PEACE- PROCESS DEVOID OF STRATEGY IS MEANINGLESS
Introduction
The savage mutilation of two soldiers of the Indian Army on the Line of Control (LoC) has brought to centre-stage two crucial aspects of our relations with Pakistan. The first is the fragile nature of the so-called peace-process with Pakistan and the second is the lack of any long-term plans/policies, without which knee jerk reactions are the norm and several different voices add to the din. Resultantly, persons who have to implement or take action are confused.
The first aspect is the so-called peace-process, which our successive governments have been pursuing by bending over backwards for decades to appease Pakistan. The results are that Pakistan as well as other countries perceive us as a soft state; a state that can be coerced into giving concessions without any quid pro quo; and a state that has no understanding of deterrence. Our leaders and their advisors also seem to have no comprehension of what ‘talking from a position of strength’ means. They need to understand that in relations between nations, the phrase ‘the meek shall inherit the earth’ does not apply. It is deterrent capability that is the most important. This translates into a strong military and a political will.
The second issue is also of utmost importance. It is obvious that the entire government machinery was taken by surprise at this event, resulting in a number of emotional outbursts suggesting different and varied responses. These have ranged, somewhat predictably, from continuing the policy of appeasement to immediate military action. We will continue to be surprised, shocked and at our wits end in this manner, till we formulate well thought out security strategies for situations that we are likely to face. It is unfortunate that even the army, which carries out continuous contingency planning, failed to anticipate this type of Pakistani attack after the heavy shelling in the Uri Sector two days earlier.
The continuation of the so-called peace process would obviously be unproductive. It will further reinforce the thinking in Pakistan that it can do what it likes, as the Indian leadership will always select the soft option, harping on restraint, not upsetting the apple cart and similar other clichés that indicate neither personal nor national pride.
Our policy makers are so lacking in imagination that they seem to think that there are only two options open to them, which are either dialogue or war. One of their main spokesperson, who is seen at most discussions, puts it across as ‘either jaw-jaw or war –war.’ How puerile can one be! Our leaders and their advisors seem to be oblivious of how other nations handle their intransigent neighbours or adversaries. It is high time the government understands that there are innumerable options available between negotiations and war, provided it stops listening to only peaceniks and sycophants and instead takes the advice of professionals.
The India-Pakistan Conundrum
Pakistan was carved out of India on the specious ground that Muslims are a separate nation and that they will not get equal status in India as a minority. History has already proved both assumptions wrong. Soon after its formation, Pakistan adopted a three-pronged strategy consisting of permanent alienation with India; heavy reliance on non-state actors to act as the vanguards to their army; and wanting concessions from India ad infinitum.
Pakistan latched on to Kashmir within two months of the partition of India by sending so-called raiders led by Pakistani Army personnel and since then it evokes Kashmir as the causes belli between the two countries. Its second gambit was to create a strong army by telling its people that India was the villain who was out to grab Pakistan! The result was that the army soon became the biggest and at times only power-centre in the country, using resources at the cost of the people. Despite this, the Pakistani Army has yet to deliver in any fight against the Indian Army, but this is hidden from the people of Pakistan by the spin doctors telling outright lies.
The third important aspect is that while the Indian Army has remained apolitical and professional, the Pakistani Army soon started toppling elected governments and became the ultimate power-centre of the country. In the process it lost its military qualities and professionalism. It is this that gets reflected so glaringly in this incident of beheading an Indian soldier and mutilating the body of the other.
Dynamics of the Line of Control (LoC)
The present LoC is the second avatar of the erstwhile Cease Fire Line (CFL), which had come into being on 01 January 1949. After the 1971 war with Pakistan, a fresh line was demarcated, which is the present LoC. A fact not well known is that when the LoC came into being the role of UN Observers in J&K became redundant and India told the UN that they could withdraw. However, in its efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, Pakistan asked the UN Observers to continue. Pakistan again attempted to drag in the UN as this event unfolded, but was informed in no uncertain terms that India would not rise to the bait.
