APPEASEMENT OF CHINA ONLY FOREIGN POLICY

THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THEIR BUREAUCRATIC AND DIPLOMATIC ADVISERS, WHO STILL HAVE NO STRATEGY OR PLAN, EXCEPT APPEASEMENT AGAINST CHINA AND OTHER ADVERSARIES. Will we ever learn? Most of the contents of the much- talked Henderson Brooks Report have been available to the public in many forms. The tumultuous events of that time need to be looked at holistically and not in segments where those in power, in a bid to protect themselves, found it convenient to place the blame on the military, ignoring their own acts of omission and commission. The suppression of the HBR has so far been a product of such fears, laments former Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Founder Director of New Delhi-based Centre for Land Warfare Studies It Gen Vijay Oberoi The Henderson Brooks Report (HBR) relating to the India-China War of 1962 is back in the news after author Neville Maxwell placed a copy on the web. While many were delighted to see the report in the public dmain, the government (read the ruling party) is still living in the past and has reacted on expected lines, by blocking the web site! They obviously believe in keeping the truth under a veil, despite our national motto - “Satyameva Jayate” (Truth Alone Triumphs’)! Indian troops on the move to stop Chinese invaders Notwithstanding the governments’ response, it needs to be clarified that most of the contents of the HBR have been available to the public in many forms. There was the book by Maxwell himself, titled provocatively as “India’s China War” and later his summary of the HBR was published in 2001 under the title “Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction”. In addition, many books and articles published since the early sixties had discussed all important aspects of the contents of the report. This was particularly so when the 50 years of the war was commemorated in 2012. Yet, such is the fascination with the report that once again considerable interest has been generated in its contents. This was expected, as the public’s interest in anything banned always zooms! Part-I of the report that was placed on the web relates mostly to how military operations were conducted; how incumbents at various hierarchical levels acted and reacted; and the background to the ill-preparedness of the country and the military. These aspects have been widely discussed in the military since the cessation of hostilities and the lessons learnt have been incorporated in military concepts and plans. However, the military fights wars based on directions and policies of the government and if such policies are flawed or absent, not only the military but the nation suffers. That is precisely what happened in the late fifties and early sixties when our political leaders and their advisers ignored realities and took decisions either on idealistic grounds or false assumptions. The tumultuous events of that time need to be looked at holistically and not in segments where those in power, in a bid to protect themselves, found it convenient to place the blame on the military, ignoring their own acts of omission and commission. They did so by suppressing facts and taking recourse to classifying relevant documents as top secret. The suppression of the HBR is a product of such fears. By these acts, the government lost even more credibility. The result is that the country has not been able to breakthe self-imposed shackles of that time and the nation continues to suffer. With this background let me now list out the main issues that led to the policy and implementation failures, resulting in a Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not pay heed to the warning of Home Minister Sardar Patel, probably the only political leader of stature who correctly read the long term intentions of China and who possessed a strategic sense. great debacle for the country. The intention is to learn from those events so that such a dismal situation does not arise again. Within a year of assuming power in China in 1949, Communist China first invaded Tibet in 1950-51, and then proceeded to extend its grip over the outlying areas of Tibet and East Turkmenistan, while building up an elaborate logistic infrastructure to consolidate her territorial sovereignty. India recognized Tibet as an integral part of China in a hurry, resulting in China breathing down on Indian territory, especially when we were not clear of where our borders actually lay. