what should be done in terms of the Pakistan policy. The obvious answer is:
ignore it, and carry on the good work with the US, China, and others in the
neighbourhood. With an economy that is in tatters, and the Pakistani rupee
standing at PKR 150 to the dollar, it is going down the drain anyway. The
truth, however, is that the Pakistan economy still has a degree of resilience,
with capable institutions like the State Bank carefully crafting a politically
unpopular policy to bring the country back to stability.
Representational image. Reuters
True,
it has the International Monetary Fund breathing down its neck to institute
reforms. But whatever other motives may be ascribed to the IMF, it is certainly
in the business of economic stabilisation and those reforms will begin to show
results. It’s going to take time, and a painful tightening of the belt. No,
don’t write off Pakistan on the economic score just yet.
The
economic crisis was nowhere more apparent than in the announcement of projected
budget cuts by the Pakistani army chief for the coming financial year. That
should have happened regardless of austerity measures. The Pakistan Army is the
fifth largest in the world, and no, it's not anywhere near the top in terms of
the listing of the largest countries. It is, however, in the top ten in another
listing.
A SIPRI fact sheet puts
Pakistan among those with the highest ‘military burden’ – that is, those who
are spending far too much of their national wealth. Since 2009-2018, it
has increased every year to reach an overall increase of 73 percent,
which is about 4 percent of GDP. Compare that to India’s spending of a reported
2.4 percent. That means a Pakistani economy in dire straits is spending more
than twice of what we do.
While the DG ISPR hastened to
explain that the Pakistani army would still be capable of cutting the Indian
forces down to size, he – together with some jubilant Indian commentators –
miss the point. If the Pakistan forces are smart, they’ll use enforced budget
cuts to trim the fat that is most apparent in the army. A reduction in size
will not reduce its political clout, but on the contrary, could make the whole
force increase operational soundness. It might even make it trim its rocketing
ambitions, but that’s probably asking for the moon. So no, while the Pakistani
Armed Forces can't have any new toys, it can polish up what it still has. So
don’t write off the khakis just yet.
Therefore,
the actual danger for Pakistan is from none of the above. It is the rise and
rise of a kind of nationalism that is closing in on itself, with more than a
tinge of jihadist fervour. Observe that despite massive US pressure, the
Pakistan Army and its backers – including sections of the political class
and the bureaucracy – have refused to cry halt to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Here, there is a sense of victory being almost within its grasp, that can't be
ceded.
It's
not, because the Afghan problem is far more complicated than that. But the
Pakistani establishment can't bring itself to believe it, so the tragedy
continues. In Kashmir, the tap has been turned down marginally. But will it stop?
Not on your life. There is also a belief that it can win through, with Kashmir
proving to be India’s 1971. It's never going to happen, but that doesn’t
prevent Rawalpindi from believing it. The inability to see reality as it is has
always been at the core of the Pakistani problem. That’s why ‘talking’ to
Pakistan is a fraught enterprise. It feeds the beast of self-delusion.
So
what's the answer? India could continue to ignore Pakistan, but you’re stuck
with it as a neighbour pretty much forever. The ‘Composite Dialogue’ of the
1980s is probably also dead in the water. If not, it deserves to be. So, the
next best thing is to provide Islamabad a way out at a time of severe and
unremitting pressure. An offer could be routed through a third country, to make
Pakistan a locus of sub-continental and Asian trade, with not just pipelines,
but connectivity projects that are designed to crisscross Asia.
Of
these, the International North South Corridor is just one possible enterprise.
There are others. That offer is of course tied to a complete and verifiable
cessation of terrorism. International traffic is hardly likely to even want to
come to Pakistan, unless it ensures a degree of safety and viability. And
arising from that, the offer is also naturally linked to ensuring stability in
the most volatile parts of Afghanistan. Something like a good old-fashioned
sundae — a vanilla, chocolate and strawberry all in one – could provide the
beginnings of a solution for all three of those most concerned — India,
Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the United States being the waffle cone that
holds the whole in place
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