रणझुंजार कॅप्टन अशोक करकरे भाग ९ ब्रिगेडियर, हेमंत महाजन
1971 WAR IN PUNJAB : SECTOR WHERE CAPT ASHOK KARKARE FOUGHT
Strategically and politically the most important sector in Western. Command was that held by 11 Corps which was responsible for the defence of Punjab, Haryana and the Ganganagar district Rajasthan. The border from Pathankot generally runs south-west along the line of the river Ravi to just north of Ranian where it turns south till it meets the er Sutlej west of Ferozepur, From there the border roughly follows the line of the river Sutlej upto Sulaimane. As these rivers had, during the years, changed their courses frequently there were many areas on our side of the river belonging Pakistan and we had many areas on the Pakistan side.
These "enclaves", as they were called, presented a difficult defence problem as we shall see later. There was only one bridge over the river Ravi and two over the Sutlej leading from Pakistan to India. The bridge over the Ravi was at Dera Nanak, and those over the Sutlej were at Hussainiwala Sulaimanke. The distance along the border, from Pathankot in the north to border post 403 in Rajasthan in the north, was just over 700 kilometres. This area divides itself rally into 4 parts, the first facing north from Pathankot along the river Ravi, to about Ranian, the second facing westfrom Ranian to Hussainiwala on the river Sutlej near Ferozepur, third from south of the river Sutlej to Sulaimanke, and the last from Sulaimanke to our border post 403 in Ganganagar district of Rajasthan from which point Southern Command took over.
In 1947 when we attained independence the area south of Ferozepore was virtually a desert, very sparsely populated and with no communication whatsoever. However, after the partiti on a large number of displaced persons from West Pakistan settled there. In order to develop the area and provide the displaced persons means of livelihood, the Rajastan canal was built. With availability of the water the hardy, industrious Punjabis so developed the land that it became parts of Punjab and Haryana, growing bumper and cotton and studded with citrus groves. Along with canal came a network of roads, and thus it became possible for mechanized army to operate in this region. Therefore, this area could no longer be neglected & had to be defended.
So far our defences had been based on preventing attack by Pakistan either along the Grand Trunk Road to between Amritsar and Ferozepore. No troops had been allotted or were available for the defence of area south of the river Sutlej. During peace time it is an uphill and almost impossible task to get the government to increase of troops, however cogent the case may be.
By early 1971 it was clear that events in East Paki lead to a war and that something would have to be done about the defences south of the Sutlej. The government still baulked (as it is still not permitting the army to raise additional troops to defend the Indo-China border) at raising a division for the defence of this region but as a concession agreed to the raising of a Sector Headquarters called Foxtrot or "F" sector with a skeleton staff to carry out planning and control of troops in this region in April 1971. However, troops were still not available.
For the defence of this 700-kilometre border, 11 Corps had in peace time 15 Infantry Division to look after all the area from Pathankot in the north to, and including, the Grand Trunk Road opposite Amritsar, and 7 Infantry Division to protect the area from south of the Grand Trunk Road to, and including. Ferozepore. During the operations, 11 Corps had been allotted another division. 14 Infantry Division, who would take over the defence of Ferozepore and the area south of it as far as Kot Kapura. However, we were on the defensive and as 15 Infantry Division was rather thin on the ground one infrantry brigade from 14 Infantry Division had been allotted for the defence of the Ajnala area. So in the area south of Ferozepore there were in fact only two infrantry brigades.
Thus the deployment of II Corps before the operations commenced was, two infantry divisions, 7 and 15, the latter having five brigades and one armoured brigade north of the Sutlej river, and one division less a brigade between Ferozepore and Fazilka.
