Trading terror with PakistanPRAGMATIC EUPHONRY
The idea of fattening the Pakistani elite is detrimental to the Indian cause of securing long-term peace.
Over at The Acorn, my fellow blogger Nitin Pai makes a strong case for what he teasingly calls “fattening the Pakistani elite”. This is his way of asking India to unilaterally drop all trade restrictions against Pakistan which will create vested interests among Pakistan’s rich and powerful to ensure stable bilateral relations with India. This seems to be a logically sound and persuasive argument until we examine it a bit closely.
The argument singularly fails to notice the nature of the Pakistani elite. The business establishment in Pakistan is predominantly the feudal land-owning gentry; there is a growing class of entrepreneurs but it is still nascent in shape. The feudal economic elite thrives not on free movement of goods but on quotas, special favours and dispensations. Their ability to thrive in a competitive market is limited. Ergo, free entry of Pakistani goods in India does not necessarily imply their acceptance in the Indian market. Therefore, the argument that unilateral opening of Indian markets will benefit traditional Pakistan elite is rather weak.
Notwithstanding that dissonance, the argument is further predicated on the premise that the Pakistani elite, if it so wishes so, has the capacity to influence the behaviour of the Pakistani Military-Jehadi Complex [MJC], which is the primary Pakistani entity hurting India. It is a question of judgement for there is little historical data available to suggest that the Pakistani elite has had the gumption to take on the Pakistani military establishment ever earlier. However, there are two examples — though not directly India-related — which lead us to doubt this fundamental premise.
First, the conduct of nuclear tests by Pakistan against the advice of, and despite promises of a liberal economic package by the international community if Pakistan were not to do so. These tests may have hurt the business interests of the Pakistani elite in a big way but it had to still go along with the wishes of the Pakistani military for the sake of patriotic pride.
Second, Sharif brothers, with their land holdings, business interests and political clout, would perfectly fit the bill of the Pakistani elite that India would hope to engage by dropping trade restrictions. Despite being backed by the Saudis, when the Sharifs chose to take on the Pakistani military establishment led by General Musharraf, the Sharifs were promptly kicked out of their own country.
Evidently, whatever may be the interests of the Pakistani elite, their ability to influence the MJC is constrained and limited. When the question concerns India, Pakistan’s arch-enemy in the eyes of its MJC, the situation for the Pakistani elite would be rendered even more difficult due to the issue of patriotism.
Moreover, the creation of the vested interests in bilateral trade with India would only be a powerful enough tool if the Pakistani elite were solely dependent on India. This means that India would have already diplomatically manoeuvred to demolish the existing strong client-patron relationships that Pakistan has — with the US, China and Saudi Arabia — and which benefit the Pakistani elite immensely. But if India were able to achieve this diplomatic coup, it would then render the whole debate over trade relations with Pakistan meaningless.
But the argument goes that there is no harm in giving the suggestion a try as it only “involves modest risks and is reversible.” Modest or not, the biggest risk is that any unilateral action by India is liable to be considered by the Pakistani MJC as a reconfirmation of its tactics, such that its adversarial attitude towards India pays dividend in the form of unilateral concessions. This will embolden the Pakistani MJC even further and could lead to a misadventure as witnessed earlier in 1965 and 1999. Now that both the countries are declared nuclear weapon states, such a misadventure could be truly catastrophic.
Another obvious advantage of this suggestion is that rather than merely call off talks or threaten to wage a war, India would have another option to re-enforce the trade restrictions that would hurt the Pakistani elite. In case of another terror attack, India’s options may not be solely limited to calling off talks or threatening military action; cutting off trade ties would potentially punish the Pakistani elite. While this may not be possible so easily due to vested interests generated on the Indian side by this trade, and due to the international pressure brought upon India — as is the case with bilateral peace talks — there is a far bigger danger involved here.
Theoretically, the additional space available to the Indian government would allow it to defuse any explosive situation from turning into a full-blown conflict. While this should theoretically secure peace, even the limited space available by way of calling-off and recommencing peace talks has paradoxically acted as a disincentive for successive Indian governments to modernise and upgrade its military capabilities. A credible military capacity is the only guarantor for long-lasting peace with Pakistan. Besides being an important component of any Indian plans to destroy the Pakistani MJC in the long-run, it is the only way to drive a behavioural change in Pakistani MJC and force it to shun the use of jehadi terror as an instrument of state policy against India and Indians in the mid-term. Unfortunately, the lack of political will in New Delhi means that the space available to the Indian government for any non-military action must necessarily shrink if durable peace between India and Pakistan is to be achieved. This has its own attendant dangers and pitfalls but that is a risk worth taking for the sake of securing long-term Indian interests.
Finally, even if the Pakistani elite were to somehow miraculously generate that leverage over the Pakistani military, the MJC itself is not an homogeneous entity as was the case in its previous avatars. There are divisions between the jehadis themselves which means that any such leverage is unlikely to protect India from all types of jehadi terror. In fact, the usual Pakistani argument of “we are all victims of terror” and “this is the doing of non-state actors” could easily lead to a situation where these unilateral trade concessions end up as the new bilateral peace-talks between India and Pakistan. Terror, talks and trade could then all go together.
This is not to say that the idea of unilateral trade concessions creating dependencies is devoid of any merit. It is perhaps the only long-term structural solution for lasting peace between India & Pakistan; but these links can only come into play once the Pakistani MJI has been dismantled. Neither can the establishment of these trade links precede the real big issue of dismantling the Pakistani MJI nor can it be allowed to distract India from working towards that goal.
