LINE OF CONTROL & PEACE

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/lines-of-control-war-and-peace.html Thursday, 20 November 2014 | Pravin Sawhney Traditional Indian wisdom puts a premium on the disputed border with Pakistan, which is prone to regular firing and attendant casualties, when in fact it is the country's border with China, where heavy weapons are not used, that should be of greater concern Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has said that the People’s Liberation Army’s incursions (across the disputed border) are not serious. This is the traditional wisdom which puts premium on the disputed border with Pakistan, prone to regular firings and attendant casualties than the disputed border with China where weapons are not used. This fallacy has survived over six decades since India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared that Pakistan rather than China was the main threat and should concern the Armed Forces. While the reality was always the opposite, it has acquired ominous overtures today. Unless the dynamics of the two borders are understood, peace on either will not be possible. In strategic terms, India’s rise will depend upon how the two military lines are understood and engaged: The 746 km Line of Control with Pakistan and the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control with China. The LoC is the consequence of the 1971 war when Pakistan was not defeated in the west and both sides had to contend with minimal exchange of territory. The earlier ceasefire line (formed after the 1948-49) thus assumed the new name. With time, military imperfections on either side of the LoC — the Siachen glacier and the Jammu International Border — came to the fore. As the LoC was left undefined beyond map reference — NJ 9842 in the north, conflict on the Siachen glacier started in May 1984 once both the sides acquired skills and wherewithal to undertake high altitude warfare. The 202 km Jammu IB runs from Madhopur in the south along Munawar Tawi River till the southern tip of the LoC at Sangam village. Given that Chhamb, which India lost to Pakistan in both the 1965 and 1971 wars is here (Pakistan controls west bank of Munawar Tawi), 10 km of the Munawar Tawi stretch of the IB is with the Army and the remaining 192 km with the Border Security Force. Pakistan calls the Jammu IB, which was traditionally the revenue boundary between the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir and the undivided Punjab, as the Working Boundary. Altering the nomenclature became essential as Pakistan could neither call it IB or LoC. Calling it IB would have meant that Pakistan accepts Jammu as border, and the LoC would imply that the northern-most portion of Pakistan’s Punjab which abuts Jammu is a military line. The IB/WB is different from LoC in three respects. Instead of the regular Army, the paramilitaries (BSF for India and Chhamb Rangers for Pakistan) guard this stretch; they do not have artillery (long range firepower); and the BSF erected a fence starting in 1995 for its primary task of area dominance. Unlike the BSF, the Chhamb Rangers is led by regular Army officers and have Army ethos, training and tactics. According to recent BSF intelligence reports which have been downplayed by the Government, Chinese soldiers have been spotted helping Rangers with weapons training and the regular Pakistan Army has interspersed its sniper shooters with the Rangers. These developments suggest that the Pakistan Army is plugging its war weakness on the IB/WB, created by the raising of the South-Western command of the Indian Army, which has led to it having offensive options in Chhamb. Given Pakistan’s counter-moves, India should place the BSF under the Army in the Jammu IB and dismantle its fence to signal an offensive posture. Unfortunately, this will not happen. Inspired from the BSF, the Indian Army erected a fence on the LoC in 2004 and adopted BSF’s area domination role rather than project an offense posture on the military line. This unexpected operational windfall is the major reason why Pakistan continues to hold the 26 November 2003 LoC ceasefire by not opening artillery fire. The fence has instilled a defensive mindset within the Indian Army, with generals boasting that they do better counter-insurgency than paramilitary forces. The Pakistani Army is using the unanticipated opportunity of the Indian Army being unprepared for war to resolve its internal security and western front issues while keeping the powder dry against India. The LAC with China is not a consequence of war, but, ironically, of peace. It is the only example in military history where a military line — which by definition can be altered by force — has been formed for peace and stability. The September 1993 bilateral treaty signed by Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao is responsible for rechristening the entire disputed border as the LAC. The 1993 treaty had menacing implications considering the LAC is neither accepted on maps nor on ground. In the western sector (Ladakh), it was only in 1959 that India and China gave up vacillation and made firm territorial claims. Until then, India’s position had swung between the Kuen Lun and Karakoram ranges. In the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh), while the British-led 1914 tripartite Simla agreement led to the creation of the McMahon Line initialed by representatives of India, China and Tibet, Beijing rejected it as being forced under British pressure. Against this backdrop, the expected happened. On the one hand, learning lessons from the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis, when China had backed off following the Indian Army build up, Beijing decided to build infrastructure at a furtive pace to support massive military deployments. On the other hand, following India’s 1998 nuclear tests where India had blamed China for it, regular intrusions by PLA along the LAC increased exponentially. India’s pusillanimity to underplay intrusions as differences of LAC perception emboldened the PLA resulting in increased disputed areas. This is not all. Believing that talks would resolve the border row, India suggested bilateral engagement by politically mandated representatives in 2003, which the wily Chinese accepted in return for two things. The then Vajpayee Government, formally conceded that Tibet was a part of China, and to not displease China, India prevaricated in building 73 border roads first sanctioned in 2000. From 2000 to 2009, China perfected border infrastructure; build massive rapid reaction forces; excelled in space, cyber, unarmed aerial vehicles and cruise missiles; and made minimal movement on border talks. India, however, continued neglecting the Chinese front. Having done groundwork to support an assertive foreign and security policy by 2008, China made two strategic moves. In 2009, China’s ambassador in India declared that Arunachal Pradesh, called South Tibet, was not a part of India. During my visit to Beijing at PLA’s invitation in July 2012, Major General Yao Yunzhu told me that, “India has transgressed more than China”, referring to Indian troops in Arunachal Pradesh. Then, in December 2010, China announced that its border with India was 2,000 km and not 3,488 km as claimed by India. In a single stroke, China said that it did not have a border with India in Ladakh (Jammu & Kashmir), thus signaling an end to border resolution talks. This explains why the Modi Government has not announced its Special Representative for border talks. Against this backdrop, the April-May 2013 intrusion by China in Depsang plain (North Ladakh) was Chinese-style replay of India’s 1961 forward policy. Like then, it did not lead to war. India instead shortened its Army’s patrolling policy there which surely would have lowered troops’ morale. PLA’s Chumar intrusion in September 2014 was different because India has better connectivity there. Thus, without firing a shot, China has pinned down the Indian Army on the entire LAC at freezing heights of 12,000 feet and above round the year against a non-existent enemy. What China has on its side are not PLA troops but sparse pockets of paramilitary, its border guards. The Army is paying a heavy price for China’s intrusions, which Mr Parrikar should know is a far more serious matter than eyeball to eyeball forces on the LoC, where troops can see the enemy. (The writer, who is editor FORCE newsmagazine, can be reached at pravin@forceindia.net)