The Rashtriya Rifles Deserves the Gratitude of the Nation
by: Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM,VSM*
7/24/2014
Defense analysts and writers seldom use emotives when they get down to
writing. Since I consider myself a bit of an upstart as a defense
analyst I justify remaining emotional about subjects which are close
to the heart. For a soldier the heart normally lays where he has
served with honor. Thus for me one of the organizations closest to the
heart remains the Rashtriya Rifles, commonly referred as the RR.
Within the Army, the RR is well known as a specialist organization
raised to fight terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir. The people outside the
Army may have just heard of it, though sketchily. Yet, when an
organization barely 25 years in being, rises to become an icon in
itself there must be something about it which is worth knowing. Hence
this piece on RR.
It may pay dividends I were to commence this piece with a single
statement which actually says it all. The Rashtriya Rifles, in my
perception, is india’s finest military experiment in 67 years of
existence as an independent nation. I never fail to repeat this
wherever I go, ad nauseum. It makes me guilty to leave my audience
guessing what I mean and how I justify such a remark.
The Origin
The origins of the RR go back to the days of Operation PAWAN, India’s
first out of area (OOA) operation. Four frontline divisions were
involved in an OOA insurgent situation leaving behind an adversely
affected force structure to respond to the ongoing insurgency in the
North East and none too stable situation on the western borders.
Immediately thereafter the Army was again involved in holding the
periphery to boost the confidence of the Punjab Police while the
Punjab militancy raged in 1990-91. With the continuous deployment of
the Army in OOA operations and CI duties, even as conventional threats
loomed large in the form of the unpredictable Pakistan Army, it became
clear that a special force was required to deal with India’s turbulent
internal security situation; a credible force which would prevent
frequent deployment of the Army’s frontline formations and units on
internal security. Raised with the Punjab situation in mind the
changeover to Kashmir and then the Jammu region was quick. Lending
credence to this theory that it was never J&K which instigated the
idea of RR, is the fact that HQ 8 Sector RR along with its three
units, 18 RR, 32 RR and 33 RR was initially deployed in the North East
and moved to its current location in the Lolab Valley only in in 1999,
at the height of Kargil crisis.
RR was raised as a specialized Counter Insurgency/ Counter Terrorist
(CI/ CT) Force in 1990 to relieve the regular Army of its CI/ CT
commitments, so as to ensure its ready availability at all times for
its primary task. It was originally planned to constitute the Force
with personnel on deputation from the Army, along with lateral
inductees for permanent absorption in the RR and suitable
ex-servicemen volunteers. It was however, later decided that the
entire manpower would comprise personnel on deputation from the
regular Army. The RR was thus raised with 100 percent personnel on
deputation from all Arms and Services.
The Organization
The first few units had no regimental orientation or links but someone
in authority (and to him we owe much) decided that one of the
strengths of the Indian Army, its regimental system,also needed to be
infused into this force. Thus came about the unique experiment of
basing an RR unit on an Infantry Regiment as the core with another Arm
(Armoured Corps, Artillery, Engineers and Air Defence) providing
supplementary manpower; the logistics and support elements were
provided by the Services.
A look at a typical RR unit’s organization will explain this little
better to a layman. 36 RR, one of the high achieving units, is
organized with a little over 50 percent manpower from The Garhwal
Rifles, 30 percent from the Artillery and rest of the elements coming
from Engineers (one Engineer platoon), Signals (a communication
platoon), EME (one Field Repair Increment – FRI), ASC (one Mechanical
Transport Platoon), Ordnance (storemen) and AMC personnel. Add to this
one JCO and 14 OR from JAK LI for interpreter and liaison duties.
