Maoist menace: Where did we go wrong?Major General Mrinal Suman

(http://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2017/mar/24/maoist-menace-where-did-we-go-wrong-1585137.html) The Maoist ambush of a Central Reserve Police Force patrol at Sukma in Chhattisgarh on March 11 has once again exposed the gross ineptitude of India’s much touted anti-Naxal operations. Twelve hapless CRPF personnel were killed and two critically wounded. Ten rifles and two radio sets were looted from the ambushed party. The attack is a grim reminder of the Dantewada massacre of April 2010 when 76 CRPF personnel were killed by the Maoists. In June 2010, the Naxals slaughtered 26 CRPF men in Bastar. Before that, 55 policemen were killed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in March 2007. It has been a long saga of precious lives sacrificed by the callous government. The policy and methodology to counter the Naxal threat have long been subjects of intense debate. The CRPF is currently countering the Naxals. It is a federal law enforcement agency and a police force. It has been organised, equipped, structured and trained to supplement the efforts of state police in the maintenance of law and order. Presently, a crisis of identity is overwhelming the CRPF. It calls itself a ‘paramilitary police force’—a force is either a paramilitary force or a police force. The term paramilitary police force is self-contradictory, dichotomist in substance, paradoxical in nature and ambivalent in identity. As a result, the CRPF has got trapped in the self-created delusion about its capabilities. Facing bullets fired by highly motivated Naxals requires totally different capabilities compared to those required to face stones thrown by hired hooligans in Kashmir. It is a misplaced expectation that the CRPF can perform like a paramilitary force with short orientation training at counter-insurgency schools. A police force can never become a paramilitary force, fallacious pretentiousness notwithstanding. The creation of 10 special counter-Naxal CoBRA teams has been of little help as the bulk of CRPF personnel are inadequately trained and poorly equipped. Worse, the organisation suffers from sub-standard leadership. No middle or senior ranking officer has ever participates in anti-Naxal operations. Junior leaders and men are made to fend for themselves. The Army’s reluctance to get embroiled is understandable. It is already over-committed in Kashmir and the Northeast. Further involvement will degrade its war potential. The only viable option available is to raise a specialised paramilitary force to suppress internal uprisings. The proposed Internal Security Force (ISF) should function under the Home Ministry. The raising of ISF cannot be termed as a wasteful duplication of existing forces. The ISF would be a genuine paramilitary force, the first of its kind in the country. Moreover, once the ISF is well established, it can relieve the CRPF of counter-insurgency operations, and the CRPF’s strength can be correspondingly reduced in a calibrated manner—by reducing intake and not retrenchment. ISF units should be organised on the lines of infantry battalions and provided necessary specialised equipment (including airborne force-multipliers). To start with, the ISF should consist of six battalions, grouped under two sector headquarters. The organisation structure should be modular and platoon-centric. The entire manpower should consist only of ex-servicemen to ensure the ISF develops a military- like ethos without any dilution. Willing medically-fit personnel, after the completion of their tenure of duty with the Army, should be inducted in analogous posts in the ISF with full protection of pay. Similarly, retiring Short Service Commission (SSC) officers should be offered absorption into the ISF. To start with, senior ranks could be manned by Army officers on permanent secondment. Once the initial inductees rise in ranks, they should man the entire organisation. The suggested proposal cannot be faulted on any legitimate grounds. It is an extremely viable scheme that harnesses the expertise and experience of ex-servicemen. It will also result in substantial financial savings to the government. Around 40,000 young, welltrained and physically fit soldiers are released from the defence forces every year. The ISF will get trained manpower with rich experience in anti-terror and counterinsurgency duties. The induction of fully trained soldiers would obviate the need for additional training facilities. The Army personnel are highly disciplined and are trained to use minimum force and act in good faith. Incidentally, the CRPF is already taking ex-servicemen on contract for a period of 5 years (extendable to 7 years). The ex-servicemen’s pension bill will get significantly reduced as pension will be due to the retiring servicemen only after 30-33 years of service as against 17 years of service at present. Additionally, the ISF would save on recruitment and training costs of personnel. Presently, insecurity about future prospects deters youth from applying for the SSC. The lateral shift to the ISF will provide a highly attractive avenue. It would also help keep the age profile of the defence forces young. During times of war, ISF units could be put under Army formations to control internal situation and secure lines of communications. Thus, India’s war ef fort would ge t augmented. A word of caution would be in order. The fundamental strength of the ISF would lie in its army-like character and it should not be diluted by parking favourite police officers in higher positions. The ISF should not go the National Security Guard way, where the real punch is provided by the military component, but ironically, the director general is a police officer. It is time India stops using hapless CRPF forces to battle Naxals. It is a grave and criminal dereliction of the state’s responsibility towards CRPF personnel and their families.*****