Relations with Pakistan is a mess inherited by us from the past. It would be a tragedy if we were to use this as an excuse to pass this mess on to our future generations
Over at The Acorn, my fellow blogger Nitin Pai makes a strong case for what he teasingly calls “fattening the Pakistani elite”. This is his way of asking India to unilaterally drop all trade restrictions against Pakistan which will create vested interests among Pakistan’s rich and powerful to ensure stable bilateral relations with India. This seems to be a logically sound and persuasive argument until we examine it a bit closely.
The argument singularly fails to notice the nature of the Pakistani elite. The business establishment in Pakistan is predominantly the feudal land-owning gentry; there is a growing class of entrepreneurs but it is still nascent in shape. The feudal economic elite thrives not on free movement of goods but on quotas, special favours and dispensations. Their ability to thrive in a competitive market is limited. Ergo, free entry of Pakistani goods in India does not necessarily imply their acceptance in the Indian market. Therefore, the argument that unilateral opening of Indian markets will benefit traditional Pakistan elite is rather weak.
Notwithstanding that dissonance, the argument is further predicated on the premise that the Pakistani elite, if it so wishes so, has the capacity to influence the behaviour of the Pakistani Military-Jehadi Complex [MJC], which is the primary Pakistani entity hurting India. It is a question of judgement for there is little historical data available to suggest that the Pakistani elite has had the gumption to take on the Pakistani military establishment ever earlier. However, there are two examples — though not directly India-related — which lead us to doubt this fundamental premise.
First, the conduct of nuclear tests by Pakistan against the advice of, and despite promises of a liberal economic package by the international community if Pakistan were not to do so. These tests may have hurt the business interests of the Pakistani elite in a big way but it had to still go along with the wishes of the Pakistani military for the sake of patriotic pride.
Second, Sharif brothers, with their land holdings, business interests and political clout, would perfectly fit the bill of the Pakistani elite that India would hope to engage by dropping trade restrictions. Despite being backed by the Saudis, when the Sharifs chose to take on the Pakistani military establishment led by General Musharraf, the Sharifs were promptly kicked out of their own country.
Evidently, whatever may be the interests of the Pakistani elite, their ability to influence the MJC is constrained and limited. When the question concerns India, Pakistan’s arch-enemy in the eyes of its MJC, the situation for the Pakistani elite would be rendered even more difficult due to the issue of patriotism.
Moreover, the creation of the vested interests in bilateral trade with India would only be a powerful enough tool if the Pakistani elite were solely dependent on India. This means that India would have already diplomatically manoeuvred to demolish the existing strong client-patron relationships that Pakistan has — with the US, China and Saudi Arabia — and which benefit the Pakistani elite immensely. But if India were able to achieve this diplomatic coup, it would then render the whole debate over trade relations with Pakistan meaningless.
But the argument goes that there is no harm in giving the suggestion a try as it only “involves modest risks and is reversible.” Modest or not, the biggest risk is that any unilateral action by India is liable to be considered by the Pakistani MJC as a reconfirmation of its tactics, such that its adversarial attitude towards India pays dividend in the form of unilateral concessions. This will embolden the Pakistani MJC even further and could lead to a misadventure as witnessed earlier in 1965 and 1999. Now that both the countries are declared nuclear weapon states, such a misadventure could be truly catastrophic.
Another obvious advantage of this suggestion is that rather than merely call off talks or threaten to wage a war, India would have another option to re-enforce the trade restrictions that would hurt the Pakistani elite. In case of another terror attack, India’s options may not be solely limited to calling off talks or threatening military action; cutting off trade ties would potentially punish the Pakistani elite. While this may not be possible so easily due to vested interests generated on the Indian side by this trade, and due to the international pressure brought upon India — as is the case with bilateral peace talks — there is a far bigger danger involved here.
Theoretically, the additional space available to the Indian government would allow it to defuse any explosive situation from turning into a full-blown conflict. While this should theoretically secure peace, even the limited space available by way of calling-off and recommencing peace talks has paradoxically acted as a disincentive for successive Indian governments to modernise and upgrade its military capabilities. A credible military capacity is the only guarantor for long-lasting peace with Pakistan. Besides being an important component of any Indian plans to destroy the Pakistani MJC in the long-run, it is the only way to drive a behavioural change in Pakistani MJC and force it to shun the use of jehadi terror as an instrument of state policy against India and Indians in the mid-term. Unfortunately, the lack of political will in New Delhi means that the space available to the Indian government for any non-military action must necessarily shrink if durable peace between India and Pakistan is to be achieved. This has its own attendant dangers and pitfalls but that is a risk worth taking for the sake of securing long-term Indian interests.
Finally, even if the Pakistani elite were to somehow miraculously generate that leverage over the Pakistani military, the MJC itself is not an homogeneous entity as was the case in its previous avatars. There are divisions between the jehadis themselves which means that any such leverage is unlikely to protect India from all types of jehadi terror. In fact, the usual Pakistani argument of “we are all victims of terror” and “this is the doing of non-state actors” could easily lead to a situation where these unilateral trade concessions end up as the new bilateral peace-talks between India and Pakistan. Terror, talks and trade could then all go together.
This is not to say that the idea of unilateral trade concessions creating dependencies is devoid of any merit. It is perhaps the only long-term structural solution for lasting peace between India & Pakistan; but these links can only come into play once the Pakistani MJI has been dismantled. Neither can the establishment of these trade links precede the real big issue of dismantling the Pakistani MJI nor can it be allowed to distract India from working towards that goal.
Relations with Pakistan is a mess inherited by us from the past. It would be a tragedy if we were to use this as an excuse to pass this mess on to our future generations
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