Despite the formal demarcation, the Pakistani Army did not honour the sanctity of the CFL, from its very inception. They commenced encroaching and nibbling on our side of the CFL, hoping to either gain tactically advantageous positions or merely to incorporate additional real estate. This was naturally resisted by our troops. Thereafter, eyeball to eyeball deployment, exchange of fire, raids across the lines and similar activities became the norm. The result was that the CFL became an active and live border, except when a ceasefire was in effect. This state of affairs continued even after the CFL became the LoC.
Whenever a new infantry battalion is inducted on their portion of the LoC, the enemy unit opposite them assesses them by initiating an action. Units that respond with guts and vigour then dominate and assume moral ascendency on the unit opposite. Subsequent actions on either side thereafter conform to this relationship. One example should suffice. On the first night after a Maratha Light Infantry battalion assumed control of their area, the Pakistani unit opposite subjected its forward posts to heavy shelling. The next morning, the officer at the Maratha post climbed a tree with a rocket launcher and blasted two bunkers of the enemy post. Thereafter, not one bullet was fired by the Pakistanis on the Marathas during their entire tenure!
The present ceasefire has been in force since 2003, the longest among many. Even though an active LoC favours our troops, we had agreed to the ceasefire, so that Pakistan could withdraw troops for conducting operations against the Taliban and other insurgents. However, Pakistan chose not to do so and instead continued to nurture those terrorists. It also continued pushing infiltrators across the LoC.
The troops deployed on the LoC have an onerous task as they have to constantly strike a balance between stopping infiltration and observing ceasefire norms. The government keeps insisting that the troops must show restraint without realising that to carry out their twin tasks of maintaining the sanctity of the LoC and not permitting infiltration, some force has to be used. The commanding officers know how to maintain a correct balance between keeping motivational and morale levels of troops high and also implementing the effects of political decisions as they pertain at their levels. They must be given a free hand.
Security Strategies
The dire need for a security strategy that defines the parameters of our relationship with neighbours, as well as with other nations is an obvious lacuna in our country. Successive governments have talked about formulating security strategies that would cover anticipated security issues but have always baulked at issuing formal written policies or even guidelines. The result is that we seem to be caught literally with our pants down when an event with security connotations occurs. We then resort to taking ‘fire fighting’ actions in an adhoc manner.
All stake holders need to be on the same grid and must be clear as to what exactly is our policy or strategy and what we want to achieve. This will result in coordinated responses and not what we normally do, with individuals and even agencies/institutions speaking out of turn and at variance with each other. This aspect clearly stood out in the present case when all kinds of statements were issued by different individuals, ranging from no disruption of the peace-process on the one hand to military response on the other. Consequently, it is imperative to spell out our policies and stances in formalised documents so that leaders and officials dealing with the subject are correctly prepared with their responses. The security strategies must clearly bring out ‘red lines’ and action to be taken if the other side crosses one or more intentionally or by default.
The Peace Process
India has been making overtures for peace for decades, yet all we have received in return from Pakistan is violence of many types, including wars and terrorism; hedging and denials; impossible demands; and subterfuges. It is unfortunate that our political leaders have taken a somewhat rigid view that the process should continue come what may. This has apparently been done at the instance of a few peaceniks and sycophants who have their own agendas, as well as international (read USA) pressure. Unfortunately, our leaders have failed to consult those organizations and individuals who are au fait with and understand Pakistan’s intransigence fully and are clear about how far one must go in trying to befriend this country that is constantly drumming up antagonism against our nation and loses no opportunity to take recourse to violence to achieve its ends.
Our apparent inability to even discern who really is in power in Pakistan is baffling indeed. Although there is an elected government in Pakistan, it is the Pakistani Army that makes policy and strategic decisions in that country and it would be damned if it makes peace with India, then why bother and waste time, money and effort in trying something unachievable? What we need to do is to have routine relations with Pakistan and deal with it on the basis of reciprocity and on a case to case basis. It is only this approach and not the policy of appeasement that may bear fruit over time.
Conclusion
It is nobody's case that we should not live peacefully with our neighbours and resolve all problems and disputes by discussion, but this needs give and take on both sides. So far, it has been a one- sided affair and there are no indicators that the future would be any different.
The least we can do is to apply a brake on the peace process, jettison the Composite Dialogue and wait for a more conducive environment. Our policymakers and security experts must first formulate a comprehensive security strategy and thereafter the diplomats and others should work out an entirely fresh negotiating plan
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