Myanmar’s outreach to India and China

Myanmar’s outreach to India and China Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Myanmar earlier this week followed State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi’s return from Beijing. The timing of Suu Kyi’s China trip and how both the Chinese “dragon” and the Indian “peacock” have together flocked around the “Lady” is noteworthy. Meanwhile, Myanmar President U. Htin Kyaw’s four-day visit to India begins today. Myanmar’s China policy has been guided by domestic constraints and economic considerations. Instability on the porous borders and ethnic conflict has been the primary concern for Myanmar. Moreover, economic dimension has added dynamism to its China policy. Myanmar has always valued its deep “pauk phaw” (fraternal) relationship between the two countries and has been thankful to China for supporting its economic and social development. China, on the other hand, “has vowed to China-Myanmar Comprehensive-Strategic Cooperative Partnership” and ensured that the two countries will always be “good neighbours, friends, brothers and partners” (as quoted by the national media in Myanmar). This has been evidently reciprocated in Suu Kyi’s recent visit. She did not speak on the thorny issue of South China Sea and has extended support to China’s Belt-Road strategy and BCIM economic corridor. Earlier in August, a commission was appointed to re-look into the fate of the Myitsone Dam — a controversy which has dragged on since 2011 when the project was stalled. The commission is expected to assess the proposal against international standards and factor in the voices of local communities and their concerns. China has been Myanmar’s largest trading partner and its biggest source of foreign investment. In the light of sanctions which have for long impeded western investments in the country, China has emerged as its biggest ally. Beijing has been investing heavily in developing ports in Myanmar, gaining greater access to the Indian Ocean. The armed forces of Myanmar have also depended on Chinese assistance. Meanwhile, after opening up, the regime in Myanmar has been delicately seeking to leverage India as a politico-economic counterpoise to that of China’s overshadowing influence, a sort of “leveling the field”. India has rightly been characterised as a benign power and an alternate force amidst the newly triggered competition among the erstwhile players as well as the emerging and potential stakeholders in the region. India’s policy towards Myanmar has been largely shaped by security and stability at the borders, diffusing cross-border insurgent groups and economic development of its Northeastern states. Accordingly, during the recent visit of Sushma Swaraj, Myanmar extended support for curbing insurgents and militancy on the borders. It has given assurance that it will not allow any insurgent groups to use its territory against India. So far as India’s interest in Myanmar is concerned, it is stepping up its development cooperation in the light of Myanmar’s continuing reform process and its historical and cultural ties. As compared to Chinese loan which are more commercial in nature, India has kept its focus on “development cooperation” projects supported through grant-in-aid, line of credits, training programmes and provision for expert knowledge. Thus, India has been particularly instrumental in setting up centres for industrial training and enhancement of IT skills and other capacity building programmes. Last but not the least, Myanmar’s India policy is more guided by “soft-power” connection. Buddhism, yoga and Bollywood have always been the strength of India’s soft-power diplomacy. India’s cultural, religious and democratic values have been a connecting ground for Myanmar since centuries