HINDI JAPANI BHAI BHAI

September 4, 2014, 12:00 AM IST Brahma Chellaney Rarely before in recent memory has Japan gone so much out of its way to welcome a foreign leader as it did when it received Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His counterpart, Shinzo Abe, broke protocol in both receiving Modi in Kyoto and spending the weekend with him in that old imperial capital. With India and Japan moving from emphasising shared values to jointly advancing shared interests, their ties already constitute Asia’s fastest-growing bilateral relationship. Abe and Modi, however, wish to turn this blossoming partnership into a defining element in Asia’s strategic landscape so that Japan and India serve as key anchors of a stable power balance. The rationale bringing India and Japan closer together is powerful: If China, India and Japan constitute Asia’s strategic triangle – with China representing Side A (the longest side of this scalene triangle), India Side B and Japan Side C — the sum of B plus C will always be greater than A. In the absence of a Japan-India axis, the rise of a Sino-centric Asia could become inevitable. Containing China, however, is not an option. China is the largest trading partner of both Japan and India, which cannot afford to disrupt their relationship with Beijing. The key issue for India and Japan is how to address Asia’s current power disequilibrium, triggered by the rapid rise of an increasingly assertive China that is seeking to disturb the territorial and maritime status quo. An entente between Asia’s two main democracies can help restore a fair degree of equilibrium to the power balance. Abe and Modi represent the best chance for establishing an enduring entente. The two are ideological soulmates, belong to the 1950s generation, share the zodiac sign of Virgo, and regard each other as friends. Indeed, like two buddies meeting after a long time, Modi and Abe greeted each other with a bear hug and glowing and beaming smiles. The Abe-Modi affinity has been fostered both by personal chemistry and hard-nosed calculations about the importance of Indo-Japanese collaboration in their plans to revitalise their countries’ economy and security and restore national pride. International relations theory assumes that interstate relations are shaped by impersonal forces, especially cold calculations of national interest. In truth, history is determined equally, if not more, by the role of personalities, including their personal strengths and foibles and their search for national security and respect. Abe sees India as the key to expanding Japan’s security options beyond its current US-centric framework, while Modi views Japan as central to the success of India’s ‘Look East’ strategy. ‘Abenomics’ and ‘Modinomics’ are both geared to the same goal – reviving laggard growth — yet they need each other’s support for success. Whereas Tokyo sees New Delhi as important to its own economic-revival strategy, India looks at Japan as a critical source of capital and commercial technology and a key partner to help upgrade its infrastructure and manufacturing base. Abe’s reassertion of the right of collective self-defence and his relaxation of Japan’s self-imposed arms export ban have opened the path to closer military cooperation with India, including co-production of weapon systems. India — the biggest recipient of Japanese aid — has already become one of the largest destinations for Japanese FDI among major economies. The two countries’ dissimilarities actually create opportunities to generate strong synergies through economic collaboration. Japan has a solid heavy manufacturing base, while India boasts services-led growth. India is a leader in software and Japan a leader in hardware. India has the world’s largest youthful population, while Japan is aging more rapidly than any other major developed country. Whereas Japan has financial and technological power, India has human capital and a huge market. Japan clearly has an interest in a stronger, more economically robust India. Just as Japan assisted China’s economic rise through large-scale aid, investment and technology transfers for over three decades — a role obscured by the recent flare-up of disputes — it is ready to help India become an economic powerhouse on par with China, a consideration that prompted Abe to pledge a whopping $35 billion in new assistance. China, by contrast, has little interest in aiding India’s econo-mic ascent. Beijing boasts a booming trade with New Delhi, but that commerce bears a distinct mercantilist imprint and shows India in an unflattering light: China exports three times as much as it imports and treats India as a raw material supplier and a market for its finished goods. This asym-metry is made more glaring by China’s minuscule FDI in India. A challenge for Modi is to correct the lopsided trade and calibrate China’s market access to progress on bilateral political, territorial and water disputes, or else Beijing will fortify its leverage against India. After all, China does not shy away from making efforts to block the rise of India and Japan, including by stepping up military pressure on them and opposing the expansion of the UN Security Council’s permanent membership. After charming Nepal and Bhutan on highly successful visits, Modi’s landmark trip to Japan has not only helped to define the parameters for Asia’s new democratic alliance but also set in motion the addition of concrete strategic content to this ‘special strategic and global partnership’ — its formal name. The entente holds the potential to revive the two countries’ economic fortunes, catalyse their emergence as world powers, reshape the Asian strategic landscape and impel a tectonic geopolitical shift.