TURBULANCE IN IRAQ

Turbulence in Iraq: A Boost to Political Islam Islam is beset by its inter-sect rivalry for space which has seen violent overtones for many centuries. Until this rivalry is put to rest with victory, dominance or defeat of one or the other, there is no likelihood of evolution towards modernism Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) TO understand just what is happening in northern Iraq one first needs to turn to a map because without that the deeper dynamics of the emerging situation in the region will not be easily understood. The next thing is to remind oneself of a few facts. First, this is not some warlord effort to garner territory or a simple standoff between sects. It is the manifestation of ambitions of ‘political Islam’ playing out. Second, in the wake of 9/11 and the entry of the US Forces into Af-Pak and Iraq, the American strategic establishment spoke of the Long War with political Islam for which the American public would have to be prepared. War weariness over 11-12 years placed this notion on the back burner and all reference to Long War was forgotten within the realm of justification for withdrawal. This appears to be the Long War returning to remind the world that there is much yet to happen within the faith of Islam, the youngest of the triad of Abrahamic faiths. Analysts point towards the churning within Islam before the process of reformation, a phenomenon which occurs in most major faiths as civilisational changes and modernism find their way into the evolutionary process. Third, Islam is also beset by its inter-sect rivalry for space which has seen violent overtones for many centuries. Until this rivalry is put to rest with victory, dominance or defeat of one or the other, there is no likelihood of evolution towards modernism. What we are witnessing in the Iraq-Syria theatre is a violent struggle within Islam. This was expected after the withdrawal of US troops. The portends were evident four months ago when Ramadi and Fallujah erupted with Al Qaida presence. The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as it is also known, is an off shoot of Al Qaida. It was lurking in the shadows awaiting opportunities. Building a strength of 10,000 (including mercenaries) in a transnational environment is not easy. Obviously the ISIS/ISIL has external and transnational backing. To sustain such an army you need money and weapons. This is a manifestation of the Syria, Lebanon and Iraq wars merging into one, much like the Af-Pak some years ago. There are major complexities within this situation. The US presence in Iraq dismantled the ruling Sunni dispensation and restored Shia authority as per demographics, even as it was opposed to Iran’s inevitable gains and Saudi Arabia’s inevitable loss of influence. The Saudis were never too happy about this or about the reluctance of the US to involve itself in efforts towards regime change in Syria, which in many ways strengthened the Alawite-Shia survivability in the greater Syrian conflict. The win-win situation for the Iran- Hezbollah-Allawite -Iraq (all Shia/quasi Shia) axis had seen the Shia hold strengthening from western Afghanistan to the eastern Mediterranean. The upsurge in Mosul and Tikrit by the radical Sunni forces now seems to threaten that dominance. The US trained Iraqi Army has wilted and this may see Iraq return to civil war; which means the spread of turbulence to areas right up to southern Iraq. The complexity brought on by the presence of multiple players with different shades of ideological moorings is resulting in selective support from the established states such as the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the US itself. However, the emergence of the ISIS/ISIL as a militarily stronger element and it carrying the stamp of Al Qaeda linkages is likely to lead to a major rethink regarding this support. This will have a profound effect on the situation in Syria and Iraq itself. How is all this likely to effect the security environment of the crucial West Asian region? First, it increases the uncertainty in Syria where Bashar Assad’s recent electoral victory had given him a lease of life. The ISIS/ISIL is opposed to various Saudi backed Sunni groups in Syria. Second, the turbulence in northern Iraq has weakened the structure left behind by the US and the Iraqi Army, also trained by the US, is unlikely to remain homogenous in the face of determined onslaughts by the Sunni dominated forces. Third, the energy belt is under increasing threat of greater violence; prices have already risen. Fourth, the Hezbollah-Iran dominance has received a setback. How actively Iran will involve itself in regaining advantage will decide how much more violence may happen. Whichever way this goes it will have a deciding effect on the future of political Islam in West Asia. Notwithstanding the fact that movements linked with political Islam have been active in faraway Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia (Al Shabab), the Sinai and Yemen, it is now evident that there are really two major areas where political Islam is fighting hard for dominance. These are the Syria-Iraq-Lebanon region and internally within Pakistan. There may or may not be direct linkages between the two emerging situations but the common thread appears to be the resurgence of Salafi groups on either flank of Iran. It is difficult to predict the response of Iran when its ideology is under threat. The last important issue is the fact that all this is happening six months from the date of final drawdown of the ISAF in Afghanistan. Is this a preparation for the re-entry of Al Qaida into Af-Pak? The US strategic think tanks need to work overtime to ascertain just what is happening. Perhaps, it is the much forgotten Long War returning to haunt the world all over again. (The writer is a former Commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, a Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group and Visiting Fellow with the Vivekanand International Foundation)