COL MAHADIK HOW INDIAN ARMY FIGHTS IN JAMMU KASHMIR

https://www.facebook.com/ata.hasnain/posts/10153268691902776 I have been monitoring messages on Facebook and Twitter regarding the martyrdom of Late Colonel Santosh Mahadik, SM (God bless his noble and brave soul) and placing my regrets and condolences. I wish to start the same with this thread by expressing my condolences to the family. However, I am pained by many comments on the necessity of a Commanding Officer to be in frontline and with troops; another comment states that the Indian Army does not have control of J&K in last 30 years; and yet another says - "don't young officers have it in them to avoid having to send out Commanding Officers to take charge". These comments smack of complete ignorance of the situation, the type of operations, the constraints of specific terrain and where we are in terms of the J&K proxy war. Despite pressing demands on my time by media houses for articles on Post Paris situation I am sitting down to explain as this is my prime duty, not writing on Paris and aftermath. Namak Indian Army ka khaya hai. WHAT STAGE OF CONFLICT ARE WE From a professional angle, on the military front we are nearing Conflict Transformation while on the socio-political front we are at early stages of Conflict Stabilization. I will restrict my comments to the military front only. With just about 200 terrorists in the Valley and a successful counter infiltration year behind it the Army will make efforts to further control infiltration (very essential aspect) and equally conduct CT operations to reduce the strength further in the hinterland. This will inevitably result in casualties because troops in large numbers in search mode are always more vulnerable. Ratios of own casualties against terrorists killed will rise as strength reduces. This is an inevitable phenomenon which professionals must understand and work upon. COUNTER INFLITRATIONS OPS IN SECOND TIER This is most difficult. Our experience shows that the LoC fence is not something impenetrable. It has been a successful instrument in focusing our CI efforts but leakages have been inevitable, especially in the Shamshabari area North and West of Kupwara. This forces the second tier to respond. The terrain here is even more difficult than the higher areas of the Shamshabari. Many rocky outcrops and caves, terribly thick undergrowth. Once infiltrated groups reach and hole up here searching for them becomes inevitable. That is when the troops are most vulnerable, especially in the first contact. Terrorists will be killed, have no doubts but the first bursts will come from them and casualties will be ours. Some people have suggested why we are not employing UAVs and helicopter surveillance. My answer -- easier said than done. This is not desert and penetration through vegetation and rocky outcrops is negligible. However, not to say that efforts are not made; they are but quite unsuccessfully. The one acme of success is patience but with that increase chances of the terrorists melting away. In the hurry to seize initiative multiple search parties comb suspected areas and lay stops to prevent access to villages. It is very manpower intensive and that cannot be helped; hope that answers one gentleman's question on why so much manpower is employed. COMMANDING OFFICER'S PRESENCE NOT WARRANTED I will ask even military professionals what the golden rule is. The answer is -- if two companies are in operations the CO will be present. Even if less the CO's presence may be necessary to assess reinforcements and widening area of operations. Unless he is upfront he will never realize the needs of the situation. Besides with young company commanders COs inevitably feel the necessity of being near them. There are NO fronts and rears here. The CO may be moving from one area of search by a company to another and could well hit upon the terrorists in the middle with his CO's party (best trained troops). The rule of all CT ops in the hinterland has always been that once a contact is established the CO's party and the Contingency Vehicle reaches the spot and he takes charge but only in as far as directing the operations. He will not enter uncleared houses but he remains vulnerable because he is moving and assessing all the time. Please do not comment adversely on an aspect which people are not experienced on. If you have been on the ground and had a couple of bursts going overhead please do so. Casualties will occur. We need not be apologetic about them and the last thing required is to issue advisories to COs. They come up through 15-17 years of grind and need no such advice

Did Colonel Santosh Mahadik, the 38-year-old Indian Army Officer who died in an encounter yesterday need to personally place himself in the line of fire in taking on terrorists in Kashmir? Yes. Without doubt. That's the message of the Army's Northern Army Commander, Lieutenant General DS Hooda. In an interview to NDTV, Lt Gen Hooda was absolutely clear: "The ethos of the Indian Army, the culture of the Indian Army - these are things that are sometimes not very well understood. We have a concept of unlimited liability. A man goes into battle, a man faces terrorists and he faces them sometimes with certainty that he could lose his life." Mahadik would not have regretted going down the way he did. Speaking to NDTV, Colonel SS Shekhawat, an Officer of the Army's elite 21 Special Forces who once commanded Mahadik says, "It is a great loss. But he has gone in style. With a bullet in the chest and we draw inspiration from him. This is the way to go for a soldier. And this is the way to lead for a soldier. From the front." Colonel Santosh Mahadik (second from right) practicing shooting Colonel Santosh Mahadik was killed in a counter infiltration operation in the Manigah Forest of Kupwara. He was in the forefront of a search party which was pursuing terrorists in extremely inhospitable terrain when terrorists targeted him with heavy machine gunfire. Mahadik was distinctly unlucky. The bullet that killed him struck his neck, an area that was not protected by his bullet-proof jacket. The operations to neutralise the terrorists are still continuing. For those who were his course-mates, Mahadik was always there for them. According to Colonel Sumeet Dua, an old friend right from when the two were in the Indian Military Academy together, "He was the most prepared officer to come to the Academy. He was physically the fittest, the strongest with the most endurance. He had a penchant for helping not just his peers but also his subordinates." Colonel Mahadik is the second Commanding Officer of the Indian Army to have been killed leading soldiers from the front. In January, Colonel Munindra Rai of the Gorkha Rifles died in Tral in Kashmir in a similar operation. Colonel Santosh Mahadik, who was given a military farewell in Srinagar today is survived by his wife, an 11-year-old daughter and a five-year-old son.