WHAT IS HAPPENING IN KASHMIR

Full Headers Printable Viewhttp://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/comments-analysis/theres-method-in-pakistans-border-madness/articleshow/44778982.cms?prtpage=1 11 Oct, 2014, 04.44AM IST Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain Social media in India is abuzz with a variety of opinion about what is happening at Jammu & Kashmir's Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB). Most comments are by people who do not know the context of J&K too well and cannot remember the pre-ceasefire period prior to Nov 26, 2003. Listening and watching visual electronic media gets adrenaline flowing but that explains nothing about context and only snippets (sometimes nuggets) are taken and discussed. So what really is happening at the LoC and the IB (Pak calls it Working Boundary in its belief that it is not the final border). Internally imploding and externally getting less significant Pakistan is indeed worried. It has no common thread of policy due to different stake holders dictating different narratives and the Chief Executive horribly out of control. To make it worse, across the border the Indian State seems to be going from strength to strength with an economic revival on the cards, a strong leader in charge with intent of securing for the Nation its legitimate rights and an increasingly confident foreign policy. That policy also clearly projects that there will be no more talks unless Pakistan stops sponsoring terror in India. The contrast could not be worse. Pakistan's relevance lies in being hyphenated with India but that may soon be history. Before it gets any worse Pakistan, or at least the main decision maker — the Pakistan Army, must do something. Build the scenario further. The India focused Jihadi groups who have been Pakistan's force multipliers all this while are clamouring for more support to up the ante in J&K lest they get completely insignificant. As it is, they are being threatened into becoming bit players or just surrogates as the high profile ISIS with Taliban on board and the Al Qaida in competition, look towards the subcontinent. The Jihadi groups perceive that Pakistan's internal security campaign against the TTP is marginalising their importance. Then comes the disastrous flood in J&K and suddenly there is a huge emotional connect from Rest of India through relief material and of treating it as an opportunity to work the Modi wonder; perhaps even make Srinagar and Jammu the first two of the hundred smart cities the prime minister intends to convert. It couldn't get worse for Pakistan; twenty five years of effort to make India bleed by a thousand cuts is under threat. To top it all, there just aren't enough foot soldier terrorists left in J&K and no leadership at all to at least create some disruption and some turbulence during the upcoming high profile elections to J&K's assembly. Efforts to infiltrate some terrorists in the Valley sector during the great deluge a month ago and thereafter have led to their near annihilation at the LoC. In spite of all this, Pakistan's intellectuals offer the oft-repeated argument about their army and nation's fight against terror which supposedly leaves it no time to concentrate on J&K. That is exactly the point I am making; the Jihadi groups and the ISI wants more concentration on the Eastern front to prevent them all becoming history. Just two other issues, in the limited space here. Why is the IB sector the target this time? Tactically, this is the best ground for infiltration and immediate targeting of suitable objectives in a very short time frame; the fence has been damaged by the floods and the BSF is doing a wonderful job with lesser than optimum density of deployment. Where is this likely to go from here and is it any different to the situation last year? Well, the times appear to have changed drastically within a year. With a strong government and leader at the Centre, the Nation is definitely handling the situation better. Freedom to the Army does not translate into a free for all as many may perceive. There is a level of calibration and India is correctly ratcheting its response appropriately. The warning to Pakistan should be clear; India's limit of tolerance will be crossed if Pakistan or the Jihadi groups under its control dare a trans LoC kind of an operation. The response will immediately go up by many notches and we would be willing to risk a permanent breakdown of the ceasefire. Handling the LoC requires insight into sensitivities of implications of every kind resulting from every action. It is not a situation which needs only bravado; much can be achieved through a range of almost unlimited options military commanders can employ but each must carry with it a message. It is an environment for thinking soldiers, politicians and diplomats, all affected in different ways. But central to the response is the need to be firm and committed to a strategy while retaining flexibility to wrest additional advantage at the termination of the standoff