CAPT CN SINGH MVC THE FINAL CHARGE

GARHWALIS THE FINAL CHARGE - Late Capt CN Singh, MVC. Copied below is a unique article on Late Capt CN Singh, MVC. The article was published in South Asia Defence and Strategic Review without the soft version appearing in the online version of the magazine. However, it was at the insistence of General Ata Hasnain, that the publishers agreed to share a soft copy online which was then circulated. General Mehta very aptly and vividly brings out a facet of our regtl hero which, to most of our generation, is not very explicitly known. Not only the Operation per-say but the strategic effect of the same is also an info which, though may be available in some documents, but is far from common knowledge in our circles. Please read on. Warm regards. Satnam The Final Charge by: Maj Gen Raj Mehta (Retd), AVSM, VSM Maj Gen KM Bhimaya, a 2 Garhwal Rifles stalwart and globally respected writer-strategist now settled in Placentia, California, USA, has in a June 2013 mail to Ravinder Singh, brother of Capt CN Singh, stated that his first contact with “CN” was when Bhimaya was posted back to the unit located in Miran Sahib, in June 1963, from the Garhwal Rifles Regimental Centre at Lansdowne. CN was wiry, of medium height, had a soft-spoken, pedigreed demeanour led by refreshing humility and displayed very strong soldiering values. He was born on 2 July 1939 to Capt Balwan Singh, a veteran, much respected soldier of Kangra, HP, who had participated in the first Indo-Pak War of 1947-48. Nicknamed 'Jallyu', CN was educated at Government High School, Dharamsala under the care of his Uncle and local guardian, Maj Gen AS Pathania, MVC (earned as CO 1/5 GR in operations in the Dras Sector during the 1947-48 war). Trained for Army entry by the late Colonel IS Deol's Minerva Academy; a premier preparatory academy in Punjab for entry into the armed forces, CN is on its honour rolls alongside Flying Officer Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon, PVC (Posthumous) and Captain Vikram Batra, PVC (Posthumous). Unable to clear the NDA examination, CN persevered; fiercely determined to join the Army. An outdoors lad, he excelled as an NCC cadet while in college, qualifying in parachute jumps and basic mountaineering skills. He qualified for the IMA post his graduation; qualifying for it in June 1960 through the College NCC entry scheme. Gen Bhimaya recalls that CN did not mention even once that he had passed out first in the order of merit in his IMA course; such was his amazing humility and inner sense of being. His cousin, Vasu Pathania, the son of Gen AS Pathania and now a retired tea-planter and gentleman farmer has an affectionate recall of Chander who was 14 years his elder. Deeply influenced by Gen AS Pathania, Chander was 'red lanyard' crazy and was desperately keen to join the Gurkhas, in whose smart uniform, the red lanyard stood prominent. Chander was, however, not disappointed when he was commissioned not in his guardians Gurkha unit but into the equally famous Victoria Cross Paltan (raised March 1901); 2 Garhwal Rifles; (“Superb Second”) on 11 June, 1961. This was because they also wore a red lanyard just like his war-decorated Uncle. Vasu remembers how moved Chander was, when, a month after commissioning, the General graciously presented him with his own red Gurkha lanyard. Gen Bhimaya remembers a unit incident that gave him a deep insight into CN's character, particularly his ingrained sense of responsibility, contrition and his remarkable fortitude. Asked to captain the unit athletics team competing at Brigade level with the traditionally superior Rajputana Rifles and Grenadiers teams, CN did not despair and surprised everyone by choosing to take part in the tough 1500 meters event himself. This was quite unprecedented because officer participation rarely took place in other than in short races. Also, athletics for the wiry, small-built though otherwise supremely fit hill troops was not their preferred sports discipline when competing against the large-built Rajput and Jat competition. CN however had supreme motivation in mind, that too by personal example. He plunged into his mandate with his trademark zeal and sincerity to train his team. The Garhwalis performed well but were trailing, a reality which Bhimaya writes CN “absorbed with remarkable stoicism”. CN was last in his own race, crippled by severe cramps but, instead of giving up, finished the event to thunderous cheers and a standing ovation from his inspired team and all spectators. His value system had ensured that he complimented his team and accepted full responsibility for their low-end performance. Small wonder that his men saw him as 'Mai-Baap' and doted on him… Young Chander was quite clearly special. Jawan of 2 Garhwal Rifles in ceremonial uniform The Battalion shortly thereafter moved from Jammu to Sarol, in Rajouri Sector, J&K, and was placed under 120 Infantry Brigade. Noting CN's worth as a soldier, the Commander, Brig Prem Chowdry, a Gurkha officer, attached him as a GSO-3 to his HQ. CN retained his trademark humility, not letting this sudden professional advancement get to his head. The Army was rebuilding after the 1962 Sino-Indian War debacle and was busy countering the insidious war-mongering that Pakistan was then orchestrating; doubtless encouraged by the runaway success the Chinese Army had attained against the Indian Army. The Pakistanis had an unusual, out-of-the-box plan in mind to wrest Kashmir away from India. Let us see how it unfolded and how Capt Chander Narain Singh was destined to get courageously involved with its opening moves. Prelude to War - Operation Gibraltar The name 'Gibraltar' was chosen because the 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from Gibraltar, a situation Pakistan likened to its intended conquest of Kashmir. Of 1950s vintage, the plan was seen as an "attack by infiltration" by regulars and trained mujahideen to compel India to seek conflict-resolution at Pakistani terms. Dusted and updated, it was preceded by launching "Operation Nusrat", an intelligence driven mission to locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) for infiltrating and thereafter gauging the local response to the infiltration and the likely Army reactions to it. Col SM Mehdi, the Pak SSG Commander was directed by the GHQ in May 1965 to interact with GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Hussain Malik on the plan's essentials. He records that he was appalled by its quixotic content and