Is there a paradigm shift in India’s counter-terror strategy under Narendra Modi? -MY ARTICLE IN DNA 13 JUN

The way forward Is there a paradigm shift in India’s counter-terror strategy under Narendra Modi? Hemant Mahajan T he Prime Minister’s decision to authorise the June 9 cross-border strikes against the National Socialist Council of Nagaland—Khaplang (NSCN—K) in Myanmar could prove to be an important step in the evolution of India’s counter-terror strategy. Though not the country’s first transborder counter-terrorism operation, this is the only operation for which our government has publicly taken responsibility. Credit, for the flawless execution of the operation, must go to the commanding officer of the unit who trained the soldiers and provided leadership to hone their capabilities. Due credit should also be given to the Major who led his team fearlessly and most importantly — to the soldiers who risked their lives, displaying raw courage and determination, which have always been the hallmark of this much decorated military unit. Transborder operations invariably run a high risk. Their successful execution calls for a great deal of professional competence on the part of the leadership as well as the team involved in the operation. The Myanmar operation raises some important questions. Does the strike signify a change in India’s policy of dealing with terrorism? Should the Narendra Modi government receive accolades for delivering an aggressive retaliation to the killings of the army personnel in Manipur? Is crossing international borders and striking at insurgent/terrorist camps on foreign soil, in violation of the conventional protocol? Can the Myanmar raid be replicated against Pakistan? What are its short and long term implications? By striking at insurgent camps inside the Myanmar territory, the Prime Minister has demonstrated his willingness for tough action in dealing with terrorism and matters of national security. If the intention is to engage in long-term surgical anti-insurgency operations, the Modi government should act tough and not advertise the details of such military projects. Leaks by government would only jeopardise future plans in this direction. The Myanmar operation has sent a signal to the rest of South Asia. India now needs a sober and, serious discussion on the lessons the operation has served to the government and the army. Notwithstanding the worry expressed by some Indian experts about violating Myanmar’s sovereignty, Myanmar has not protested against any such perceived transgression. This could be taken as Myanmar’s nod to the Indian Army’s action. We are familiar that multiple terror groups had established camps in Bangladesh and Bhutan in the past. That the ruling governments in both countries have friendly relations with India does provide India with an opportunity to destroy terror camps if and when they are spotted in these countries. Besides, this is not the first time that the Indian army has unilaterally entered a neighbouring country’s territory, to pursue broader national interest. At least on four occasions in the past, beginning with the Operation Golden Bird in 1995 in Myanmar, the Indian army had smoked out militants in Myanmar and Bhutan. And with the consent and active participation of the governments of the two countries. All these operations however did not lead to a coordinated strategy. Moreover, kept under wraps, these strikes were discussed only in military circles. But this indeed is the first time that the army and government have publicly acknowledged crossing the border, in pursuit of insurgents. The goal now should be to put together a well-thought-out strategy to weaken insurgency in the North East. There is no doubt that the recent transborder operation will be analysed in the neighbouring countries for its future implications, as some of our neighbours harbour terrorists executing terror acts in India. Can the Myanmar operation be replicated in Pakistan or in China, which is known to take an interest in North East’s insurgent groups? It must be argued that wider conflicts could provoke international intervention especially since some of our neighbours happen to be nuclear powers. At the same time, even as many experts warn us about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, have India’s nuclear weapons ever deterred Pakistan from carrying out transborder terror strikes? In case of another 26/11 attack — or an attack on Indian Parliament — we can respond with covert operations, Special Force operations, air strikes, even conventional war — if there is a strong political will to walk that path. At present, the task of destroying terror camps in Pakistan could be best left to various terror groups inimical to Pakistan, or even the forces of sectarian violence and the civil war-like situation in Balochistan, FATA, Waziristan, and the ethnic violence in Karachi. Not to forget the foothold ISIS has acquired in Afghanistan and the advances Taliban has made in Pakistan. Pakistan suffers 7,000 to 8,000 civilian casualties every year because of acts of terrorism within the country. Defence minister Manohar Parrikar recently said that terrorists would be used to take out terrorists, while Information minister Rajyavardhan Rathore said India will strike at the time and place of its choosing. The Myanmar strike should be a warning to Pakistan that India is not going to simply sit quiet if they trouble us. And any future strike, albeit covert, may not necessarily be confined in a border area or to a specific terror camp. An assessment of North East’s security situation reveals the formation of the ‘United National Liberation Front of West South East Asia (UNLFWSEA)’, a grouping of nine militant groups, including the NSCN —K, and the ULFA faction of Paresh Baruah. Their combined and approximate strength of 4,000 to 4,500 is spread over 40-45 camps, across the thick jungles of Myanmar. Neutralising these camps is going to be a long haul. It is important remember that India’s recent strike coincides with the abrogation of a 14-year old ceasefire by the NSCN—K. Three hundred insurgent groups are at present active in North-Eastern states. In the short term, these terror groups — in order to deter further military action — will seek to strike back at Indian targets. Relentless operations — even across borders — must be undertaken to neutralise such a possibility. India’s counter-insurgency doctrine gives the army permission for transborder operations; but only after due political clearance from the Prime Minister’s Office. India’s effective use of Special Forces was long overdue, and it must now know that these forces work best when applied as a precision instrument. When the moment of triumph arrived, politicians thumped their chests — the PMO as well as ministries alongside the Intelligence agencies — publicised their outstanding feat. Meanwhile, the Special Forces stood quietly next to their helicopter, their faces hidden to avoid recognition. Can the nation recognise these real heroes? The author is former brigadier with the Indian Army