The total manpower comes to about 1200 all ranks but the capability to
have six RR companies is a definite plus. This affords an ideal six
point deployment i.e. occupation of six company operating bases (COBs)
with one of the companies being co-located with the Battalion
Headquarters. The logistics is kept to the bare minimum with
specialists available in each field thus obviating any training of
general duties personnel in specialist fields involving logistics. The
Engineers complement is a major asset because it can be employed for
anti-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) role, bomb disposal, demolition
tasks in CT operations and very importantly for electrification,
construction of habitat and maintenance tasks. Similar is the case
with Signals.
In many ways an RR battalion represents a battalion group which can be
reorganized for tailor made tasks because of the inherent flexibility.
It can latch on to any logistics node or specialist logistics
establishment for its logistics needs and is completely self-contained
in transport.
Two other aspects need to be known. First, that RR Budget is
additionality to Army Budget under a separate Head. All financial
rules as applicable to regular Army are also applicable to RR Budget.
Second, the manpower is supplementary to the authorized manpower of
the Army and thus comes under Composite Table II. It means that it
requires a special approval of its mandate for a fixed period after
which the mandate has to be approved again and that too at the highest
level. This has sometimes caused problems in functioning as such
approvals are known to get delayed with resultant effects on the
budget.
The initial organizational concept was based upon two to three RR
units functioning under a Sector HQ (equivalent to a Brigade HQ). This
was supplemented in 1994 with the raising of the two HQ Counter
Insurgency Forces; Victor for the Kashmir Valley and Delta for Doda in
Jammu region. The CI/CT grid came under the two Force HQ which too
were lean and mean, devoid of all the add on supporting units
associated with a division HQ. In fact the first light division
concept in India had thus taken birth. With the expanding arc of
militancy through the Nineties, it was not possible to execute the
CI/CT role over the large swathe of areas North and South of the
PirPanjal with these two Forces alone. Additional forces were
inducted, 8 Mountain Divison (from North East) in the Kashmir Valley
with 25 Infantry Division and 39 Infantry Division doing service in
Jammu region. It also led to the raising of additional RR HQ, Kilo
Force for the Valley, with Uniform and Romeo Forces in Jammu region.
That is where it rests today with the strength of RR units going up
from 36 in 1999 to 63 by 2003 with fifteen Sector HQs to control
these, along with the five Force HQ. The Directorate General of
Rashtriya Rifles (DGRR), located as part of the Integrated HQ of the
MoD (Army) at Delhi controls the non-operational part of the
management of the Force. An extremely neat arrangement.
The Ethos and Mode of Functioning
Keeping the North East model as the backdrop, interoperability between
the RR and the regular Army was ensured. Thus RR units form part of
regular infantry formations just as an RR Sector HQ can have regular
infantry units placed under it.There is even a unique case where an RR
unit is placed under an artillery brigade of an Infantry division
because it is the garrison battalion in a mid-size city for which the
formation is responsible; flexibility of command and control is thus a
mantra.
Additional information, suitable to discuss under ‘ethos’ rather than
‘organization’, relates to the makeup of officers, the backbone of the
leadership. The CO is invariably an Infantryman from the same regiment
as the infantry troops, so is the Second in Command, although another
officer (not from Services) can also perform duties if he is the
senior most. There has been a running battle between the Infantry and
Arms such as Armoured Corps and Artillery for a percentage of
vacancies of command. It has yet to be resolved to satisfaction.
However, if this is a negative, the positives far outweigh it. In the
RR, while an officer may have his core competence based on his Arm or
Service, no one denies him an operational role in command of troops.
This gives huge fillip to the self-esteem of officers who proudly wear
their RR badge, shoulder titles and lanyard, temporarily casting aside
their original embellishments. The Military Secretary’s Branch has
done its bit by ensuring that service in RR (usually 30 months)
fetches the qualitative requirements (QRs) for consideration for
foreign postings and career courses of instruction. While many an old
timer from the Infantry may consider CI/CT operations as a purely
Infantry domain, the RR experience has proved that ultimately it is an
officer’s personal involvement and application which makes him a
competent CI/CT leader. Besides numerous Infantry officers who perform
marvelously there are an equal number of officers from Armoured Corps,
Artillery, Air Defense, Engineers, Signals, Ordnance and ASC who
perform outstandingly under the most stressful conditions. The bulk of
the officers are from the Infantry (4-6), with the other Arm providing
4 and an officer each from Engineers, Signals, ASC and EME. A
Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) is a must, considering that
casualties are frequent and the rule of Golden Hour necessitating the
presence of an RMO at the site of operations.
