HOW NOT TO TACKLE TERROR

Terror, politics make for a deadly cocktail Patna’s Gandhi Maidan blasts probe is a case in point about how not to investigate a terror attack. NSG collecting samples from Patna’s Gandhi Maidan a day after it was rocked by bomb blasts on 27 October. PTI errorism mixed with politics makes for a deadly cocktail, as truth gets hidden behind verbal pyrotechnics. The Gandhi Maidan (Patna) blasts (27 October) illustrate a text-book case of how not to tackle terrorism. It provided a conclusive argument against our present counter-terrorism (CT) methodology in which all initiatives are left to the state police, and the Centre watches from the spectator stands. It highlighted the utter inefficacy of our system of terrorism alerts, which results only in "finger-pointing". It exposes successive New Delhi governments that have failed to establish a cooperative, preventive CT architecture, and instead indulged in bellicose slug-fests after every terrorist attack. Finally, it also displays a cynical indifference to the public, whose lives are lost while the overprotected politicians, intelligence agencies and policemen only squabble over the culpability. As usual, there is no official version of the reported 23 October Intelligence Bureau (IB) alert to Bihar government quoted by BJP leader Arun Jaitley. A national daily said that it was "about Narendra Modi's image of a Hindu leader". Surely this was not a "specific alert" on an Indian Mujahideen (IM) bomb attack, as claimed by some sections. On the other hand, Bihar DGP quoted a line ("presently there is no specific input") from the same letter to prove that it was not specific. Media said that there were 7 blasts, the first one at Patna railway station at 11 a.m., three hours before the Modi rally. However, vivid details of the conspiracy were published by another national daily with a caption "Agencies could have prevented blasts" three days after the bombing. If the media could get it so soon, why couldn't our police and intelligence agencies get it earlier? Published information did not reveal that Bihar police was kept informed of the suspects mentioned, nor had the IB claimed so. It is to the credit of the Bihar police that they could make the first arrest by 5.15 p.m. on 27 October. It is a tragedy that the public, who are always the innocent victims in all such cases, have to depend upon media leaks to get all this information. Unlike in other countries there is no official briefing on the correct picture. If at all held, such briefings contain only bland statements such as, "Investigation is in progress." I may be permitted to quote a foreign experience as I was witness to the NYPD commissioner's briefing after the 1 May 2010 Times Square bombing attempt in the evening. Although there were no casualties, the incident was treated with utmost importance, revealing as much information as was available with the investigators at the time. Even rumours were discussed. The video footage on a "white male in his 40s" was released to the press, with a caveat that he might not be a suspect. By that time the Taliban claim had surfaced, but NYPD was frank to admit that they had no evidence. On 4 May, Attorney General Eric Holder announced all the details that were repeated by the FBI website. The success of the CT methodology in the United States and United Kingdom is also due to joint efforts. The CT responsibility is shared in a non-confrontationist manner through joint teams. In the Times Square case the NYPD did not have to send a team to Connecticut on 3 May to track the SUV's previous owner after the vehicle identification number (VIN) was known. The FBI did it. The suspect, Faisal Shahzad, meanwhile, had fled and would have escaped to Pakistan but was pulled out of the taxiing Emirates Airways plane by the FBI after his name was detected on the passenger manifest by National Targeting Center (Virginia) at 11 p.m. The FBI compensated for the negligence of the US Border Agents and Emirates security at the Kennedy Airport, which ignored the "No-Fly Notification" issued by Homeland Security at 12.30 p.m. (3 May) and allowed him to board the flight. But this close coordination through joint teams came only after 9/11 even though they had suffered due to their uncoordinated approach earlier. Mir Aimal Kasi (25 January, 1993 shooting of CIA officials) and Ramzi Yousef (26 February 1993 World Trade Center I bombing) had escaped much in the same way as Shahzad had attempted. But we in India have learnt no such lessons even after 26/11 and are bumbling along with uncoordinated intelligence processing and conflicting investigation procedures