unprofessional methodology. He ensured that his dissent was conveyed at all intervening Army decision-making levels but in vain. A similar response was recorded by the newly appointed Pakistani Air Chief, Air Marshal Nur Khan, when he confronted the Army and was told by its Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan that Pakistan was launching “Operation Gibraltar” to throw out Indian troops with the help of the local population. As observed by Mehdi, the plan lacked coherence. Effective coordination with “Kashmiri Muslim supporters” in what Pakistan termed as Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) had not been undertaken and the raids had grossly inadequate logistics planning and back-up. Mehdi felt that the planners had hopelessly mixed up Commando raids with complex Guerilla operations. Col Mehdi was sacked for his opposition. Launched in August 1965, personnel of the Pak Army's 50th Airborne Paratroop Unit and mujahideen in civvies entered J & K to trigger off an insurrection but their plans got unhinged from the outset. Capt CN Singh was amongst the first few soldiers who voluntarily got into the line of fire and won, but at huge cost. Execution of Op Gibraltar In the first week of August 1965, Gibraltar Force began to cross the CFL. The 10 forces each of five companies, were given different code names, mostly after past, successful Muslim rulers. The force names and their areas of responsibility are listed as under: All company commanders were given Rs. 10,000 for incidental expenditure. The mujahids were on hard-scale rations with 200 rounds@sten and 750 rounds@LMG. Each company had 100 pounds plastic explosive. Company rear communications were on HF ANGRC-9 radio and platoons had transistors to receive broadcasts. Gibraltar Force began its operations by infiltrating at selected places across the 750 kilometer long CFL on 5 August 1965, by 1500 mujahids crossing over. Their second wave would come two weeks later, with overall strength peaking at 5000-6000. The third wave comprising 5500 mujahids was still waiting for launch in POK when their induction was called off in early September because by then India had carried the war into Pakistani Punjab. Gibraltar Force initially gained limited success, over-running some Indian positions, destroying bridges, carrying out ambushes on patrols, isolated localities and on convoy movement. This did not last. The Indian Army, after overcoming the shock and surprise that unforeseen and unprecedented aggression brings, quickly secured the border. Aided by the local population which, in most cases, refused succor, shelter or intelligence to the raiders, the Army hunted and eliminated them mercilessly. Gibraltar Force overall suffered huge losses in men and material and, by 10 October 1965, had only 500-600 mujahids left; the remaining either eliminated or escaped across the CFL. In frustration, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam in early September 1965 but that too, after initial success followed the way of Op Gibraltar. The outcome of the 1965 war was, overall a politico-strategic victory for India and cost Pakistan heavily in economic, political and military terms. Chander's Deathless Sacrifice With the background established, let us get back to 5 August 1965, the day Gibraltar Force began its operations across the CFL. At about 1800 hours, HQ 120 Infantry Brigade was informed by friendly locals that a few “raiders” had been seen moving in area Dhabhot, near Galuthi, in Mendhar Sector, very close to the Brigade HQ location. Captain Chander Narain Singh volunteered to lead a patrol to locate and liquidate them. In the hills, it gets dark sooner than in the plains and in the gathering darkness, the patrol drew accurate, intense small arms and automatic fire nearing the summit of the hill where the raiders had been reported. In that opening burst, Chander lost one of his men. This did not deter him from moving to a flank to get behind the enemy. This resulted in the successful silencing of two of the enemy's automatic weapons. By now it was pitch dark. Chander planned and then executed his final attack, leading his patrol to within 50 metres of the enemy. He lost two more men in closing up. Wounded in the arm, he continued undeterred, rallying his men to go for the kill instead of withdrawing; a show of rare leadership under fire, courage and fortitude whose roots went back to his early grooming in 2 Garhwal Rifles. Some reports suggest that his final, desperate charge ended 10 meters away from the enemy where he succumbed to a burst of machine gun fire. Hugely inspired by their wounded leader, his men carried on with the attack till it ended entirely in their favour. The mujahideen, in running away across the CFL, left behind six dead and large quantities of arms and ammunition. Of far greater importance however, they left behind key documents that, for the first time, revealed to the Army, the true nature of Operation Gibraltar and, in specific, the operational plans and locations of Ghaznavi Company operatives who were charged with causing mayhem and insurrection in the Mendhar-Rajouri area. This find led to focused Army operations based on high grade intelligence. Thus, within a short span of time, Gibraltar Force had been annihilated much as the Pakistani SSG Commander Col Mehdi had presciently predicted. In a little over two months, the Force became history all over the Kashmir Valley and its surrounding areas…It had been totally decimated. For his stellar “follow me” leadership and inspirational heroism, Capt Chander Narain Singh was decorated with the MVC posthumously; the only MVC to be awarded to the Garhwal Rifles during the 1965 operations. Observers feel that a better written, nuanced citation which had taken key assets of Chander's operational conduct on record, including his urging his men on even when he was seriously wounded, may have resulted in his being considered for the highest award; the coveted Param Vir Chakra (PVC). The lesser award does not reduce the impact that CN had on his men in specific and on soldiering in general. He died selflessly and in the best traditions of the Indian Army. Honours The Kangra District Sports has dedicated its multi-purpose Indoor Sports Stadium to the memory of Kangra's proud son. In October 2013, Capt CN Singh's bust was unveiled at the entrance of Dharamsala Cantt. Also, the road leading to the house of Maj Gen AS Pathania, MVC is now named as 'Chander Marg'. May his soul rest in peace. __._,_.___