KASHMIR MISSING TREES FOR WOODS

Missing wood for trees Focus on the larger picture in Kashmir by Lt Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain The Indian public and the media have taken an unusually intense interest in the incidents along the LoC in Kashmir. Much of this interest seems to arise from emotions and salability rather than informed knowledge of the ground situation. There is a certain romantic aura linked to the LoC - the known unknown about which everyone likes to comment. After all, on the LoC there is blood and gore, shelling and shooting and everything macho, something missing in everyday mundane life in our cities except on roads and in films. Media commentaries rarely analyse the linkage of these incidents with the internal dynamics of Kashmir. The Indian Army tries to be neutral by refusing to comment or join issue with the media and is reluctant to be transparent on its actions at the LoC or within Kashmir, and there are reasons for it which can be well appreciated. Let us recall the facts. Kashmir's strategic environment arises from proxy support to terrorism by Pakistan's inter-related entities -- the Pakistan Army, separatists, the ISI (as distinct from the Army) and terrorists. The aims of India and of Pakistan collide at the LoC. For Pakistan the aim is to wrest Kashmir from India through the continuation of turbulence in any form, keeping the people enthused and motivated for separatism, not necessarily pro-Pakistan, as also for drawing the attention of the international community. For India it is thus far an unstated aim: integrating Kashmir with the rest of India, politically, socially, economically and psychologically. To ensure the achievement of our aim and the defeat of Pakistan's aim, there are four distinct areas of concern. First, it is the LoC, which must remain stable without leaking any infiltration so that terrorist numbers in the hinterland remain within a given threshold. Secondly, the resident terrorists have to be marginalised to allow the writ of the state and the people to run. Thirdly, the ideologues and the radicals have to be neutralised to prevent them from spreading their wares and creating triggers to keep separatism alive while placing the security forces on the back foot. Lastly, and most importantly, it is the people of Kashmir who need to be empowered with enhanced dignity to start taking pride in being Indians. Noticeably, only the first of the above factors alludes to the LoC which has excited the Indian public and the media so much. The rest is all about the internal battle, not necessarily in the physical domain but more in the attitudinal and psychological. It is this which will contribute to the final victory but it is all in the realm of the unromantic where battles of the hearts and the minds have to be fought. This excites very few and in fact only those who realise that the war is almost over; it is the peace which has to be won, a task always more difficult than the war itself. For Pakistan it is necessary to upset the apple cart of Indian success if Kashmir has to be relevant in the international domain. It would be a commentary on their maturity if the Indian media and the public are more excited by the prospects of the final victory, debate the efforts which need to be put in, assist in building public opinion to back the security forces and political initiatives and counter Pakistan's well-nuanced propaganda. The Army is well in control of the LoC, notwithstanding some negative incidents which it knows how to convert to the positive. It needs no nitpicking and no non-professional advice being the only entity which truly knows what the LoC is all about. It needs the entire intellectual and physical backing in the internal domain where it continues to perform the difficult task of integration. The experiment of 2011-12 was a fresh approach towards the people of Kashmir, a changed force ethos, high-profile social initiatives and integration between the security forces across task boundaries which all added up to the success story; this needs revival. It cannot happen if the professional and nationalistic intentions of the Army are viewed with suspicion and its assistance to the state government in the social field is considered as politicisation. The unfortunate and completely untrue allegations against the political set-up of Kashmir are only assisting in widening the cleavage among all stakeholders. Pakistan is hastening this by taking away the attention from the peace-building efforts in the hinterland by refocusing us all towards the LoC. Surely, the Indian state has the ability to see through this and ensure that it is not ensnared; and the Indian media and the public have the maturity to view the larger picture where they appear to be missing the woods for the trees. The Army once again needs to get into the saddle and provide the much-needed direction to support the state leadership. Very little has been lost. Any further hesitation of getting right back there is likely to result in losing the initiative and thus the battle. What must this involve? Although this needs a separate and detailed answer, the initiation is done here. First, a completely new and baggage-free examination of the tasks of each stakeholder needs to be initiated. Secondly, a renewed and continuous vigour on the part of New Delhi in coordination with Srinagar is necessary. Thirdly, freedom for the Army on the LoC, and more importantly, to take on the stabilisation of the hinterland; this must be accompanied by a campaign to restore the pride and dignity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and an addressing of the youth to de-radicalise them. The de-radicalisation model adopted by Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, recently discussed at a seminar in Singapore, needs a serious look. "Sadbhavana", the Army's hearts and minds programme, needs to be given its primacy without attaching labels after the recent controversy of its funding. For 15 years it has been the Army's flagship for outreach and has achieved much. However, to move to the next level of achievement "Sadbhavana" has to be taken well beyond with attitudinal change and emotional outreach. A repeat of the success of 2011 is necessary to show the way and cement the final integration.