CHINA INDIA & INDIAN OCEAN

China and the Indian Ocean Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd) History tells us of the Chinese eunuch Admiral Zheng He and his seven voyages in the early 15th century, leading a fleet of over 300 ships and more than 27,000 men through Malacca into the Indian Ocean, nearly a century before Vasco da Gama found the sea route to India. Zheng He travelled through most of South East and South Asia as well as the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa during the period 1405 – 1433 AD. A trilingual tablet in Chinese, Tamil and Persian invoking blessings of Hindu deities for peaceful trade erected by the Admiral at Galle now adorns the Colombo National Museum. His voyages made Ming China the pre-eminent naval power in the Asia-Pacific region during the first half of the 15th century. Chinese power retreated from the region after Zheng He’s demise. Six centuries later, it has returned, but this time with a key difference. Ming China did not need anything from Indian Ocean states and sought only to display its wealth and power. Today’s China is focussed on economic growth, for which it needs energy, in the form of crude oil, natural gas and coal, as well as other minerals, the major sources of which lie in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, many of China’s markets lie in the Indian Ocean or require ships to transit through it to reach their destinations. The security of sources of energy and other raw material, its transportation, and the markets both in the Indian Ocean and Europe are vital interests for China; without them, it can give up on its dream of economic resurgence and becoming a global power. The US Navy took over the role of securing Indian Ocean trade from the Royal Navy in the 1960s, with the Soviet Navy as its only competitor. Breakup of the USSR left the US Navy with a virtual monopoly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). American bases at Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Qatar and Singapore, and access agreements with a host of other littorals enable it to operate freely in the region. China competes for the same space, admittedly in a way very different from the Cold War, but the competition is there. It would be naive for China to believe that the USA will protect Chinese interests, even dependence, on the Indian Ocean when push comes to shove. There is no option but to establish its own presence in the region, failing which the USA will be able to deprive China of energy, raw materials and markets without contest. China’s current focus is on ports and facilities that can help feed her insatiable appetite while serving as outlets for Chinese manufactures. A realistic china has no option but to create a fourth fleet, to add to its North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets, to focus on the Indian Ocean. Talk of this is already in the air, though there is no official confirmation yet. And projections indicate that the PLA Navy will become larger than the US Navy by the end of this decade. The PLA Navy began regaining experience of Indian Ocean operations by way of its Gulf of Aden patrol in early January 2009. Its recent deployment of submarines continues this trend. There is speculation that agreements for construction of port facilities at Kyaukphu, Chittagong, Hambantota and Gwadar contain secret protocols that permit Chinese naval use in the event of requirement. In any event, given the immense help China has provided in infrastructure creation, it would be well nigh impossible for Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to deny permission for port calls, which could conceivably expand to base and repair facilities that could allow China to dominate the Indian Ocean, in the way the US Navy does at present. For a rising India looking to establish its own space, increased Chinese presence is as much of a potential threat as American presence was in the 1960s. “Talk softly and carry a big stick”, was President Roosevelt’s prescription to deal with threats. India’s policy often appears to be the opposite: “Talk loudly and don’t pay attention to the stick, hoping that its bluff will not be called”. The furore in our media, with reports of India expressing its displeasure to Sri Lanka over the visits of Chinese submarines to Colombo in October and November 2014 reflects this mindset. The fact that the claimed provision of the Indo Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987 which stipulates that Sri Lankan ports “will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests” does not find mention anywhere in the agreement’s official text seems to have escaped the attention of our ‘strategic’ commentators. Perhaps it is implied, like Bhutto’s verbal commitment to Indira Gandhi in 1972 – but verbal commitments are meaningless. There is need for India to take concrete steps to safeguard its considerable interests in the region, instead of deluding itself into believing that ‘talk’ will suffice. The steps required can broadly be considered at the Armed Forces and the national levels. Action at the Armed Forces level includes the following:- •Strengthening bilateral and multilateral linkages with regional navies and Armed Forces, particularly in South and South East Asia. •Enhancing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) capability and outreach, given the vulnerability of the region to natural disaster. •Strengthening the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which sits astride China’s Malacca Dilemma, and making it specialise in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), given its favourable geography and the fact that PLAN submarines must transit through constricted waters to gain access to the IOR. •Increasing surveillance capability, both aerial and sub-sea. •Increasing naval outreach to Pacific countries, particularly Vietnam, South Korea, Japan and Australia. At the national level, the following should be implemented:- •Articulation of a clear policy that addresses the nation’s security requirements. •Creation of a comprehensive programme to provide security assistance to IOR countries, to encompass maritime domain awareness, surveillance, intelligence sharing, transfer of naval platforms, maintenance, training of personnel, financial transfers etc. The need is to create regional capacity and capability. •Creating expeditionary capability, including a Marine Corps, particularly in view of the vulnerability of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to occupation. •Expansion of the Look East Policy to create a regional security architecture, with the inclusion of all interested parties, including China. •Building true indigenous naval capability, not one dependent on external sources for sensors and weapons. •Strengthening of Indian Naval capability so that it does not have to echo General VP Malik’s words at Kargil (We will fight with what we have) as and when a threat develops. That not a single submarine has been commissioned into the Indian Navy in the last 14 years, or the acute paucity of helicopters for ASW missions, shows lack of seriousness with which our policy-makers consider national defence. Successive Defence Secretaries, who have exclusive responsibility for transaction of all business pertaining to “Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution ....” have much to answer for