The organizational ethos has refined over time with every effort to
ensure that each RR Unit has a fixed number of Infantry and other Arm
units to subscribe the manpower. Most RR units go to the extent of
organizing themselves in sub units on the basis of sub division of the
units which subscribe the manpower. For example 14 RR could have three
Garhwal Rifles units subscribing to an RR company along with two or
three Armoured units. This develops a close bond and the sub unit’s
unique ethos and operational culture can many times be traced to the
culture of the original units. RR companies are a proportional mix of
Infantry and the main Arm which provides the manpower. It should be
noted that the Indian Army’s concept of service in an operational area
is quite different to that of Western armies who ensure that a single
tour of duty of its servicemen is no more than six months. Officers
and jawans in RR units serve for approximately 30 months during which
there is no absence for training, temporary duties etc; the only time
an officer or jawan may not be present is during the period of his
authorized leave. Every effort is made to ensure that these personnel
proceed home on leave at least once in three months. There are no
training courses or promotion cadres in the RR. Each time a jawan is
required to attend such a cadre he is required to return to his parent
unit which provides a suitable relief for the period of absence. The
Central Government’s decision to provide two free railway warrants to
personnel in operational areas has paid dividends in terms of morale.
The various chartered flights to Srinagar have also contributed
towards this.
The above system ensures something which every Army officer deployed
in an operational environment is conscious of – manpower availability
(bayonet strength). Ask an experienced infantry officer what is the
bayonet strength available to him from a company when proceeding on a
mission and he will state that he would be thrilled with 75 from
strength of 120; of which at least 20 must be left behind to protect
the company operating base and logistics follow up. More often it will
be 60-65 (less 20). CI/CT operations can be very manpower intensive
except when a deliberate attempt is being made to hunt in small teams.
Even then the initial contact may be by the small team, the finishing
has to still be done by reaction from a sub unit; that is if you wish
to ensure hundred percent successes. In the case of an RR sub unit 90
would be a credible figure for availability for various operations but
at a time an RR sub unit may be deployed on myriad operational tasks
ranging from road opening, helipad protection, convoy protection for
own logistics, QRTs for unit tasks such as attendance at courts and
offices of local administration, Sadbhavna (WHAM) tasks etc. Lucky
that a sub unit may still find 40-50 personnel for immediate reaction
to a contact or a developing intelligence based situation. For an
infantry battalion it would be well-nigh impossible. Thus, the slow
buildup of ethos of functioning of the RR through directives such as
those which ensure that its manpower is never frittered; the wisdom of
the Indian Army’s system is indeed appreciable. It knows how to
nurture a resource such as the RR.
I have to admit that a senior DG of a CPO once visited me at Srinagar
and inquired how the RR had come to be such an effective force. I was
actually elated at his observation and offered to arrange for him a
longish visit to one of my RR units. He spent a couple of hours with
the unit (must admit the DG’s most professional outlook) after which
he rang me up and told me he had learnt enough. In his view it was the
Regimental system which was the glue which had the right potion to
give these units a high. Of course, he had volumes to speak about the
professionalism of the RR officers and men, the flexible yet firm
control that the Sector and Force HQ ensured over all operational
activities, the readiness to learn from mistakes and very importantly
the continuity of presence in a given area of deployment where the
unit gelled with the local population. He also observed how much
importance was being given to intelligence gathering, briefings and
debriefings.