DUAL COMMAND & CONTROL OF BSF
In peace time the border between India and Pakistan is pro-tected by a series of posts manned by the Border Security Force (BSF), a paramilitary organization whose function is to prevent infiltration and smuggling. In order to accomplish this they are armed and organized more or less like army units and are trained up to company level military tactics. They also had a number of army officers, mostly retired, seconded to them. The Border Security Force personnel are basically policemen and policemen are not generally trained to withstand an organized attack by regular forces. These posts whose strength varied from one platoon (about 30 men) to a company (100 to 120 men) could prevent only minor incursions. In the 11 Corps sector there were thirteen such Border Security Force battalions deployed in small posts along the border.
As war loomed nearer, Headquarters Western Command started pressing that these battalions be placed under its command so that they could incorporate them in defence plans. However, this was resisted by the Border security Force and it was only on 14 October 1971 that the Border Security Force battalions were placed under our command. Even then the local Border Security Force Headquarters were not placed under Command of the army. The dual control is always problematic.
KALRA-KHEMKARAN AND FEROZEPORE SECTORS
The task of defending all territory south of Buchar headworks up to and including Ferozepore was the responsibility of 7 Infantry Division.
There were, south of the Grand Trunk Road, two main approaches for the enemy for capturing important towns in Punjab. These two axes of advance were known as the Kalra and Khemkaran axes. The third and the most important axis was the Lahore-Kasur-Ferozepore Road. As this was the chief artery carrying the international fruit trade from Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, there was constant traffic on this road.
7 Infantry Division was deployed to deny Pak attacks along these three routes. In view of the large frontage it had to cover. It was essential for the division to have reserves; so it was deployed north of the Sutlej with two infantry brigades forward and one in reserve, the reserve brigade, leaving one battalion west of the Sutlej at Hussainiwala.
7 Arty Brigade commanded by Brig R. S. Mahal consisted of 171, 172 & 174 Field Regiments, 35 Light Regiment, 60 Heavy Regiment 125 Div. Locating Battery, one troop 49 AD Regiment & two sections of 14 Air Op Flight. The 35 Med Regt. Moved from Pathankot on 14 August 71 and reached Ferozepur to join 7 Infantry Division on 15 August 71.
119 Light Bty was deployed in "OP CACTUS LILY" in Hussainiwala Sector on 07 Oct. 71. The rest of the Regiment was deployed in Khalara and Khemkaran sectors. From 03 Dec. to 17 Dec. the unit took part in war against Pakistan.
DEPLOYMENT OF 65 INFANTRY BRIGAGE (CAPTAIN ASHOKS BRIGADE)
65 Infantry Brigade was positioned to prevent ingress along the Kalra axis and 48 Infantry Brigade along Khernkaran axis, and 29 Infantry Brigade was held in reserve. For operations a brigade from 14 Infantry Division was to be inducted and located behind the Hussainiwala headworks to strengthen the defences and to ensure that no break through was possible along the Kasur-Ferozepore road.
172 Field Regiment, one battery 35 Light Regiment (Captain Ashok's battery), two batteries 60 Heavy Regiment were allotted to 65 Infantry Brigade. The artillery units provide fire support to the infantry battalions located in the defences. The artillery guns were located 3-4 kms behind the main defences. The battery was located at Khalra village.
65 Infantry Brigade, the northern most formation of 7 Infantry Division, was deployed between Buchar head works and Bherwal, and their main defences were based on the Marimegha drain which is about 5 miles from the border, with outposts on the border. Marimegha drain is a wet canal. 14 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles less two companies were located on the disused Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) in the Kalra area as covering troops, while the main defences were held by 14 Rajput and 3 Madras. As they had to defend about 26 kilometres of ground, the brigage was very thin on the ground. The plan therefore was that, if attacked, the BOP's held by the Border Security Force would fall back and fill up the gaps in the main defences. The BOP was located right of the international border.
PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL BSF BOP
On 3 December 1971 teh enemy started shelling our outposts and the division, thinking that an attack was imminent, first thinned out the BOP's and then withdrew them in preparation for the expected enemy attack. The enemy were therefore able to advance and occupy the area vacated and make contact with the covering position held by 14 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles on the UBDC without opposition. They then started to probe our flanks. These probing attacks were however easily repulsed. When it became clear that this was no major offensive the formation regretted their earlier decision to withdraw their BOP's and decided to recapture the post of Chhina Bidi Chand which was then serving the enemy as a base.
As 65 Infantry Brigade had no reserves, 9 Bihar from 29 Infantry Brigade was placed at the disposal of the Commander 65 Infantry Brigade. The plan was 9 Bihar to replace 14 Rajput, one of his own battalions in the defences, and thus release 14 Rajput, who knew the area well for the attack. The relief was carried out one the 7th. Meanwhile on the night of 6/7, 14 Rajput patrols reported that Chhina Bidi Chand was held by a company of Pak Army only.
Captain Ashok was the forward observation officer (FOO) with 14 Rajput. As a FOO he was located with the attacking troops.
ATTACK BY 14 RAJPUT (Capt Ashok was the FOO)
14 Rajput mounted their attack at about the midnight of 7/8 December 1971 and captured the position by 2 a.m. The enemy immediately brought down intense artillery fire inflicting heavy casualties on our troops. Captain Ashok Karkare secured a captured enemy artillery radio set and through it misguided the enemy thereby diverting enemy artillery fire and saving casualties to our troops.
Capt. Ashok ensured that very accurate fire was brought on the Pakistani thereby making the task of 14 Rajput easy. However, 14 Rajput patrolling report proved incorrect, for afterwards it came to be known-that there was another enemy company in the area. 14 Rajput were counter attacked at 1.15 a.m. The attack was again beaten back. Capt. Ashoks artillery fire again proved decisive. At dawn the next day, 14 Rajput anxiously awaited arrival of armored squadron (14 tanks) & reorganization stores to help rebuild & consolidate their defences. The tanks never reached. The tanks that had been allotted to the battalion for the attack were on the wrong side of the UBDC and could not cross the canal and come to the battalion's assistance. At 7.15 am. the enemy launched second counter attack. Again this attack was repulsed. Captain Ashok's accurate arty fire again proved effective.
The enemy again counter attacked at 10.30 am, at which time the Rajputs withdrew. In the withdrawal 1 officer & 5 other ranks were killed, 1 JCO & 23 other ranks were wounded & 3 JCO's & 22 other ranks went missing.
Undeterred by the shelling and small arms fire captain Karkare directed own artillery in an accurate manner and was instrumental in repulsing the attacks. He continued to engage the enemy till our troops had extricated themselves from the position. While he was himself withdrawing, he was hit by a machine gun burst and killed on the spot.
Captain Ashok held on to the post & as FOO played a gallant role in covering the withdrawal of 14 Rajput. Ashok went to the extent of calling fire on the own post to keep attacking enemy at bay. Generally safety distance of 250 metres is kept when arty fire is brought down close to own troops in defences. Bringing fire on own defences when withdrawing is rarely done & is termed as DFSOS. It requires lot of courage as own fire on own post can hurt/kill arty FOO's located there. In the midst of heavy fire Capt AK Karkare displayed exceptional degree of intelligence and bravery by laying his hands on the enemy radio set and created confusion and mayhem on the enemy side. Despite being hit by a machine gun burst fire, he displayed unstinted devotion and absolute courage and continued directing fire on the enemy till he sacrificed his life in action at Sidhwan village on 08 Dec. 1971. On 20 Dec. 1971, body of Capt Ashok Karkare was received from PAK authorities and was cremated with full military honours. A richly deserved Vir Chakra (Posthumous) was conferred upon him on 26 Dec. 1971.
His bravery ensured that 14 Rajput suffered very less casualties. Had the tanks arrived & withdrawal was not ordered Chhina Bibi Chand may have remained in our hands. (CAPTAIN ASHOK's SECTOR)
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