The great Arab divide Sep 14, 2016 Vivek Katju India has done well to not take sides in the Shia-Sunni contest

 The great Arab divide By Vivek Katju SUPREME leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei decided early this summer that Iranians would not go for the Haj this year... SUPREME leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei decided early this summer that Iranians would not go for the Haj this year; the annual pilgrimage, which is one of the five pillars of Islam, began on September 9 and will conclude on September 14. The decision was taken because Iran and Saudi Arabia could not reach an understanding on security and logistics issues relating to Iranian pilgrims, despite two rounds of talks between them. These discussions were necessitated because of the stampede in the city of Mina during last year’s Haj that resulted in over 2,000 deaths, including more than 400 Iranians. Iran accused Saudi Arabia of mismanaging the Haj and declared three days of national mourning. Every financially and physically able Muslim is obliged to go on Haj at least once in his lifetime. Hence, Iran’s decision to prevent its nationals from going for the Haj is symptomatic of the dangerous and virtually complete meltdown in the Iran-Saudi ties, already deeply damaged by the Saudi decision to break diplomatic relations in January this year. The immediate provocation for that step was a mob attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran — a reaction to the execution of prominent Saudi Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. In this present climate of great tension in the Iran-Saudi relations, and conflict in West Asia and parts of North Africa in which both countries are also involved, Khamenei’s lashing out at the Saudi royal family has raised temperatures. Khamenei, only partly catering to a domestic constituency, said the Saudi rulers were “disgraced and misguided”, and called on the Islamic ummah to fundamentally reconsider the management of the two holy places and the Haj. As Saudi monarchs, since 1986, seek to claim prestige, if not leadership of the Islamic world by styling themselves the “custodian of the two holy mosques”, the demand that the ummah should establish new structures for the control of the two holiest Islamic places, the Al Masjid al Haram in Mecca and Al Masjid an Nabawi in Medina constitutes a direct and unacceptable challenge. The Saudis responded swiftly and brutally. Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, and thus the country’s top cleric, said of the Iranians, “We understand that they are not Muslims for they are the descendents of the Magus and their enmity towards Muslims, especially the Sunnis is very old.” The Magus was a reference to Iran’s Zoroastrian roots, but the comment resonates as openly sectarian, questioning once again Shias’ Islamic credentials. The Iranian political leadership rallied behind Khamanei. Foreign minister Zarif tweeted, “No resemblance of Islam of Iranians and most Muslims and bigoted extremism that Wahabi top cleric and Saudi terror masters preach.” The Arab League ministers, clearly persuaded by the Saudis, condemned Khamanei for making “bellicose and inciting” statements. The split in West Asia between Arabs and Iranians, as the Arab League’s comment would indicate, is only one of the contradictions in the region. The sectarian split that has pitted Sunni Arab countries against Shia Arabs, with Iranian support in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, is a more fundamental consequence for the region’s future. This is despite the fractures in the Sunni world with the rise of the IS and its barbaric practices. The countries, which quietly had supported the IS to apply a brake on Iranian ambition, find themselves contending with a group that is purely malignant, even to their own interests. Many observers believe that the Sunni-Shia contradictions are over-emphasised and are only one of the factors influencing developments in the Muslim world. While this is true in many situations and periods, a survey of events since the Iranian revolution of 1979 reveals that the Shia-Sunni divide has been of basic importance in the unfolding of events in the region. The Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, had feared that Iran would claim not only the leadership of the world’s Shias, but also of the ummah. To prevent Iran from exporting the revolution and also prevent their own Shia populations from revolting, these countries, especially Saudi Arabia, supported Saddam Hussein when he launched the Iraq-Iran war in 1980. That war continued till 1988 and soaked Iranian energies. At the same time, revolutionary Iran’s hostility to Shaitan-e-Buzurg — the US — and the “capture” of its embassy in Tehran and holding US diplomats hostage for over a year, led to the West responding with a total commitment to contain Iran through sanctions and alignment with the Sunni Arab states. Iran was hemmed in, but supported Shias, including in countries such as Pakistan. This led to years of bloody sectarian conflict in Pakistan that continues till today. The end of the Iran-Iraq war witnessed an easing of relations between the Arabs and Iran. However, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology and missiles led to continuing suspicions among Sunni Arab countries. Hence, the US and UN sanctions, which contained Iran, became an essential part of these countries’ security calculus. A significant feature during the 1990s related to Iranian-Saudi attempts at bridging the theological divide between the Shias and Sunnis. Religious scholars of both countries had numerous meetings, but it is clear now that Shia-Sunni differences, which go to the immediate aftermath of the death of Prophet Mohammad, are so rooted that the rift cannot be healed. The US-Iran nuclear deal is removing the sanctions that had hobbled Iran. Iran has been swift to seek to spread its influence and the Sunni Arab states are alarmed. The Saudis have responded by gathering 34 Sunni Islamic countries in an alliance against terrorism. The exclusion of Iran and Shia-majority countries, including Iraq, is a clear indication of Saudi motivations. Thus there is every likelihood of the exacerbation of the current turmoil in the Islamic world, especially in Arab countries. India has done well to steer clear of showing any partisanship in the Shia-Sunni contest. Over the past months, PM Modi has visited Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran to build bilateral ties. This is the basis on which India needs to move ahead. All these countries recognise India’s emergence and have responded well to India’s emphasis on bilateralism as the foundation of its West Asian policy. — The writer is a former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs