After the Arjun tank program, it seems that the Indian Army is now taking aim at its future next-generation tank initiative, known as the Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV). This new tank endeavor seeks to replace approximately 2,500 aging Soviet-origin T-72 tanks procured back in 1982.
Currently, the Army operates a mix of T-72 tanks and their upgraded versions, alongside Russian-made T-90 tanks and domestically produced Arjun Mk-1 tanks, with more advanced Arjun Mk-1A tanks in the pipeline. Additionally, plans are underway to acquire 350 Zorawar light tanks for deployment in mountainous regions like Ladakh and North-Sikkim against China.
The FRCV project represents the Army's vision for a future-proof tank equipped with cutting-edge technologies to ensure relevance for the next several decades. However, mirroring the challenges faced by the Arjun program, the FRCV initiative appears poised to encounter similar hurdles.
The Army's recently outlined qualitative requirements (QRs) for the FRCV project seem unrealistic and reminiscent of past missteps. These requirements, akin to something out of a comic book, echo the overly ambitious QRs set for projects like the Multi-Caliber Assault Rifles (MCAR) in 2011, which ultimately failed to materialize. For instance, mandating a tank weighing 55 tonnes +/- 5 percent with extensive armor and versatile loading mechanisms proves impractical given existing tank designs and capabilities.
Furthermore, the Army's insistence on incorporating a multitude of advanced features, including active protection systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and provisions for unmanned ground vehicle integration, while maintaining a modest price point, seems untenable. The proposed budget of $4 million per tank, totaling around Rs 57,000 crores ($7.1 billion) for 1,770 tanks, is notably ambitious considering the demanding specifications outlined.
This unrealistic budgeting could potentially lead to project delays or even cancellation, reminiscent of past defense procurement blunders such as the ill-fated Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) program. The discrepancy between budget estimates and actual costs resulted in the acquisition of only 36 Rafale jets from France at a significantly higher per-unit cost.
In essence, unless the Army revises its expectations and aligns them with practical realities, the FRCV project risks facing similar challenges and setbacks encountered by its predecessors, hindering the nation's quest for a truly next-generation combat vehicle.
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