INDO PAK CONFLICT OF 1971 PART 2-CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN AND WESTERN SECTOR

 

 

Indo-Pak War 1971

 

By 30^th November the armed forces were ready.  The Prime Minister sanctioned attack for day-break on 4^th Dec, 1971.  Though the army had wanted a dusk attack so that the night could  be used for penetration by the columns, the Air Force preferred first light in order that the whole day should be available to carry out sorties.   Manekshaw was being briefed by the DMO, Maj Gen Inderjit Singh Gill, in the Operations room when the news came at 5 PM that Pakistan had launched a pre-emptive attack in the Western Sector. 

 

Since neither Mrs Gandhi nor Mr Jagjivan Ram were in Delhi, (the Prime Minister was in Kolkata and Defence Minister as stated above in Banglore) it fell upon Sam’s lot to issue the orders to enforce the operational plans with immediate effect.  Since it was known that he had the absolute confidence of the Prime Minister there was no problem in obtaining concurrence down the line. 

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN SECTOR

 

The progress of operations in Easter Sectors proceeded on schedule with the help of 50 Para Brigade.  9 Infantry Division pushed into Jessore on 7 Dec by afternoon.  Comilla town fell on 9 Dec.  On 9 Dec Manekshaw rang up Jacob in the Eastern Command and ordered to send a force by sea to Cox Bazaar to fore-stall any Pakistani troops escaping Burma.

 

At Khulna the Army got bogged down in the marshy terrain of this area. On  13 Dec Manekshaw issued a signal to the Eastern Army instructing them to,  without any loss of time capture all towns which had so far not fallen to our troops.  These included Dinjapur, Rangpur, Shylet, Maynmati Cantt, Khulna and Chitagong.  Manekshaw was highly successful Chief who restored the esteem of the Army after humiliation of 1962 and the “self-doubts” of 1965.

 

It was Manekshaw who called on Jacob at 9.15 AM on 16 Dec, asking him to proceed to Dacca immediately so as to organise the surrender at Dacca.   He raised some queries about the draft surrender document which he had prepared sometime back.  Sam said it would be dispatched with Lt Gen J.S. Aurora that afternoon.  Sam showed considerable properties by not going himself to take the surrender.  According to some sources he was even told to do so by the Prime Minister.  He rightly felt that this was the perorgative of the Chief of the Eastern Army.  Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora.

 

Our army however offset the losses in Chhamb in the Western Sector with gains at Chicken’s Neck, the territory between the two branches of the river Chenab as well as gains in the Kargil Sector.  Likewise the losses in Husainiwala and Fazilka were offset by gains at Dera Baba Nanak, Sherja Bulge and Basantar River.  We lost 55 villages and 52 sq. miles to Pakistan but were able to gain 630 villages and 419 sq. miles of their territory.

THE WESTERN FRONT INDO PAK WAR 1971

 

In the 64 years between Independence , India has had to take up arms to repel Pakistani aggression three times-in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, in the Rann of Kutch in 1965, and again in Jammu and Kashmir in 1965. This is the story of the fourth conflict which started on 3 December 1971; unlike the others the origin of this conflict did not lie in the desire of Pakistan to wrest some territory from India by force but was the consequence of an internecine quarrel between the East and the West Wings of Pakistan. West Pakistan's refusal to abide by and respect democratic norms and share some power with East Pakistan led to the West Pakistanis trying to subdue East Pakistan by force, which led to a confrontation which finally involved India and led to a war between India and Pakistan. This part of the book traces the origins of the 'war and details the course of events in the West.

 

 

At first sight it may seem odd that Pakistan, a country less than half of India's size and with infinitely less resources in men and material, should wage a war against India. The reason for this seemingly suicidal policy can be found in history. The people, especially the ruling elite, in Pakistan have always identified themselves with the Muslim invaders who time and again have, from Central Asia, or from Iran, poured through the passes leading from Afghanistan to India seeking loot, a more hospit­able climate, riches and territory. The Pakistani rulers consider themselves as heirs to these invaders and so feel that they too can emulate their feats. What they have failed to understand is t when these invasions occurred India was not united. They defeated and conquered individual Indian princes or the rulers . However it would be wrong to consider that they were always victorious. Mahmud of Ghazni was defeated many times each time the chivalrous Rajput .Prithvi Raj let him off, thus enabling him to come back with a larger army. When Mahmud  won he had no inhibitory scruples and gouged out Prithvi Raj's eyes. The Indian code of honour requiring the warrior either to win or to die in battle also helped the invaders for when defeated the Indians killed themselves. In every case the Indians fought bravely.

 

WIN THE WAR & LOSE PEACE

 

In the encounters between Pakistan and united India, India has always had the upper hand but in the peace treaties that followed each conflict the reverse has generally been the case. It is odd that the Pakistani who prides himself as warrior should lose to India every time in war and that the Indian whom the world considers clever, subtle and diplomatic should have been worsted at the Conference table. This is perhaps largely due to India's excessive desire for peace, to placate Pakistan and win them over.

 

From these events one thing stands out-the Indian soldier with his courage, loyalty and tenacity,  is second to none. Time and again he has stood as a bulwark against foreign aggression. The account will also show how well the Army has succeeded in integrating the diverse communities and creeds that make up India, for the Indian Army is composed of men from every corner of India. The traditions and the esprit de corps are such that officers identify themselves with their men who generally are of a different community. Thus, in the Army, when one says he is a Rajput, Sikh, or Maratha what one means is that the person referred to belongs to the Rajput, Sikh or Maratha Regiment,-for all one knows he may actually be a Bengali or a South Indian. These traditions are very valuable in war and serve to hold the unit together in times of stress and should not be lightly discarded. It has been a great privilege to write about such a force of such gallant and devoted officers and men and one of the chief reasons for writing this is to place on re­cord their valour our and courage before these events fade from public memory.

 

BRIEF ACCOUNT OF WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONT

 

Pakistan dictator Gen yahya khan started the war by an air strike against our airfields on 03 Dec 1971.

 

 

KG PUNCH SECTOR IN KASHMIR

Pak offensive commenced on Night of 3/4 December.  The key to Poonch defences were picquets 405 and 406 held by 6 SIKH.  While 2 POK Brigade was attacking these posts .Similar attacks were also launched on Gutrian and Shahipur posts held by 11 JAK RIF.  These were beaten back with heavy casualties including two enemy battalion commanders killed.  Enemy also attacked Langar Post held by 1/4 GR on 03 December only to taste failure.  Post 408 held by a company of    9 RAJ RIF too repulsed an attack.

 

At 0800 hr on 04 December, 2 POK Brigade attacked again, committing all the three battalions only to be beaten back, though they did succeed in capturing Helipad by about 1030 h.  Thereafter, enemy tried to establish a road block between Points 405 and 406 but since these localities had been reinforced with a platoon each of 8 JAT, the same could not be accomplished.

 

By 06 December evening Pakistan 7 Infantry Division offensive in Poonch Sector petered out and it was evident that the enemy had shot his bolt.  Therefore Brigadier Natu decided to launch minor attacks to improve the defensive posture.  93 Infantry Brigade captured Nangi Tekri and Jungle Tekri while 80 Infantry Brigade captured Sukhanban.  Apart from these attacks, a number of raids were carried out, notable amongst which was destruction of six artillery guns by  9 PARA COMMANDO in Area Mandhot.

 

BATTLE OF CHHAMB

 

In the 1971 War, Chhamb was the only area where the Indian forces suffered a setback.  The setback can be attributed to two factors , terrain & wrong plan.

 

The enemy launched its attacks on 03 Dec 71 at 2150 h on all battalions West of Munnarwali Tawi preceded by heavy artillery shelling.  All the attacks were beaten back with heavy casualties except at Pir Jamal.  The enemy renewed its attacks on 04 Dec with vastly superior forces and air support and was able to progress operations towards Munnawar Tawi.

