Relations between Pushpa Kamal Dahal and India have seen many ups and downs.

Relations between Pushpa Kamal Dahal and India have seen many ups and downs. Dahal has in the past accused India of trying to micro-manage Nepal. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal embarks on a four-day visit to India this week (September 15-18). The visit will of course have show value, and will re-emphasise the “special relations” the two neighbours share — their common civilisation, culture, religion, and geographical proximity and the close relations people living across the border maintain. This emphasis will be tactically necessary for the rulers of both the states, especially in the context of bilateral relations having nosedived after India cold-shouldered the new constitution and aligned with regional forces in Madhes leading to the five-month long blockade. The fracas cost India its image in Nepal. K.P. Oli as prime minister sided with the palpable anti-India sentiments in Nepal. As a result, his official visit to Delhi in February ended in a fiasco with the two sides not even issuing the customary joint communiqué. A joint communiqué during Dahal’s visit and a declaration that the “age-old” relationship is back on track could be beneficial to both parties. For Prime Minister Narendra Modi, this could mean a message to his opponents that their criticism about India pushing Nepal into “China’s lap”, to borrow Mani Shankar Aiyar’s inference, was not quite right. Back in Nepal, Dahal can blame Oli for having annoyed a valued friend like India. But what could these claims translate into on the ground? The two leaders, Dahal in particular, need to understand that the visit is under close scrutiny in Nepal, and possibly, China. The northern neighbour will not take it kindly if the visit creates a situation detrimental to the execution of bilateral agreements (related with trade and transit) the two countries had agreed on during Oli’s visit, when he was PM, to Beijing. China may express its displeasure in many ways, including by cancelling or postponing the much-awaited visit of President Xi Jinping to Nepal in October. But given China’s current popularity in Nepal and its enhanced involvement in Nepal’s trade and development, it is unlikely that the northern neighbour will beat a retreat. China is likely to seek firm assurance from Nepal that the understanding reached earlier would not be confined to paper, and ask Nepal to involve itself more intensely in the One-Belt-One-Road Project. China’s changed narrative of the bilateral relations is “we are neighbours but closer than relatives”, implying that China is now closer to Nepal than India. Relations between Dahal and India have seen many ups and downs. Dahal has in the past accused India of trying to micro-manage Nepal. So how he reads India’s approach now will be crucial. India needs to do a few things in Nepal: Leave Nepal’s politics to Nepalese and execute its projects within the “defined time frame”, something Modi had promised when he first visited Nepal as prime minister in July 2014. Two hydro-electric projects — Upper Karnali and Arun Three, each of 900-MW — that GMR and Sutlej Jal Vidhyut Nigam Ltd were awarded respectively have failed to complete the mandatory “financial closure” provision. The firms may get another year since the delay took place in the background of the earthquake and Nepal government’s failure to acquire land. India may be lobbying for more projects in Nepal including the 76.3-km Nijgarh-Kathmandu Fast Track Road that Oli said “Nepal itself will construct”. Dahal has promised he will not “sign any agreement that is detrimental to Nepal’s interests”. His statement reflects the undercurrent of hostility and mistrust between the two sides. Dahal will have to impress Delhi about the need to rebuild trust. Modi has often praised Maoists — including from the ramparts of Red Fort — for renouncing the politics of bullets for ballots. His remarks are also indirect appreciation of the UPA government’s role in bringing the insurgents and seven political parties together for “peace, democracy and economic prosperity”. But the past 10 years have been anarchic. At least 200 people have died in this period, one-fourth of them during the Madhes agitation against the present constitution, which India raised at the Human Rights Forum in Geneva. India is also blamed for having aligned with “radical or militant forces” at the cost of moderate and conventional forces. That India chose to raise the issue in an international forum is also seen as evidence of its diminishing clout in its backyard. Nepal’s leaders during the transition period failed to manage the “changes” and deliver on the outcomes that were collectively envisaged, when India mediated to bring Maoists and the seven parties together. How does India see this failure, which goes against its official line that “India wants to see a prosperous and stable Nepal”? Is is willing to review its past advocacy for a radical agenda? Answers to these questions will shape the future of Indo-Nepal relations