A word on continuity. An RR unit turns over almost 50 percent of its
manpower every year, which means 600 men come and 600 go, making it an
average of 50 a month. An RR CO may see as many as 2000 personnel
through his command tenure. But the fact that the unit remains static
except for minor tactical redeployment contributes to its hold over
its area. The terrain is well known, the sources are more loyal, the
SOPs are easier to follow and lessons of the past are always
applicable to the ground. Besides a very simple direction is followed;
no man can operate unless he undergoes pre induction training at the
Corps Battle Schools(CBS)of either 15 or 16 Corps. These are very
important institutions where the continuity factor is also ensured.
Commonality of understanding the mission, the force ethos and the
ramifications of various actions have to be starkly brought to the
mind of every man especially now when conflict stabilization is
underway. RR General Officers and Sector Commanders have to ensure
they address their men right there at the CBS. It makes a world of a
difference when you have such a focused command.
Operational Aspects
The RR has evolved over a period of time confronting first the hard
core cadres of the Ikhwan, Hizbul Mujahideen, JKLF and Harkatul Ansar
and then confronting the foreign terrorists who started to enter the
Valley in droves. Hard power was a necessity otherwise the situation
would have gone out of hand. As cadres of the Lashkar e Toiba (LeT),
Al Badr and Jaish e Mohommad (JeM) started to emerge in greater
strength the degree of coordination from across the LoC enhanced
exponentially. Operational concepts had to rely on large scale cordon
and search operations (CASO) of urban areas bringing the RR into
direct contact with the people. There was then little need for
intelligence so intense and dense was the presence of the terrorists.
They employed IEDs at will and even confronted the RR troops frontally
in encounters in the jungles of Rajwar, Hafruda and Rafiabad. It
needed diligence and a degree of risk to move for operations. The
terrorist cadres then used simple VHF radio for communications. This
moved on to mobile technology before resting on satellite phones
(Thuraya). The emergence of the Jihadi radical as a modern technical
whiz kid (4th Generation Warrior) employing social media and Skype for
communication forced the RR to technicalize both with authorized
equipment and a lot of ‘Jugaad’. The RR today reflects the technical
savviness of the modern generation. A major challenge that any RR unit
faces today is the absolute need to ensure minimum collateral damage
during an operation. The kinetic aspect of disproportional use of
force of which CI/CT units are often blamed remains a critical
component of execution and operations may be delayed only for this
need.
The RR has also travelled through the transforming conflict with
aplomb. From large scale contacts and CT operations in the hinterland
it is now also doing service in counter infiltration in the vicinity
of the LoC and is optimized to be available for conventional role too.
Its primary role in conventional conflict remains Rear Area Security.
However, it has gone on to train and be ready for confrontation at the
LoC itself. The transforming internal conflict scenario has also left
many in a quandary about understanding the RR’s role in conflict
stabilization and conflict termination, the stages that we are
entering and will enter in the future. For a professional it is
important to realize that of the continuously changing role of the RR
this one aspect will remain constant. This is the original task; the
integration of the State of J&K with mainstream India. It has never
been articulated but is the intellectually evolved role which should
have been spelt out at the outset. Thus, while many may bemoan the
fact that today there are very few terrorists for the RR to eliminate
and the romanticized and gung ho role may be over, the more difficult
task starts now; the task of actually rebuilding and integration. No
organization is better suited for this than the RR. With intimate
knowledge of the socio-cultural landscape and sensitivities this Force
now needs the right orientation to hold the periphery and assist in
the integration effort which must be undertaken by the Central and
State Governments in earnest. Its quasi-military experience of
executing the hearts and minds game most innovatively over the last 17
years or so should give confidence to the various stake holders.
Last, the RR would have seen the end of internal conflict with its
continued efforts of Sadbhavna (the Indian Army’s Hearts and Minds
program) under modified conditions of lower levels of violence. It has
the experience, the organizational capability and the leadership like
no other organization in India. If J&K has to be fully integrated in
mind and spirit the continuation of the RR’s mandate is an absolute
must.
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