 

On 06 Dec, the enemy launched a series of attacks on the balance positions held by us on Western bank of Munnarwali Tawi forcing 191 Infantry Brigade to withdraw East of Munnarwali Tawi.  The withdrawal was successfully carried out between 0800 h and 2330 h on 06 Dec and the bridge over Munnarwali Tawi at Mandiala was blown up. 

 

The enemy launched a series of attacks commencing on 08 Dec at 0130 h across Munnarwali Tawi and managed to establish a bridge head of 4000 x 1000 yards in the area of Darh and Raipur crossings on 10 December.  A counter attack was launched with all available forces both from North and South and by 0100 h on 11 Dec the bridge head had been cleared of the enemy.

 

Attacks by 7 POK Brigade, which were beaten back every time with heavy casualties.  The enemy was able to capture only Dewa Post by 08 Dec. 

 

BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH

 

A major threat to India’s J & K theatre has always been along the southern boundary of the state not only the road link to Jammu but also the Pathankot base itself lies close to the border.  Pakistan’s II Corps (Sialkot), the strongest of the Pakistan Army Corps, could with the greatest ease either cut the road link or launch an attack on Pathankot itself.  it was vital therefore to pinch out the Shakargarh salient and to carry out similar operations wherever tactical disadvantage was reckoned to be crucial.  It is with this aim that a major operation, though in limited depth, was undertaken to capture Shakargarh.

 

 

  While 39 and 54 Infantry Divisions were launched on night 05/06 Dec, 36 Infantry Division launched its offensive on night 08/09 Dec.  Despite the stiff resistance put up by the enemy screen was gained on all the three fronts, however, the progress was slow due to extensive minefields laid in great depth.  The two northern thrusts of 39 and 54 Infantry Division had reached the outskirts of Shakargarh by 08 Dec.

 

Battle of Basantar

 

Battle of Shakargarh would not be complete without recounting the courage, valor and leadership shown by both sides. 3 Grenadiers captured the area of Jarpal-Lohal at about 0300 h on 16 Dec.  Major Hoshiar Singh with his C ‘coy’ occupied a position in a low lying ground approximately 200 metres short of the village.  In the morning the enemy brought down heavy fire on his company (coy) in which Major Hoshiar was wounded.  He refused to be evacuated and kept moving from position to position, encouraging his men.  The enemy mounted six counter attacks by armour and infantry, but was beaten back every time. Major Hoshiyar Singh and 2 Lt Arun Khetrapal were awarded PVC and CO of Pakistan 35 FRONTIER FORCE, Lt Col Akram Raja was awarded the highest gallantry award of Pakistan ‘Sitar-E-Haider’ and our own Major Hoshiar Singh was awarded the PVC.

 

BATTLE OF LONGEWALA

 

In the Sindh theatre opposite Rajasthan and Gujrat India’s aim was to make Paksitan commit her strategic reserve.  The area of Southern Command were the responsibility of 11 and 12 Infantry Division respectively.  Both divisions were directly under HQ Southern Command .

 

Pakistan assembled its forces between Gubbar and Border Pillars 635 and 638 on the night of 03/04 December and launched its offensive from BP 638 towards Longewala .

 

The tank column had achieved complete surprise and had penetrated 16 kms into Indian territory when it was detected by a patrol operating in that area. The patrol, started shadowing the advancing column and gave continuous information regarding their progress.  Thus by the time enemy contacted the post, the post was well prepared.The first assault came at about 0430 h on 04 December. The tanks as close as 400 m to the post. The attack was repelled.

 

Major Chandpuri was told to hold on at all costs.  By 0730hr in the morning our Air Force joined the battle by hitting hard at the enemy tanks.  It is worth mentioning here that until shortly before the war began, Jaisalmer had not been in operational air use and had a flight of only four Hunter. By mid day 25 tanks were destroyed by these four aircraft.

 

Meanwhile, by 0900 h the enemy again formed up for an attack. This attack was also repelled.  The withdrawing troops were given a hot pursuit along and in the bargain our troops captured Marutwala post 10 km inside Pakistani territory.Major Chandpuri the Coy Commander was awarded MVC for his outstanding bravery in defending the post.