CHINESE PLAAF operating out of TAR poses no worthwhile threat to our land forces provided the IAF is given free hand to operate. Chinese land forces can/will be decimated in the TBA.

PLAAF In terms of number of aircraft the Chinese Air Force is the largest Air Power segment in our neighbourhood. Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the third largest in the world. When we in India look at PLAAF capability, we examine PLAAF operational capability ex Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). PLAAF operations from mainland China, though operationally feasible, but with little effectiveness. This paper examines PLAAF capability to support their Army and their offensive strike power with conventional weapons only. In order to evaluate PLAAF capability ex TAR, understanding of regional geography and terrain is absolutely essential. Of the seven Military Regions (MR) OF THE Chinese Armed Forces only two are opposite India. LANZHOU MR is opposite Ladakh sector and CHENGDU MR is opposite north eastern region. The MRs are further sub-divided into Military Districts (MD). MDs facing us are:- · Chengdu MR. Two MDs in this region are YUNAN (opposite Myanmar) and Xizang (opposite Assam, Sikkim and Arunachal). · Lanzhou MR. South Xinjiang MD (opposite UP,HP and Ladakh). East Xinjiang faces us adjoining Ladakh. PLAAF Airfields There are 15 operational bases in these two regions from where PLAAF can launch air operations. If the airfields located in probable Tactical Battle Area (TBA) are considered the number reduces to a mere five. These airfields are:- · Khotan (Lanzhou MR) · Hoping · Kongka Dzong (Chengdu MR) · Donshoon · Pangta Except for Khotan the other four airfields are at an average location of around 4000 metre. Khotan at 1400 metre is nearly at same elevation as Srinagar. Pilots, who have operated from Srinagar would understand the problems better. Simply stated; an aeroplane and human being is affected by altitude in identical manner. Both start puffing and panting with increase in altitude. Load carrying capacity drops markedly. Due to high true air speed at altitude corresponding to same indicated air speed, landing and take off run are excessively long. Remaining ten airfields in the region are Kashgar, Kunming, Paoshan, Jekundo, Chengdu, Petun, Mangshi, Nagchuka I&II and Kantse. PLAAF continues to depend upon obsolete/obsolescent aeroplanes viz Q-5, IL- 28, J-8, Tu-16 etc. Modern fleet comprises of a mix of Su-27/30. Even a Su-30 will reach the TBA with minimal load due to distances involved. Q-5, IL-28 and J-8 are ineffective in terms of radii of action and load carrying capacity. Tu-16 can be used with sufficient load but its employment in hilly terrain is highly doubtful. Radar cover at medium and high level is satisfactory in spite of vintage radars being operated. However low level cover is virtually non-existent/ineffective due to terrain and fewer number of radars. Most of the airfields have dedicated radar located at the base. First generation air defence weapons are the only protection available. Deployment of low level SAMs is limited. Airlift Capability Airlift capability of PLAAF is extremely limited due to exponential reduction in carrying capacity at high altitude. For instance an IL 76 of the IAF, which can carry 40 ton from Chandigarh to Leh. But on return trip Leh-Chandigarh, it will barely carry less than half the load, may be lesser. Likewise heli-lift capability reduces exponentially. Even as a concept using helicopters for large scale troop/equipment transfer within TAR is well nigh impossible. For instance a Mi-17, which can lift around 2000kg at sea level, will carry a mere few hundred kg at PLAAF airfields. Capability to air drop a fully equipped battalion size force is simply unachievable. Enhancement of Capability with Force Multipliers Force multipliers viz mid air refuellers, airborne warning and control systems, if used by PLAAF will enhance their capability by a few notches but will still remain well below the force levels required to cause any substantive attrition. Weather For eight months in a year( September to April), operations will be severely effected due to extremely low temperatures, icy strong surface winds and extensive ice accumulation over the runway. Few airfields, particularly in Chengdu MR are affected by extensive fog. Sustained day/night operations are virtually impossible. PLAAF Capability ex TAR at a Glance · Only effective strike element is Su-27/30. Even this machine will operate with severe load penalty. · Airfield infra-structure cannot support large scale and sustained operations. · Extremely limited night operations are possible. · Tactical Battle Area can be approached from very few directions due to terrain. · Nearest Indian airfields viz Bareilly, Gorakhpur, Bagdogra, Hashimara, Jorhat, Gauhati, Tezpur, Chabua, Mohanbari and nearly a dozen Advance Landing Grounds will be around 4-500 km in most cases. · Strike elements of IAF will lift off with maximum load as all of these are at Sea Level unlike PLAAF airfields. · Air Defence infra structure is extremely limited and is in pockets. Chances of successful interception of IAF strike element in TBA is virtually NIL. However strike elements targeting PLAAF airfields will/may face air defence aircraft. · Airlift capability of PLAAF is grossly inadequate for any large scale transfer of troops/equipment by air. PLAAF capability ex TAR is severely limited and would remain so, irrespective of the acquisition and/or employment of more modern aircraft, which might be in their inventory by 2020. PLAAF elements based in mainland China will have no substantive effect in overall PLAAF performance ex TAR. Indeed if our diplomacy fails and PLAAF operates out of bases in Myanmar and Bangla Desh, our problems will increase exponentially. PLAAF operating out of TAR poses no worthwhile threat to our land forces provided the IAF is given free hand to operate. Chinese land forces can/will be decimated in the TBA. Nuclear China is beyond the scope of this paper. Conventional tipped SSMs will also have little or no effect, even if used by PLAAF