Countering Chinese Grey Zone Warfare In Maritime Domain Stop Chinese Use Of Maritime Assets, Shipping For Maritime Intelligence Operations part 1

 There are ongoing investigations into whether China's shipping cranes could be utilized as espionage tools. Beijing's systematic information-gathering endeavors potentially enable the pinpointing of critical Western and Indian  trade and supply chain vulnerabilities, as well as the monitoring of military shipments, equipment, and components.

 

Global maritime operations conducted by Beijing serve a dual purpose as intelligence-gathering outposts. Over the past three decades, the Chinese government has been actively seeking access and influence in open seas, strategic shipping lanes, and foreign ports worldwide.

China's ownership, co-ownership, or operation of around 96 foreign ports globally reflects its expanding portfolio, including recent acquisitions in Hamburg, Germany, and the Solomon Islands.

Given Beijing's increasingly adversarial stance towards the West in economic and geopolitical matters, it is imperative to thoroughly comprehend and mitigate the risks associated with Chinese maritime infrastructure ownership.

What specific measures should the Western world and India take to mitigate challenges posed by Chinese takeover of maritime assets all over the world?

What should be done so that free flow of global merchant traffic takes place both during peace time and war time?

 

Approximately 90% of the world's trade relies on sea routes to transport finished goods, components, and commodities to international markets. However, this critical maritime trade is vulnerable to disruptions caused by various factors such as pandemics, port congestion, or ship blockages in canals. While historical wartime embargoes involved fleets of ships, contemporary warfare can incapacitate shipping through the manipulation of information.

 

Chinese seeking influence in open seas, strategic shipping lanes, and foreign ports

Foreign ownership or control of ports and logistics operations is not inherently problematic, as companies from the Netherlands, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates similarly own and manage numerous overseas ports.

Our understanding must encompass identifying precisely what information Beijing has access to, what data it collects, and how intelligence-gathering activities are linked to Chinese port operations.

China's maritime operations raise two significant concerns. First, China has introduced extensive and relatively opaque information-gathering infrastructure at critical ports across the world. Second, Chinese laws mandate that all Chinese companies, whether private or state-owned, operating abroad must gather and report intelligence on foreign entities to the Chinese government.

 

Given Beijing's increasingly adversarial stance towards the West in economic and geopolitical matters, it is imperative to thoroughly comprehend and mitigate the risks associated with Chinese infrastructure ownership.

 

Out of the world's 75 leading container ports located outside the Chinese mainland, almost half have some degree of Chinese ownership or operational involvement, with the latter being more substantial, enabling China to control access to terminals, supplies, dry docks, and storage facilities. Over half of China's overseas maritime assets are strategically positioned along major shipping routes traversing the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea, and other vital waterways.

 

China's maritime presence, varying from smaller facilities to larger operations with considerable operational control, creates opportunities for extensive information-gathering and strategic activities.

Also, China holds the world's leading shipping capacity, encompassing a vast commercial fleet, including container ships, oil tankers, liquid natural gas transporters, and bulk carriers for commodities like coal and grain. China manufactures over 90% of all shipping containers and 80% of the world's ship-to-shore cranes.

 

Chinese shipping activities serve as data collection outposts, engaged in intelligence-gathering

Chinese shipping activities abroad serve as data collection outposts, engaged in intelligence-gathering and surveillance on a massive scale. Numerous ports globally utilize China's logistical software system, LOGINK, to monitor a wide range of trade-related information, including vessel and cargo status, customs data, billing and payment records, geo location data, pricing information, regulatory filings, permits, passenger manifests, and booking details. Chinese-owned ports also host 5G telecommunications towers, while China provides the operating systems for port facility computers.

Chinese stringent policies, which compel all commercial activities to align with the state's interests. Chinese port, shipping, and logistics companies are legally obligated to gather information for the Chinese Communist Party, and Chinese law obstructs the flow of shipping data, such as vessel location signals, to other nations.

 

China, already possessing the world's largest navy, benefits from access to a global network of state-owned ports. While Beijing operates only one foreign naval base in Djibouti, Chinese military vessels routinely visit Chinese commercial ports, which could serve as crucial resupply points or repair facilities during conflicts. Consequently, China is increasingly emphasizing civilian-military interoperability in maritime infrastructure and other domains.

 

Restoring Western and Indian shipyards to the necessary capacity will require a significant investment

Beijing has blurred the line between commercial and military activities. In fact, all nominally civilian ports constructed with Chinese assistance abroad are designed with potential military use in mind. Additionally, Chinese law mandates that all civilian-owned assets and operations must provide support to the Chinese military in the event of a conflict. Presently, approximately one-third of ports with Chinese company investments have hosted Chinese naval vessels.

 

In February, the shipping giant Maersk took delivery of a new cargo vessel that meets the International Maritime Organization's zero-emission shipping requirements. The vessel, named the Maersk Biscayne, was constructed at the Jiangsu New Yangzi shipyard in China. Maersk has several more ships awaiting construction at Chinese shipyards, highlighting the shipping industry's growing dependence on Chinese facilities.

This dependency becomes a concern at a time when tensions between China and the West are escalating. Unfortunately, restoring Western and Indian shipyards to the necessary capacity will require a significant investment of both time and resources.