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not pay heed to the warning of Home Minister Sardar Patel, probably the only political leader of stature who correctly read the long term intentions of China and who possessed a strategic sense. Nehru’s idealism and incorrect reading of security issues resulted in his belief that a country that had won its freedom with little violence and bloodshed had no need for an army! This thinking was based on incorrect assumptions and inadequate grasp of real-politic. The then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon’s ego, self-importance; rigid views about China; and his arrogance; blinded him to the realities, but on account of his close personal rapport with Nehru his views prevailed. He was universally disliked in the armed forces as well as his political party – the Congress, but he had the Prime Minister’s ear and apparently that was what mattered at that time. Menon had an uncanny knack of rubbing people the wrong way, by his acid-tongued, acerbic wit and rude behavior. He failed to appreciate that Service Chiefs were a class apart from the civilian officials who he was used to haranguing and humiliating.The result was that within a short period there was little meeting of the minds between the service chiefs and Menon. Nehru, probably on the advice of Menon, commenced interfering in promotion of senior officers based not on professional acumen but on loyalty, sycophancy and known characteristics of being amenable. This category included Lt Gen B M Kaul, Lt Gen L P Sen, and others, including the weak Chief, General P N Thapar. He also ignored military advice rendered more than once by military experts like General Thimayya and Lt Gens Thorat, Daulat Singh and S D Varma, as well as many senior commanders and staff officers. This, along with starving the military of urgently-needed funds, resulted in adversely affecting operational planning, equippingand employing the armed forces. In frustration, in his farewell speech at the Passing Out Parade at the Indian Military Academy, General Thimayya stated – “I hope I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese. God bless you all”. Prophetic words, indeed! Among the fawning coterie of self-serving officials, diplomats and politicians around Nehru was the chief of the Intelligence Bureau B N Malik, the author of the misguided ‘Forward Policy’, which was adopted in the face of objections by the army, being tactically unsound. Incorrect and guarded advice by the Ministry of External Affairs, as well as our Ambassador at Beijing, added to Nehru’s thinking that there will be no military confrontation with China. The cumulative effect was that there was lack of any grand strategy, as decisions were taken on whims of a handful of persons close to Nehru, whose abilities The military is clear about the capabilities and intentions of China and has applied the many lessons learnt in their plans. The same may not be true of the political leadership and their bureaucratic and diplomatic advisers, who still have no strategy or plan, except appeasement against China and other adversaries. and experience were suspect. One result was to focus on Pakistan as the major adversary and inadequate reading of China’s intentions. Nehru had four flaws in his personality. The first was a genuine belief that a country like India did not need an army as it did not covet anyone’s territory! Consequently, he curtailed the defence budget to subsistence levels. The second flaw was his idealism, which subsumed the reality that the actions of countries are governed by their national interests and not by diplomatic and populous noises their leaders make. His third flaw was encouraging a coterie and sycophants,who were loyal but lacked professionalism. The final flaw was that he had psyched himself of the fear of ‘the man on horseback’, which was stoked by power-brokers and obsequies bureaucrats bent on feathering their nests. This resulted in distancing the military hierarchy from their legitimate policy-advisory role. This was exacerbated by undermining the military authority by foisting incompetent sycophants in important command positions. The result was a flawed governing apparatus, which set the stage for the 1962 debacle. Let me dwell, albeit briefly on how our soldier’s performed. When a war is lost, the gallantry and courage of the army is forgotten and everyone gets subsumed in the national trauma and shame. The sycophants and the spin doctors of political leaders then look for scapegoats, so that blunders of the leaders are transferred to others. This is what happened following the 1962 debacle and the blame was squarely laid on the military. Although the military hierarchy too must share the blame, I must emphatically state that our troops at the brigade and below levels fought bravely and acquitted themselves in the best traditions of the army. Bravery was not only the forte of the troops in the west in Ladakh, as is the prevailing perception, but on all fronts. The battalions in 7 Infantry Brigade at the Nam ka Chu and those of 5 Infantry Brigade in the Walong Sector fought valiantly in the face of deprivation, death and defeat, and the contrasting breakdown of the ‘will to fight’ among some of the top military leadership. Let us jump to the present now. The military is clear about the capabilities and intentions of China and has applied the many lessons learnt in their plans. The same may not be true of the political leadership and their bureaucratic and diplomatic advisers, who still have no strategy or plan, except appeasement against China and other adversaries. The government is still to get its act together; and the military continues to be kept out of the policy formulation loop, in addition to being starved of funds resulting in no modernisation, especially in the army.