A Third-Rate Police Force Can’t Be A First-Rate Anti-Terror Force – Analysis
By Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray -- (March 17, 2013)
Among other things, the February 21 explosions in Hyderabad, claiming 17 lives and injuring 117 people, posed fresh questions on the country’s ability to secure its urban areas, where its economic and political powers reside. The claim that the country’s counter-terrorism ability has increased over the years too took a serious beating, which the future arrest of terror masterminds and neutralisation of terror modules are unlikely to redress.
A lot of emphasis has been put on augmenting the numerical strength of the police personnel in each of the states. It has been alleged, albeit for valid reasons, that police to population ratio (policemen per 100,000 people) in India—137 at present—is one of the worst in the world and is grossly inadequate to deal with the evolving security challenges. According to an estimate, it is only better than Uganda in a list of 50 countries drawn up by the United Nations. Interestingly, the Indian police-population ratio has remained almost at the same level where it was 12 years ago. For 2010, according to the National Crime Records Bureau, the ratio was 134. Rising population has made the recruitment sprees virtually useless.
However, the numbers of men in uniform are not relevant as far as the Indian megacities are concerned. National capital Delhi boasts a police population ratio of 448, Chandigarh 584, Mumbai 400 and Hyderabad 265. More policemen are available for the cities than the smaller towns and villages. In fact, police strength in cities surpass even the number of police personnel available for cities of the developed world. New York’s police strength of 34,500 policemen is less than half of Delhi’s 75,117. London’s police strength of 32,000 is less than 35,381 policemen Andhra Pradesh said it will recruit in 2010. It is indeed a matter of quality of the police personnel India has recruited over the years and their utilisation rather than the numbers it has tried to amass, which forms the core of its counter-terror ability.
Even with the modernisation programmes and capacity building among the police force, it needs to be accepted that the ability among the police to prevent crime is declining at an alarming rate. This assumption is supported by the rising number of criminal cases in the country. For example, compared to 1971, the incidents of rape in the country have registered a 873 per cent increase by 2011. Interestingly, only a year ago, the increase was 791 per cent and till 2010, 760 per cent. Since 1953, kidnappings have increased by 749 per cent till 2011. In fact, barring petty crimes like burglary and dacoity, the cognizable crimes under the Indian Penal Code have registered a 286 per cent increase since 1953.
Countering terror, far from being a stand-alone capacity among the police forces, is merely an extension of their general ability to maintain law and order. A policeman who is oblivious to the need of peeping inside a bus with thick curtains on its windows is most likely to let go the opportunity of arresting a rapist as well as a terrorist. A policeman who ignores the need to scan through the bag of a suspicious-looking person is likely to miss the chance of recovering fake currency notes as well as explosives. In short, a third-rate police force can never become a first-rate counter-terror force.
Contrary to the common understanding that the quality among the policemen has declined in recent years, the rot appears to have set in immediately in the country’s post-Independence period. In its 1953 assessment, available in the public domain, reflecting the culture of frankness prevalent at that point of time, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) pointed at the “dilution of the quality” of police force and “fall in the standards of work”, mostly due to the “large-scale recruitment during the last few years”. A year later, the IB again pointed at the “general fall in the standard of police recruits of all ranks”, which has resulted in the lack of “control over bad characters”. It would appear that the policies pursued in the subsequent years has merely accentuated the problem of lack of quality.
The focus on augmenting numbers alone needs a rethink. The increase in numbers is a necessity, but would not be sufficient unless a similar emphasis is put on the quality of the personnel recruited and their effective utilisation. This understanding must start factoring in India’s counter-terror policy-making apparatus
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