing to pressure tactics seems the only option. No wonder the Government is in denial over Chinese intrusions and must seek China's permission for even civilian works on our side of the LAC.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit last year was preceded by a tectonic policy shift, conveyed through a typical Chinese subtlety. In a press briefing before the visit, Assistant Minister Hu unobtrusively lopped off 2000 km from the Sino-Indian border, thus implying that China now regards the disputed Pakistan Occupied Kashmir as an integral part of Pakistan.
Consequently, although Wen Jiabao promised to hike trade to $100 billion in five years and opined that the Elephant and Dragon should tango, he pointedly deferred the J&K stapled-visa issue. Many analysts now believe that Nehru's belligerence caused the 1962 conflict.
Hence, the MEA avoids even the slightest risk of offending the Dragon. But such restraint has served only to encourage Beijing in upping the ante. China is now giving stapled-visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh. Recently, Army chief General VK Singh confirmed that over 4000 Chinese troops are present in POK and many of these are combat soldiers. Last month, INS Airavat was harassed by the Chinese navy in international waters while on a routine port call to Vietnam. China has now brazenly warned Vietnam and India against bilateral cooperation in oil-exploration.
Therefore, if we are not to precipitate a conflict by encouraging adventurism through perceived weakness and timidity, we should heed the age-old maxim, `He that desireth peace must prepare for ware'. A strong stance backed by real military strength alone can ensure peace, enabling us to get on with the real task of pulling nearly half a billion Indians out of poverty. Some steps like the formulation of a national security doctrine recommended by the Naresh Chandra Committee, greater equipment indigenisation etc. have been initiated, but they need an urgent push. In addition we must make Service Chiefs formal members of the CCS and engage professional HR consultants to reverse endemic officer shortfalls.
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